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Minister Botha Comments on Relations With USSR

MB1906154690 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1537 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] House of Assembly June 19 SAPA—Establishment of diplomatic or trade relations with Lithuania and the USSR was a delicate matter and was receiving attention, the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Pik Botha, said on Tuesday.

Replying to a question from Mr. Andrew Gerber (CP [Conservative Party] Brits) on whether the government would consider establishing such relations with the two territories, he said the question was "definitely of current interest."

"As soon as any new developments take place, announcements will be made."

French Official Holds News Conference, Departs

MB1706210090 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2047 GMT 17 Jun 90

[Text] Johannesburg June 17 SAPA—The first official French visitor to South Africa in 15 years, French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Aid Dr Barnard Kouchner on Sunday [17 June] warned South Africans to speed up the process of democracy because "racism is on the rise in Europe."

"You must be in a hurry to found your democracy—racism is on the rise in Europe," he told a press conference at Jan Smuts Airport shortly before returning to France following a five-day visit to South Africa.

He also announced his intention to recommend an increase in French aid to South Africa. It is currently 12-million francs (between R[Rand]4 and R5-million).

Apparently close to the French President Francois Mitterrand, Dr Kouchner said he would convey to Mr Mitterrand the need for "special" French attention to South Africa.

"This country is so important for Africa that we must pay special attention to what is going on here," he said. He said he believed developments in South Africa were of vital importance to the rest of Africa.

Asked, however, to clarify his statements in light of the current trend by European countries, and France in particular, to "write-off" Africa, Dr Kouchner said there had been no change in the French budget for aid to African countries.

"We are involved in a lot of projects to help French speaking African countries. We will follow that. There is no decrease in our aid to Africa but we are also obliged to help Eastern European countries," he said.

The way in which France had assisted African countries had to change, however, because most African countries had failed to develop, he said.

"We now have to work with African democrats."

"President (F.W.) de Klerk and (ANC [African National Congress] Deputy President) Nelson Mandela are talking like democrats."

Dr Kouchner reiterated the official French position—recently restated by the French President—that sanctions against South Africa would remain intact.

The French standpoint on this issue would only change once they were satisfied "real negotiations" were under way, he added. The issue would again be discussed by a meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on Monday and again on June 25 in Dublin.

"I don't know if anything definitive will come from these meetings," he said.

"We are waiting for people (in South Africa) to talk to each other and the beginning of real negotiations."

The rebuilding of South Africa meant the building of a future for the whole of Africa, he said, adding that: "I believe you (South Africa) have the chance to build a real democracy and a non-racial system here."

It was also a challenge to this country for those "in charge" to convince those at "grassroots level" and to prove to them that democracy was on the way.

"But nobody has ever built a non-racist system anywhere in the world," he added.

He foresaw the possibilities of the French and South Africans in future being able to exchange "experiences", particularly in the fields of research and work in terms of socio-economic problems and AIDS.

While in South Africa, Dr Kouchner held discussions with various ANC officials, church leaders, human rights activists, "intellectuals", Foreign Minister Pik Botha, Health Minister Dr Rina Venter, Constitutional Development and National Education Deputy Minister Roelf Meyer, and National Education Minister Gerrit Viljoen who is also government's chief negotiator in terms of talks with the ANC.

He visited various centres and townships in and around Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, and KaNgwane. He condemned the electric fence between KaNgwane and Mozambique, which he described as "an awful fence which kills people and is difficult to support".

He spoke of the contrasts of South Africa's "fantastic" cities with the extreme poverty he encountered in the townships. "These contrasts are certainly difficult to support."

He referred to Natal, which he also visited, as a "very cruel affrontment" saying he perceived the conflict in the

province as "not a jungle war" and likened the situation there to "an old middle-aged country".

Referring to an incident which occurred during an ANC rally in Natal when, according to him, police arrested and badly wounded supporters of the organisation who were then refused medical assistance from a local hospital, Dr Kouchner said: "Why is a country not able to protect its own wounded citizens? That must change."

Currently the world's only secretary of state for humanitarian aid, he said he hoped South Africa would be the next country to appoint such an official.

SUNDAY TIMES Column on 'Mandela and CIA'

MB1706085090 Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES
in English 17 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

["Mandela and the CIA," by Mark Stansfield]

[Text] This is the man who shopped Nelson Mandela—ex-CIA chief in southern Africa, Millard Shirley.

"I'm 90 percent sure it was him," said retired South African Police spy Gerard Ludi, who worked closely with Shirley in South Africa in the 60s.

Mr. Ludi, now a farmer, gave the SUNDAY TIMES exclusive pictures of Shirley from his private files.

Shirley was head of the CIA's covert operations section in southern Africa during the 60s and 70s—a chameleon-like super-spy who drank too much, womanised aplenty but who had an incredible mind.

He was killed about two years ago in a high-speed car accident in Swaziland, where he lived after retirement from the CIA in 1973.

Claims that a CIA tip-off led to Nelson Mandela's arrest at a roadblock in 1962 have caused a stir in the United States on the eve of the ANC [African National Congress] deputy president's much-publicised visit.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater was questioned about it at a press conference this week.

A White House source said yesterday: "Shirley is dead. Quite frankly, the whole issue is so sensitive and embarrassing I wish everyone involved with it was dead.

"In any case, Marlin Fitzwater was right—this all happened on (President) Kennedy's watch. Why don't you ask Ted Kennedy about it?"

ANC executive Ahmed Kathrada said: "It all sounds very plausible but I find the timing of the disclosures highly suspect.

"These disclosures come at a time when such a report could sour our relations with the United States—while Mr. Mandela is over there."

In an interview this week, Mr. Ludi—himself no stranger to the cloak-and-dagger world of espionage—described

Shirley as an insignificant-looking, charming man whom many regarded as harmless because of his excessive drinking and womanising.

"But he was a very deceptive character and used his cover as a heavy drinker to maximum effect...he had friends in high and low places on both sides of the fence—the ANC, SACP [South African Communist Party] and SA Government—and he had a brain like a computer.

"He was rated one of the CIA's most experienced agents and in the late 60s was recalled for a few years to run the CIA 'spy school' in South Carolina before returning to South Africa to head the CIA's covert southern African bureau," Mr. Ludi disclosed.

How Shirley supplied the crucial information which led to Mr. Mandela's arrest on August 5 1962 was revealed this week by Mr. Ludi, who infiltrated a communist cell run by SACP leader Braam Fischer the 60s.

"Shirley had a high-ranking 'deep throat'—a Durban-based Indian within SACP ranks. This man was obviously close to Mr. Mandela shortly before his arrest and gave Shirley detailed information about Mr. Mandela while he was on the run.

"This information was given to the security police, who set up a roadblock and captured Mr. Mandela," Mr. Ludi claimed this week.

Mr. Ludi—or Agent QO18 as he was known during his undercover days—now farms near the Kruger National Park.

He stressed that South African agents and the CIA in SA co-operated informally in the field—not through official channels.

"I can only guess that Shirley was instructed by his government to supply the information to the South Africans because it was in America's interest to have Mr. Mandela out of the way.

"During the 60s, communist expansion in Africa was one of America's biggest bugbears and I think this was why the information was given—solely for America's benefit.

"I can only assume Shirley was instructed to give the information and that the instruction came from high up in the American Government," he said.

"Shirley often boasted that one of his best informers was a Durban-based SACP member. After Mr. Mandela's arrest this informer caused him (Shirley) endless embarrassment with the SA security police because they wanted the name of the informer so they could 'use' him personally. "This was information Shirley refused to give. After that he was tailed wherever he went by the security police. He grumbled about this for years afterwards."

In the Rivonia treason trial which led to Mr. Mandela's jailing, the State introduced a mysterious witness who, they claimed, could not be identified because he was "in mortal danger."

The witness—who has never been identified—told the court of meeting Mr. Mandela at the home of an Indian at Reservoir Hills in July or August 1962.

This man may have been the SACP member who worked secretly for the CIA.

"I cannot say who the SACP man was, but I am 90 percent sure Shirley was given the information about Mr. Mandela's movements by his Durban-based SACP informer and supplied this information to the police," Mr. Ludi said.

File records show that on the night he was arrested, Mr. Mandela was on the run and had secretly visited ANC leader Albert Luthuli.

He was caught in a police roadblock near Durban.

Mr. Kathrada, the ANC's internal wing publicity secretary, recalled: "There were all kinds of rumours at the time of Mr. Mandela's arrest, including that he had been given away by the CIA.

"I was very surprised that he was captured.

"I'm not going to claim that we (the ANC) know who gave Mr. Mandela away in 1962, but we do have our own theories.

"We (The ANC) cannot discount the possibility that forces hostile to us are attempting to sour relations between ourselves and the U.S. for obvious reasons.

"At the time Mr. Mandela was underground we formed a very select committee to co-ordinate his movements, family visits and meetings.

"I was closely involved in that committee. We were very security conscious," he added.

The Atlanta JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION [as published] newspaper—the first to disclose the CIA may have been responsible for Mr. Mandela's arrest—quoted another South African-based CIA agent, Paul Eckel, as saying:

"We turned Mr. Mandela over to the South African Security Branch. We gave them every detail, what he would be wearing, the time of day, just where he would be. They picked him up. It was one of our greatest coups."

Mr. Ludi explained: "It is no secret that intelligence operatives world-wide co-operated.

"Paul Eckel was a CIA station chief based at the U.S. Embassy. He worked as the official liaison officer. Millard was in the covert section and would have told him about the information."

Millard Shirley and Gerard Ludi met for the first time in the early 60s when they co-operated to thwart KGB attempts to plant an agent at Hartbeeshoek satellite tracking station.

"We became firm friends after that—he was on his way to visit me when he was killed. We often spoke about mutual matters," Mr. Ludi said.

Millard Shirley was born in South Africa and spent his early years in Sabie, where his father was a missionary.

Disclosure of Further Details

MB1906131390 Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
18 Jun 90 p 1

[By Sarie van Niekerk]

[Text] The mind-bending riddle of who divulged Mr. Nelson Mandela's movements to the security police 28 years ago was solved yesterday.

In exclusive interviews with BEELD, high-ranking police officers and former members of the security police disclose that a leak by a U.S. diplomat led to the arrest of Mr. Mandela.

The officers denied the CIA or Mr. Millard Shirley, at that time the head of the CIA in southern Africa, were involved in the matter in any way.

These disclosures should relieve the pressure on U.S. President George Bush, who was CIA director in the 60's [as published]. Since the finger pointed to the CIA in U.S. newspapers about two weeks ago, Bush has been chastised by antiapartheid activists who demand that he apologize to Mr. Mandela when he visits the United States.

A U.S. Government official yesterday repeated that no comment is made on intelligence matters. He said nothing further.

Since Mr. Mandela was released from Victor Verster Prison in Paarl on 11 February, the one burning question has always been who betrayed him in 1962.

Yesterday BEELD received confirmation that the information was supplied by a member of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. The diplomat was friendly with a now retired warrant officer of the security police in Johannesburg.

"The diplomat said certain things in a discussion with the policeman that led him to Mr. Mandela's tracks. That led to the arrest of a highly disguised Mr. Mandela on the evening of 5 August 1962 at a roadblock near Howick in Natal," a senior police officer said. The roadblock was arranged by the warrant officer. The arrest was made by a detective sergeant from Natal who died about 10 years ago.

Mr. Mandela escaped the South African Police for over a year and thereby acquired the name of Black Pimpernel.

In the time between the Sharpeville shooting on 21 March 1960 and his arrest, he worked underground for the ANC [African National Congress] and Umkhonto we Sizwe [spear of the nation; ANC military wing].

At the end of January 1960, Mr. Mandela illegally left the country for six months to forge ties with African leaders and the British Labor Party. It was also during this time that he received guerilla warfare training in Algeria.

Shortly after Mr. Mandela's return to South Africa, the information was leaked. The warrant officer who was friendly with the diplomat said he had good sources and received, almost daily, information about Mr. Mandela's activities in Africa.

"The night he was arrested he had been at a meeting in Durban. He would return to Johannesburg the same evening. Thanks to my sources, we knew that and erected three roadblocks. He was spotted at the first roadblock in the car belonging to Mr. Cecil Williams, a listed communist. Mr. Mandela was wearing a white cap and white coat. He was disguised as Mr. Williams' chauffeur. However, he did not drive the car himself.

"The car was allowed to pass through the roadblock, but he was arrested at the second roadblock near Howick. He was detained in Pietermaritzburg that night and brought to Johannesburg the following day," the policeman said.

That same year Mr. Mandela was sentenced to five years imprisonment for, among other things, illegally leaving the country. While he was detained the Rivonia conspiracy was exposed, which led to his sentence of life imprisonment.

U.S. Citizen Allegedly Smuggles SDI Technology

*MB1606103990 Umtata Capital Radio in English
0900 GMT 16 Jun 90*

[Text] United States authorities have arrested a technology exporter for allegedly supplying Star Wars technology and data to South Africa without a license. Shirley Smiths reports.

[Smiths] An American engineer has been arrested for allegedly smuggling confidential Star Wars data out of the country to (pass) on to South Africa. Police say that Ronald Hoffman of Los Angeles was taken into custody after a five month investigation. He was accused of smuggling Star Wars data out of the country for about a year, and has been paid at least 150,000 dollars for the information.

Armcor: 'No Knowledge'

*MB1606192990 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1918 GMT 16 Jun 90*

[Text] Pretoria June 16 SAPA—Armcor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] had no knowledge of an American defence exporter who is alleged to have given

"Star Wars" technology to South Africa via West Germany, a spokesman for Armcor told SAPA on Saturday [16 June] night.

Mr. Ronald Hoffman, 51, was arrested on Friday for allegedly shipping "Star Wars" technology and data to South Africa via West Germany without a license, the U.S. Attorney's office said.

In response to an inquiry from SAPA a spokesman for Armcor said: "We have no knowledge of a Mr. Ronald Hoffman or his alleged sale of technology to South Africa, therefore we cannot comment on his arrest."

American press reported earlier that Mr. Hoffman of Los Angeles appeared in court and was jailed after failing to pay 500,000 dollars bail. A preliminary hearing was scheduled July 5.

Mandela Notes Black Education in South Africa

*MB2006182590 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1803 GMT 20 Jun 90*

[Text] New York, June 20, SAPA—ANC [African National Congress] Deputy President Nelson Mandela appealed to students of a predominantly black school in New York on Wednesday [20 June] to raise funds so the African National Congress could provide better education in Lusaka, Zambia, for their counterparts who were fleeing inferior, white-controlled systems in South Africa.

Mr. Mandela was speaking to a crowd of about 15,000 people, who packed the grounds of the girls and boys school in Brooklyn, which has New York's largest black population, at the start of his tour of the United States.

Hundreds of people, who could not gain entrance to the grounds, waited outside and prompters coached them in the cry of "Amandla" [power] and its response, "Awethu" [power is ours] before the Mandela contingent arrived.

A television commentator explained to viewers this was "an African welcome."

In his speech, Mr. Mandela said: "If in our struggle we receive support of the youth of the world, then our cause can never be lost.

"It is your spirit that is cutting 25 years off my age."

He said the state of black education in South Africa was very bad.

"It is far inferior to that available to whites, who control it and determine the syllabus. Our youth are seeking help abroad; we ask the young people of New York to raise funds so that our children can get the facilities to study under better conditions."

Mr. Mandela said he had delivered the same message in Canada on Tuesday to a similar school meeting.

"We have no doubt we will receive enormous help from that state and we are confident you too will donate the funds to help our children."

Mr. Mandela also appealed for qualified teachers, particularly in the fields of mathematics and computers, to be made available to go to the ANC's schools in Lusaka to train South Africa's black youth to become future leaders.

Mrs. Winnie Mandela received a prolonged wave of applause and cheering when she also spoke at the meeting saying "When we in South Africa see you, we see the young lions of the struggle in our country."

SECHABA Article Assesses 2 May Talks

MB1906065590 Lusaka SECHABA in English
Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Editorial]

[Text] "In so far as gaining citizenship rights and opportunities for the unfettered development of the African people, who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly, at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of my many years of moderation?"

The passage above was contained in the text of a public statement in 1952 by the late president-general of the ANC [African National Congress], Chief Albert Luthuli. He was responding to the racist government's dismissal of him as a chief because of his refusal to resign from the ANC. The last 38 years have seen that door continued to be barred to the ANC, except if it would abandon its principles and vision of a democratic and non-racial society.

On May 2 this year, that door was opened a crack. It was opened after that moderation had turned into anger and a determination to respond to the violence of the successive apartheid governments with violence.

F.W. de Klerk and his government have broken with the past and decided that that door so violently slammed in the face of the oppressed people must now be opened, albeit a crack, to see and know the persons who are outside. That is a brave step for which they must certainly be congratulated. We extend these congratulations knowing full well that this is only the beginning and that the pressure will still have to be maintained in order to speed up the process of change in South Africa.

The meeting was about removing the obstacles that stand in the way of any meaningful negotiations on the future of South Africa. What this means is that for the ANC the decisions made by de Klerk to unban it and release some of its leaders were not enough. They did not create conditions for free political activity for the ANC and a host of other organisations which are opposed to the government's apartheid system.

High, therefore, on the agenda of the meeting were issues which the ANC felt should be dealt with in order to ensure that a process of negotiations is entered into in which all parties involved will not be shackled by any laws, regulations or decrees. The de Klerk government, of course, had its own views about what the major obstacles are to genuine negotiations taking place.

What emerged as an important factor in this meeting, right from the first day, is that the regime had come to accept that it cannot deal with the ANC in any way other than as equals. As the deputy president of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, stated at the beginning of the meeting, there was going to be no master and no servant in the talks. While the leaders of the ruling Nationalist Party and the ANC met, thousands of political prisoners remained locked behind prison bars; the State of Emergency, which interferes with political activity and gives the police and army the right to "crack down" on anti-apartheid demonstrators had not been removed; laws such as the Internal Security Act which allows detention without trial remained an instrument to be wielded by the security organs at will; political exiles could face prosecution if they came back to their own country. More than all this, the violence against opponents of apartheid from the regime's police and its surrogates in the bantustans and the community councils had not stopped, and had instead increased.

The de Klerk group, on the other hand, wanted to pile all the reasons for the violence in the country on the ANC's refusal to stop advocating armed opposition to apartheid. The ANC memorandum on violence which was produced and circulated before the meeting points at the apartheid system as the primary cause of the violence. We only have to look at Natal, at what Chief Buthelezi's followers are doing to those who oppose him, to realise how fundamental violence is to the apartheid system. We have to observe the actions of the white racist vigilante groups that roam the streets of some towns, brutally beating up black people, really to understand to what lengths those who defend the apartheid system will go.

The results of the meeting represent a leap forward. They reflect that it is possible to cross the barriers that have kept South Africans so far apart. Despite the differences of views about how the future South Africa should look, agreement was reached on the necessity to continue the talks until the correct climate exists for real negotiations on the constitutional future of the country.

There was also agreement on both sides that they should commit themselves towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter, as well as make a commitment to stability. The establishment of a working group to make recommendations on a definition of political offences in the South African situation; on issues related to political prisoners; immunity to those facing political charges, both those inside the country and outside the country and other related matters, is an indication that we have moved

significantly forward in terms of beginning to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of negotiations.

In addition to the working group, the South African government has granted temporary immunity to certain leaders and functionaries of the ANC based outside. It also undertook to review existing security legislation "to bring it into line with the new dynamic situation developing in South Africa in order to ensure normal and free political activity." It also said that it is committed to work towards the lifting of the State of Emergency and called on the ANC to do its best to help to resolve the climate of violence existing in the country. Last but not least, efficient channels of communications would be maintained between the two parties to speed up the process which has been set in motion.

Most South Africans saw a ray of hope for the future of their land which has never known peace, security and prosperity for all its people since it was colonised in 1652. It was an opening for all those who are concerned about the future to give encouragement to those who sat in Cape Town to make speedy progress to a Constituent Assembly in which a new, non-racial and democratic constitution would be worked out. The peoples of the world also focused on South Africa and prepared to support all positive moves that would come out of the meeting.

Clearly, there are positive moves. But those moves will not bear fruit if the process towards their achievement is not speeded up. The media that has sympathised with de Klerk since February 2 when he unbanned the ANC, was quick to try and portray him as having gone further than the ANC in what he promised to do after the Groote Schuur meeting in Cape Town. The truth is that all the keys that can lead to free political activity and an end to the violence are held by his government.

He has to take the power away from the bush tyrants that the apartheid system has created. He has to address the question of the racist lunatics who are buying guns in preparation for what has been called the "right-wing backlash." In learning lessons from the Namibian situation he has to recall that that was the scare-tactic that was used to try and halt the peace process in that country. And today Namibia is moving on the path of reconciliation and no whites have been victimised for being part of the previous colonial system.

There are also those who profess to be against the apartheid system but stand on the edge and oppose the history-making process that has been set in motion. They offer no solution to the situation either than that there should be no talks, even about creating a climate of free political activity. It is not too late for these people and organisations to join the ANC and the rest of the mass democratic forces in broadening the front for democracy that years of struggle have created. Now it is urgent for all the oppressed and democratic forces to unite.

To the majority of the white people who have not allowed themselves to be swayed into armed preparations in defence of white minority domination, we restate the call of the ANC at the beginning of the talks, "All those who are hostages of the past must transform (themselves) into new men and women who shall be fitting instruments for the creation of the glorious South Africa which it is possible and necessary to realise. Accordingly, we must deny the past its attempts to enslave us. The vocabulary of the old society should find no place in our dictionary."

African National Congress Memorandum on Violence

*MB1906070890 Lusaka SECHABA in English
Jun 90 pp 3-4*

[ANC Memorandum on Violence Prepared on the Eve of the Talks About Obstacles"]

[Text] This memorandum is an attempt to summarise the extent of the violence and its significance as an obstacle to negotiating a peaceful settlement in South Africa. Our perception is that violence is an aspect of apartheid and it has been used with varying degrees of ruthlessness to maintain the status quo. We refer here in particular to the actions of the security forces in Sharpville, Langa, Nyanga, Soweto, right up to Sebokeng.

Five types of violence can broadly be distinguished:

- a) Massacres and other violent actions by the security forces;
- b) Covert killings by agents of the state;
- c) Deaths in police custody and detention;
- d) Vigilante violence;
- e) Violence against perceived symbols of oppression.

The first four types are directed exclusively against those seeking a transformation of this society. Put crisply, it is violence designed to perpetuate apartheid oppression. We perceive vigilante violence as being perpetrated by people with an identical interest to that of the present regime, namely, to crush democratic opposition to the government's policies.

For instance, on Election Day—September 6th 1989—alone there were 55 deaths throughout the Republic through police action. Nineteen of these occurred in the Western Cape alone where a further 200 people were injured. In one month, from August to September 1989, 46 meetings were broken up by security forces; in 28 of these violence was used.

Vigilante action against democratic organisations of the people have assumed frightening proportions. We have masses of documentation which is available indicating the almost shameless way in which elements sympathetic to the government and its policies have given themselves licence to attempt to crush political opponents of the government with brute force. We have seen this in Crossroads and other townships throughout South Africa. Then there is the type of vigilante action which is

waged by homeland administrations, for instance, KwaNdebele and other homelands. A particularly sinister face of this species of violence currently has Natal in its throes.

A particularly disturbing feature of this last-mentioned type of violence is the perceived collusion of the police with the perpetrators of the violence. This collusion manifests itself in two ways:

a) By passively allowing the vigilantes to do almost as they please. A most frustrating aspect of this is failure to disarm, arrest and prosecute the offenders.

We are in possession of affidavits, photographs, reports and other documentation to prove this;

b) By security forces actively assisting the vigilantes in their attacks or actually carrying out the attacks themselves.

So far we have made no distinction between homeland police forces and the security forces in general. Obviously, where a homeland is involved any lack of impartiality on its part confronts the victim of the attack with a desperately frustrating situation where he has virtually no choice but to himself devise ways and means to protect his life, limb and property. In Natal, several calls have been made for the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry. This was precisely because of the need to establish the causes of the strife and the role of the security forces in it. These calls have been rejected. It is no secret that there is a crisis of confidence in the ability of the security forces to maintain the required impartiality, particularly in Natal. There have been very loud calls for the kwaZulu police to be withdrawn from some townships. These calls have so far gone unheeded.

In relation to the kwaZulu police, our submission is that the ultimate responsibility for the protection of the lives and property of all the citizens rests on the government of the Republic of South Africa. The power to police in respect of areas falling under kwaZulu has been conferred on the homeland government. This power can be taken away. It is certainly inappropriate for a party in the "war" to be armed with the exclusive right to maintain law and order and to be entrusted with the protection of life and limb of members of the opposing party in the "war." We have documentation wherein the Minister of Law and Order pleads a lack of jurisdiction to interfere with illegal activities carried out by kwaZulu police against members of the community. We submit that this cannot be the final word, particularly where the officer in overall charge of kwaZulu police is seconded from the South African police. We therefore make a crisp submission that the powers of the department of police should at least be recalled from the kwaZulu government to be exercised by the central government. In this connection it is relevant to note that the kwaZulu Minister of Police is also the President of Inkatha, an organisation which considers itself engaged in a bloody physical conflict with members of ANC/UDF [United Democratic Front]/COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Union].

We are in possession of sufficient documentation to prove the allegations made in the previous paragraph; this documentation is available. We believe it is within the power of this government to end the violence in Natal and elsewhere. Certainly a climate for negotiating a political settlement cannot exist while this violence continues unchecked. We make the point which is made elsewhere in the documentation in our possession that the pillars of the violence in Natal are the "warlords" and the perceived involvement of the police. The allegation has been made before by various groups, including members of the South African Parliament, that certain people who have been identified are allowed to be at large and to continue operating as "warlords." Again this documentation is available to this conference.

We have not dealt in detail with massacres and other violent actions by the security forces. These should be common cause. We have also not detailed covert killings by agents of the state. We refer here to the "assassination" or "hit" squads. The subject is topical enough at the present time to need no comment from us. It will be noted that we likewise have not amplified on the sub-heading "deaths in police custody and detention." All these are aspects of violence which are being perpetrated by people in the employ of the state against our people. All these activities certainly constitute the violence which negates a climate conducive to negotiations.

Against the background we have already sketched, the fifth type of violence can certainly be seen as a reaction to continued harassment and oppression.

In areas where our people have been engaged in conflict, our role has been to attempt to de-escalate the conflict as far as possible. Examples of this are Uitenhage and Ciskei. We mention that increasingly our people are being given no option but to defend themselves, precisely because of the failure and/or refusal of the security forces to exercise their functions with impartiality.

We stand for the following:

- a) Peace in the area;
- b) The right of every citizen to free political expression and freedom of association;
- c) The duty of law enforcement agencies to protect the life, liberty and the property of the people; the duty to be exercised with impartiality and in such a way that the confidence of the community is maintained.

For Peace and Life!

African National Congress Outlines Economic Plan

MB1606210090 Johannesburg NEW NATION
in English 15-21 Jun 90 pp 11-12, 21-22

["The Economy Beyond Apartheid"; first paragraph newspaper introduction]

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress] this week released to NEW NATION a document on proposals for

a post-apartheid economic policy. The document arose from a consultative workshop of ANC and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] economists and representatives in Harare from April 28-May 1. This is the first time it has been published in full.

INTRODUCTION

Building a post-apartheid economy which will serve the interests of all South Africans is a central challenge for all those striving for a non-racial, democratic South Africa.

This crucial question was discussed at a workshop organised by the ANC and the COSATU in Harare from April 28 to May 1 1990.

The product of this workshop, which was attended by economists from the ANC and COSATU, was a document outlining policy proposals for a post-apartheid economy. This document has been presented to the National Executive Committee of the ANC and COSATU for consideration.

The workshop was an important step in working towards policy options for a future democratic economy. However, the process would be incomplete and the result therefore inadequate without the participation of the people of South Africa as a whole in moulding these policies.

Suggestions from the people on these proposals will be studied and incorporated into further workshop[s] which are being planned as a follow-up to the Harare workshop.

This process will ensure that the proposals that finally emerge on the economic policy of a non-racial democratic South Africa are a product of the people as a whole.

[(A)] THE GROWTH PATH FOR A DEMOCRATIC NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA

The South African economy is in fundamental crisis. This arises out of the distortions of the apartheid system, problems in the sphere of domestic production and reproduction and the changing and destabilising international environment. It has not been able to meet the needs of the great mass of the country's people. Neither are current state and capital strategies likely to alleviate poverty and mass deprivation.

1. THE GROWTH PATH

To address these goals, a non-racial and democratic state would follow an economic strategy that aims to achieve economic growth through a process of increasing equality in the distribution of incomes, wealth and economic power.

This strategy calls for the active restructuring of production to meet basic needs, to expand employment, to redistribute incomes and to provide social services.

Furthermore, the restructuring of production would take account of the need to transform South Africa's international economic linkages. The aim would be to increase competitiveness and develop dynamic linkages with domestic industries and markets.

2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Within the context of a mixed economy, the democratic non-racial state would assume the leading role in the reconstruction of the economy in order to facilitate the realisation of its developmental objectives. This necessitates some form of overall macro-economic planning and coordination. The democratic non-racial state would involve the mass-based organisations in planning this reconstruction. The criteria for state involvement would be efficiency and effectiveness.

3. FINANCING THE RECONSTRUCTION

3.1 SAVINGS AND TAXATION

The main emphasis in financing the reconstruction of the mixed economy would fall on domestic savings, including personal savings. Foreign capital should supplement domestic savings and not be seen as a substitute.

The new state would also undertake tax reform to make taxation more equitable and effective in many areas. Over time, the expected expansion of income and employment will widen the tax base.

At present the tax burden is carried disproportionately by individuals through [words indistinct] taxation and indirect taxation. The new state would begin the process of shifting the burden of taxation, especially towards the corporations.

3.2 MACRO-ECONOMIC IMBALANCES

Macro-economic imbalances, including inflation and balance of payments deficits, have been an important factor contributing to South Africa's economic crisis, and their effects have been a severe problem for the living standards of our people.

We are also aware that such imbalances have presented critical obstacles to redistribution and economic development policies of governments in some other countries.

For these reasons, appropriate economic stabilisation policies, including monetary and exchange rate policies, would be used to manage macro-economic imbalances of this nature.

The issue of state expenditure and overall fiscal policy is especially important in this regard. A future non-racial democratic government would not replicate the recent practice of using borrowings to finance current state expenditure.

The overall budget and the budget deficit would be managed according to criteria determined by the democratic state. Those criteria will be in accordance with our objectives of socio-economic reconstruction and the

redistribution of income and wealth, and would pay regard to macro-economic balance.

3.3 THE CAPITAL MARKET

The current capital market does not sufficiently direct investment into productive activity or into critical areas of infrastructure (such as housing) which a new democratic government would want to develop. The new government would seek to rationalise and restructure the financial sector and to develop new institutional arrangements for both the primary and secondary bond markets. This is needed to make them more ordered and directed to meet broader developmental objectives.

Current financial deregulation policies and monetary policy exacerbates the problems of the present financial system. To correct this requires direct state intervention, including state regulation. Consideration will be given to the extent of state ownership within the financial sector.

3.4 EXCHANGE CONTROLS

The non-racial democratic state would pursue exchange control measures in order to retain domestic savings within the country and to prevent destabilising speculative capital flows.

These exchange controls would have to be consistent with other macro-economic policies and development objectives.

The present system of exchange controls would continue, but would have to be modified in ways consistent with development objectives of the new democratic state.

4. CONGLOMERATES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT

4.1 CONGLOMERATES

The existing extreme concentration of economic power has been detrimental to the achievement of balanced economic growth in the interests of all the people of South Africa.

The government of a democratic non-racial South Africa would investigate this concentration of economic power with the objective of promoting a more efficient and effective use of resources.

In addition, consideration would be given to extending collective bargaining into investment planning. Where feasible, a policy of dismemberment of conglomerates into units would be pursued to make the operation of conglomerates more compatible with the overall development objectives of the democratic state.

4.2 FOREIGN INVESTMENT

The democratic state would encourage foreign investment on terms which are consistent with its developmental goals.

Foreign investors would be encouraged to invest in activities which lead to increased employment and the development of local technological capabilities. They will also be required to follow labour practices acceptable to the trade union movement.

Such policies are required to ensure that the activities of foreign investors do not have a detrimental effect on the environment or the general development strategies of the state.

Finally, the state and the trade union movement should be legislatively empowered to ensure that foreign investors reinvest productively to promote continued growth.

5. OWNERSHIP AND NATIONALISATION

The transformation of the economy will require a viable state sector. Nationalisation would be an essential part of the reconstruction programme of such a state.

The non-racial democratic state would retain existing nationalised industries and would be prepared, as a matter of fundamental policy, to renationalise privatised state assets. Furthermore, it would set up new state corporations in areas where necessary.

Nationalised industries would operate within strict budgetary controls and they would not become vehicles for the enrichment of a large bureaucracy. Rather, they would be developed in the interests of the people.

Nationalisation would be affected through due legal and constitutional processes. In addition to these measures, the democratic state would also facilitate forms of collective ownership, including co-operatives.

6. GENDER

One of the legacies of apartheid [word indistinct] economic system is discrimination against women. Women have been marginalised and relegated to being victims of unemployment and low wage employment.

The democratic South Africa state will strive to promote the rapid integration of women into economic activity, and to promote the removal of gender inequalities in employment.

A programme of action will be mounted by the state to address the problems of gender discrimination in and outside the workplace and to provide support for women, especially in areas such as ante and post-natal child care.

7. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION

The non-racial democratic state would actively seek to promote regional economic co-operation along new lines, in ways that would not be exploitative and will [word indistinct] imbalances in current relationships.

The state must be prepared to enter into negotiations with its neighbours to promote a dynamic and non-exploitative and mutually beneficial form of regional

cooperation and development. This may involve making concessions to our neighbouring states.

8. [Word indistinct] LEGISLATION

The democratic forces do not recognise, and find morally reprehensible, the present government's attempts, through privatisation, deregulation and other legislative means, to weaken the new state's ability to intervene to restructure the economy.

The majority of these laws and measures which the apartheid state has used to give effect to these policies will be reviewed and, where necessary, reversed. Privatised institutions will be open to renationalisation.

(B) INDUSTRIAL RE-STRUCTURING

Despite the poor performance of manufacturing over the past two decades, emphasis should be given to the potential for manufacturing growth. The non-racial democratic state would actively seek to address problems inherent in the present industrial structure and in present industrial policy.

It will give serious consideration to the implementation of policies which are incorporated in the following proposals. These are aimed at addressing current problems, restructuring industry and developing a more dynamic path of industrial expansion. Industrial restructuring would be directed to meeting domestic needs and increasing international competitiveness.

Industrial policy and planning would be based on strategies targeted at specific sectors. This approach would be complemented by strategic planning which would set objectives across the economy as a whole and provide guidelines for sector strategy.

Sector strategy and strategic planning can only be undertaken on a selective basis with targeted objectives in each case.

1. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY ISSUES

A first priority would be to meet basic needs for the population in food, housing, welfare, and employment etc. This should be done in a way that is sustainable, for example, by creating new production capacity through employment linkages rather than in the form of simple income supplements.

To some extent, user charges would have to be applied depending on the services being offered.

The non-racial democratic state would develop industrial policies aimed at transforming imbalances that exist between blacks and whites, between urban and rural areas and between regions.

The failure of the regime's industrial decentralisation policy should not detract from the need for rural industrialisation with well-developed linkages within the local region.

The alternative industrial strategy would have to meet macro-economic objectives. A key constraint on manufacturing development has been the balance of payments.

South African manufacturing is import intensive and has failed to develop export growth strategies aimed at raising living standards for the mass of the population. The potential to reduce import intensity would be investigated.

Restructuring industry would require a major set of policies with respect to technology, skills training and labour process reorganisation.

South Africa's manufacturing industry is heavily concentrated and there is some scope for the development of small-scale enterprise. The new state would consider the establishment of an agency to support and direct such developments. Other important aspects of firm size are the development of localised industrial districts and the break-up of conglomerates.

Infrastructural development can in part be based upon a radical transformation of existing potential in the mineral-energy complex.

Attention would be given to the institutional structures responsible for devising, implementing and monitoring industrial policy.

The non-racial democratic state would recognise the need for an industrial strategy for the armaments industry. Armaments production will be converted to meet civilian needs.

In formulating industrial strategy, the need to protect our environment will [be] given high priority.

2. RESPONSE TO CURRENT GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

The capacity of the post-apartheid state to intervene to serve basic needs and to promote economic growth is being undermined by current and proposed legislation of the apartheid regime. Immediate steps should be taken to:

- 1) halt privatisation and deregulation;
- 2) oppose the application of the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act;
- 3) review the approach embodied in the General Export Incentive Scheme, in the light of the essential need for selective sectoral strategy with respect to exports.

[C] MINING

1. PLANNING AND POLICIES

The non-racial democratic state acknowledges the demands of the mine workers. It would initiate measures to root out racist labour practices and improve wage levels and living conditions. This would be done without weakening or making less efficient the mining industry.

The state recognizes and will seek to enhance the role of the industry as a job creator, foreign exchange earner and raw material supplier.

The democratic state would investigate the feasibility of creating an inspectorate that would police mining health and safety, mining legislation, transfer pricing and high-grading.

The democratic state would investigate the use of fiscal policy to encourage venture capital in new mines. The possibility of the state making strategic investments in mines would also be considered.

In view of the declining and volatile nature of mineral prices, a policy of stabilising mineral prices through the formation of cartels would be seriously considered. The formation of a State Minerals Marketing Authority would be investigated. Such an agency would control all minerals marketing and enter into marketing agreements with other producing countries.

Consideration would be given to using surpluses created by cartelising certain minerals to stabilise the domestic price of non-cartelised minerals. A minerals marketing authority would also be necessary to restrict transfer pricing by the mining companies.

Given the wasting nature of mining, high priority would be given to the creation of resource-based industries to further add value. In this regard research would be undertaken to identify optimal areas for mineral transformation industries, such as mining machinery. Methods of encouraging this such as tax incentives, government funding of R&D, import tariffs and cheap loans, need to be investigated.

The concentration of monopoly mining finance capital is a great impediment to alternative means of controlling mining. In order to control investment strategy and labour practices, the non-racial democratic state would encourage research into the benefits of disaggregating the monopolies [words indistinct] of the economy as a whole into consideration.

Policy to maximise the benefits of mining to the people as a whole and to optimise the working conditions and life chances of miners could be brought about by a variety of instruments. These include fiscal instruments, inspectorates, equity, board representation, incentives, direct funding, anti-trust legislation and union empowerment. Within the context of the state's developmental objectives for this industry, the nature and extent of state intervention and ownership will be considered.

2. RESPONSE TO CURRENT CAPITAL/STATE INITIATIVES

The recent shift of De Beers control to Switzerland is a serious development and potential disinvestment of this type should be an urgent item in negotiations with capital.

There is also concern among miners about the implications of the new Mineral Bill currently being proposed. Its privatisation/deregulation outlook represents an abdication of state responsibility in crucial areas. Mineral rights must be retained by the State, not given away as proposed.

It is strongly recommended that a Minerals Policy Research Commission to consider the future of the mining industry and to address the above issues, needs to be created as soon as possible. It should be based in South Africa.

Emergency action should be taken to investigate means of preventing the passing of the new Minerals Bill and curtailing asset transfers out of South Africa.

[D] AGRICULTURE

South African agriculture is facing a major crisis both in the advanced capitalist sector and in the black rural areas. Land distribution is a central national grievance and raising agricultural production is vital to the future economic prosperity of the country.

A future non-racial democratic state commits itself to:

1. the immediate return of land to those removed from black freehold farms and to the repossession of land by certain categories of labour tenants;
2. redistribution of land and relocation of people by a land claims commission with grassroots participation;
3. promoting various forms of production, including smallholder production, cooperatives, and joint ventures;
4. providing a secure food supply at affordable prices and producing industrial raw materials;
5. a reallocation of support services and training provision to achieve redistribution whilst maintaining production;
6. provision of support services which will positively discriminate in favour of women to ensure access to land credit and training;
7. redistribution of land to create employment and provide secure housing;
8. enacting labour legislation to abolish backward labour employment practices;
9. promoting rapid unionisation and encouraging rural community organisation to redress historical injustices and protect jobs and worker rights;
10. state intervention on environmental issues to sustain the long term production capacity of land.

[E] LABOUR AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVES

The non-racial democratic state commits itself to the development of, a high employment, high wage, high productivity economy, with economically viable, competitive enterprises. It will ensure a central role for organised labour in the formulation and implementation

of all economic policy. It will seek to empower organised labour, and to promote greater industrial democracy.

2. LABOUR RELATIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK

Current labour legislation in South Africa is based on maintaining the industrial balance of power firmly in the hands of capital. A democratic state would be committed to changing this.

The empowering of trade unions and their active involvement in economic policy is based on three propositions:

- 2.1 The need to avoid an over-centralised, commandist approach to economic policy by the state;
- 2.2 The need for a strong civic society, independent of state and political party, with real economic and other power;
- 2.3 The advantage of creating a compact, powerful state, without a massive bureaucracy to regulate and implement all policy.

3. UNION RIGHTS

There are a number of specific areas where the legislative programme and constitutional rights ought to empower organised workers. These are:

- 3.1 The right to enter and organise in all establishments;
- 3.2 The right to bargain, including legislation requiring centralised bargaining, disclosure of financial information, the right to strike, the right to picket and the right to protection against employers replacing strikers with scab labour;
- 3.3 The extension of workplace democratic rights for organised workers in publicly-owned corporations, privately-owned companies and provident fund management/trustee boards;
- 3.4 The right to be represented in and participate in industrial courts/tribunals and in state commissions on housing, transport, unemployment and other areas directly affecting workers.

4. HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY

4.1 RACIAL EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE

The democratic state would correct racial inequalities in the workplace. This would be done, not only through legislation and prosecution, but by investing and redirecting resources.

A comprehensive programme of education, training and skills for workers in industry and within the state sector is needed. In addition technical, professional and managerial skills among blacks will be promoted.

Policy towards the civil service needs to address not only racial inequality, but also the issues of the political complexion of the civil service, appropriate staffing levels to give effect to the changed emphasis of state policy and the need to avoid an excessive state bureaucracy.

All policy options which address the transformation of the civil service must involve the public sector trade unions.

4.2 GENDER EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE

Apartheid economic development has fundamentally shaped gender employment structures. Women in townships, squatter settlements and rural areas have been particularly discriminated against and constrained by the labour policies of the state. The limitations of social infrastructure, and by power/gender relations in the family.

The democratic state would seek to correct these gender inequalities by means of legislation to secure women's rights, a vigorous programme to provide training and examine opportunities for women and by means of support in the sphere of ante and post natal care.

4.3 EMPLOYMENT CREATION

The current state strategy of seeking to create employment through deregulation and privatisation is not a solution and must be opposed. The democratic state would address employment creation through public works programmes (of which housing projects hold distinct advantages), retraining and the deployment of resources from apartheid-oriented projects into employment-creating economic activities.

The democratic state would encourage the unions to play a role in employment creation through collective bargaining over resources for employment creation and by encouraging the direction of pensions and provident fund investment capital towards productive investments in employment creating activities.

5. TRAINING

A democratic state would initiate a comprehensive training programme, to remove racial inequalities and to improve the productivity of labour. In particular, the democratic state would intervene to ensure that the content of all education and training at technikons, universities, schools and other training institutions is appropriate for changing labour market needs and consistent with national industrial strategy.

It would also set up non-exploitative youth training schemes for underskilled and unskilled youth.

The state would encourage trade unions and employers at industry level, to develop and co-manage training schemes. Linked to this, private corporations would be required to direct resources to training schemes.

[F] BASIC GOODS AND SERVICES

A massive injection of finance is going to be required to meet basic social needs (i.e. welfare, housing, health, education). Two sources of finance can be considered—public finance, and the mobilisation of private capital.

Determination of priorities in meeting social requirements will have to take account of several conflicting objectives:

- (i) the immediate relief of poverty;
- (ii) the need to reduce existing social conflict over unequal distribution of material resources;
- (iii) the expressed expectations and demands of people and communities;
- (iv) promotion of economic development strategies;
- (v) the need to avoid inflationary spending policies;
- (vi) the promotion of equality to correct existing biases in resource allocation, relating to (a) race and gender; (b) socio-economic divisions within black urban communities; and (c) between urban and rural communities.
- (vii) the promotion of employment and training opportunities.

The non-racial democratic state would foster active community participation in order to determine priorities, and in order to ensure the effective implementation of development strategies. This must also include training in implementation and administration of capital development projects.

1. SOCIAL WELFARE AND PENSIONS

The democratic, non-racial state would bear ultimate responsibility for the provision of welfare and pensions. This would be exercised in the context of the negotiated provision of welfare benefits between capital and labour, and of private provision by those groups able to provide for themselves. The role of the state would be to provide a minimum level of social services at a reasonable rate for all people.

The possibility of a national compulsory retirement schemes, underwritten by the state, would be investigated.

A system of compulsory unemployment insurance will be enacted based on contributory obligations by employers and employees. The objective in dealing with structural and other forms of unemployment will be to create an extended network of institutions for training, retraining and placement in jobs of the unemployed.

State policy would seek to counter discrimination, whether legal or informal, in regard to gender unemployment benefits.

Existing benefit funds would be deployed in support of national development objectives. State policy would facilitate such redeployment by providing legislative regulation, and by underwriting such initiatives so as to ensure the worker's monies are not at risk.

2. HOUSING

The provision of sufficient and affordable housing for millions of South Africans is dependent on the following areas:

2.1 The release of affordable urban and rural land could be achieved through the removal of land from the market

by implementing a policy of 'land banking' as a matter of urgency, and by reducing of land prices through the imposition of a generalised land tax on unused land to force sale.

2.2 The non-racial democratic state commits itself to providing the minimum infrastructural services that are needed to ensure decent living standards. These include water reticulation, waterborne sewerage, electricity, stormwater drains and tarred public transport routes.

However, the provision of these services is very costly. The state would intervene through extensive subsidisation (both central and local) in order to provide these services at an affordable cost and of a reasonably high standard.

Construction of serviced stands would be part of a public works programme aimed at job creation.

2.3 Provision of Housing: It is recognised that there are increasing negative effects arising out of the rapidly growing housing market in low-income black residential areas.

The non-racial democratic state would counter these effects by defending the existing public housing sector, by providing new houses and flats for rental with security of tenure and by providing state assistance to community controlled non-profit housing development projects.

Furthermore, the provision of housing is currently taking place on a privatised basis. In the future, the democratic state would take primary responsibility for the provision of housing needs.

However, it is noted that the provision of affordable housing for all can be costly. As such, the role of the state would be based on establishing the conditions for providing low-cost housing (i.e., subsidisation of land and services) rather than direct state construction of houses.

This would not rule out the establishment of a national state housing company. The democratic state would also encourage initiatives on the part of local and community-based organisations to undertake housing projects.

3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local government is central to the provision of goods and services.

3.1 ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE:

State policies would include integration of towns and cities into metropolitan management structures, and an end to separate black local authority structures.

The principle of financial self-sufficiency for poor communities would be replaced by the integration of divided urban areas into a single local tax base, and cross-subsidisation within metropolitan areas.

3.2 REPRESENTATION:

The future democratic state's priority would be to foster the establishment of democratic, non-racial municipalities, while at the same time maintaining the involvement of mass-based organisations in the provision and control of certain services.

EEC Reportedly Funds Democratic Front Projects

*MB1806190590 Durban ILANGA in Zulu
14-16 Jun 90 p 7*

[From "Comment and Opinion" column: "Kagiso, the UDF and the EEC Millions"—article published in English]

[Text] Millions of rands are being poured into projects in Natal by the Kagiso Trust. There is a common denominator to all of them—they have all either been spawned by or allied with the United Democratic Front (UDF). The bulk of the money emanates from countries that form the European Economic Community (EEC). The churches of Europe are major donors.

The key people who have a decisive say in how the Kagiso millions are dished out are Dr. Michael Sutcliffe, UDF activist and Natal University academic. He is the chairman of the Natal Regional Board of Kagiso. The other is Mr. Yunus Mohamed, Natal Indian Congress executive member, prominent executive of the UDF and arguably the key member of the cabal that controls the UDF.

It is well known that both gentlemen are feeling more than a little uneasy after questions have been asked about who the beneficiaries of the Kagiso Trust monies are.

Even the radical ANC [African National Congress] organization, the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), although a major recipient itself, has asked questions. In a recent internal document SAYCO had the following to say:

"There are so many resource and project centres existing in the name of the UDF, but who do they in practice serve? Who has decided on their existence within the UDF? Why are these resources concentrated only in certain towns and regions while the rest of the country is suffering? Even worse, why are the people—the sectors and groups in whose name these resources have been created and motivated for—not in control?"

At another point the document says: "Like mushrooms, committees projects, 'resources' centres, etc., began to crop up in the name of the UDF but without accountability to the organizations that constitute the UDF. Some are not even known to certain structures of the UDF."

If one ignores the scramble for the Kagiso millions for a moment, the really revealing point about the SAYCO document is its confirmation that the funds are only used for UDF bodies.

On Monday this week ILANGA asked Dr. Sutcliffe [a] long series of questions about some of the projects Kagiso is funding. He refused to answer questions [that] were sent to him by facsimile.

By lunchtime on Wednesday there was still no reply. Here are some of the questions we asked. Since they have not been answered by Dr. Sutcliffe, ILANGA has sought to at least partially answer the questions from its own sources of information.

Did you or other planners from the University of Natal receive monies from the Kagiso Trust this year? If so, how much was given and what will the money be used for?

To our knowledge, these "planners" have been given a "first installment" of R[Rand]240,000 from the Kagiso Trust.

Will it be administered by the University of Natal?

ILANGA does not know the answer.

Has a body known as the Built Environment Support Group been given money by the Kagiso Trust? If so, how much and what will it be used for? What is your relationship with this group?

As far as we could establish, Dr. Sutcliffe is an instrumental member of this group. It received over R140,000 from Kagiso. We have no knowledge of what the funds are used for.

How much money has been given to academics or other groups in Natal to research violence? If money has been given, what has become of the research?

ILANGA does not know the answer.

How much money has been given to the New African by the Kagiso Trust this year? (This matter is dealt with elsewhere on this page.)

Has the Kagiso Trust given money to an organization known as the Insika Nkandla Farmers Depot Training Centre? If so, how much and what is the money used for?

It could not be established what this organization does, but it is believed to have been given more than R500,000. It appears as if it is designed to get support for the ANC in rural areas through patronage.

Do you have any knowledge of a group called the Phoenix Working Committee? If so, what does this group do? Has it been given money by the Kagiso trust?

This group appears to be completely unknown. There are suggestions that it might be a front to ferment opposition to "Indian" political groupings working within the tri-cameral Parliament.

Do you know an organization called the Natal Civil Committee? If so, what does this organization do? Has it received funds from the Kagiso Trust? If so, how much?

It is not known what this group does or where it operates, but it is believed that it was given more than R40,000 by Kagiso this year.

Has the Kagiso Trust provided funding for Civic Associations in or around Durban? If so, how much?

Although the answer is unknown to ILANGA, it is believed that amounts of more than R10,000 have been given to individual association.

Has the Kagiso Trust financed any Careers Centres in Natal? If so, which ones and how much money was made available?

The answer is not known to ILANGA.

How much money has the Kagiso Trust given to the Community Research Unit? What does this unit do?

The precise answer is not known. There are indications, however, that Dr. J. Coovadia of the Natal Indian Congress is a key player in this organization. Unconfirmed reports suggest that as much as R1,500,000 might have been made available to the Unit through Kagiso. It is probable that activists provide academic underpinning to the UDF and MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] through this unit.

* Mandela, Gavin Relly Discuss Economic Future

34000751B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 25-31 May 90 pp 6-7

[Article: "Power Is the Issue"]

[Text]

Nelson Mandela

Recently I had occasion to read an advertisement inserted in the British press by the Anglo American Corporation.

It begins by quoting various clauses of the Freedom Charter on housing and education. It then poses the very important and correct question: "If the South African economy doesn't deliver, how can any politician hope to?"

That, in a sense, encapsulates the significance of this conference. Both of us, you representing the business world and we a political movement, must deliver.

The critical questions are whether we can in fact act together and whether it is possible for either one of us to deliver and if we cannot or will not cooperate?

The issue we are addressing is the one of power and the uses and abuses of power. Those among us who are white come from that section of our population that has power, and in a sense, total power over the lives of the black people. Indeed, this even extends to the right to decide who shall live and who shall die.

One of the fundamental issues that the process of transformation must address is the question of the structure of power. Within the political sphere what has to be done seems clear enough. I think we would all agree that we must have a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. The specific manner in which this would be expressed in a constitution is something that will have to be negotiated, preferably within an elected constituent assembly.

But then, what about economic power. This, obviously, is one of the thorniest issues that must be addressed. It is said that less than 10 corporate conglomerates control almost 90 percent of the shares listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange.

If somebody did any arithmetical calculation, he or she would probably find that the total number of people who sit on the boards of these companies as directors, is far less than one thousand. These will almost exclusively be white males.

If you add to this the fact that 87 percent of the land is, by law, white owned and is in fact owned by a minority even among all the whites, then the iniquity of the system we have all inherited becomes even more plain.

If we are genuinely interested in ending the old social order and bringing in a new one, characterised by the notions of justice and equity, it is quite obvious that the economic power relations, represented by the reality of the excessive concentration of power in a few white hands, have to change.

We make this demand not as a result of any imperative that might be said to derive from ideological convictions. We make it because we cannot see how it would be possible to pull our country out of the endemic crisis, in part caused and exemplified by white control of economic power while, at the same time, we perpetuate this power structure.

There are many issues we shall have to consider as we discuss the question of the democratisation and deracialisation of economic power.

One of these is whether we should not draw on such lessons as we might learn from the anti-trust laws of the United States or the work of the monopolies commission in Great Britain to address the issue of how to ensure that there is no unhealthy over-concentration of economic power.

Another issue we might have to consider is the advisability or otherwise of the placement on the boards of privately owned companies of directors appointed by the government, to see whether it is possible to balance the pursuit of private gain with the need to promote the common goal.

Yet another question we might consider is whether there are no areas in which it would benefit society at large if the state established public corporations or strengthened existing ones. One of these areas might be housing.

We might mention, at this point, that we are firmly opposed to the process of privatisation on which the government has embarked.

It would seem only reasonable that so important a question as the disposal of public property should be held over until a truly representative government is in place.

Additionally and inevitably, the process of privatisation cannot but reinforce the economic power relations which we assert have to be changed.

As we have said, the land question must also be addressed within the context of the restructuring of the old economic power relations.

Recent state actions to sell state land and to evict people from white farms are entirely unhelpful to these purposes.

We still believe that there must be further discussion of the issue of nationalisation of assets that might at the moment be privately owned.

The ANC [African National Congress] has no blueprint that decrees that these or other assets will be nationalised, or that such nationalisation would take this or the other form. But we do say that this option should also be part of the ongoing debate, subject to critical analysis as any other.

It should not be ruled out of the court of discussion simply because of previous bad experience or because of a theological commitment to the principle of private property.

Of course, the issues, about which I am sure we are agreed of, the need to generate significant domestic savings, to attract substantial foreign investment and to keep the rate of inflation reasonably low, are central to the discussion of the question of economic growth. Perhaps there are only three or four points we should raise at this stage.

One of these is that we are concerned at persistent reports that some of our own domestic companies have been and are involved in a process of exporting capital from this country. We cannot sit here, verbally welcome the prospect of democratic transformation, talk of the need rapidly to develop the economy, and the same time reduce the means that would make such development actually possible.

We should all accept the reality that growth by itself will not ensure equity. A situation could develop in which, in terms of levels of income, we continue to have a persistent gap between the haves and the have-nots, despite any increases that may take place in the standard of living of the latter.

I am therefore raising the question that the matter of the redistribution of wealth in conditions of a growing economy, is one that must be faced squarely and addressed firmly.

Indeed we could say that even now, as we enter a period of transition, it might be necessary to establish mechanisms by which those who have been excluded from power play a role in determining the disbursement of public funds.

In the debate about our economic options we have fortunately progressed away from the crudities of a capitalism versus socialism dogfight, to a recognition that, as with all other societies in the world, we have today and will have in future a mixed economy. The interest is in the details of the mix.

Fundamental requirements for economic growth:

Gavin Relly

With South Africa on the threshold of a new political era, discussions on a post-apartheid economy have been characterised by lively debate within and outside the democratic movement. This week the ANC met with an estimated 400 businessmen, among them leaders of conglomerates which control almost the entire wealth of the country. Keynote addresses were delivered by Deputy president of the ANC, Nelson Mandela and Chairman of Anglo American Corporation, Gavin Relly. NEW NATION publishes, edited versions of these two speeches.

Confidence

First and foremost we in the corporate sector believe that the retention of domestic and international investor confidence is critical to economic growth. Whilst the criteria for such confidence, including the levels of state participation in the economy, may vary from country to country, the universal experience is that if investors conclude that state intervention and regulation stifle initiative, entrepreneurial activity and the ability to make a profit, then capital and skills flight will ensue.

Market-Oriented System

The state has an important role in distributing or redistributing resources for reasons of equity through transfer payments from one taxpayer to another and through government spending.

A balanced tax system provided the wherewithal for this distribution. But for business a market-oriented system is required for optimal investment and resource allocation decisions.

Size of Government

One of 10 major factors leading to changed economic policies on the part of the government was the realisation in the late 1980's that the country could no longer afford

a bureaucracy of the current size without serious inflationary implications and the continued decline in infrastructural investment in favour of non-productive consumption expenditure. A firm control on the size of the bureaucracy will remain desirable.

Inflation

Unless inflation continues to be targeted as an economic priority, the differential between South Africa's high inflation rate of 15 percent and those of her trading partners of 4 to 5 percent will lead to a vicious circle of inflationary pressures as South Africa tries to juggle the need to keep exports competitive with the inability to sustain higher import costs.

Nationalisation

There is no short cut to development, yet, in a sense, nationalisation is proposed by some in our economic debate precisely as one of the elements of a short cut. Of course it has emotional attractions, given the acts of omission and commission of the past.

It also has attractions in power and patronage terms as being a vehicle likely to provide for the faithful. But it is most often adduced as a provider of resources for the state to undertake essential social programmes and to steer formerly private sector investment in a direction which planners believe will be more socially useful.

One of our chairmen today, Ken Maxwell showed the dangers of tipping industry quickly into a subsidy-consuming state by trying to extract greater resources from it.

Instead of contemplating mechanisms such as nationalisation, the private sector should be seen as the source of wealth and job creation, with the budget acting as an allocator of resources raised through the taxation system.

The international trend is towards the development of more efficient tax systems which nurture rather than discourage the development of the advanced, formal sectors of the economy.

Co-Operative Values and Strategies.

All this leads me to conclude that business and political movements will both have to seek a new set of jointly held values which will enable them to co-operatively confront the challenges of building an economic future. Such a set of values will have to share elements of individualism, competitiveness, consensus, co-operation and social conscience.

*** COSATU Joins ANC/SACP Alliance**

34000751A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 25-31 May 90 p 24

[Interview with COSATU Gen Sec Jay Naidoo: "Cosatu Joins the Central Alliance"]

[Text] COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] recently joined the revolutionary alliance between the ANC [African National Congress] and the SA [South African] Communist Party [SACP] in the place of the SA Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), which is being phased out. NEW NATION spoke to Cosatu general secretary Jay Naidoo about the alliance.

[THE NEW NATION] What is the nature of the tripartite alliance?

[Naidoo] In order to understand the tripartite alliance, one has to go back to the alliance between the ANC, the SACP and Sactu that emerged out of struggles waged against apartheid in the fifties and the sixties.

It was an alliance forged very much in struggle and an alliance that brought together the major revolutionary forces in the country at the time.

With the growth of Cosatu, the role of Sactu was discussed and, after discussions between ourselves and Sactu, it was decided that Sactu should be phased out and that the revolutionary alliance would be reconstituted to include Cosatu.

One must understand that this is a revolutionary alliance premised on our struggles for a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa.

It is a strategic alliance representing the core forces that have been at the centre of the struggle for a non-racial democracy. It will then obviously relate to a range of other organisations and broad forces working for social change in the country.

The ANC is the leader of the alliance, but each organization has its own independence and is under the democratic control of its own constituency.

Each organisation will be responsible for formulating its own policies, its own principles, its own decisions.

The task of the alliance will then be to thrash out a common programme on a range of issues.

[THE NEW NATION] What are the aims and objectives of the alliance?

[Naidoo] The alliance is the engine of change in the country. Its aims are to precisely formulate the programme to reach the goal that we have set ourselves, that is establishing a non-racial democracy and to ensure the fundamental restructuring of the political and economic systems.

Politically our demand is for one person one vote on a common voters' roll.

Economically we want the restructuring of the economy to address, on the one hand, the needs that our people have and the whole question of poverty and inequality caused by apartheid exploitation. And, on the other hand, to ensure that economic decision-making on important issues such as investment, the redistribution

of wealth and housing is democratised right from the factory floor to a national level.

The short-term aim of the alliance would be to devise strategies to enable us to reach these goals.

In relation to the whole negotiation process, the alliance will be pivotal in determining the positions taken forward by the negotiating team.

[THE NEW NATION] What form will the alliance take at a national, regional and local level?

[Naidoo] The content of the alliance is still being debated within the ranks of each organisation. What we have agreed is that it should be structured at a national, regional and local level; that there should be mandated representatives from each organisation and that there should be regular meetings.

The practical arrangements in working out the relationship have been referred to a working committee made up of one representative from each organisation.

[THE NEW NATION] Will Cosatu, as a full member of the alliance, be represented at future talks between the ANC, SACP and the government?

[Naidoo] For us the most important part of the negotiation process is the consultation within the alliance to formulate common positions to take into the negotiations.

Cosatu argued in its last Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting that it should be represented in the talks with the government although at the same time accepting that the ANC is leading those talks. In principle, this has been accepted within the alliance. Again the practical details will have to be worked out.

[THE NEW NATION] At present there is an overlap of leadership between the ANC and Cosatu. Why is this and is there not a danger of the federation being weakened as a result?

[Naidoo] While there are certain levels where leadership does overlap, this certainly isn't the general rule.

Cosatu, at its last CEC, argued very strongly that building a mass-based ANC is in the interests of Cosatu and the working class more broadly. Therefore our structures should give full support to this process.

We also endorsed the appointment, on an interim basis, of certain officials of Cosatu who are serving on the Interim Leadership Core, and resolved that the task of the officials would be to involve themselves in the process of rebuilding the ANC on an interim basis until there are fully-elected democratic structures.

We see the involvement of Cosatu officials as an interim measure where the experience we have accumulated in building mass organisations will be used in the process of building the ANC.

At the same time, the CEC resolved that the Cosatu responsibilities of our officials still remain a priority.

The way in which we have structured the involvement of our officials will ensure that the federation is not weakened.

In fact, we believe that, by involving ourselves in the process of building the ANC, Cosatu itself will be strengthened, particularly when it comes to community-level organising with house-to-house work being done. This will also provide the opportunity for Cosatu activists involved in the process to recruit workers they meet to Cosatu unions.

[THE NEW NATION] Do you think there will be an overlap in leadership between Cosatu and the SACP when the SACP re-establishes itself legally inside the country? If so, what affect do you think this will have on the federation, particularly when taking political decisions?

[Naidoo] In the long term, we don't see an overlap in leadership between the ANC, the SACP and Cosatu.

We believe that our task is to generate leadership at all levels and involve that leadership in other organisations, whether at a community level through civic structures or in other organisations such as the ANC and SACP.

But we feel that at a leadership level we should try to maintain a separation of leaderships.

The particular problem we have seen in Eastern Europe and one of the weaknesses of socialism there has been the situation where the Party secretary has been the trade union secretary and the local state official. This created problems of making the trade unions and other organisations of civil society a conveyor belt of the Party.

That is certainly the situation we want to avoid here. We believe that each organisation has the responsibility of formulating its own programmes.

The task of the alliance is to forge a common programme in relation to our agreed goals and objectives. Therefore we are building an alliance based on the relationship between organisations rather than individuals.

[THE NEW NATION] What do you see as the role of a legal, mass-based Party?

[Naidoo] A mass-based Party should provide a home for all genuine socialists. It should draw from the working class more broadly the militants who are committed to socialism and should seek to represent the political aspirations of the working class.

It is clear that the Party will develop a close working relationship with other working class organisations such as trade unions, but we feel that having a mass-based Party and having an independent trade union movement

are indispensable in deepening democracy in a post-apartheid society, ensuring that the political and economic aspirations of the working class are represented.

Our relationship to the Party will be in the context of the alliance and it will be defined by the programme of action that we agree on in that alliance.

[THE NEW NATION] Do you think Cosatu's role will change when the SACP re-establishes itself openly?

[Naidoo] No, I don't think Cosatu's role will change. In fact, in a post-apartheid society Cosatu's role will be deepened as it is involved in the formulation of economic strategies and policies.

We don't see ourselves competing with the SACP. Cosatu is a trade union federation representing organised workers. What has been accepted is that, because of our organisation at the point of production, we are an important vehicle of the working class. But that does not make us a political party, even though we carry—through our constituency—political responsibilities for ensuring that the interests of the broader working class are advanced.

[THE NEW NATION] There have been claims that the SACP may encourage divisions in the trade union movement if it recruits openly. There are also claims that the SACP is too closely aligned to the ANC for it to be a truly representative "working class party". How do you respond to these claims?

[Naidoo] Given the Party's policies and the extent to which democratic debate is being encouraged, for example, in Joe Slovo's article, "Has socialism failed?", there is very much more enthusiasm for the Party.

And, given the commitment of the Party to open debate and its position that leadership of the working class is not imposed on people but earned through the discipline and conduct of its cadres, divisions are not likely to display themselves.

Secondly, the ANC is regarded by the majority of our people as the leader of the national liberation movement. The Party and Cosatu do not see themselves competing for that role but rather strengthening that role by playing an important role in rebuilding a mass-based ANC.

We see that the ANC, in representing the national democratic struggles that we are engaged in, will be identified with the demands that the working class is putting forward. For example, the right to self-determination, the right to vote, the democratisation of entire societies.

Cosatu also believes that it is the right of any party to recruit members and this certainly will not lead to divisions.

What we would warn against are divisions created by the conduct of political parties especially where there is no respect for the independence of the trade union movement.

But, for the Party and the ANC, this is certainly not the case. This has been confirmed in the many meetings that we have had with them and in their practice which has emerged in our working relationship over the past few years.

*** SADF 32 Battalion Performance in Natal Viewed**

34000744C Cape Town THE ARGUS in English
25 May 90 p 11

[Article by Cloete Breytenbach]

[Text] A concerted effort is being made by the UDF/ANC-/Cosatu [United Democratic Front/African National Congress/Congress of South African Trade Unions] alliance to get the South African Defence Force out of the troubled Maritzburg area, where fighting has escalated between the Zulu Inkatha movement and the UDF alliance, resulting in an estimated 3,000 deaths since 1983.

Particularly badly hit are the Edendale and Mpumalanga areas where what used to be a mainly criminal problem has turned into a political one.

Getting most of the flak from the UDF/ANC is the crack Defence Force 32 Battalion.

This unit was formed during the Angolan war—from former FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] members—and waged a most effective campaign against the Cuban and MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] forces.

Since then they have been redeployed in Pomfret, in the northern Cape. The battalion was brought into the unrest area near Maritzburg—with half a dozen other SADF [South African Defense Forces] units—to assist the South African Police in maintaining law and order in the area.

But, according to one of several pamphlets issued by the ANC Natal Midlands, these soldiers are "mercenaries" and formerly of the FNLA "who fought alongside apartheid forces against the popular MPLA government, under the leadership of comrade Agostinho Neto (sic)".

The pamphlet goes on to claim that this unit "was led by CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] agents" and "a number of forces rallied around the MPLA to defend Angola against this imperial onslaught".

In an interview, top UDF official Dr Deliza Mji had this to add to the anti-32 Battalion campaign: "This is an anti-communist force who fought the MPLA and Swapo [South-West African People's Organization] in Angola,

both close allies with the ANC. Here they are fighting on the side of Inkatha, which is pro free enterprise and anti-communist.

"In fact, it is our sincere view that, if all troops could be withdrawn from the townships, there would be peace, because Inkatha on their own cannot do any damage."

And what would the UDF-/AND suggest as a possible solution?

"If a force has to be maintained in the townships it's got to be neutral. The deal that we are coming up with now is that the SADF has lost all credibility amongst our people. This also applies to the SA [South African] Police.

"The only force our people have any confidence in are the Imkonto we Sizwe (ANC) forces which, we feel, could hold the peace. We actually want the Ministry of Police disbanded—there must be no Kwazulu police. As to the availability of our forces, that is a matter to be discussed between the government and the ANC, namely the repatriation issue. These highly trained forces have to come back to South Africa in any case."

Accompanying 32 Battalion's foxtrot company in the Edendale/Mpumalanga area a few days ago proved otherwise. These well-disciplined troops moved around unhindered and appeared to be most effective in performing their duties.

After all, most of them have experience in checking out townships—a shanty town in the Maritzburg area is not all that different from a shanty town in Angola. Not being able to converse in Zulu does not appear to be that much of a problem—platoon leaders speak English.

In any event, other units of the SADF in the area (the Cape Corps, for instance) have the same communication problem.

And, says Sergeant Mario, "the people here are getting used to us. We talk to them and, sometimes, bring out some smiles and handshakes. They feel safe with us around. Even the children, although scared because of the weapons we carry, and the uniforms, relax after a while. We have never fired a shot in anger. Some of us do, however, get a bit uptight when we see the "communists" banners being waved around at processions.

Commanding officer Colonel Johan Swanepoel has this to add: "We have had no complaints of ill-treatment by one of our members. As to the accusation of being mercenaries—these troops are all fully fledged South African Defence Force members and subjected to all standard regulations like any other permanent force unit. Also, incidents of violence have decreased dramatically since the Defence Force moved in to assist the police."

Official figures seem to bear this out. In the first week of April there were 37 murders, 12 attempted murders and

17 shooting incidents (this could mean anything from taking pot shots at undefined targets to sniping at police).

This situation changed dramatically towards the end of April. In the last week of the month there were five murders, nine attempted murders and 11 shooting incidents.

For the time being, at least, the situation seems to be stabilising. This does not mean an end to political and criminal violence in the troubled area—far from it.

And the crack 32 Battalion will continue to contribute what is expected of them.

* New Banknotes To Eliminate 'White' Symbols

34000744B Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English
11 May 90 p 1

[Article: "Van Riebeeck Vanishes From New Banknotes"]

[Text] The government has decided to drop the portrait of Jan van Riebeeck from future banknotes, Reserve Bank governor Dr Chris Stals said yesterday.

New banknotes to be issued from October 1992 will instead have the "big five" South African wildlife animals as main motif.

The new green R10 note will have the rhinoceros, the brown R20 note the buffalo, the red R50 note the lion, the blue R100 note the elephant and the orange R200 note the leopard.

The move may be a step towards removing some symbols of a "whites only" past.

"I don't see why it's necessary to move the old chap's head from the notes," the Conservative Party's finance spokesman, Mr Caster Uys, said last night.

"I suppose it is meant to be adapting to a new South Africa—but the currency won't be worth much if we do enter the new South Africa," he said.

Democratic Party co-leader Dr Zach de Beer said: "It takes only a moment of reflection to realize that the majority of South Africans owe no special loyalty to Jan van Riebeeck and that politically neutral symbols are actually far more sensible.

"I congratulate the authorities on doing this and would point out that in relation to public holidays, flags and anthems and other symbols, there would be need for many changes like this one."

The concept of a new banknote series was approved by the Minister of Finance last June.

Reasons given by the government for the change include upgrading the security of notes, adapting them to sophisticated sorting machines, and the high number of notes in circulation.

Domestic economic growth and high inflation, coupled with automatic tellers, had put such a high demand on notes that the SA [South African] Banknote Company was under pressure.

* Slovo's Outlook on Communist Party Viewed

34000744A Cape Town CAPE TIMES
in English 16 May 90 p 8

[Commentary by Heribert Adam a leading analyst of South African affairs and, with Kogila Moodley, author of "South Africa Without Apartheid"*. He is doing research at UCT [University of Cape Town]: "Joe Slovo's Problem: A Stalinist Past and a Democratic Future"]

[Text] Joe Slovo's thoughtful paper "Has Socialism Failed?" constitutes the first theoretical attempt by the chairman of the South African Communist Party to shed the ideological ballast of a Stalinist past.

Slovo does not go nearly far enough in coming to terms with the tyrannical system whose terror is akin to fascism as well as apartheid. By blaming human error rather than fundamental Leninist ideals, Slovo fails to recognise the intrinsic causes of Stalinist tyranny.

Lenin introduced the one-party state and abolished independent unions. Celebrating a Leninist vision of the state contradicts the proclamation of democratic pluralism.

Conceiving of itself as a "vanguard party" with "moral superiority" remains incompatible with liberal equality. Even if the vanguard role is to be earned rather than imposed, as Slovo now realises, commitment per se is no criterion of truth or higher morality.

Peripheral Issues

Slovo now claims he had his personal doubts since the mid-Fifties. However he remained silent on the subject and the party continued to endorse Stalinist practices. When pressed as to why, the answer amounts to expediency. He said in 1988: "It became almost risky and counter-productive to battle this issue out in our party. It would have caused an enormous split and it had less and less bearing on our own work."

Such opportunism on a vital issue disproves Slovo's current claim that there has always been internal democracy in the party. If the party cannot take a principled position on Stalinist crimes for fear of a split (or more likely for fear of being denied Soviet assistance) then its internal debates on peripheral issues are meaningless distractions.

Slovo defines Stalinism as "socialism without democracy". He repeatedly refers to "distortions" from the top. It is pilot error, rather than the structure of the plane, that is responsible for its crash.

Slovo, like Marx, conceptualises an abstract working class but the working class comprises blacks and whites, women and men, skilled and unskilled workers who live in urban and rural settings. Above all, there are employed and unemployed.

Common Action

To expect solidarity because of common exploitation lingers as a long-standing illusion. Yet it is such a self-deception on which the ANC [African National Congress] and the SACP [South African Communist Party] bases its strategy.

Despite the long tradition of similar failed strategies, the Left apartheid opposition hopes that resentment of big business by white workers would translate into common action with black unions.

It is a vain hope to bank on the superior rationality of interests winning out. The appeal to emotional rewards wins over the calculations of material interests.

Rather than joining Cosatu or the ANC, the few remaining white workers flock to the neo-fascist AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement]. Deep resentment over loss of status and security drives its victims into the camp of those who hold out the vain restoration of a lost past. That was one of the lessons of fascism in Nazi Germany.

By building its strategy on white-black working-class alliances, the SACP not only starts from false assumptions but neglects an increasingly significant split in the labour movement: the competition between employed and unemployed.

Neither the ANC nor Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] has devised a strategy to cope with the 33 percent of the national workforce which is unemployed. The unions increasingly represent only the employed.

Underclass

Mere employment in South Africa almost qualifies for membership in a "labour aristocracy". Merely having a job is a mark of privilege. The range of life-chances—from access to housing, medical care, education and pensions—depends on employment.

Those millions outside the formal economy—in township backyards, in shacks around the cities and in huts in the countryside—form a permanent underclass. The liberation movements have yet to organise these permanently marginalised outsiders, the unions have yet to address the relation between employed and unemployed people.

In Slovo's sensible, pragmatic assessment, the South African economy cannot be transformed "by edict without risking economic collapse". Instead of bureaucratic state control along Eastern European lines, Slovo now advocates public control through effective democratic participation by "producers at all levels".

'Off Guard'

This amounts to a classic social-democratic programme of co-determination where large firms are held publicly accountable and union representatives sit on boards. Since such widely legitimate visions are also considered negotiable, not much of economic orthodoxy is left among former Leninists. The collapse of Eastern European state socialism has finally shown its impact on some of its last fervent adherents.

The SACP, by its own admission, was caught "off guard" by its unbanning on February 2, 1990. After preparing for 30 years for liberation, the ANC found itself unprepared.

Believing its own propaganda of a fascist, racist enemy, most exiles never took seriously the warnings about the adapting, deracialising capabilities and modernising potential of the opponent. Without an adequate theory of the antagonist, the opposition wasted precious years with doubtful and ineffective strategies.

Yet the test for the future South African democracy may not lie in the SACP's past alliances but in its internal practice of a democratic culture. The recognition of union independence by the SACP together with the endorsement of a multi-party system and traditional liberal freedoms bodes well for South African democracy, despite the Leninist relics and a repressed Stalinist past.

Because SACP members are the major force that dominates the theoretical debates and strategies within the broad apartheid opposition, its own practice of internal democracy influences the style of the entire movement. Whether the SACP declarations for democracy should be taken at face value or treated with scepticism is best tested by the behaviour of the party itself.

Will the SACP continue placing its members into strategic political and union positions, as the secret Broederbond infiltrates influential Afrikaner and government institutions?

The leader of a past Stalinist party, as Mandela's right-hand man, obsesses white South Africa. In fact, dedicated SACP members occupy most of the influential positions in the ANC and the unions as a separate vanguard underground. To reveal its secret membership, as would be normal under democratic conditions, could embarrass the SACP. It would show its dominance in the ANC. This would vindicate government propaganda.

What white South Africa has not yet understood is the recent development that turned rhetorical Stalinist ideologies into the more pragmatic and moderate force in the ANC. With a disintegrating Soviet bloc seeking peace and investment instead of world revolution, South African communists have nowhere else to go but home.

This makes them unexpected allies of Pretoria's negotiation project, whether or not they are "without a hidden agenda", as Slovo assured the government during the first Groote Schuur talks.

Red Flag

The SACP's professed socialism in the second stage depends, in Slovo's words, "on the class forces in play at that time". In practical terms this puts socialism on ice: once non-racial capitalism delivers the goods relatively colour blind, Marxist socialist parties shrink or turn into social democrats, as has been demonstrated the world over.

Because of its past radical image, the SACP leadership can entice a sceptical youth into the negotiation process. From this perspective the government should welcome the red flag rather than fear it. If anyone can prevent a latent counter-racism and make a rational, colour-blind attitude prevail, it is the ideological indoctrination in internationalist universalism by traditional Marxists. That is the historical merit of South African communists, their undemocratic Stalinism notwithstanding.

Pressure for democracy from below, particularly in the unions, may well finally force the SACP to part with the relics of Stalinism both in theory and in practice.

The self-critical Slovo account of the failure of socialism constitutes the first indication of a democratic renewal that may lay to rest Pierre van den Berghe's sceptical comment in 1989 that "South Africa, which has already spawned the world's last official racists, may also see its last Stalinists".

* Maskew Miller-Longman

*** Commentator Argues Against 'Group Sentiments'**

34000743B Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English
25 May 90 p 6

[Article by Gerald Shaw: "Mobilisation of Group Sentiments Could Destroy SA"]

[Text] There was wisdom in the statement by Judge Pierre Olivier in Durban that it is premature to draw up a constitution before South Africans have settled the question of their identity.

As he said, we must not end up with a constitution in search of a nation. Yet we may be heading precisely in that direction unless some thought is given to Judge Olivier's point.

Is it possible to educate or re-educate individuals who have been socialised from childhood to mistrust and fear their fellow citizens, having been told, in fact, that they are not fellow-citizens at all, but members of alien, separate nations if not outright enemies?

How sad it was to see that picture in the weekend press, of young whites beating up a blackman in Welkom, as

the fear-ridden citizens of that unhappy community walked rapidly by on the other side of the road, looking the other way.

Some upstanding citizens did stop—but only to encourage these relentless young thugs in their viciousness. Only one person, a woman, had the guts to do anything about it, or was prepared to testify in court.

The saddest thing was the youth of the assailants. They were mere boys, teenagers, the rising generation in which we repose our hopes for the future.

It seems to me that the root of the trouble is a deep-seated insecurity, sometimes verging on the psychopathological. This insecurity, we are told, derives from a sense of threatened identity and function which is powerful and deep-seated, overriding merely material or economic interests.

Losing Identities?

The rapid change since February 2 has shaken many people reared in the Afrikaner Nationalist tradition, which became calcified in the Verwoerd era as a kind of Afrikaner jingoism.

This generation of Afrikaner Nationalists did not doubt that they were the real, first-class South Africans.

Now they wonder: is the Afrikaner no longer to be master in his own house?

After all the years of pain and struggle in the wilderness, fighting off savage tribes and imperialist oppressors until finally coming into the kingdom in 1948, is the Afrikaner to lose control of his destiny a few decades later?

And what about English-speaking South Africans? My generation grew up in the afterglow of empire. Our fathers fought on the Western Front in 1914-1918 and our elder brothers in the Western Desert, Italy and elsewhere in 1939-1945.

We had a strong and secure sense of identity as South Africans, first and foremost, yet proud of our British descent and our share in saving the world from the Nazi terror, and strongly in favour of the Commonwealth link. We felt no conflict whatsoever between our South African patriotism and our Commonwealth loyalties, which were one and the same.

In 1960, we were told this would no longer do. We were suddenly bereft of the symbols of statehood and nationality which had been meaningful for ourselves and our ancestors.

It was a sad time, yet there was some vicarious consolation in the joy felt by our Afrikaner brothers, many of whom said they now felt fully at home in their own country for the first time. Perhaps things would now be better after all, we hoped.

English-speaking South Africans made a good pragmatic adjustment to loss of Commonwealth membership. Yet there was a sense of loss: something had gone from our lives.

It will be easier, perhaps, for the English-speaking section of the community to accept the idea of a broad, all-embracing, non-racial South Africa. Or will it?

Afrikaners may find it easier after all. They have no other cultural home. They have nowhere to go. Their pastoral origins and their attachment to the soil are a strong link with black South Africa.

Group Sentiment

And the black majority? This community has its own nationalist tradition. Happily for the whites, the oldest and best-established custodian of this tradition, the African National Congress [ANC], adheres very strongly to a non-racial ideal of South African nationhood, partly on account of its white communist links, ironically enough, but more fundamentally, we may hope, on account of its roots in the Christian missionary tradition.

The ANC's much-younger offshoot, the Pan Africanist Congress [PAC], has not yet had much opportunity to present its position to the public. But the PAC, or indeed the ANC, could be tempted to emulate Afrikaner nationalism—and to apply its techniques of mobilising group sentiment to win the political kingdom.

South Africa is doomed if the remorseless stirring up of sectional passions, as practised by the NP [National Party] (until fairly recently) and by its off-shoots, is to continue in the new South Africa.

If the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement], the CP [Conservative Party], the PAC or anybody else carries on much further down that road, South Africa will destroy itself, whatever fine new constitution may be in place.

*** Chamber of Mines on Black Economic 'Illusions'**

34000743A Cape Town *THE ARGUS* in English
8 May 90 p 10

[Commentary by Chamber of Mines President Kennedy Maxwell: "Black Illusions About SA's Wealth"]

[Text] The South African [SA] mining industry welcomes Mr Cyril Ramaphosa's proclamation of 1990 as the Year for Justice, Democracy and Peace on the mines.

It agrees with the general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers when he mentions the social and economic damage done by apartheid, especially to black people.

And, yes, it agrees that a new ray of hope has emerged; that resolution of conflicts through peaceful means is "the new international norm of our time."

Assumptions

Regrettably, that course is not served by the emotional tenor and sweeping assumptions that colour some of Mr Ramaphosa's recently expressed views on the mining industry.

The first and most dangerous assumption, because it ignites unrealistic expectations that cannot be fulfilled, is that South Africa is a wealthy country, and that a fairer division of its wealth would ensure prosperity for all.

The hard fact of the matter is that this is not a wealthy country; that if all personal wealth were pooled and equally divided, most whites and many blacks—including the majority of his union members—would lose, but the gain spread among the masses would be minimal.

Resources

And those with the skills which generate wealth and create employment would take those skills elsewhere—leaving behind a further impoverished country.

The answer is not to rob the rich but to uplift the poor. A look at the wealthy nations of the world will indicate that a country's most valuable asset is not its mineral or other natural resources but its human resources. The only way to increase wealth, or the size of the cake to be divided, is by greater productivity and economic growth.

Education

South Africa has one of the lowest productivity rates in the world, and part of the reason for this has been inferior black education under the apartheid system—exacerbated by the township dictum of "liberation before education."

Mr Ramaphosa refers indirectly to the changes in Eastern Europe, where socialism has so dramatically failed, and then proposes that failed system—including nationalisation—for South Africa. He does not say how nationalisation of the mines is going to be achieved or how it will create more wealth, but it is worth looking at some facts.

Revenue

During 1989:

- 33 percent of the revenue earned from gold sales was paid in wages.
- 39 percent was paid to suppliers of stores, materials and services required to produce the gold.
- 15 percent was spent on capital expenditure items to keep the mines going.
- 8 percent went to taxation and lease payments.
- That left 5 percent for the shareholders which meant that they earned 3.2 percent return on the market capitalisation of all the gold mines. Hardly profiteering!

How would Mr Ramaphosa propose to rearrange these figures? How would he compensate shareholders if the industry was nationalised? How would he retain the confidence of local and international investors without whom new mines will not be opened up to create more jobs and more wealth?

It is patently absurd to write off the economic contribution of the mining industry with the comment that it has enriched only a tiny minority.

Some R7,000,000,000 was paid out to 513,000 employees in the gold and coal mining companies during 1989 and two thirds of all foreign currency earned by exports came from the mining industry.

It has given birth to whole towns, to educational and medical institutions, dams, roads and railways. It is the backbone of the economy.

At the same time, the eighties have not been good for South African gold mining. During this decade inflation has seen our mines move from being the lowest cost producer of gold in the world to the highest.

Since 1989 real annual profits have fallen every year, and the fall in the price of the metal means that by July half the mines will be operating at a loss.

Efficiency

What is needed now is further improvement in productivity and efficiency, not political rhetoric which provocatively seeks to place the Chamber of Mines and "the apartheid State" in the same camp.

The mining industry fully supports peaceful moves toward the creation of a non-racial, democratic post-apartheid society. Its opposition to apartheid has been expressed frequently and effectively: through representations to win full and equal trade union rights for all employees, irrespective of race; through successful efforts to secure the abolition of the "scheduled person" definition from the statute books, scrapping statutory job reservation; and through numerous other motivations including the scrapping of the Group Areas Act.

Restrictions

The industry has also initiated legal action against government and conservative unions over the training of coloured winding engine drivers; the segregation of change houses; restrictions on the number of people employed with blasting licenses (which could restrict the entry of blacks into jobs requiring this certificate); and on the admission of qualified blacks, Asians and coloured people to the Mine Employees Pension Fund.

When Mr Ramaphosa wilfully confuses recruitment with abduction, employment with slavery and hostels with prisons; when he makes totally unfounded allegations about workers being denied the right to organize themselves or elect their own representatives; then he mocks the peace he proclaims.

Aspirations

The government has conceded that apartheid is doomed. What is now at stake is what is to take its place, and how.

Only if we work together constructively will we be able to match our common aspirations of building a prosperous nation in which democracy and an equitable distribution of wealth is fully realised.

* Theories on Future Status of Afrikaans

* Fanie Olivier

90AF0169A Johannesburg RAPPORT
in Afrikaans 8 Apr 90 p 11

[Statement by Prof Fanie Olivier, poet and professor of Afrikaans, at Afrikaans literature seminar in Port Elizabeth]

[Text] Realistically, I have no doubt that we will have one official language: English. Next to it, on an equal footing with all the other languages, will be Afrikaans.

On the part of the ANC [African National Congress], there have already been clear signs that they are going to bring mother language instruction with them to the negotiating table, at least for the first couple of school years. If you take this into consideration, then I would think that the scenario will look as follows:

Three languages at school—mother language, English, and a third language that is strong in your part of the country. In Port Elizabeth, for example, English, Xhosa, and Afrikaans, although people could always do Zulu instead of Afrikaans. Or Sotho.

The abolition of the official status of Afrikaans will probably cause drastic language rationalization... The large number of Afrikaans newspapers will probably shrink to only a few...

The language will be trimmed back. That much is clear. But this does not represent a danger for Afrikaans, because in this way we will be able to grow more firmly in Africa, retaining that remarkable ability to open up a window to Europe.

* Piet Muller

90AF0169B Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans
8 Apr 90 p 11

[Article by deputy editor Piet Muller: "No to This Sort of Inferior Role!"]

[Text] Let's just say this loud and clear: People who figure that Afrikaans will have to play an inferior role in a "new South Africa" for the sake of national reconciliation or for whatever reason are simply politically ignorant. No political order will be able to survive in South Africa against the full force of a language dispute surrounding Afrikaans.

Thus, it is striking that it is not the grim men of revolutionary politics nor the iron men with their AK47s that are announcing that Afrikaans must disappear, but rather the petit bourgeoisie of the revolution, with their clean hands and warm chairs around the "cultural desk."

Just look at the facts: Afrikaans is the mother language of 19 percent of the country's total population. After Zulu (24 percent), it is South Africa's biggest everyday language. Compare this to Xhosa (11 percent) and English (11 percent).

A total of 30 percent of all blacks use Afrikaans as their second language, compared to 28 percent who use English as a second language.

As a language of reading and writing among second-language speakers, unfortunately, Afrikaans lags behind English. This can be attributed to racial prejudices and egotism in the past: Afrikaners chose to instruct black children through the medium of English because then they would not be tempted to try to get into Afrikaans schools. We will be paying a high price for this practice in the future...

I remember an argument that I had one day with a respectable scholar who today is one of the great thinkers of the far-right movement. This conversation concerned what is necessary to make Afrikaans bloom and how to get nonwhites involved with Afrikaans. Up to a certain point things progressed calmly, but suddenly he blurted out, "If this is what is necessary to save Afrikaans, then I would rather speak English..."

I hope that all the rightists who secretly feel this way, but, who still take great pride in Afrikaans publicly, will simply Anglicize as quickly as possible, so that those people with an Afrikaans orientation can continue with their task of expanding the language.

The political charge contained in Afrikaans should not be underestimated. Since the 1800s, language struggle has given a certain momentum to Afrikaner politics.

Granted, the National Party government has a miserable record over the past two decades when it comes to Afrikaans. Over the years, there has been an unwillingness by politicians to recognize that everything is not as rosy as they would like to believe. It was easier to close their eyes to problems that had not yet completely crystallized out, such as starting something that could upset the delicate balance between Afrikaans- and English-speaking voters.

I am thinking about one incident when SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] threw its established language policy overboard in favor of more commercials. This is something that would never have been tolerated in Canada by that country's "language commissioner."

Cultural organizations were deeply concerned, and rightly so. One of them seriously considered approaching

the HSRC [Human Sciences Research Council] to do a private study on the possible consequences of this for Afrikaans.

When the minister in question heard about this, he said in no uncertain terms that the government would regard this as a "hostile act"—and appointed the chairman of the organization in question to the board of directors of SABC.

But that sort of evasion of the problem is no longer possible. The government will be increasingly forced to take clear positions on the Afrikaans question, as Dr. Gerrit Viljoen has already done in quite clear language.

The fact that Afrikaans, as South Africa's second biggest everyday language, must fight for its rights these days can to a certain extent be attributed to a process that began with the Great Trek. It would probably have been better for Afrikaans if the Great Trek had never happened, because the power of the muzzle-loading rifle—and later the Pax Britannica of the colonial masters—made Afrikaans-speakers disperse all over southern Africa. Afrikaans spread itself so thin that nowhere north of the southern Orange Free State is it in fact a majority language.

But English is in the same boat. This is why there is special merit in the FAK [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Association] proposal that South Africa should think about trilingualism on a regional basis. The two official languages, English and Afrikaans, should remain in force, with a third language as an official language in a particular region—such as Zulu in Natal, Sesotho in the Orange Free State, and Tswana in the western Transvaal.

This will perhaps be the language arrangement that will cause the least political tension.

The new gospel that politicians these days are proclaiming, to the effect that "free-market forces" will perpetuate Afrikaans—or any other language—in the future, is naturally utter nonsense. A language's future depends not only on how many people speak it in bed or in the kitchen, but also, and in particular, on what "higher" or official functions it occupies. Once a language has ceased to be the language of court and of the civil service, then it soon ceases to be a language used in secondary schools as well. After that, it disappears from the university level and then ceases to be a literary language.

"Individual rights" cannot protect languages, because languages are "collective rights." A language right is useless if you do not have people around you speaking the same language. This is why the most general problem with language arrangements is the possibility that people speaking other languages can come into an area and later deprive the established speakers in that area of their language rights.

Thorough plans must be made for this eventuality. It cannot be left up to the "free market" without creating political tension.

And always remember that languages are more than means of communication. Languages are like the protoplasm found around the nuclei of cells: It links individuals to a community and nourishes them with certain values.

It is like the song that the old women in N.P. van Wyk Louw's "Raka" sings: "an umbilical cord of gently throbbing blood."

Any attempt to misjudge the reality of language for propaganda purposes would unleash a storm in South Africa that would make any national reconciliation or constitutional dispensation impossible.

Do we really want to condemn ourselves to an "80-year war"?

*** Joan Kruger**

*90AF0169C Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans
8 Apr 90 p 11*

[Article by journalist Joan Kruger: "Vine Shooting Tendrils"]

[Text] Scratch Afrikaans out of the code of law, they are now saying.

Abandon all expectations that it will remain an official language.

Don't shove it down people's throats.

Accept it as simply a tribal language.

"One of the very beautiful languages of our region."

This is what Afrikaner writers and intellectuals say.

Pitiful.

And what makes me sick is that in my heart I agree with them.

At first, this prophesizing left me in something of a daze; the wild dropper of a wire fence going thud across my face.

But then I realized that the people who are saying such things are right.

I too want to see Afrikaans pure again. Purified of ideological warts, cleansed in the purgatory of penance. Deloused, dewormed. Disinfected.

The language of the little people, no longer that of the People.

The language will not perish.

Pruned back, it will instead bloom.

Just like in earlier years, when the wild outgrowth began to send its roots through the reefs here.

And we will continue to speak it on a modestly small—but pure—scale.

I am a black sheep because of this, in quiet semantic martyrdom.

But then I make a mistake.

I start thinking about it.

About statements like, "Afrikaans has too much 'ideological baggage.'"

What?

Then just look at English, with its suitcases full of injustice. Shepstone and Milner, the donkey eyes and "I must not speak Dutch"...

I start to think about "Afrikaans is just a tribal language."

Tribal language of whom?

The white Afrikaners?

This language that was first a black language and then became the language of whites as well?

The language that has shot tendrils all over the country, that is spoken by more blacks than English...

Restrict it for the future to a tribe and region?

Get thee to a reservation!

Says Carel Boshoff.

Say the white Afrikaans-speaking clerks at the ANC [African National Congress]'s cultural desk.

An intellectual Dorsland for Afrikaans. But English you can use anywhere in the country.

English which was also just a tribal language.

English which was also scorned by its own upper class, which wanted to speak only French.

Which barred English from its own parliament, its own schools, its own churches...

Just as some of our own writers want to do with Afrikaans now.

A smug upper class that has outgrown the language of the kitchen table?

With broad intentions, but narrow understanding.

Remember too, comes the next accusation, that Afrikaans is not the only tribal language. There is also Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, and so on. They should have the same right to be an official language.

Yes. And no.

The other languages have the option. Afrikaans already has the will.

The other languages have themselves suspended their pretensions to be a full language.

They did this when they themselves, out of their own free will, chose English at school and rejected their own languages.

We did not do this with Afrikaans.

From the days when the people on high said, look at the lower classes who are speaking Afrikaans, through the years when we shrank at the hate that apartheid had inflicted on our language in Soweto, we remained true.

Shame on us and our deeds, in some cases, but never on our language.

This is why we will not go back to just a "tribal language."

We will not have our language turned into a nice ethnic bonsai tree.

We want to use it to its full capacity and in all places, let its roots sink deep, let its tendrils shoot out far and wide.

Just as the Jews wanted to do when they revived Hebrew.

Just as the Irish have not done.

Because they no longer had the will.

And that one word renders this entire debate unnecessary, fruitless, just words in the wind. Because the people who think that Afrikaners no longer have that will understand little of what their own people think and feel, understand little of that fervent passion that binds us to our language.

Stubbornly, without recognizing its limitations, this language of children and slaves has become the language of our existence.

And now?

Should we now close the flood-gates? Let the irrigation furrows grow over? Sink the spade into the ground at the last row?

Just because there could be a new water bailiff? Or because our neighbors want to fight us over a chance at the water?

Let that sort of defeatism build up like foot-rot around the cultural desk.

But not among us.

Not among us, for whom Afrikaans is the impossible that has become possible, the sign that Africa and Europe can speak each other's language. A useful thing from the past that will become even more useful in the years ahead.

Instead of letting it dry up and pruning it back, we want to give it water for the future.

This language, which goes back much further than the British occupation, the language that bound whites and colored to the same fate from early on, can help us in the times ahead to reach out to the new Europe.

The Europe that with a unified Germany could once again become the focal point of trade and development.

Because Afrikaans is not some sort of self-sown plant. It is still close enough to Dutch and German to make large parts of Europe easily accessible. The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland. And all the other countries in which the language of the Deutsche mark is spoken, a language that will probably regain its old status before long.

We are blessed to have English as one of our official languages; we are doubly blessed to have Afrikaans as another bridge to Europe.

Also so that Afrikaans can serve as a dam against the homogenized, pasteurized, over-simplified American culture that continually threatens to make us an intellectual colony of the Yanks.

Let us not beat around the bush: The English of today's world is no longer Shakespeare's English, it is the English of He-man and She-ra. It is the English of American vendors of entertainment and fried chicken.

Should this be our model for the future?

Is there not much more to be gained by giving our own language the chance to grow?

Once the other black nations discover their love for their own languages, once those languages are ready, through dedication and work and will, to also become official languages, we as a nation will be even more rich intellectually. And with new methods of learning languages, it is not only easy for you to learn new languages; at the same time you nurture exciting capacities for thought.

It was under an Afrikaner government that the black languages gained scope, that white children began to learn them at school.

We would like to believe that their growth has enriched us all.

In the meantime: to all the writers and cultural workers, those doing penance and flagellating themselves:

It is one thing to whip yourselves and bleed visibly about the sins committed against humanity.

It is another thing to renounce your language along with it.

Keep your hands off Afrikaans.

It is not yours to throw away.

* Adam Small

90AF0169D Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans
8 Apr 90 p 11

[Article by poet, dramatist, and sociologist Adam Small: "My Type of People Must Move Towards Grayness"]

[Text] If it appears to you that your language is being taken away from you by your language, then you certainly have reason to feel a special rancor towards whatever imposed this situation on you. Now, my experience over the years has been that my children have become alienated from my language, so that they no longer use it now at home. It is preeminently in Afrikaans that they experienced apartheid, and the effects of apartheid overwhelmed them. What else could they do?

In this sense, "my language"—the language "that my mother taught me"—has been taken away from me; actually, pulled out from under my "domestic" feet. And for outsiders, including those who use Afrikaans, it is certainly scarcely possible for them to conceive of the impression that such a thing has on a writer (a personal earthquake?).

Perhaps the way in which I took the loathsomeness of apartheid to heart over the years was simply too individual... but then my writing also progressed according to that very best characterization of "the man behind the book" by fellow writer Jack Cope:

"The pattern in any study of literature would not be complete," he said, "if it failed to include the kind of writer who fits into no pattern at all: the odd man out, the awkward guest at the party."

In another sense, however, this very experience of mine, in an aggravated manner, revived in me the reality and value of being a cultural mulatto: the reality and value of the freedom that this brings with it.

Politically speaking, in our contemporary situation, I am "black"—this too according to my own definition; in fact, during the early 1970s, I had a great deal to do with the establishment, in the western Cape, of the term "black" in this sense. Culturally speaking, I was still a mulatto the entire time, and I often referred (and still do refer) to "my type of people" as "gray"... culturally "gray."

Because look—and now I am clearly talking again as the "odd man out," as the "awkward guest at the party" (but nonetheless at the party): When you are born into the world as a mulatto, you inherit the grayness, and it is hardly necessary for you to look for it. What you as a writer or any other sort of "artist" must do is fathom and exploit the cultural meaning of that fact.

Especially in a historical situation like ours, now, when people must disengage from exclusivism and apartheid, it is almost vitally important that the writer who was born mulatto do just that, and that the writers who were

not born that way attempt make up for that type of experience of being a mulatto as well as they possibly can.

The mulatto, as neither "white" nor "black," as nothing "pure," as "mixed" goods, encounters—without any of his own merits to begin with!—the following joy in life:

By birth, he or she can hardly rectify his or her unawareness of cultural "individuality"... reticence and seclusion.

The mulatto is "inherently" opposed to apartheid; or better yet, in a situation like the one in South Africa, for example, he is in favor of freedom, or—better yet and in anticipation—a free man. In that sense, nonmulattoes have a lot to learn from mulattoes in the world and locally...

Thus, it is obvious that the insights of (say) an Albie Sachs on the virtues of striving for a genuine or open South African-ness is nothing new to me. Perhaps it does not go far enough.

And I want to experience all the issues concerning the "future of Afrikaans in a new South Africa" as a mulatto as well, and as a mulatto who was Afrikaans through and through (and still is?). What is the insistence on a "statutory status" for Afrikaans and the "nonnegotiability" of that issue really about in terms of future language issues in this country?

OK, a person (any "Afrikaans person," I would think) has understanding for and sees the possibility of such an insistence, if—and only if—those insisting sit down at the table (the much-promised negotiating table) with complete and utter clarity about this: that apartheid, in the future, is finished and over with, in the language, dead as a door-nail...

In short, those who are so insistent in this regard must come to the table with the honest realization (and everyone coming to the table must do the same thing) that we must all move towards grayness. And an honest realization is a visible realization, whose visibility must be grounded in the type of political order for the country that these negotiators will set out at the table...

We must move towards grayness. And naturally that journey can also be undertaken with and through Afrikaans; even more honestly than with and through our (necessary) lingua franca, our no-man's language for the country, English. Because insofar as apartheid is a variant of colonialism in our part of the world, and the mother language of that colonialism was (and is) English, then when all is said and done apartheid's loathsomeness owes more to English than to Afrikaans.

So later, much later (?), my children will perhaps give up and read Afrikaans once again, as a free language with the eternal theme of human good and evil.

* Karel Prinsloo

90AF0169E Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans
8 Apr 90 p 11

[Article by Karel Prinsloo of HSRC: "Still Many Opportunities for Afrikaans"]

[Text] Naturally, it is important that there be detailed discussion and sober planning on the official recognition of the role that the main languages—including Afrikaans—will play in a changing South Africa.

At the same time, discussion of the future should not begin to assume such great dimensions that the existing realities and immediate challenges of our language situation are no longer attended to adequately.

Just as the unrest in 1976 drew negative attention to Afrikaans, President F.W. de Klerk's reforms in 1990 have drawn positive attention to Afrikaans-speakers' genuine interest in normalizing relations in South Africa.

There are numerous signs that the Afrikaner is in the process of setting aside his old inclination towards exclusivity in favor of a greater openness with respect to the Afrikaans language and culture. Even many of those who regard themselves as oppressed and who are active participants in the "liberation struggle" in this country identify openly with Afrikaans.

The negative image that Afrikaans gained during one period as the so-called "language of the oppressor" has thus undergone an interesting change to a certain extent. The major question now is this: To what extent are the many opportunities that exist for Afrikaans currently being exploited? It is not only the legal position of the language that determines what the future of Afrikaans will look like; it is especially the Afrikaans language community's own care and use of the language that is critical for the future.

Thus, for example, it is doubtful whether all the rich opportunities for Afrikaans in education are even close to being taken advantage of. Besides the use of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in a considerable part of the country's schools, Afrikaans is also a compulsory subject in white, colored, and Indian schools. In the majority of black schools, Afrikaans simply has elective status, but this still represents an opportunity for Afrikaans.

In the entire national school system, there are major challenges associated with using Afrikaans as the medium of instruction and as a subject. Curricula, textbooks, teaching methods, and the competence of teachers are all examples of issues to which full attention must be continually given in order to take advantage of the opportunities that exist for Afrikaans.

In the present-day struggle for liberation, during which the broad masses in South Africa are being politically motivated, Afrikaans is in the thick of things, specifically whenever the future is discussed. Certain activist leaders

regard it as an important objective to scale down the role of Afrikaans in the future to that of a minority language, just as Venda, for example, is a minority language. Thus, we must look at their proposals on a future language policy against this background.

The fact that right now, in a period of a great deal of contemplation of the future, the future language situation is also being contemplated, is to a certain extent completely natural. It is even a healthy phenomenon that people, in light of changing needs on the regional level, for example, or due to the expansion of the functions of certain languages in the broader community, are coming forth with suggestions concerning adjustments.

However, detailed consideration and responsible discussion of any proposal is a rather complicated matter, often far removed from public platforms, where wild allegations are sometimes made.

In a country with so much linguistic diversity as South Africa, language adjustments can easily lead to conflict. This is why it is necessary that the great discussion conducted by experts, ordinary users of the language, and politicians on the language dispensation remain as open as possible.

We in South Africa now enjoy the advantage that a broad diversity of people and parties are actively and dynamically taking part in the discussion on our language future. This ensures that all the most important factors (the African reality and Western aspirations, the richness of all the main languages, the interests of all the minority groups) will be taken into account.

The great language discussion is happening rather spontaneously, with divergent groups all taking part in a different way: universities, the language academies and language councils, cultural associations, research institutions, political groups, and writers groups. This open discussion is indeed progressing in a constructive manner in the sense that policy-makers, decision-makers, and negotiators on a future dispensation are receiving or have access to continual information on the progress of the discussions.

As these great language discussions churn on, plans continue to be made for the future of Afrikaans. This is a planning process that many people are helping to develop and implement. It is planning for the development of Afrikaans together with other languages, in a South Africa with normalized relations.

*** De Klerk's 'Failure To Acknowledge Guilt' Scored**

34000752B Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS
in English 19 May 90 p 14

[Commentary by Allister Sparks of THE OBSERVER:
"De Klerk Must Acknowledge Guilt of an Apartheid Past"]

[Text] When President F. W. de Klerk began his visit to Britain on Thursday night, he did so as the most internationally acceptable and publicly applaudable South African leader since General Jan Smuts.

No doubt there will still be demonstrations, but they will not have the fervour of the past. Mr de Klerk may not have attained the degree of acclaim outside his own country that Mr Mikhail Gorbachev has, but there is a sense that he, too, is a man of political courage who is trying to change the evil system that nurtured him and that this deserves acknowledgment.

It is an awesome task. To dismantle apartheid, to allay white fears of the black majority, to demythologise Afrikaner nationalism after generations of indoctrination in the notion that theirs is a special nation with a right to rule in their own God-given land, is an undertaking that may be even more daunting than Mr Gorbachev's.

The man must be given credit for that. Yet his performance is not above criticism. In several areas Mr de Klerk has bungled the job and compounded his own difficulties.

The most serious of these is in failing to explain adequately to his own followers why he is making such a remarkable U-turn and where it is that he is taking them. The result has been to strengthen the right-wing backlash against him.

As recently as last October, Mr de Klerk was still fulminating against the African National Congress, leading his National Party into an election campaign in which he accused the liberal opposition of treasonous behaviour for meeting with the ANC [African National Congress] and suggesting that it should be unbanned and engaged in negotiations. Six months later he did exactly that himself—with no attempt to explain his startling change.

When leader of the Conservative Party Dr Andries Treurnicht accused Mr de Klerk of acting without a mandate from the white electorate, it struck a responsive chord. Angry Nationalists turned to him in droves.

What is worse, they felt insecure. All their lives these loyal Afrikaners had relied on the National Party government to guarantee Afrikaner security by keeping the black majority firmly in its place. Now it seemed to have lost its will to do that, with the result that many decided they had better do the job themselves.

So vigilante groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging have flourished, and the police force has become something of a vigilante group in itself, often acting with a repressive violence that is completely out of tune with the government's reformist rhetoric.

Mr de Klerk's other failure has been in not acknowledging the guilt of the past. There has been no equivalent of Mr Gorbachev's, or even Khrushchev's, de-Stalinisation.

At no time have Mr de Klerk or any of his ministers renounced Hendrik Verwoerd, the chief architect of apartheid who put most of its laws on the statute book between 1948 and his assassination in 1966.

In an interview with the WASHINGTON POST late last year, Mr de Klerk refused to concede that the government's policies over the years had been reprehensible or wrong. He even defended the homelands policy. It had contributed to the eventual solution of the race problem, he insisted.

The implications of this reluctance are serious. If there is no acknowledgment of past wrongs then there is no acknowledgment that blacks have legitimate grievances, or that these now require redress. So there is no acceptance of a need for affirmative action.

* Post-Apartheid Education Issues Debated

34000752A Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS
in English 19 May 90 p 14

[Article by Tyrone Seale: "Educationists Take Up Cudgels"]

[Text] Education for a post-apartheid South Africa is becoming a visionary hotbed as official and community-based educationists thrash out options for a single school system.

Education Deputy Minister Mr Piet Marais fuelled discussion this week when he predicted a future where a single education department would plan policies, syllabi and finance.

In an SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation]-TV interview he said the government was prepared to sit down and talk about such a system.

He also disclosed that under-utilised white schools would be bought for black pupils to stem overcrowding in black schools.

At the same time the Humans Sciences Research Council released the results of an opinion poll showing that 52 percent of whites "strongly" or "predominantly" favoured racially-open schools, if standards and admission requirements were maintained.

About 41 percent of the 1,856 respondents surveyed were against open schools.

This week's developments came a few weeks short of the June 15 deadline by which statutory advisory bodies should submit comment on a plan by Education and Culture Minister Piet Clase for a restructuring of white education.

Under this plan State schools could be given the option of going private and admitting pupils of any race but paying more for upkeep; or they could remain under State control, admitting pupils of any race but under stricter conditions.

In both cases, the government would seek approval from a higher percentage of parents—possibly as high as 90 percent.

Depending on approval, the State could implement one, or both, of these options by next January.

Officially there is no advance on Mr Clase's March announcement, according to a spokesman in the minister's office.

But beyond the parliamentary arena educationists are casting options into a visionary crucible from which they hope an education system by, for and about all South Africans will emerge.

Two important organisations, the Open Schools Association (OSA) and the National Education Co-ordinating committee (NECC), are already moving from principles to practises to lay the foundation for post-apartheid education.

The OSA, established by some of South Africa's best-known and oldest white schools to fight for non-discriminatory admission to schools, met last weekend to discuss the challenges facing educationists.

A senior OSA official, who asked not to be named for professional reasons, said: "We looked at the issue of no-racial schooling in the short term, which will involve only white schools.

"We tried to address issues like language, religion and culture, about which parents, pupils and teachers are asking questions and expressing fears.

"Based on this, we will prepare for schools a package of guidelines about issues concerning non-racialism.

"Many of the issues are universal, but some relate specifically to the short-term opening of white schools and point out the challenges and richnesses that will come with that.

"There is no doubt that there are prejudices, fears and myths—this is true of all sides—because of the history of this country. This can only be overcome by education and getting to know the people you ask questions about. We hope our guidelines will help our members and, hopefully, black schools as well."

This package will be released towards the middle of next month.

While the conference produced a concrete, short-term package that was much-needed in white education, the OSA remained committed to working for a non-racial system that would reshape and revitalise all education departments, the spokesman said.

"We have always advocated that the ultimate education system should be totally non-racial. There should be no discrimination.

"Only as an interim measure should white schools be allowed to elect whether enrollment should be non-racial or not.

"We are very happy to see the existence of private schools and the minister's plans for more private schools.

"We have no objection to the setting up of new private schools, but we do have a problem with the conversion of State schools into private schools. The State system is created for the ordinary person and everyone should have access to that system."

On the funding of post-apartheid education, he said: "We believe there should be an equitable policy for the funding of education.

"This does not mean equal funds—it might happen that for certain historical or geographical reasons it may be necessary to pay more for the provision of education in certain areas and aspects of education than would be necessary in others.

"This should be developed on non-racial grounds and must be based on educationally defensible reasons. At the same time alternative funding sources have to be found.

"As it is, the State is probably spending as much as it can afford for quality education, but the distribution has to be redressed."

The spokesman said the scrapping of the Group Areas Act was a key issue in the workability of non-racial education.

"The school has a community role and if it's an all-white community by law, it's going to be as close to a white school as possible, unless one employs artificial means, like bussing, to integrate schools.

"Education is going to be a key factor in the new South Africa and if it is neglected, the possibility of harmony is nil."

The NECC has welcomed official gravitation towards open schools and universities, but expressed reservation about Mr Clase's "top-down" formulation of his two models.

"We believe that the open schools initiative is a necessary step to embark on and one that should be supported, which is why we have also supported the Open Schools Association," regional NECC chairman Mr Monde Tulwana said this week.

"But we need to make it clear that we don't see the opening of schools as a matter of white schools providing tokenism to a group of stranded black children.

"To us it is a question of the opening of all doors of learning, in line with the Freedom Charter. We see it as the upgrading of the provision of all basic necessary resources needed in black schools especially.

"At the moment we can foresee black pupils moving into white schools, leaving a majority of blacks stranded.

"We tie the opening of schools to the scrapping of the Group Areas Act and other fundamental laws governing the country and this is how the State should see it too.

"This will demand certain changes in the curriculum. Our education is not yet serving the needs of the country. White education suffers the same difficulty.

"The opening of schools should go hand in hand with steps to serve the interest of the country as a whole. We need to provide basic teaching to allay the resentment that has built up among various communities over the years."

On Minister Clase's option of privatised education, Mr Tulwana said: "We believe that privatisation is not an answer in resolving the crisis in education.

"We still believe very strongly that education is the State's responsibility."

"We don't accept models that will be thrown at people after they've been left out of discussion on the matter. Why were we not consulted on the opening of white schools to us?

"This kind of 'top-down' decision-making is a great problem for us."

* ANC's Max Sisulu Discusses Economic Policy

34000751C Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 25-31 May 90 pp 6-7

[Text] NEW NATION spoke to the ANC [African National Congress]'s chief economist, Max Sisulu, about the organisation's objectives and obstacles in the way of achieving its aims.

[THE NEW NATION] What is the ANC's economic policy and what are the organisation's goals in this regard?

[Sisulu] The economic question is crucial—it is where the hopes and aspirations of our people are going to be either met or dashed.

Therefore like the Freedom Charter (FC) and the ANC's political guidelines, our proposals for the management of the economy will be a product of widespread consultation, informed political debate and discussion inside the ANC and within the mass democratic movement (MDM).

We have already had discussions, seminars and workshops with the trade union movement, Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions], with people who are involved in agriculture and the land question.

We've had discussions and are again having discussions with the business community—white business. We've had discussions with small business—black business.

Our economic policy is therefore rooted in the FC and is a policy that has been dictated by the need to address problems of acute poverty, inequality and deprivation that have been generated and duplicated by apartheid.

Our aim, also, is to democratise the economy. The apartheid economy has been shaped by the needs of the apartheid system and the needs of the capitalist system which, for centuries has been based on the exploitation of cheap black labour for the benefit of the white minority and the conglomerates, both the domestic and foreign.

We need to change all of that—we need to change the economic base of apartheid, change the patterns of production and distribution.

[THE NEW NATION] What are the constraints in the way of achieving these objectives?

[Sisulu] There are a number of constraints. The first being the structure of the economy, which is based on the system of apartheid.

Apartheid, which initially fostered economic growth, has now become an impediment to economic growth, that is why business, which has always been in cohorts with apartheid, is now ditching apartheid.

And also, the masses of people are fighting to end apartheid. So there is that political and economic instability and profit margins are decreasing—there isn't really any profit margin—you have industry that is not working to capacity. You have a situation where even the domestic private owners of capital don't want to invest in the economy because of the uncertainty.

A democratic government is therefore going to inherit a situation where there is massive unemployment, it's going to inherit a country which has got education and training bottlenecks.

You also have a situation where less than one person of the economy is in black hands.

You have the vast majority of the people participating in the economy only as labourers and consumers.

Now these are some of the constraints.

There are also demand-related constraints—namely that the market is very small inside the country. This is not because there are few people but because the people do not have enough money to buy the goods and services that are there—the majority of the people are unemployed, there is also high inflation—and under those conditions people do not have enough money to buy the goods and stimulate the growth of the economy.

Because of its apartheid policy, SA [South Africa] has got a low-wage-high-cost structure. Because of the high costs, goods produced in SA are not competitive on the world market.

[THE NEW NATION] The ANC has stated its preference for a mixed economy. What are the essential features of a mixed economy?

[Sisulu] Yes, the ANC supports the mixed economy option and this is implied in the FC and also stated in the ANC's constitutional guidelines.

One of the essential features of a mixed economy, in the way we see it—because almost every country has a mixed economy—even the present SA has a mixed economy, is the co-existence of different patterns of the ownership of the means of production, the co-existence of private and public sectors.

Another essential feature of the mixed economy is active government intervention in the economy.

Now the mixed economy is not a fixed concept—at every stage in the development of the mixed economy, there will be corrections and changes.

The important feature about our mixed economy is that it will involve the mass of the people in its formulation and direction. It will also have elements of both market and planned economies.

But the planning we are talking about is different from perhaps that in an over-centralised and bureaucratic state.

[THE NEW NATION] So you do envisage active state intervention in the economy?

[Sisulu] Yes, as the South African state intervened on the side of capital, in order to increase profits for capital and maintain a high standard of living for the whites, the sales in a democratic SA will have to intervene on behalf of the people so that the wealth of the country serves the interests of the country as a whole and not just a particular section, a particular class or race.

The harm done over centuries of oppression will have to be undone—you cannot leave this to market forces.

Market forces simply reflect the existing inequalities in a society—market forces replicate and duplicate the existing inequalities, they don't change the inequalities.

They can only be changed by the active participation of the people, through the state and through their organisations.

There are many people who say that the state must get out of the economy. We are saying no—if anything, we have to strengthen the ability of the state to intervene actively in economic issues.

That is why we are opposed to issues like privatisation—that is why we are saying that the state, among other things, has to embark on programmes to make sure that there is some income and wealth redistribution.

[THE NEW NATION] When the ANC advocates income and wealth redistribution, the state and capital

have argued that the emphasis should be on growth instead. Are these issues mutually exclusive?

[Sisulu] No, it does not mean that redistribution would impede growth—obviously when there is growth, there is more to distribute.

We do, however, emphasise that there is a need to redistribute—there is a need also for economic growth.

We also see that it is quite possible to have growth through redistribution. We cannot have growth of the kind that we have had for the past few decades, where there has been no distribution—it has been growth, not for our people, but growth for the pockets of big business.

One of the problems of the current economic system, as we have explained, is that it is demand-constrained, that the market is small, etc., and that we need to pay a living wage so that there is a demand for goods and services.

So that way you get the economy again beginning to work properly and not under-capacity as it is right now.

[THE NEW NATION] But where does the money for redistribution and financing a democratic post-apartheid mixed economy come from?

[Sisulu] One possibility is rationalising state expenditure, which is 22 percent of the gross domestic product. Sanctions is currently costing SA a lot of money—nobody knows how much savings will come from this area once sanctions are relaxed.

Given all things unchanged, namely no capital flight, no loss of labour skills and so on, I would estimate that the post-apartheid economy would enjoy a substantial increase of real resources with an accompanying rise in income and productivity.

The oil embargo will end as will other forms of international sanctions. This could bring about an improvement in the country's terms of trade. Quantitatively, this improvement could be translated into around R10-billion in year one.

[THE NEW NATION] Do you see the existence of huge monopolies and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few as an impediment to development in a future SA?

[Sisulu] Well, you have about four conglomerates owning almost the entire wealth of SA. No democratic government can allow a situation like that to continue where economic power—and together with economic power follows political power—is in the hand of a few conglomerates.

They will be more powerful than the democratic state. They therefore have to be dismembered and cut down to size—and without having to sacrifice efficiency.

There are a number of anti-trust laws in the SA statute book that haven't been used. And all over the world you

have anti-trust laws, that are designed specifically to make sure that no corporations, at least in theory, are as big as the ones we have in SA. They have to be cut down—we can use the anti-trust laws to break them up.

The ANC has indicated that it is committed to nationalising certain enterprises. How do you ensure that nationalised enterprises do not develop into bloated bureaucracies and end up serving the party faithfuls?

[Sisulu] An important feature here would be democratic control of these institutions—and accountability—it must be cost-effective. In other words they shouldn't be perpetually subsidised because in that way you are taking money from the tax payer and putting it into a bloated bureaucracy that does not produce the desired goods and services.

* CP: Reforms Hamstring Police Power

90AF0164A Pretoria DIE PATRIOT
in Afrikaans 13 Apr 90 p 11

[Unattributed article: "The SA Police in the Gun's Sight": first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The government warns the police that it must play a "nonpolitical" role, proceeds to unleash a revolution on the country, and then calls on the police to restore law and order. Subsequently, it promises the ANC [African National Congress] to consider appointing a judicial commission to look into the role of, among others, the police in the incident in question! Read on in the accompanying article about how the government is acting disloyally towards the police.

Several days ago, when he received ANC Deputy Chairman Mr. Nelson Mandela at Tuynhuys, State President Mr. F.W. de Klerk promised to consider appointing a judicial commission to look into police action during the recent shootings at Sebokeng.

In order to put that action into perspective, it must be remembered that the police at Sebokeng were forced to fire after they were attacked by a horde of armed demonstrators. The events in question took place after a protest march by revolutionary elements was turned back from a white residential area.

The Sebokeng protest march was the umpteenth one since the first one was approved by Mr. de Klerk last 13 September. In justifying granting permission for this, the government indicated that that sort of action is an escape valve for black aspirations. Warnings that protest marches would heighten the revolutionary climate and by necessity lead to violence and the loss of life were strikingly confirmed during the months that followed.

Nevertheless, the government has yet to notice this, and continues to allow numerous marches. Although the Sebokeng march was prohibited, it is clearly part of a new culture of demonstrations that has been expedited by the government. If the dominant feeling among the revolutionaries at Sebokeng was one of frustration, then

this is completely understandable. According to the state president, marches are a lawful form of political expression that are in fact encouraged by the government. Why make Sebokeng an exception?

Ultimately, however, it was the police that had to bear the brunt of criticism. The government allows protest marches, but once they get out of hand and the police must intervene, the state president promises to consider a judicial commission to look into the incident!

The police have in fact been a prominent victim of Mr. de Klerk's policy ever since he took office. Mr. de Klerk's primary task since he became state president has been to improve the "climate for negotiation," and the release of leading ANC and PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] figures and the legalization of revolutionary organizations was easily the most important part of this.

Few people know that the police and its leaders (as well as those of the Defense Force) were not even consulted by Mr. de Klerk. However, he had announced earlier that they should no longer play a "political" role, and that they should concern themselves exclusively with law enforcement.

As predicted from the very beginning, these steps led to unprecedented violence all over South Africa. It not only gave rise to flare-ups of unrest in the major urban centers, but even led to violence in small towns of the Orange Free State. Mr. de Klerk was obliged by this to turn to the police and suddenly ask them to once again play "a political role."

What Mr. de Klerk and Minister of Law and Order Mr. Adriaan Vlok actually did was to unleash revolutionary elements on the country without the knowledge of the police. When the experiment failed, the police were called in to save the day. After they were forced to take action, however, Mr. de Klerk promised the leadership of the ANC to consider appointing a judicial commission to look into the incident!

Never in the history of South Africa have a head of state and a responsible minister acted with such abominable disloyalty towards the police.

The lack of understanding for the current lawless situation that Mr. Vlok exhibits is effectively illustrated by his admonition to policemen last year that they should smile instead of using their cudgels! Shortly thereafter, policemen sometimes had to fight for their lives after violence broke out across the land as a result of the government's (including Mr. Vlok's) action.

This was the same Mr. Vlok who informed the Parliament during the debate on no-confidence that the police supported Mr. de Klerk's actions. Besides the fact that this was a clumsy attempt to involve the police in partisan politics, it was also untrue. No referendum has ever been held among policemen to determine whether they support Mandela's release and the legalization of the ANC and the SA [South African] Communist Party.

In all probability, the opposite would be true if such a referendum were to be held.

However, the police are being handicapped in their job in other ways as well. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen revealed last week that the police are being "psychologically reoriented" in order to make them capable of working together with a legal ANC. Mr. Vlok explained this program to him earlier, Mr. Cohen said.

In the meantime, the ANC continues with its "armed struggle," and has committed itself to attacking government installations, among other things! A number of attacks have already taken place since Mr. de Klerk legalized the organization on 2 February. Another organization that has also been legalized, the PAC, is not even considering negotiation and has already warned that it is going to intensify its terrorism!

The government's new noises on the police are easy to explain. The police is regarded by the ANC as the most prominent stumbling block on the road to a successful takeover of power. This is why pressure is being applied on the government to tie the police's hands, such as through the appointment of judicial commissions and the acceptance of a nonpolitical role. The police have been determined to be a stumbling block to negotiations, and the government is being asked to get rid of them.

Mr. de Klerk's promise to Mr. Mandela last week underscored how successful the ANC has actually been.

*** Youth Group Calls for Political Interaction**

90AF0164B Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD
in Afrikaans 20 Apr 90 p 7

[Interview with University of Pretoria Youth Force leader Werner Viljoen, by Pearlle Joubert: "Youth Force and the ANC: We Do Not Want To Exclude Anyone"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Last weekend, there was an Afrikaner in coat and tie sitting among the approximately 1,200 "young lions." Werner Viljoen, chairman of the Youth Force branch on the campus of the University of Pretoria, was an invited guest to the first national meeting of the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO). Pearlle Joubert had a talk with him.

[Joubert] Youth Force is described as an organization that is sympathetic to the NP [National Party]. You spoke with the ANC [African National Congress] at the beginning of this year and were a guest at the SAYCO congress. Why has Youth Force waited until now to talk to the ANC?

[Viljoen] Youth Force regards the ANC as playing an important role in South Africa. The ANC too realizes now that it is important for various youth organizations to come together. In addition, it is only now that the political climate has become ripe for youth organizations

to talk to each other. After all, it is a general trend that more people today are realizing that they must talk to each other.

[Joubert] Didn't Youth Force wait for the NP to open up the road to talks with the ANC?

[Viljoen] No, Youth Force has always wanted to stimulate dialogue.

[Joubert] Where does Youth Force fit into the political future of South Africa?

[Viljoen] We see ourselves growing and as an organization that will increasingly initiate talks. We bring people together to talk about the South Africa of the future.

[Joubert] To what extent do Youth Force's positions and political ideals differ from those of the ANC and of other organizations such as SAYCO, NUSAS [National Union of South African Students], and SANSCO (South African National Students Congress)?

[Viljoen] I really can't think of any differences right now.

From the point of view of the ANC youth, they feel that we are the most accommodating youth organization. We do not want to exclude anyone, and we will not join ranks with some unified group; rather, we see ourselves in the middle, aiming in this way to bring groups together.

Youth Force wants to bring about agreements between various groups instead of emphasizing their differences. Perhaps we do emphasize the policy of negotiation more than other political youth organizations, but we all have the same common end goal—to bring about a new South Africa.

[Joubert] Why do you think the ANC was interested in talking to Youth Force?

[Viljoen] Youth Force is traditionally regarded as an Afrikaner and Afrikaans political youth organization. I think that they want to know what the Afrikaner youth is thinking.

[Joubert] But doesn't Youth Force organize among black and brown students as well?

[Viljoen] Yes. However, the nonracial approach by Youth Force is still sometimes problematic, because the political climate on a campus largely determines how Youth Force will organize. If a community is not yet ready for an organization between black and white students, it doesn't help any to force them into it. This process must occur gradually, and then you get everyone to go with you.

[Joubert] Could Youth Force, NUSAS, SANSCO, and SAYCO, and the ANC organize as one organization?

[Viljoen] Yes, I think so. We are all dealing with the future. However, Youth Force emphasizes that people must remain positive and not get emotionally roused.

[Joubert] Youth Force is seen as a political organization that has always been part of the NP's plan for South Africa...

[Viljoen] Yes, that is a problem. That view is due to a lack of correct information.

[Joubert] What effect have the meeting with the ANC and last weekend's SAYCO congress had on Youth Force?

[Viljoen] We had our last meeting with the ANC on Sunday. Two days later, F.W. [de Klerk] made his "stunning" statement.

Youth Force's external image was greatly helped by the ANC meeting, and the fact that SAYCO invited us gave us a much more positive image. The black youth now look at us in an entirely different light—Youth Force is regarded as an organization that is interested in open dialogue and negotiations, and as being very accommodating to different viewpoints. In the past, they regarded us simply as Afrikaner youth. Now we are a political organization that is ready to listen and talk. Youth Force is now open to contact, talks, and negotiation. They also realize now that white youth who were not active "liberals" in the past must also be exposed to the function and activities of political youth organizations like SAYCO.

* Church Opposes Reform on Biblical Grounds

90AF0164C Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD
in Afrikaans 20 Apr 90 p 10

[Article by Ina van der Linde: "Afrikaans Protestants Say No to a New SA"]

[Text] The Afrikaans Protestant Church (APK) of Prof Willie Lubbe says that as "believers of the Bible who want to follow God's way in our lives and in our future" they find the announcement by the state president concerning a "new South Africa" unacceptable.

The APK broke away from the Dutch Reformed Church [NGK] in 1987 over changes in policy concerning racial issues during the previous General Synod of the NGK.

Lubbe, the founder of the APK, chairman of the executive board, and editor of the official newspaper DIE BOODSKAPPER, writes in the latest issue, "We were not put on earth and in the RSA [Republic of South Africa] to give free rein to our own human will and desires, but rather to continually learn God's will from his Word and to obey that will."

If "accommodation" means deviating from "God's Way" in order to take the way desired by man, then they say no to that. "God's Way" is the preservation of the "God-given diversity of peoples and nations."

He writes, "If a new South Africa asks us to ignore the fact that God has provided for the existence and survival of the Afrikaner nation on this soil, then we must say no

to a new South Africa. We cannot fulfill our calling as a Christian nation to promote God's Kingdom in this land if our national existence is lost.

"If a new South Africa asks us to ignore the fact that God has provided a separate national soil, a separate living space for each nation that comprises part of its diversity—and thus for the Afrikaner nation as well—then we must say no to this kind of new South Africa. God's way of a separate living space for each nation is the true way for the nations...

"If a new South Africa asks us to open the doors for un-Christian or anti-Christian forces to take over the political system in South Africa... then we must say no to this type of new South Africa. A Christian nation should have a Christian political system and should not be satisfied with anything less. To regard an un-Christian government as acceptable if God has placed a Christian government within your reach means repudiation of God's Kingdom and his interests in your political system," says DIE BOODSKAPPER.

* SAYCO Passes Resolutions; Plans Expansion

34000681A Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 4-10 May 90 p 5

[Article: "Sayco Branches To Be Launched"]

[Text] The new national executive committee (NEC) of the SA [South African] Youth Congress (Sayco) has mapped out the way forward for the organisation based on resolutions taken at last month's national congress.

In line with the decision that Sayco should become a unitary organisation, all local youth congresses and regions will have to relaunch as Sayco branches and regions and adopt the Sayco constitution, slogans and logo.

"We expect all regions to have launched by June 16," said Sayco publicity officer Parks Mankahlana.

Sayco membership will now be registered and membership cards issued. Subscription fees are to be set by the Central Executive Committee (CEC), which is made up of the NEC and representatives from each region.

The NEC is also to meet the ANC [African National Congress] Youth Section shortly to discuss the formation of the ANC Youth League (YL).

The SA National Students' Congress (Sansco), National Union of SA Students (Nusas) and Congress of SA Students (Cosas) will also be drawn into discussions on the YL's constitution, code of conduct and programme of action.

"Every Sayco member has the responsibility to join the ANC," emphasised Mankahlana.

While Sayco is working towards consolidating progressive youth into the ANC, it will also be working towards drawing all anti-apartheid youth into a Youth Front.

"The Youth Front must incorporate all youth organisations against apartheid rallied around the unifying perspectives of the Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF)," said Mankahlana.

Natal is another major area of focus for Sayco. The organisation is taking a three-pronged approach to the violence by working to strengthen mass democratic movement organisations, forming defence committees and embarking on a mass political education campaign aimed at exposing the role of Inkatha in the violence.

* Question of 'Minority Protection' Debated

34000681B Johannesburg *SUNDAY STAR*
in English 13 May 90 p 11

[Article by David Breier, Political Correspondent:
"Minority Rights or Just Apartheid in Disguise?"]

[Text] Apartheid is dead—long live the protection of minority rights.

This is the Government's message marketed in the capitals of Europe by State President F. W. de Klerk this week and argued in Parliament by his Minister of Constitutional Development Gerrit Viljoen.

The question now being hotly debated is whether "minority protection" is really apartheid in disguise, or whether it is proof that the Nats have really abandoned white domination.

"We are talking of the same prostitute in a new dress," was how Labour Party leader Allan Hendrickse contemptuously dismissed the new Nat terminology.

But some commentators believe the lady has truly learned the error of her ways and has resolved to become respectable.

Perhaps the suspicion that "minority protection" is really apartheid in disguise is based on the NP [National Party]'s long record of playing with words to doll up the apartheid "prostitute".

'Segmental Autonomy'

When "apartheid"—both "grand" and "petty"—became too hot to handle, it was called among other things "separate development", "parallel development", "separate freedoms", "multinational development", "plural development", "vertical differentiation", "segmental autonomy", "multicultural differentiation", "own affairs" and "group rights".

Along the way there were some real beauties. University of Cape Town professor of political studies, David Welsh, says his favourite is "creative self-withdrawal" which the old Info department in the Eschel Rhoddie days once briefly toyed with to describe the hiving off of the bantustans.

In the light of their amazing record of semantics, the Nats could hardly be surprised that "protection of minority rights" has been greeted with some scepticism.

But Professor Welsh believes Mr de Klerk has launched a new dynamic that is unstoppable.

"Some people say nothing has changed except the labels. I think the whole process does represent a growing rejection by an increasing number of NP supporters of the idea of racial domination," he said.

ANC [African National Congress] deputy-president Nelson Mandela says the ANC is not prepared even to consider group rights.

The question is whether the Government can market "minority protection" to him instead, for Mr Mandela has gone on record as calling for "structural guarantees" to prevent domination.

Dr Viljoen this week described minority protection in words the Nats would have regarded as taboo a few months ago. He said it would underpin and not subvert "majority rule"—two words which have always been anathema for the NP.

But he now openly supports "majority rule"—qualified of course by the enigmatic "minority protection".

Is It a Cover?

Somehow he intends to remove the taint of "race" from the definition of groups and replace it with language, culture and what he calls "ethnicity"—something that sounds suspiciously close to race.

Democratic Party spokesman James Selfe believes that some Nats merely see the new term as a cover for "own affairs". But he believes that for other Nats it shows their real concern that a future majority government be prevented from riding roughshod over the intimate concerns of minority interests.

Professor Welsh believes the changing Nat terminology over the years was more than just an exercise in semantics and that there have been progressive shifts away from crude white domination.

He said that D. F. Malan, the father of apartheid, believed that it had got out of hand and was dismayed by Transvaal hardliners such as J. G. Strijdom and Hendrik Verwoerd.

When Mr Strijdom, the "Lion of the North", took over as Prime Minister, he turned it into crude domination dubbed "baasskap".

He in turn was succeeded by Dr Verwoerd who was a "thorough-going racist".

"But astounding though it may seem, Verwoerd recognised that South Africa could not bank on white domination in perpetuity," Professor Welsh said.

PW's Initiative

He said that when Dr Verwoerd launched his homeland policy, he made it clear for the first time that society based on white domination could not carry on forever. "Verwoerd in a sense was one of the first to take his finger out of the dike," he said.

Under John Vorster there was an increasing recognition that apartheid was unravelling fast.

And although he has now repudiated the NP, former President P. W. Botha set in motion the movement which Mr de Klerk is now continuing.

"By conjuring the monstrous tricameral constitution, Botha unleashed a destabilising force in society which expedited the end of apartheid," Professor Welsh believes.

Under Mr de Klerk, the whole process has gone full circle and apartheid has been played out, he said. "You will not find anywhere in the NP anyone prepared to defend racial discrimination as a principle."

But Mr Selfe disagrees. He believes there are three types of Nats today: Nats who genuinely support what Mr de Klerk is doing, Nats who say they do because they want to keep their jobs, and there are Nats who oppose his policies but for the moment mouth support without really believing it.

Dr Viljoen explains the changes in the NP by saying the party's concept of nationalism has "matured" over the decades to an "all-encompassing inclusiveness".

He said that back in 1915 when it was founded, NP nationalism was largely confined to the Afrikaner people. By the 1960s it had expanded to include all white people, while in 1983 the "breakthrough" came by including coloured and Indian people in the constitution.

"Now we accept a nationalism embracing all South Africans irrespective of race, language or creed.

"Within this new context, the protection of minority rights for groups requiring it, becomes a completely different proposition," he said.

In Parliament this week during his budget vote, Dr Viljoen was disarmingly frank about what he was doing. "The biggest challenge facing the Government and the NP is to make our 'group concept' acceptable and marketable against the suspicion that it is advanced merely as a disguise for continuing the disparities and injustices of apartheid," he said.

Historic Concept

This suspicion was "of course due to the albatross of apartheid and discrimination hanging around the neck of this historic group concept," he added.

The answer was the prompt dismantling of the remains of apartheid, he said, referring to Mr de Klerk's recent announcements on replacing the Group Areas Act, re-assessing the Land Acts and purging race from group definitions.

Is this all clever political marketing, or is it for real?

There is a strong school of thought that believes it doesn't matter. If it is genuine, well and good. If it is only marketing, the natural forces against apartheid that are being unleashed by the campaign will make it real soon enough.

* Trade Minister Launches Overseas Offensive

34000681C Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 14 May 90 p 1

[Article by Michael Chester: "Updating SA Firms in World Trade"]

[Text] Far from the fanfare as President F. W. de Klerk led the cavalcade around Europe trying to break the shackles of political isolation, quiet teams of export experts were planning a still wider round of overseas safaris—aimed at bringing South Africa [SA] in from the cold in world trade.

While Mr de Klerk and Foreign Minister Pik Botha tested the political reaction to reform initiatives, Minister of Trade and Industry Kent Durr was planning to test the climate on international export routes as optimism grew about the chance to break out of the straight-jacket of trade boycotts.

Mr Durr recalled the entire corps of government trade representatives from around the world—more than 30 outposts scattered through Africa, from the Balkans to the Baltic, Britain to Romania, North and South America across to the Far East and the Pacific Basin—to brief them on new trade offensives.

All of them had to listen to pep talks on the key role they had to play in intensifying the search for new markets now that a global electronic network was in operation to flash back instant signals about any fresh trade opportunities in their territory.

The Directorate of Export Promotion in Pretoria, they were reminded, was on constant alert to relay flashes from the listening posts to export companies linked into the new global information system.

And they learned that more and more listening posts were being established as SA exporters probed deeper into the African Continent and now laid plans to seize new openings in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Mr Durr has personally been the busiest of them all as roving trade ambassador—engaged in discussions with the European Commission in Brussels, talks with members of both the House of Commons and House of Lords in London, as the first South African Cabinet Minister to

visit East Berlin and Poland since World War 2, on trips to Austria, France and West Germany.

Strategies

"There are encouraging signs that for the first time in decades we are seeing a rollback of sanctions," says the Minister. "Sometimes these are only gestures—but then the sanctions were often only signals anyway.

"In these dynamic times we must plan for the future and develop new strategies and new markets as well as extend traditional markets," said Mr Durr.

There are fewer and fewer gaps between the miniature flags pinned in the world map that signify SA trade office bases—or else next on a growing list of export targets.

The newest have been pinned all across the Indian Ocean. They dot not only all the islands.

They have been placed all around the vast littoral north to Mozambique and East Africa, on around the Horn of Africa and across the rim of the Middle East, and on to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

"It is a huge potential new market, a population of a staggering one billion or more, often linked by natural affinities or common languages," said Mr Durr.

"And SA has the advantage of being able to call on its own large Indian community to join in the export drive through business or personal contacts across the whole region.

"We have to exploit every comparative advantage we can find and the Indian community has a crucial role to fill."

Ron Haywood, deputy director of the SA Chamber of Business, senses it is the launch of the most dynamic South African drive into global markets since a whole chain of traditional trade partners started dropping the shutters with sanctions and embargoes.

Hard Lessons

But he cautions that political developments—whatever the favourable reaction to F. W. de Klerk's talks with Nelson Mandela—should not be read as any sweeping and automatic success formula in international trade.

"Overseas markets are shopping for the best bargains," he says.

"South African exporters mustn't be lulled into the euphoria of thinking that world markets will shower out contracts as a sign of congratulations.

"It's awfully tough out there. Fortunately, many of our manufacturers have been forced to learn hard lessons about world trade in years of weaving new routes through all the sanctions. They have emerged leaner—and fitter.

"What's needed now is a deeper commitment to a sustained export effort, rather than viewing overseas sales as a sort of overspill when the domestic market hits any slowdown."

Bruce Donald, economist at the SA Foreign Trade Organisation, takes as an example the renewal of trade contacts with the Eastern European countries as they ditch Communism and start talking turkey with South Africa and the rest of the western world.

The challenge identified, Safto is gearing up to encourage exporters to have to go. It has already started work on a special business programme to introduce SA firms to local contacts in the region and critical market information.

Mr Kent takes a hard-jawed look at potential new trade routes—and pins still more export flags on the world map.

* Future of Gold Mining Industry Explored

34000685A Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
in English 11 May 90 pp 28-29

[Text] Three weeks ago, as the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) kicked off this year's round of bargaining by calls for wage increases averaging 35 percent, mine managers groaned. How, they wondered, does one convince an increasingly confident and militant union that inflation-beating wage hikes are not on without accompanying productivity deals?

Wages are about half the average gold mine's working costs. Judging by latest Chamber of Mines figures, any more than a token increase could tilt several into loss. Naturally, there are ways around this. Gencor has come up with one—cost-cutting by reducing ore production and employee numbers at small, marginal mines. Anglo has taken a different tack, seeking to contain unit costs by seeking to raise output at large mines.

Wage talks are due to start within days. Ahead of them, the chamber is reluctant to discuss its negotiating stance. Nor are spokesmen happy about discussing nationalisation. But as NUM leaders Cyril Ramaphosa and James Motlatsi increasingly toe the ANC [African National Congress] line on nationalisation, resolution of the question of State ownership of mines grows daily more pressing.

Basically, the ANC argues that State ownership will be beneficial, while the mining companies believe it will lead to gold mining's rapid decline.

Earlier this year, Wits University's Economic Geology Research Unit reckoned that a tad less than 40,000 t gold remains under the surface of SA, almost as much as the 42,000 t extracted since mining began on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Remaining reserves represent over 60 percent of the estimated 65,000 t gold still to be mined the world over.

Of that 40,000 t, 23,000 t could be extracted by existing mines and 17,000 t by new mines. Mining that gold will, nonetheless, be accompanied by a steady decline in annual production. A couple of months ago, Lloyd Pengilly, Martin & Co. mining analyst, told a New York conference that, in the best circumstances, production could hold fairly steady for three or four years before sliding from last year's 619 t to an estimated 324 t by the year 2014. That is his most optimistic scenario, which assumes new mines will be opened in the Free State and Transvaal.

As our graph shows [omitted], Pengilly has some less cheerful predictions. If no new mines are established but existing mines open new shafts to replace those whose ore becomes exhausted, production tumbles to an estimated 159 t by 2014; if existing mines are nationalised and private-sector capital spending to replace tonnage dries up, production is slated to drop to 111 t; and if nationalisation and no capital spending are combined with productivity declines, Pengilly reckons annual gold production will be a mere 48 t a quarter of a century from now.

That is one outlook if nationalisation removes the profit motive. Not that profits are anything to get excited about. Gold mining's heyday was in 1980 when, for a few days, the metal traded at more than U.S.\$800/oz. Then, according to E W Balderson's Nick Goodwin, working costs absorbed only 30 percent of the industry's total revenue and capital spending 9 percent. After necessary working and capital expenditure, residual revenue was split 36 percent to the taxman and 25 percent to shareholders.

That was the best year, as our graph shows. Back in 1970, just as gold was freed from its \$35/oz straitjacket and annual production was peaking at just over 1,000 t, two-thirds of revenue was swallowed by working costs and shareholders had to make do with 9 percent. Still, that did not prevent mining houses from sinking funds into new mines, even though their commissioning did not prevent a fairly steady decline in total production. Throughout the Seventies, the houses counted on gold prices rising to counteract rising capital and working costs.

This year's first quarter, Goodwin says, was the worst since 1970. Working costs swallowed 75 percent of revenues; a mere 6 percent was left for shareholders. This year, he reckons, could be even more miserable. If gold averages R990/oz, more or less its present price, working costs could absorb 82 percent of revenue. A further 11 percent will be needed by already attenuated capital spending programmes, revenue will rake in 4 percent and shareholders will get the rump of 3 percent.

So, ironically, the threat of nationalisation has become a factor just as the industry is embroiled in one of its most difficult periods. Wholesale nationalisation now would merely give the State an additional 3 percent of total gold revenues. And getting that 3 percent could dry up any

new investment funds, lead to an exodus of mobile, skilled whites and possibly precipitate some sharp cuts in employment.

There is, though, another way of looking at it. Since 1970, annual gold production by SA's fiercely private enterprise mines has dropped by just short of 40 percent—more or less the same drop as recorded by Zambia's copper mines since they were nationalised. That, proponents of nationalisation argue, proves private ownership does not necessarily ensure better performance.

Even setting aside how State-owned mines will raise development capital, there remains the problem of just how private enterprise will cope. Hard-pressed mines, such as ERPM, have already turned to government to help stave off closure—but sauce for the goose, union economists argue, should be sauce for the gander. Why should loss-making mines expect to be subsidised by taxpayers if the State receives only a tax benefit from profitable ones?

This type of argument is probably academic as far as investors in potential new mines are concerned. Even if investors had cast-iron guarantees of no nationalisation, it is not altogether certain they would find investing in new gold mines attractive.

For the past century, gold has been the principal generator of funds to finance other development. Now roles seem to have been reversed, as mining companies eye other capital sources. Finance Minister Barend du Plessis' Budget concessions on ring fencing and non-taxation of investment portfolio sales have improved the investment climate. But a new deep-level gold mine costs upwards of R2bn. While the gold price shows no signs of advancing, it is unlikely institutions like life insurers would choose to invest in new, risky mines rather than in shares in proven, existing operations.

The mining houses' dilemma is underscored by Anglovaal's foot-dragging over its Sun project in the Free State. The group is raising R1.2bn through its rights issue. But that will nowhere near cover Sun's likely full cost and, meanwhile, the house seems reluctant to disclose Sun's known grades for fear of dissuading shareholders from following their rights.

Anglo is more open about its Potchefstroom Gap drilling. But, understandably, it wants to be belt-and-braces sure of what is in the ground before committing itself.

Geological certainty is all very well, but, these days, the mining companies are more preoccupied with SA's political and investment outlooks. Until they become clearer, it might be wiser to count on gold production being near the bottom of our range a quarter of a century from now.

* Options for Representative Government Discussed

34000685B Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 11 May 90 pp 33-34

[Text] It is no longer a question of where we want to go politically, but how to make sure we get there. President F W De Klerk has already made it clear that apartheid will go as soon as possible. What was once unthinkable—a nonracial common voters' roll—is now inevitable.

In principle, it is very simple to create such a roll. There will be difficulties with registration and illiteracy, of course, but with proper preparation these can be overcome.

The problem is that a national voters' roll is not a solution in itself. It is nothing more than the end of the beginning. The crucial decision is this: what electoral system would be best suited to our diverse society? What system has the best chance of producing a government that is representative, stable and accountable?

Much has been written about various methods of decentralising power—federation, cantons and so on. But all the major political actors insist that SA [South Africa] will remain a unitary State—indeed, will *revert* to being a unitary State with the likely reincorporation of the TBVC [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei] "countries."

This means that ultimate power will rest, as it does now, with a single central authority (which may or may not choose to devolve some of its power). We are concerned with how that authority can be put in place using a common voters' roll.

One option is to extend the Westminster system that has elected white House of Assembly MPs [Members of Parliament] and produced governments since 1910. (The central characteristics have remained virtually unchanged since then.) The sovereign assembly is composed of a fixed number of members (166 in recent years), each elected to represent a geographic area, or constituency, of voters. By convention, government is then formed by members of the majority party, or an alliance of parties, and the minority go into opposition.

The theory behind the system is that each constituency should represent a roughly equivalent number of voters and physical boundaries are drawn in an attempt to reflect the population distribution.

Reality has been somewhat different. For political reasons, the system has always favoured rural constituencies and this imbalance has become worse with steady urbanisation. A vote in Kuruman, for instance, is now worth more than five votes in North Rand.

But such anomalies can be rectified whenever a delimitation commission sits: the principle of the system remains. As in Britain, the MP is answerable primarily to

the voters of his constituency and they are the only people who can kick him out.

This is important. However great a political party may be, and however tyrannical its leader, they are powerless to deprive an MP of his seat. They can disown him, expel him from the party, even select someone else to oppose him at the next election—but only the voters can remove him from parliament. This tends to concentrate an MP's mind.

The system is far from perfect. In SA and elsewhere, it has always tended to favour bigger parties, often entrenching a two-party system. The old Progressive Party, for instance, had only one seat in the House of Assembly between 1961 and 1974—not a reflection of its share of the total votes cast in elections. Much the same happened to the Liberal Party in Britain.

Even if the candidate who comes second has lost by only one vote in 10,000, his support is meaningless in terms of representation. A classic "winner-takes-all" example was Denis Worrall's 39-vote defeat by Chris Heunis in Helderberg in 1987.

Critics argue the system is discriminatory towards small but important interest groups and undemocratic in that it "wastes" votes. More powerfully, they point out that it can produce a parliament where the party with most seats does not necessarily command the most votes.

A classic example was the SA general election of 1948: the United Party lost power even though it received 51 percent of the total vote to the Nats' 47 percent. In the 1989 general election, less than half the electorate supported the National Party, yet it retained power with ease.

The defenders of the system concede these flaws, but point to its simplicity and the generally stable governments it produces. The authors of the latest Anglo American political study (*Shaping the Future*, edited by Bobby Godsell, published by Human & Rousseau) have argued that a positive feature of winner-takes-all is that "it gives to each party an incentive to moderate its position and appeal to 'the centre.' In this manner it promotes ideological compromises before the election rather than between ideological factions afterwards."

What are the alternatives? The most important are those based on proportional representation (PR). This means the number of seats a party wins explicitly reflects its share of the total vote. Variations of PR are far more popular than the Westminster system; they also tend to be extremely complicated, involving multiple voting and computerised counting and are, therefore, unsuitable beyond the sophisticated electorates of the First World.

The simplest PR variation is the party list system. Instead of dividing the country geographically, political

parties present the electorate with a ranked list of candidates for seats in the legislative assembly. The voter then puts his cross next to the name (or symbol) of a party, not an individual.

Assume there are 100 seats in the assembly. If a party gets 56 percent of the total vote, the first 56 names on its list will be declared elected. If a minor party gets only 7 percent of the vote, its top seven candidates are elected. (This is essentially how the Greens first made their voice heard in the West German parliament; they would not have surfaced in a Westminster-style system.)

In terms of governing, the natural result is multi-party coalitions—which are often highly unstable (as in Italy and Israel). However, in the older, more homogenous democracies of western Europe, instability may well be a blessing in disguise for economic prosperity: weak governments are less likely to interfere in the market.

A major problem with the list system is that it removes the accountability of the individual MP and increases the power (and vulnerability to corruption) of the party machines. An antidote, perhaps, is the PR variation where the country is divided into constituencies—but each area is then presented with lists, so that the party's chosen candidates will be locally accountable to some extent. Some countries, like West Germany, use both national and constituency list systems.

Then, of course, there are the countries where the executive leader is not elected by the MPs of the majority party (as in Britain or SA), but directly by the people. The most striking examples are the United States and France. In both countries, however, presidential power is firmly balanced by other elected bodies. Effective government depends on the president reaching accommodation with the majority party in the elected assemblies. Compromise is essential, administration can be lengthy and complicated, executive power relatively weak.

In countries which are racially and culturally heterogeneous, with an immature democratic tradition and a history of conflict—such as SA—it would appear that accountable and decisive central government is essential (even if some powers are devolved later). It also seems inevitable that the executive leader will need to exercise the kind of power presently enjoyed by our State President (with a broader mandate), rather than the diluted power held by the American or French presidents.

An electoral system which produces weak government for "the new SA" would be an invitation to one or other grouping to seize power by force. Therefore, a new electoral system should produce a strong, decisive government that is accepted as legitimate by a clear majority of the people—and one that is likely to submit itself, after a reasonable time, to judgment by the electorate.

So where do we go from here?

For a start, we need a Bill of Rights and we must retain an independent judiciary. If possible, this must be agreed

in principle by all significant parties *before* any election takes place. In addition, there should be agreement that race classification will disappear when the present constitution is replaced by a new one. No apartheid law has any value as a bargaining chip.

For all the advantages of the Westminster system, to extend it would simply entrench residential apartheid—and increase the possibility of intimidation and disruption of personal campaigning. A generalised national election campaign is more likely to be peaceful. And the winner-takes-all system is clearly not suited to a country with so many powerful competing interests.

Whites in SA may be fortunate in the lessons they can learn from neighbouring territories. In Zimbabwe, whites insisted on the constitutional "protection" of 20 percent of the seats in parliament; even before the privilege lapsed, this proved divisive, embittering and futile. In Namibia, however, Dirk Mudge persuaded sufficient whites that alliances based on political values rather than skin colour would be the best protection. This has proved conciliatory and it seems that Mudge is now in a far better position to influence events than Ian Smith was after independence.

It is significant, too, that a PR party list system was used in Namibia, thus denying Swapo the dominance it had hoped for.

The NP [National Party], having discarded separation, is rapidly coming to terms with equality. Already there is talk of alliances and the Nats are not referring only to conservative coloureds and Indians. The ANC [African National Congress] remains a force to be reckoned with, but it is now demythologised and other groups are competing for the support it once took for granted.

If the NP abolishes apartheid while still in power, who can say what limits there will be on its electoral appeal?

It is not inconceivable that President De Klerk and present senior Nat ministers could be part of a post-apartheid majority rule government. To get there, it seems the Namibian route would be the best bet—no ethnic protection, but party-list proportional representation—perhaps blended with the constituency accountability of the West German system.

Let De Klerk put that on the table tomorrow and he could keep the initiative indefinitely.

* Thabo Mbeki Outlines Constitutional Change

34000685C Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 11 May 90 pp 52-53

[Text] A step-by-step framework within which the African National Congress (ANC) envisages constitutional change in SA [South Africa] was spelt out by its international affairs chief, Thabo Mbeki, in an address to the Cape Town press Club last week:

- Remove obstacles to negotiation. This first step has

already been taken with last week's meeting between the ANC and government at Groote Schuur and is progressing well;

- Determine who should be party to constitutional negotiations. All interested parties should be involved in broad discussions which should aim at achieving consensus on how best to achieve representation at the negotiating table.

The ANC's view is that a constituent assembly, similar to that which drew up Namibia's constitution, would be the best way. It would be elected by all South Africans;

Agree on the supervision of elections for a constituent assembly. The ANC believes it would be unfair for government, being a party to the negotiations, to supervise elections.

Another authority would have to be created to implement whatever agreements are reached during the broad discussions between the various parties;

Form an interim government. The ANC believes this is the best way of implementing agreements in a manner that doesn't benefit or prejudice any party; and

Establish the impartiality of the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation]. The ANC believes the SABC will play a crucial role in disseminating information during elections and negotiations and cannot be controlled by a party to the negotiations as is currently the case.

Mbeki says the ANC remains opposed to a group-based system, but not to a consensus system within a democratically elected body.

He says it's difficult to understand why President F W de Klerk is opposed to an interim government, which the ANC doesn't expect to be established immediately but at some future date. It will try to convince De Klerk of this need during negotiations.

According to Mbeki, the principal danger to the success of negotiations in the coming months is the fear of change among whites.

* QwaQwa Launches Campaign To Attract Investors

34000684A Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY*
in English 11 May 90 p 11

[Article by Linda Ensor]

[Text] The QwaQwa Development Corporation (QDC) has embarked on a concerted campaign to attract industrialists and investors to the impoverished homeland.

QDC GM Louwtjie du Toit is confident about the future role of a decentralisation programme in QwaQwa, even under a newly constituted SA [South African] government.

The QDC is holding a seminar this month for 40-50 Chinese businessmen in Johannesburg and a QDC delegation departs for Hong Kong on 11 May for 17 days to recruit investors.

Marketing manager Johan Nieuwoudt and his team will be promoting the development of Industriqwa, a decentralisation point within QwaQwa, 8 km from Harismith. Of the 900 ha available for industrial development, 80 ha have so far been developed.

Over 290 factories are in operation, employing more than 28,000 workers.

Nieuwoudt says the incentive packages offered will improve the bottom line of investors and give them a "competitive edge."

Du Toit says the need for economic development in QwaQwa is a real one and the QDC has the expertise necessary to oversee it. He says it is positioning itself in such a way that no other organisation will be able to compete with its ability to undertake the economic development of the region.

The QDC provides factory premises at Industriqwa and offers a low interest rate scheme for import replacement and exports.

The manufacturing incentives are paid quarterly as a taxable cash grant.

Factory rent is subsidised for 10 years at 75 percent of actual rent and a non-taxable cash grant for labour costs—depending on the number of staff—is payable for seven years.

Labour costs are relatively low, Nieuwoudt says.

Also, a substantial concession is payable for 10 years on investment in plant, machinery and equipment, commercial vehicles, office equipment, debtors and stock.

The concession is calculated on 50 percent of the sum of the assets at 75 percent of the cost of money.

Training grants, a 40 percent transport rebate, housing subsidies and a maximum R1m grant for relocation are also available.

Furthermore, in addition to all these incentives, the investor enjoys a 10 percent price preference in respect of public sector tenders.

Finally, applications can be made for the financial rand to be used to take up shares in the new companies.

Nieuwoudt says that on average over the past five years the QwaQwa region has been the fastest developing decentralised growth point in SA.

* KwaZulu Finance Minister Gives Budget Figures

34000684B Durban THE DAILY NEWS
in English 10 May 90 p 4

[Text] Ulundi: The KwaZulu "bantustan" region received R282 million or 15 percent more than last year from South Africa in its budget allocation for the 1990/91 financial year, it was said here yesterday.

KwaZulu Finance Minister Dr Dennis Madide said during his department's budget speech that R2,151 billion had been allocated to the region by South Africa.

During the 1989/90 financial year, a total of just under R1,869 billion was allocated by South Africa.

Total funds available for the 1990/91 financial year were estimated at R2,8 billion, or 16,7 percent higher than the original estimates for 1989/90.

Dr Madide said the R2,8 billion was made up of:

- An expected opening balance of R3,826,000;
- Self-generated revenue of R584 million;
- The South African grant of R2,151,224,000;
- Loans from the Development Bank of South Africa totaling R80,446,900.

The largest share of funding was received by the Department of Education and Culture followed by Welfare and Pensions.

The two departments received a total of R1,559,970,000 in allocations.

The various KwaZulu departments were allocated:

- Chief Minister—R88,174,000;
- Interior—R23,861,000;
- Works—R421,590,000;
- Education and Culture—R933,640,000;
- Agriculture and Forestry—R69,684,000;
- Justice—R21,190,000;
- Health—R345,808,000;
- Police—R59,271,000;
- Finance—R159,123,900;
- Economic Affairs—R57,206,000;
- Welfare and Pensions—R626,330,000;
- Prisons—R13,619,000;
- Total: R2,819,496,900.

Natal Indian Congress To Disband; Join ANC

34000684C Durban THE DAILY NEWS
in English 11 May 90 p 1

[Article by Nicola Cunningham-Brown, Political Reporter]

[Text] The 96-year-old Natal Indian Congress [NIC], which was founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1894, is to disband "in the near future" after prolonged discussions between its members.

NIC leaders say their organisation will be phased out once its role of mobilising the Indian community into African National Congress structures is completed.

NIC vice-president Mr Mewa Ramgobin, who was instrumental in reviving the organisation in 1971, said yesterday that the NIC had almost fulfilled its role of rallying the Indian community against apartheid and its manifestations.

"In order to lead the Indian community into a non-racial and democratic society, it is essential to have unity in action—in this case, direct participation through membership of the ANC [African National Congress]."

He said it was "no secret" that the NIC had always acted under ANC leadership and consulted that organisation before formalising its policies.

The ANC had regarded the NIC as an ally from Gandhian days and also as a result of the Dadoo/Naicker pact in 1947. Both organisations held "basically the same policies."

"There will be no need in the future, especially after the ANC's first general conference later this year, to continue spectral formations."

However, he conceded that the NIC had to be realistic and could not take it for granted that they would be able to recruit every Indian into the ANC. He said the political situation was volatile and the Indian community in Natal had been affected by the continuing violence, where the ANC had been painted as "the bad guys" responsible for the trouble.

Mr Ramgobin said he was not aware of any internal opposition towards disbanding the NIC.

The NIC's general secretary, Dr Farouk Meer, confirmed that the NIC was to be disbanded "at a future date."

He said in the LEADER newspaper that without the NIC it would be difficult to mobilise the Indian community into the ANC camp.

Dr Meer said there was a need for the ANC to open branches in Indian areas and it was the NIC's task to act as organiser and facilitator. Once that task was completed the NIC could be phased out.

*** Inkatha Accuses NIC of Controlling UDF**

34000684D Durban THE DAILY NEWS
in English 14 May 90 p 4

[Commentary by Garry Brennan]

[Text] NIC = MDM = UDF ... QED. That is the equation of the Natal-based Inkatha newspaper, ILANGA.

Or, to put it in less mathematical terms, the newspaper believes that the Natal Indian Congress [NIC] exercises a cabal-like grip on the Mass Democratic Movement [MDM] and the United Democratic Front [UDF].

ILANGA has waged a long and sometimes bitter feud against the NIC. This week it claimed support for its views from an unexpected quarter, the South African Youth Congress (Sayco), a strong affiliate of the UDF.

The newspaper quoted from a Sayco position paper dealing with the urgent need to restructure the UDF. The paper sketched a picture of intense rivalry and dissension inside the UDF, which it said had become "infected by a serious case of cancer called the Cabal."

The paper added: "No one within the UDF who is true to the principles of the organisation can deny without contradiction that:

"1. Within the UDF undemocratic practices have developed on a scale and level that is upsetting and disturbing;

"2. Within and 'outside' the UDF resources are concentrated in few hands and are distributed unequally and in accordance with undemocratic and anti-organisation considerations and are used to control rather than to help those who receive them;

"3. Ascendancy into leadership structures of the UDF is now by the route of undemocratic co-option where organisations play no role at all."

The paper concluded that "these and other problems within the UDF must, among other things, serve as a basis for the restructuring of the UDF."

The Sayco paper did not identify the "cabal," but ILANGA left its readers in no doubt. "The leadership of the UDF has been concentrated in the hands of a small group of NIC leaders, who control the organisation in the same way as they control the MDM.

"The NIC might have minuscule support within the Indian community, but through its cabal-like control of the MDM and UDF it exerts considerable influence in Natal." The newspaper identified Dr Farouk Meer, secretary of the NIC, Dr Jerry Coovadia, executive member of the NIC, and Mr Mewa Ramgobin.

ILANGA said that some UDF and MDM members were finding it "increasingly intolerable" that the two organisations were controlled by "the professional middle class of the NIC," and said claims that they embody "working class leadership ring distinctly hollow."

Meanwhile in the LEADER, which came on sale at the same time as ILANGA, Dr Farouk Meer confirmed that the NIC was to be disbanded "at a future date."

*** PAC Leader Explains Refusal To Negotiate**

34000683B Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR
in English 13 May 90 p 10

[Article by Barney Desai, co-ordinator of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania: "To Negotiate Now Is To Capitulate Now"]

[Text] It is necessary to re-state the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress]'s position as succinctly as possible, and in this regard the words of its first president, Robert Sobukwe, are the vehicle through which we reiterate our case:

"We are quite aware of the fact that we are faced with an overwhelming combination of forces internally in the form of the white ruling minority, and externally in the person of the forces of Western capitalism and international imperialism.

"...Our contention is that Africans are the only people who, because of their material position, can be interested in the complete overhaul of the present structure of society.

"...As South African history so ably illustrates, whenever Europeans 'co-operate' with African movements they keep demanding checks and counter-checks, guarantees and the like with the result that they stultify and retard the movement of the Africans.

"The reason is, of course, that they are consciously or unconsciously protecting their sectional interests.

"Politically we stand for government of the Africans, for the Africans, by the Africans, with everybody who owes his allegiance and loyalty only to Africa and accepts the democratic rule of an African majority being regarded as an African.

"We guarantee no minority rights, because we are fighting precisely that group exclusiveness which those who plead for minority rights would like to perpetuate.

'Highest'

"It is our view that if we have guaranteed individual liberties, we have given the highest guarantee necessary and possible.

"There is no reason why in a free and democratic Africa a predominantly black electorate should not return a white man to parliament for colour will count for nothing in a free Africa.

"We stand for a planned economy and the most equitable distribution of wealth. The slogan 'equal opportunities' is meaningless if it does not take equality of income as a springboard from which we take off.

"Our problem, as we see it, is to make a planned economy work within the framework of a political democracy.

"Socially we stand for the full and complete development of the human personality, with the active creation of conditions that will encourage the rapid disintegration of group exclusiveness and the emergence of a united African nation."

These words were spoken 31 years ago, and remain our perspective and goal for a future Azania.

Starting with negotiations, both the PAC and the ANC [African National Congress] subscribe to the principle of one-person one-vote in a unitary state.

We are both committed to the demand for the establishment of the mechanism for the calling of a constituent assembly where representatives of the people elected by universal adult suffrage will deliberate and enact a new constitution for our country.

Preconditions

Both organisations demand the unconditional release of our political prisoners and the return of exiles.

The PAC also demands as a precondition to any negotiations with this regime:

- The abolition of the Land Acts which reserve 90 percent of the land to the white settler population.
- The Population Registration Act must be scrapped.
- The abolition of the Bantu Education Act.
- The abolition of all security laws which restrict our freedom of speech and of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. We demand the lifting of the state of emergency.
- The regime must unequivocally commit itself to the equitable redistribution of resources, and must commit itself to righting the wrong done to the black masses of our country.

What has been the regime's response to the demands?

It has rejected, out of hand, the demand for convening a constituent assembly. No doubt they fear such an assembly would terminate white supremacy for good.

On majority rule Mr de Klerk says: "I want to emphasise that I am against simplistic majority rule."

He asserts that there have to be "checks and balances", leading to a "consensus government". Votes will be of "equal value".

The PAC poses these questions: Can there be consensus between master and servant? Can we reconcile the irreconcilable? Can there be any doubt this is yet another attempt to secure group privilege and to frustrate the majority oppressed?

Mr de Klerk's proposal (or ruse!) is an attempt to divide the three million white votes enough times to ensure that the majority vote does not mean majority rule.

In essence, the baseline for this De Klerkian concept is, simply stated: "Votes for all, but whites rule, okay!"

The Land Acts will not be scrapped, only amended. Questioned on television on April 23, 1990 whether this would not merely perpetuate a situation where the country's wealth would be concentrated in white hands, Mr de Klerk responded:

"One of the basic values in which I believe is free enterprise. Redistribution of wealth is a socialistic term. I am absolutely against that."

Thus land acquired through the barrel of the gun will be legitimised as private property by a process of negotiation.

The Population Registration Act, the pillar of apartheid, will remain in place until a "new constitutional dispensation" has been arrived at. Clearly Mr de Klerk, wedded to group privilege, sees this Act as vital to identify the group for which special protection and privilege will be sought.

The Group Areas Act, which has been used to diabolical effect not only to enforce blatant racial discrimination but also to plunder black property, will be amended and not scrapped.

Preserve

No doubt the amended version will not be used to preserve established residential patterns and living standards. According to Dr Gerrit Viljoen the protection of property values would be one of the major objectives of the "replacement measures".

Amendments would include those aimed at ensuring that established residential patterns and living standards do not drop when blacks move into neighbourhoods at present reserved for whites.

Can there be any doubt that here is another game being played out by the regime to frustrate the desire of blacks to live wherever they wish? Conversely, when white economic interests move into black areas in pursuit of the spending power of our people, the black trader and small business entrepreneurs will be obliterated—all in the name of upgrading the depressed black areas.

The question the PAC poses at this juncture is a fundamental one. With regard to our stated policies and responses of the ruling class to them, we boldly ask: "What self-respecting organisation within the liberation movement can come, even within spitting distance, of the negotiating table?"

The regime is in deep economic and social crisis. While its legitimacy has been dented so that it formally rejects apartheid, it is nevertheless still powerful enough to dictate the terms to ensure an "informal" system of white domination of the majority black population, namely, to impose a neo-colonial system the likes of which Africa has never seen.

Battlefield

It is in these circumstances that the PAC rejects negotiations, for we hold the simple truth that what has not been won on the battlefield will never be won at the negotiating table.

Negotiating from a position of weakness opens the way to unacceptable compromises.

We certainly do not see negotiations as "another form of struggle", nor do we wish to engage in the futile exercise of building castles in the air about a "post-apartheid society".

The PAC sets itself the task of building the organisational structures of our people into a formidable fighting force that will offer the real challenge for fundamental change.

We refuse to negotiate under the present conditions, for to do so will make us accomplices in our own oppression. To negotiate now is capitulation now.

We are for peace, but not for appeasement. Our struggle for self-determination continues until victory is assured.

This land must be returned to its rightful owners.

* Black Consciousness Presents Negotiations View

34000683C Johannesburg SOWETAN
in English 17 May 90 p 6

[Article: "Negotiations Are Not a Good Strategy for Liberation"]

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress]'s historic meeting with the Government early this month has drawn a mixed reaction from the community. In this, the second part of a series on what political organisations think of these talks, the BCM [Black Consciousness Movement] forwards its view. Tomorrow we will publish the view of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], and on Monday that of the newly-formed Workers Organisation for Socialist Action.

When the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) emerged in 1968 under the leadership of the late Steve Biko it made its stance on negotiations very clear.

Any oppressed people who were fighting for liberation had to bargain with the oppressor "from a position of strength"—a position which could only be achieved if fundamental liberatory programmes were embarked upon by black people.

Such programmes would guide black people towards their total liberation—an aspect of which was their psychological liberation.

Bottom Line

Black people had to work towards self-reliance, had to be conscientised to be able to take decisions about their own lives. In this regard, black solidarity was a means to give black people the strength required to bargain.

It is inconceivable that anyone can bargain from a position of weakness. To negotiate or bargain means that

the forces negotiating must regard each other as equals and be prepared to relinquish their positions of superiority.

The degree to which solidarity or unity amongst black people is achieved will govern our strength at the negotiating table.

The most ideal position of strength would be that stage when black people could bring the oppressors to their knees and take power.

That for the BCM and Azapo [Azanian People's Organization] is the real bottom line. The white minority ruling class in the country has taken power illegitimately. Their government is illegitimate. Therefore, everything else they do—including their package of reforms—is illegitimate.

At that level negotiations can only take place in the context of this illegitimate Government discussing how it would hand over power to the black working class. It can be about nothing else.

We cannot negotiate with this Government about what kind of economic, political or social system we want. That can only be worked out after this Government has resigned and its constituency (white society) places itself on an equal footing with every other component in the society.

There are two sets of conditions that must exist for negotiations to be possible.

On the side of the Government—its morale and the morale of its supporters must be at its lowest. They must be on the point of raising the white flag and giving in to the popular demand for their resignation.

Exhausted

Their constituency must be so divided that there can be no cohesive force amongst white people.

The Government's war machine must be completely exhausted and there must be large areas of the country where their security forces cannot enter. In other words, black people must "liberate" as much land as possible.

As far as we the oppressed and exploited are concerned, we should be highly conscientised (politicised), and have a tremendous sense of unity where black people are not fighting with each other but acting as a unit.

All the suspicions, tribalism, the fears and mistrust within the black community must have been eliminated.

Hand in hand with that goal, the representative forces of the oppressed and exploited must have a militant programme of political action.

Bankruptcy

We believe that the present "talks about talks" have, in fact, given the De Klerk regime an extra lease on life.

One only has to look at the degree to which he has had the red carpet laid down for him in European countries over the past few days.

Before February 2, South Africa was on the point of bankruptcy. It had a R6 billion international debt that it could not pay.

Because of his reform programme and his success at the Groote Schuur meeting, this Government has been able to pay that R6 billion debt with money that flooded in from overseas.

If negotiations get underway at this stage, Azapo is firmly convinced that only the De Klerk regime will come out winners.

Black people will continue to suffer unemployment, poverty and police and vigilante violence. Despite the victories of the black people (on the factory floors and in the streets) against the nationalist regime, the recent "talks about talks" have once again strengthened their hand.

That is why Vlok can meet with right-wing racists like Eugene Terreblanche today and do the same with Nelson Mandela tomorrow.

If we go to the negotiating table now our powerlessness will have been entrenched.

Azapo believes that the priority for the broad liberation movement (the ANC [African National Congress], the PAC, Azapo and the trade union federations) is to meet behind closed doors and work out a strategy to ensure the collapse of the De Klerk regime.

*** Radar Technology Breakthrough Lessens Dependence**

34000737 Pretoria PARATUS in English Mar 90 p 14

[Text] In another South African technological breakthrough, making the RSA [Republic of South Africa] even less dependent on foreign suppliers ESD South, a research and development company in the Reutech group, has produced the first radar system developed fully by private enterprise in this country.

"Coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the first radar set operational in South Africa, the completion of the system is a dream come true," says Bill Reeler, ESD GM.

South African radar technology started developing towards self-sufficiency in 1979 when a Barlow Rand subsidiary—ESD's forerunner—was awarded a contract for the supply of locally manufactured air traffic control radars. The challenging contract involved about 200 sub-contractors, their tasks ranging from supply of components to precision engineering. Over 15 000 components were used.

In the process of manufacturing these radars, new technologies were established, and these in turn led to advances in a wide spectrum of industrial applications in

South Africa. The foundations were laid for a viable South African radar industry.

ESD South followed a modular approach in developing their new radar. Many of the components developed in the early stages can therefore be used as building blocks for future systems. The full spectrum of high-technology electronics is involved.

*** ANC's Sachs on Obstacles to Negotiations**

34000726A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 27 Apr-3 May 90 pp 5, 7

[Interview with ANC Constitutional Expert Albie Sachs:
"Obstacles to Talks"]

[Text] Leaders will confront the core of the apartheid government next week in what is the first formal meeting between the organisation and its arch adversary in decades.

But many obstacles still have to be removed before any serious negotiations about dismantling apartheid can begin. And this is largely what the talks about talks will concentrate on.

NEW NATION asked ANC [African National Congress] constitutional expert Albie Sachs to deal, in his personal capacity, with some of the likely problems.

[THE NEW NATION] What major obstacles are likely to emerge in the course of negotiations?

[Sachs] I think there are basically two kinds of obstacles. The one is that the anti-apartheid forces are at an enormous disadvantage—the bulk of the organised ANC cadres are outside the country and there are thousands of anti-apartheid activists in prison. The repressive laws are also intact and waiting to devour anybody if the negotiations don't go the way that Pretoria wants.

There is also the whole question of getting a full mandate from the people. We take negotiations very, very seriously, and it is because we take them so seriously that we want them to be well prepared. It is not a public relations job. We are dealing with the life and the future of our country and all its people and this requires free and active consultation in conditions of freedom.

The granting of amnesty and the repeal of repressive laws are necessary to ensure this. These are the immediate obstacles in relation to creating the proper conditions for negotiations.

But there are other obstacles—and they are of a procedural kind. You often find that, when you are dealing with procedural matters, you get very close to substantive matters, for example, who negotiates with whom? And, those that negotiate, what sort of mandate do they have?

It makes all the difference in the world as to whether the body that is drafting a new constitution for a new South Africa is constituted by people duly elected, representing

the whole South African population with the authority and legitimacy to speak and establish an accord.

On the other hand, you can have negotiations between self-appointed, self-nominated groups. It clearly does not carry the same weight.

So, the whole question of who will be at the table, as it were, or in the hall and how that's to be determined, is a procedural matter. But it touches on quite important substantive issues.

What would really establish a sound foundation for negotiations would be the holding of general elections to choose an assembly that would then draft a constitution.

This was done in Namibia, and I think it is fair to say that, in Namibia, the elections themselves did more to end the war and civil strife than anything else.

The fact is that even the terrible bloodshed in Natal could be diminished if people there were given a free choice to elect whom they want. Let those with ambitions run for office like anybody else. And, if they get a mandate from a sufficient number of people, they can speak at the table—they don't have to speak with assegais and sawed-off shotguns.

So I assume that this is one of the questions that is going to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting. But the statements that de Klerk has been making indicate that his intention is to resist elections.

[THE NEW NATION] de Klerk envisages that a set of proposals will emerge from the negotiations which will then be put to the electorate that put that Nats into power. This is very different from the elections you are talking about.

[Sachs] What de Klerk has in mind, is racially-constituted negotiations, preserving a certain degree of racial privilege, which is then legitimised by racist referenda. So the racial theme runs all the way through.

One can understand that, having been elected on a racial basis and a racist programme, he has problems. And while I think our main objective is to advance the interests of the mass of the people, who have been victimised by apartheid, we are not going to go out of our way to exacerbate his problem.

But that doesn't mean that we will step back from our basic democratic objectives.

[THE NEW NATION] de Klerk also dismisses majority rule as unworkable in the South African context. How does the ANC define majority rule?

[Sachs] I think one could say that there is no democracy without majority rule—but majority rule in itself does not guarantee democracy. What are elections for, if they are not to find out what the people want, who they want to be in their government?

We have to underline our faith in elections and the electoral process—that's in the interests of everybody. We don't want pseudo-elections where the people are told: "you have choices to make, you have people to elect", but, in effect, the choices can be nullified.

Everybody has been applauding the democratic principle in China, Poland and Nicaragua, why not South Africa?

At the same time, the question of domination is a question that can be dealt with quite appropriately.

[THE NEW NATION] How?

[Sachs] Democracy is not just a question of voting—it is also a question of involving as many people as possible in the processes of government. And there are well-known constitutional mechanisms that provide copper bottom guarantees, if you like, in South Africa's case, gold bottom guarantees, which we can use.

We can have a bill of rights that guarantees every individual basic freedom irrespective of race, colour, gender, language or creed.

We can have clauses in the constitution that specifically forbid any kind of constitutional discrimination against groups on the basis of race, colour, etc.

You can have constitutional guarantees of a positive or affirmative kind, that will, for example, actually require the promotion of different languages of the country.

So, for example, the guarantees for the Afrikaners are not based on the whiteness of their skins, but on the fact that they speak one of the main languages of South Africa, one that is deeply embedded in its social and cultural history. Afrikaans will live in the homes, in schools, in churches, in universities and probably in the rugby scrums.

What the constitution will do is to give guarantees that no one will interfere with or try to suppress the free use of Afrikaans.

These guarantees can be backed up with appropriate mechanisms involving the courts and special bodies with an interest in language and cultural matters.

They have nothing to do with voters' rolls. It would be enough to invoke a person's constitutional rights—it doesn't require a racially-selected bloc in parliament.

[THE NEW NATION] de Klerk dismisses majority rule as simplistic. He cites alternatives, as in the case of the United States (US), where member states have equal representation in the Senate, irrespective of the number of votes, and Switzerland, where there is a "strong devolution of authority". Can you comment on these models?

[Sachs] I think the US is a very bad example for de Klerk to support his argument. The essence of the US scheme is based on a general will and this comes through the

election of the president, who has very extensive powers, and in the election of the Congress.

It is true that the Senate over-represents certain territorial areas. This is related to the way in which the US was constituted. But this was never done on a racial basis. It was done on the basis of historically-constituted states coming into the union with a guarantee of at least two representatives in the Senate.

Now, in South Africa, we don't have these states. Following de Klerk's argument, we should have a senate consisting of eight members—two from the Cape province, two from Natal, two from the Orange Free State and two from the Transvaal. I don't think that will get us very far.

At the same time, I think the question of strong local government is very important—it's a demand that has emerged from the democratic movement and, in that sense, we don't want a remote, bureaucratic, over-centralised state.

On the other hand, we don't want to perpetuate the massive imbalances between the still poor rural and the highly developed urban areas.

One danger of the so-called devolution of power has been to block off the so-called bantustans into regional "states" that have no tax base whatsoever and to shed the responsibility of education, nutrition and the basic human rights in those areas.

So, from that point of view, a national vision is fundamental. We also want people to think of themselves as South Africans. The flag, the presidency, the parliamentary institutions should all encourage the concept of a common citizenship. At the same time, though, it shouldn't necessarily be remote and highly centralised, and apart from the grassroots.

So, certainly, there is a lot of scope for discussing ways and means of guaranteeing lots of active grassroot empowerment and participation. But this is not the same thing as dividing the country up into racial groups which would be a kind of Group Areas by another name.

If, however, de Klerk has suddenly become a convert of people's power, he's right on. But what I suspect he is interested in, when talking of the devolution of power, is white power rather than people's power.

[THE NEW NATION] de Klerk also said that the National Party is not prepared to accept the unqualified provision of a common voters' roll as part of a new constitutional dispensation. What is the ANC's position on this?

[Sachs] A common voters' roll is, I think, the political symbol of equality of an undifferentiated citizenship and the foundation of building a common society.

My own feeling is that the worst thing that the whites can do, from their own point of view, is to continue insisting

on their whiteness. Because that is simply highlighting their self-exclusion from South African society.

And it throws the spotlight on their privileged status and on the fact that they wish to veto all major changes in the country. So, I think, even from a purely selfish, white point of view, they should think again and see that it is very much in their interests to have a political system with special guarantees that apply equally, across the board, so that any attack on any view threatens everybody.

It is as though the whites are saying that there is still something distasteful or uncomfortable and difficult for them being on a common voters' roll.

[THE NEW NATION] de Klerk also talks of a "realistic climate" for negotiations as opposed to the climate defined in terms of the demands contained in the Harare Declaration. How will this impact on talks?

[Sachs] I think when he talks of "realistic" he means realistic in the context of racist South Africa. And the question always is: what's realism and what's simply a concession to racism? In any case, without a general, clear and comprehensive amnesty, it is very difficult to see how the right climate could exist. It could be that the amnesty, or rather its actual implementation, could be phased in within a short period and there could be negotiations about that.

My personal view is that, far from creating a climate for negotiations, the failure to have a clear amnesty will create a climate for great disquiet and encourage the belief that the whole thing is just a sham.

*** Role of Chiefs in Liberation Struggle Discussed**

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in English 2nd Quarter 90 pp 65-76

[Article by Thando Zuma: "The Role of the Chiefs in the Struggle for Liberation"]

[Text] Amongst the many forces thrown up by the mass struggles of the second half of the eighties and drawn into the anti-apartheid forces were traditional chiefs. It might be difficult at first sight to accept that in the 1980s there can be chiefs in South Africa who find common cause with the rest of the broad anti-apartheid forces. The institution of chieftainship has been severely weakened by the political plans of Colonialism of a Special Type (CST). Chiefs were deliberately undermined by successive white governments of South Africa during Union and after.

"Chiefs", the traditional saying goes, "are chiefs because of the people", the suggestion being that they should be bound together with the people and acceptable to them. The advent of colonialism in South Africa put chiefs in a dilemma. The chiefs led their peoples against colonialism. They fought hard battles during those wars of resistance. But the colonial occupation of the country and the gradual introduction of schemes to use chiefs

and undermine their authority led to the weakening of the institution. This became more pronounced from the period of the introduction of the Bantu Authorities system by the Nationalist Party governments in the post-1948 period.

Govan Mbeki observed in South Africa, The Peasants' Revolt (1964, 1984) that as a general rule "the chiefs have been turned into government appointees and learn soon enough that the way to entrench themselves is to keep as close to government policy as possible". The top-down nature of the Bantu Authorities system was carefully designed to make chiefs the local representatives of the CST governments. Chiefs gradually lost their traditional position and role in the communities.

As Mbeki noted, "The chiefs had long had their duties outlined to them, but again these were stressed as the maintenance of law and order, the reporting to the Bantu Commissioner of any unrest, the enforcement of all government laws and orders, and the dispersal of unlawful assemblies". The apartheid state policy on chiefs followed this pattern so that the African chiefs formed an important basis for the bantustan system.

It would be incorrect though to see all African chiefs as collaborators. Resistance by "patriotic" chiefs took place in many parts of the country. Chiefs who did not conform to the new system were deposed and replaced in many instances by people who had no hereditary right to be chiefs but were prepared to implement Bantu Authorities. Recalcitrant chiefs were not only deposed and replaced, but in many cases deported and exiled to other parts of the country.

How Matanzima Rose

These apartheid chiefs who were imposed on the people were to become the most rabid defenders of the bantustan system. Mbeki has graphically illustrated how such chiefs were installed by tracing the example of Kaiser Matanzima. Matanzima was a minor chief in Emigrant Tembuland. According to Mbeki, "Matanzima has administered one district of St Marks. Then he had been handed Calanga, formerly under (Kumkani/King) Sabata's own control, in a government move further to enhance his status. Next he claimed Lady Frere in the Glen Grey district of the Ciskei, and even though no legal transfer took place, the government implemented Bantu Authority regulations in the area and then placed it under Matanzima, to add once more to his domain".

The process described above is what made Matanzima a "paramount chief". He was deliberately promoted because he was very enthusiastic about Bantu Authorities. This tactic had to be applied because most of the Kings/"paramount chiefs" in Transkei were not well disposed towards Bantu Authorities. The major chiefs in the Transkei were Chief Poto of west Pondoland, King Sabata of Tembuland and Chief Botha Sigcau of east Pondoland. But it seems that the most crucial area to control was Tembuland, hence the concerted effort by the state to promote the ambitious Matanzima at the

expense of King Sabata. Once made paramount chief, Matanzima was set to become "the fanatic supporter of Bantu Authorities, and the whole bantustan fantasy" (Mbeki). The similar case of Buthelezi has been well illustrated by Mzala in his book *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (Zed Books 1988). The regime has likewise promoted Lucas Mangope, Patric Mphephu, and Prof Hudson Ntsanwisi who has been made chief of Lulekani in Phalaborwa where he has no hereditary right whatsoever.

Some chiefs did survive as chiefs but tried to find a way round the Bantu Authorities without selling out their people. Some joined Bantu Authorities but later changed. The story of chiefs in South Africa still has to be told in full.

But given the general trend towards the acceptance by chiefs of the CST policies towards them, it is not surprising that Mzala in his book could conclude that "from 1927 onwards, no chief who held political views contrary to those of the government was confirmed in his position as 'chief' by the Governor-General, irrespective of his hereditary right by African tradition" (Mzala, 1988: 422). In 1927, the Union of South Africa government promulgated the Native Administration Act No. 38. This Act laid the basis of what was to become the "taming" of African chiefs and the bringing into complete subservience of most of these chiefs under successive African governments.

Under this Act the African chiefs were subordinated to the native commissioner and the minister of Native Affairs. Chiefs literally became the localised representatives of the commissioner and the CST state: they collected taxes, became the "judges", made sure that the labour needs of the political economy were satisfied, etc. Those African chiefs who did not comply were deposed and new ones installed. Most chiefs played the role as determined by the CST state throughout the whole period of the Bantu Authorities and the bantustans.

Today the institutions of chieftainship has been firmly embedded within the bantustan system. Chiefs compose a greater percentage of the nominated members of bantustan parliaments. Those positions which require no election have been used in some bantustans to frustrate the attempts by patriotic forces to unseat reactionaries in democratic elections. In the Transkei and Venda, Matanzima and Mphephu were kept in position by reactionary chiefs when defeated in elections by the Democratic People's Party and Venda Independence People's Party respectively. In other cases, chiefs were the only ones composing both a cabinet and a parliament, eg, in KwaNdebele up to the late 1980s.

Cotralesa

How does it come about therefore that in 1987, a number of chiefs came together found the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (COTRALESA)? Where do these chiefs who compose COTRALESA come from? Where have they been all along?

On 20th September 1987 about 38 chiefs came together to form the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa. The announcement of the formation of this congress shocked many people both in the mass democratic formations and amongst the general political observers. The major forces at the founding congress of Cotralesa were the chiefs from KwaNdebele and Moutse who had been involved in the bitter struggles against independence and the incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele. One of the chief movers was Prince Klaas Makhosana Mahlangu, who belongs to the numerically powerful Ndzundza royal family in KwaNdebele.

The South African Youth Congress [SAYCO] also had a significant influence in the formation of Cotralesa. This SAYCO influence was to prove both an advantage and a liability in the early life of the organisation. Tactically this was incorrect, the chiefs should have been seen to work for their organisation themselves. The institution of chieftainship is too conservative and as such it is important that chiefs organise themselves and not via the youth.

The logo of the organisation was a hand holding firmly to a leopard skin with in the background some sun's rays symbolising the awakening of the chiefs. The motto of Cotralesa was: "The Dawn of Freedom". At the time of the founding, an interim committee of five was elected comprising a chairperson, vice-chairperson, a secretary and two additional members. The interim chairperson was Chief Morgan Mathebe of Moutse and the secretary Prince Makhosana Mahlangu.

Some of the aims of Cotralesa were stated as: (a) to organise and unite all traditional leaders in our country; (b) to make up the demands of our communities jointly with them, to fight against tribalism, ethnicity and all apartheid instigated conflicts among our people; (c) jointly with all our people to win back the land of our forefathers and share it amongst those who work it in order to banish famine and land hunger; (d) to fight against the destruction of family life through the bantustan system and all related unjust laws; (e) to fight for the eradication of the homeland system and the restoration of South African citizenship to all the people; (f) to build, develop and deepen the spirit of free exchange of cultural activities among all our people in pursuance of the building and development of a true South African culture and national talent; (g) to run projects and self-help schemes together with other progressive organisations that advance our communities and enhance the good image of COTRALESA, also to accommodate chiefs who have been forced to leave their homes (Cotralesa Constitution, 1987).

The preamble of the Constitution stated amongst other things that: (a) we members of the oppressed and exploited people have been abused and alienated in the land of our forefathers by apartheid and its violent homeland system; (b) we look to our forefathers amongst them Sekhukhuni, Ramabulana, Cetshawayo, Ngungunyana, Moshoeshe, Faku, Luthuli, and now to Mandela,

to define our duty and the role we are to play in the ongoing national liberation struggle for a free, unitary and non-racial South Africa.

The founding members also went further to state that "in perpetuating the evil system of apartheid especially in the form of the Homelands, the regime has been, and still is, using chiefs to oppress their own people and to suppress their aspirations for the achievement of a fair, just and equitable order". These chiefs went further to observe that because of the above, "in the eyes of our society traditional leaders are viewed as part of, and collaborators in the apartheid regime" (Cotralesa Constitution, emphasis added).

The political stand of Cotralesa was clearly anti-apartheid from its formation. The founders spoke militantly of the historical role played by some chiefs against colonialism and who in turn "have been subjected to imprisonment, banishment and all other known forms of atrocities committed by Pretoria against its opponents" (SASPU National, Fourth Quarter, 1987: 14).

In a statement after its formation, Cotralesa publicly stated that "apartheid has separated us from our people, now we are going back to them" (emphasis added). The statement went further to strongly condemn "those of our traditional leaders who have been manipulated by apartheid to become collaborators and serve in the structures that have been created by the regime to further enhance the oppression and exploitation of our people" (ibid).

There was a swift and excited response to the formation of Cotralesa from the resistance movement. The United Democratic Front issued a statement which said that "it is a great achievement to see chiefs coming back to the people. We call on all chiefs to join Cotralesa and become part of the oppressed people's struggle for liberation" (ibid). Sayco said that "we are proud that traditional leaders are beginning to realise the truth... We have a long history of chiefs who fought on the side of the people. We believe in such chiefs... Let the present chiefs, if they are still chiefs, lead the people in the fight against what actually deprives their people of their land... Let them be accountable to the people and directed by them" (ibid).

The ANC [African National Congress] also welcomed the formation of Cotralesa as a significant step in the fight against apartheid. On the 24th February 1988, a Cotralesa delegation met the leadership of the ANC led by Secretary General Alfred Nzo in Lusaka. The ANC also congratulated the chiefs who had come together to form Cotralesa, which was seen as continuing the heroic role of the chiefs who were part of the ANC for a significant period after its formation. The regime had realised the importance of the chiefs and moved in to corrupt them. Cotralesa was urged to spread itself into the whole of South Africa, organising all patriotic chiefs who are longing for a political home.

Organisational Developments

After the initial excitement about the formation of Cotralesa, there followed a period of no growth at all for the organisation. Some of the underlying reasons lay in its approach to organisation. The first problem was lack of organisational skills. Cotralesa tended to rely on youth, most of whom were urban, to organise rural chiefs. It seems that there was reluctance on the part of chiefs to be organised in this way.

The second organisational problem was the conference-oriented approach of the founders. Most of these conferences tended to take place in hotels, the most unlikely places to find a patriotic chief. Thirdly, the immediate hostility which Cotralesa found amongst some chiefs in the bantustan hierarchies was a significant constraint. Fourthly, like many other mass democratic organisations, Cotralesa suffered from severe lack of resources. Fifth, and perhaps the most important reason, chiefs are unlike industrial workers. They are scattered all around the country and organisers have to be prepared to travel long distances to remote areas to organise—in most cases—just one chief. This takes a lot of time. Finally, the fact that this was a historically new project in a situation where chiefs had never been so organised poised its own objective problems.

From 1987 to 1989 Cotralesa struggled to establish itself as an organisation. Meanwhile, the apartheid regime had unleashed repression throughout the country, in February 1988 restricting and banning about 17 organisations and thereby driving many activists underground. Even though Cotralesa was not banned, the general atmosphere was not conducive to organisation, particularly for inexperienced organisations.

There was a general feeling amongst activists, particularly at the senior level of the mass democratic movement, that the Cotralesa project was too important to die. Slowly, Cotralesa was making some breakthroughs in Transkei, Natal and Northern Transvaal. A restructuring of Cotralesa took place during the June 11th conference. The conference was attended by about 150 chiefs. At that conference, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, a highly respected chief from the Mpumalanga area, was elected President of the organisation and Chief G. R. Tshikalanga from Venda its national organiser.

Chief Tshikalanga is one of the examples of chiefs who suffered from the apartheid system. He became chief of his people in December 1963, but did not last long as he was deposed in 1966. He is popular with his people and the fight to reinstate him continues.

Transkei and KwaZulu

Significant developments have recently been reported. In the Transkei, it is estimated that about 80 percent of the chiefs have declared themselves in favour of Cotralesa. In KwaZulu, about fifty chiefs have so far joined the organisation according to Chief Mophumulo

(WEEKLY MAIL, OCTOBER 6-12, 1989). These particular developments in KwaZulu have incensed Gatsha Buthelezi who has unleashed a vicious campaign against chief Maphumulo and Cotralesa.

Buthelezi has described Cotralesa as an organisation attempting to "thrust the spear into the very heart of Zulu unity" (ibid). Buthelezi is particularly worried about the growth of Cotralesa in Natal because he sees it as challenging his traditional political hegemony amongst the chiefs of that region. In September 1989 Buthelezi summoned all chiefs in KwaZulu to Ulundi to discuss or to tell them not to join Cotralesa.

He made sure that King Zwelithini was with him at that meeting. He said that he had summoned the chiefs so that they could "close ranks and rejoice in our unity and to tell Inkosi Mophumulo to go to hell" (WEEKLY MAIL, September 15-21, 1989). It was further reported that King Zwelithini also joined the Buthelezi chorus and condemned Chief Maphumulo who he said had "shed his right to friendship and comradeship" and should thus be isolated by other chiefs (ibid).

Other chiefs who are members of Cotralesa in Natal have also suffered attacks from Buthelezi and the King. The most notable member of Cotralesa in Natal is the Senior Prince of the Zulu royal family, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni. He is a particularly interesting member of Cotralesa because he was regent of the Zulu royal crown when the present King was still at school. He also has a history of disagreement and conflict with Buthelezi. In November 1989, the Senior Prince's house was attacked by vigilantes thought to be members of Inkatha. The attack occurred after Buthelezi had verbally attacked the Senior Prince for his membership of Cotralesa. However, it seems that the Senior Prince is popular with the Zulu people and as such Buthelezi may be constrained in taking any further action against him.

Chief Alpheus Molefe, the chief of the Molefe people in Nqutu district of Natal, has already been suspended from his position because of his membership of Cotralesa. He is currently filing papers to the Supreme Court challenging the legal and constitutional basis of his suspension by Buthelezi. There has been no recent attempt to dismiss Chief Maphumulo because such an attempt was previously made in 1978 but was declared null and void by the supreme court. Chief Alpheus Molefe is also one of the popular chiefs in Natal and claims support from the 30,000 people who reside under his jurisdiction. In northern Natal, there are about four chiefs in control of the Ingwavuma area who are sympathetic to Cotralesa and are seeking legal means to secede from KwaZulu because, as they argue, they are not Zulus but Tongas.

Thus in organisational terms Cotralesa is growing. According to Chief Maphumulo, there are many chiefs who have not yet joined but have indicated their willingness to join. He says that Cotralesa has to be built because "it will be a big force in South African politics"

(WEEKLY MAIL, October 6-12, 1989). To what extent this will be the case will depend on organisation and political consciousness.

So far, as indicated above, some significant steps have been made. But a lot remains to be done. According to a Cotralesa survey published in November 1988, there are many anti-apartheid, anti-bantustan chiefs who are willing to be part of Cotralesa. But for now it seems that the main areas where organisational gains have been made are Natal, Transkei and KwaNdebele. The organisation has a lot of work to do in the northern, western and eastern transvaal and the Border region.

Contest for Democratic Power

Has the institution of chieftainship not as yet outlived itself? Are the material conditions which gave rise to this institution still there or are we trapped in cultural romanticisms? Is the liberation movement seriously committed to this institution of chiefs? If the material conditions for its existence have long ceased to exist, has people's consciousness developed to the level of accepting its demise?

Let us present two theses on these questions for consideration.

Thesis 1: chieftainship is outdated and should therefore not find any role in future. Isn't it the case that "if Africans have had chiefs, it was because all human societies have had them at one stage or another? But when a people have developed to a stage which discards chieftainship, when their social development contradicts the need for such an institution, then to force it on them is not liberation but enslavement". (Mbeki: 47). We will need to legislate against it and give democratic power to the people. In any case, the institution of chieftainship is fundamentally anti-democratic, i.e., chiefs are not elected by popular vote but follow a line of succession, which is after all patriarchal, except in a few instances like the Balobedu of the Mojadji royalty in the Northern Transvaal who are ruled by queens.

This thesis could cause a lot of political problems for us. True, the position of chiefs in contemporary South African society could be said to be redundant due to the emergence of other 'chiefs' who are elected and perform similar functions. In a situation of profound people's power, most chiefs could indeed become redundant. But that will not necessarily imply that people's views and perceptions of chiefs will change likewise. In the early 1980s, there was an interesting polemic between comrades Spectator and Nyawuza in the pages of THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST about tradition and revolutionary society in Mozambique.

In those debates, the question of chiefs also occupied a significant space. Comrade Spectator argued that in Mozambique "chiefs and indunas continued as a whole to play the role of lackeys for the colonialists. They passed on information, collected taxes, recruited for the colonial army..." (Spectator, AC, Second Quarter 1983).

Comrade Spectator went further to argue that in FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front], "the great Kingdoms of Monomotapa, Zimbabwe and Gaza are not presented as proofs of a glorious past which preceded colonialism, but as examples of feudal exploitation in terms of which a small number of royals surrounded themselves with religious awe and lived in splendour on the basis of tribute exacted from the artisan and farmer subjects" (AC, No 89, Second Quarter 1982).

Comrade Spectator's conclusion is based on the FRELIMO approach which—according to him—says, "it was the masses who bore the brunt of foreign domination, it was they who fought back in their daily lives, who in their songs, dances and stories kept the flames of independence alive even in the darkest days. Glory—not to the feudals—but to the people as a whole!" (ibid).

Nyawuza's argument was that one must not confuse one's advanced political consciousness with that of the people who still accept these kingdoms and the institution of chieftainship as a whole. For him, any political programme which is divorced from "the level of consciousness of the people, to say nothing of the practical-political demands of the times, can—in our anti-colonial struggle—lead to disastrous results" (AC, Fourth Quarter 1982).

People's Control

Thesis II: the institution should be allowed to exist in future but under "our" control, "our" here suggesting democratic people's power. The specific role of chiefs would depend on the role they play now in the national democratic revolution. It is recognised that historically chiefs have played leadership roles in our societies in line with the given material conditions. Shaka for example was king and commander of his Zulu forces. His position was due in the main to his political and military skills. Societies of those days were organised along these lines and did not know other forms of political organisation.

Whilst Thesis II may sound acceptable to those comrades who now compose Cotralesa, there will be many problems concerning the way in which chiefs will coexist with democratic organisations and other government organs of people's power. In terms of political participation, the people's power perspective will favour democratic election, instead of appointment by hereditary right. A lot of political work will have to be done to raise the consciousness of both the chiefs and the people as a whole on whatever formula of coexistence we find.

One can further argue that people's power will create a whole new set of political and economic conditions which together could create a basis for the gradual phasing out of the system of chieftainship. But this will take a long time. And in any case not everybody will agree that the system must wither away. There may be those who want a new constitution to guarantee a secure position for the chiefs, queens and kings. Political history does show numerous cases where the institutions

and traditions of royalty continue to exist (albeit controlled by the constitutions) even in advanced capitalist countries; Britain, Sweden, Belgium, Holland and so on.

The question of the future position and role of chiefs has to be debated in the open so that there is no suspicion of a hidden agenda on the part of the liberation movement. The emergence of Cotralesa is clearly a contribution to the debate. Despite the fact that CST has over the years used chiefs for its purposes, the national liberation movement has adopted the position that those patriotic chiefs who join the people in the liberation struggle are important component parts of the national democratic revolution. In any case, despite the various machinations of CST, there are many popular chiefs in South Africa today who together with their people are taking part in the struggle. Most of the struggles they have engaged in are against the bantustan system itself and for land.

Cotralesa will play an important role in the mobilisation of the rural masses. This becomes even more important now with the deepening crisis of the bantustan system. Together with the other formations of the mass democratic movement, the people in the rural areas can be reached, organised and mobilised into struggle. We should welcome this move by the chiefs to organise themselves. There is still a lot of organisational and political work to be done. At times the process may be contradictory and costly.

The ANC once had a house of chiefs, but it died as a result of the tactics employed by CST. In 1932, Dr Pixley ka Seme was president of the ANC. Making a passionate appeal to the chiefs not to move away from the ANC, he said that "The chiefs today should realise that their forefathers won these positions of honour and of high esteem by fighting for the salvation of their own people and not by lying down and seeking personal comforts and pleasures." (quoted in Mzala: 43, emphasis added).

In the January 8th Statement of the NEC [National Executive Committee] of the ANC for 1990, Cotralesa is singled out. The statement says that "A special tribute is due to the traditional leaders who have combined themselves into the Congress of Traditional Leaders. Having broken away from the stable of those who help to administer the apartheid system, these leaders have regained the respect of the people and are a valuable and indispensable component of the genuine forces for change". It is probably correct to repeat that call with the confidence that Cotralesa will reach out to these chiefs and indeed bring them back to the people!

* CP Strategy Against NF Reforms Outlined

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in Afrikaans 20 Apr 90 pp 16-17

[Report on address by Conservative Party leader Dr. A.P. Treurnicht at the opening session of the People's Forum in Pretoria on April 6, 1990: "Let Us Fight for Our People"]

[Text] In the future, the historic People's Forum that took place on April 6 will stand out as one of the milestones in the struggle for the freedom of whites and Afrikaners. The opening address at this People's Forum was delivered by the leader of the Conservative Party and the unintended leader of the last community of whites in Africa, Dr. A.H. Treurnicht.

Following is a somewhat shortened version of his historic address.

For our people the year 1990 is truly a year that will determine its destiny!

We are being weighed by our own people who are asking: Is our sense of freedom still intact, or are we looking for reasons to surrender?

Are we demanding those rights for a whole people, or are we singing in the choir of elusive human rights?

Do we have the firm will to survive, or have we let ourselves be intimidated into servile subservience? Will we survive as a civilized, Christian people with character, mental nobility, and justice, or have we become the prey of nihilism, neutrality toward God, materialism—a society in which the anti-Christ and satanism are tolerated?

I believe that today the answer is: Lord, there is no salvation without You. We want to be a people for the Lord!

We are being threatened and challenged from many sides. We are being humiliated by a government which is betraying our character and freedom. We are being challenged by the liberals who despise national pride. We must resist the national suicide gangs of certain intellectuals at our universities. We must resist the naked racism and enmity of some blacks who want to take away our country, our freedom, and our survival as a white nation.

Communists

Our archenemies, the Communists, ANC [African National Congress], and PAC [Pan-African Congress], all of whom are planning the overthrow of all white institutions and are intimidating and murdering moderate blacks, have suddenly become unconditionally legitimate and are now being treated as fellow citizens and allies.

Our people's freedom is at stake now, today. If there ever was a question of total onslaught, then it is now. This is not against our country and all its people, it is against the freedom loving white men, and specifically the Afrikaners!

We are convinced of it: this total onslaught must be averted.

It must be answered with double action. First of all, there is faith action. I am taking the liberty today of saying to you what the Apostle Paul said to his fellow travelers

during the storm at sea. You have lifted the anchors and a storm wind has pulled you along; for days the sun and the stars were invisible; you abandoned all hope of being saved.

But there was someone on board for whom God had a plan and who believed.

Reality

In the middle of the despair, he stood up and said: "Keep up your courage! I put my trust in God."

And now I am telling you: It is possible that doors will be opened which you and I are unaware of! Evil plans can fall apart. Unchristian ideologies change and die off. The wheels turn and powerful possibilities fall into decline.

Those who do not take this into account are out of touch with the greatest reality.

The second very important action is much more than our One Million Action, which already has the nationalists on the run. In concurrence with Professor Geoff Cronje's statement years ago before an academic meeting, we talk about a national movement. This means a total, all encompassing popular action to make ourselves counted as a nation, to live and develop according to our own national character, and to resist situations or phenomena which threaten or impede our self-realization.

Even though Dr. Cronje specifically referred to the Afrikaners, he realized that the culture and philosophy of the English and the Afrikaners have become indigenous. We share a common loyalty to this country.

Unrealistic

We are not incited by enmity or hatred toward other races or ethnic groups, but we reject the so-called non-racial society as totally unrealistic and a denial of our identity.

We expect the government to use the necessary means, violence if necessary, to protect the lives and property of our people and the opportunity for us to do our professional work and live a normal family life.

We denounce the government: by lifting inflow controls it has allowed uncontrolled squatting by blacks, caused the flooding of living areas for whites, and allowed a dangerous lack of security to escalate.

The world is full of rumors about planned ANC attacks on white homes and individuals. The lifting of the ban on the ANC, PAC, and Umkhonto we Swazi was a fatal blunder. The freeing of Mandela and his agitation in favor of the armed struggle and socialism has raised the revolutionary climate to dangerous levels.

The so-called peaceful demonstrations have turned into open demonstrations of antiwhite black power. Large black communities, council members and policemen live in fear of ANC violence and killings.

Police

We said to one another: let us not stand in the way of the police as upholders of law and order. But if the police find themselves in situations where they are being attacked; if situations get out of control or they cannot strike everywhere at the same time and the armed forces cannot take effective action immediately, then we have the right to defend ourselves.

Then the ordinary citizens must not be disarmed! We must not be left defenseless against ANC marshalls, ANC street committees, and planned attacks against whites, against our residential areas, and against other targets.

To plead for a united society, distribution of power, joint government, and shared democratic control for terrorists and communists is the greatest folly and irresponsibility.

We say that it is unthinkable for such people as the ANC, who deny our people our right to exist, our own government and our own land, to become members of the armed forces and the police. It is unthinkable for our security to pass into the hands of the ANC and the Communists.

Future

Our students and young people have the right to ask what kind of future or inheritance there will be for them in the new South Africa.

Our economists and business people have the opportunity and responsibility to make plans with maximum self-sufficiency within the framework of economic interdependence and political independence.

We have large numbers of academics who feel it is scientific to promote national awareness and loyalty to their own people and culture.

We value the contributions of our lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, nurses, and welfare workers when they professionally think over the issue of the continued survival of our people in freedom.

As far as we are concerned, they are much more than simply professionals. They are fellow citizens who fill a place in the all encompassing popular action and who complete our cultural calling.

We would like to hear what our women and their organizations are planning for the struggle for our survival in freedom. If our wives and daughters grab our people's freedom flag, then we will be marching toward victory.

Bearers of Culture

We need advertisers to present our case, our people, and our party correctly. Excellent products often remain unknown due to poor marketing.

Our civil servants are not simply cogs in the government administrative machine. They are bearers of culture and are manning an extremely important facet of our national economy. It is definitely not all the same to us whether or not they are replaced by members of other population groups.

The role of our farming communities as the owners and workers of our land and as producers cannot easily be overestimated. However, their importance goes far beyond food production. They make an extremely significant contribution to the perpetuation of the character of our people and the maintenance of values, spiritual and moral standards, and national consciousness.

The politicization of the work area, where black unions are turned into political levers against white political power in our own country, constitutes a very serious threat to self-determination of the Whites.

Labor

We want our people in labor to come forward in an organized way and to say what contributions they could make to the survival of our people in freedom.

We are convinced that our people in the media and the press are not at all culturally or nationally neutral beings who merely concern themselves with objective news.

Loyalty to truth is not the same as social neutrality. Those who love the truth do not have to despise their own people.

Our male and female athletes will have to help us put the practice of sports in the right perspective—as personal pastime and fitness program, as school, university or community activity; and thus also their national and international perspective. Sports boycotts are practiced to force whole peoples into multiracialism and political abdication.

Artists—writers, painters, musicians, entertainers—can help us develop understanding for the international language of the arts, the artistic norms which transcend nationalities and the legality of esthetic as opposed to ethical and religious norms.

Artists

But let our artists also explain for us how free art is practiced by people who have national and cultural ties and who are jealous of that freedom and the specific characteristics of the people that has produced them.

Local governments, who were elected to implement certain policy directions, are being ignored, made powerless, and thwarted by court decisions.

Our local government representatives will neither be intimidated nor silenced. We are not serving our own interests, but the interest of our communities and we have a right to our own community living.

If there is an area where a people cannot allow any meddling into their own characteristics, then it is in education.

We say that multiracial education is not only absurd, it is contrary to sound educational principles. It is an undermining of the national consciousness.

Crossroads

Politically speaking, South Africa is at a crossroads. The white nation must decide now whether it will be swallowed up in a unitary multiracial state, which is really nothing more than domination by blacks, or whether it will demand the right to self-determination for itself.

This means that the white nation would demand its own land, its own government, its own parliament, its own budget, and its own security forces.

We will not negotiate about the right to govern ourselves. We believe that it is folly to see members of the ANC, the Communist Party, and PAC as parliamentary types or as democrats and to invite them to act as fellow government members—and ultimately dominators—over the white nation.

However, the day is long past when the whites could make decisions for the nonwhite population groups. Today we must accept responsibility for our own people in order to acquire space for our children.

We are not looking for theologians or a church to soft-soap our people or to preach in defense of a certain ideology. The church, in its distinctiveness of origin, character and calling, should never be anyone's propaganda machine.

Churches

Will our African churches, like the priest and the Levite, pass each other on opposite sides of the street and not concern themselves with the misery and threats suffered by their own people?

After all, when you preach that the people should convert to God, you do not expect those people to have to commit suicide, do you!

Besides, to consider separate survival and the establishment of peoples in different residential areas as a command of God is not heresy as we were recently told, is it?

That is why I have the temerity to ask our church members: "If separate national existence is the will of God, then please think about what you could do in the interest of the continued Christian existence of your own people."

It is my sincere prayer that this total, all encompassing popular movement will quickly get under way. In the words of Nehemiah, the faithful leader of the people: "Think of the Lord, great and awe-inspiring, and let us fight for our fellow citizens, our children, our wives, and our homes."

* Commentary: Dispossession of Farmers' Land Near

90AF0157A Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER
in Afrikaans 18 Apr 90 p 8

[Commentary by Hannes Ferguson in "Farm Talk" column: "Dispossession Approaching"]

[Text] The de Klerk government's surrender to the ANC [African National Congress] inevitably includes the attempt to accept and help apply the ANC's principle of taking over white farmland and distributing it to blacks. Its influence on that policy can only be applied in gradual degrees, without meddling with the accepted principle. The situation created thereby is the prevailing agricultural problem currently.

Everyone knows that white farmland was not "stolen" from the blacks. In the first place, the Voortrekkers in Transvaal and the Free State moved into an empty, unpopulated world which lay wild and fallow after a generation of murderous raids by Zulu and Matabele warriors. Secondly, the hard work, ingenuity, and perseverance of many generations of white farmers have turned the land, which initially was in fact unused, into a tremendous economic asset. If now he must surrender the land to blacks, it will be ruined to the same extent as the land and parts of the homelands. It will return to its previous desolate, wild state, or, worse, through overgrazing and erosion it will ultimately turn into a dead, harsh desert.

But no, the de Klerk government continues with the ANC program, cautiously and, in the beginning, gradually, later on fast and "like a whirlwind," in Mr. de Klerk's own words. That is just like the promise of Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe that there won't be a black majority government for 10 years. The dynamics of the surrender policy will turn those 10 years into only ten, perhaps two. And then? Then, after two or three years of soothing talk, comes the end, the destruction, in a just a few years, of what was built up laboriously in almost two centuries.

And what do the elected leaders of the farmers, the president and vice president of the South African Farmers' Union [SALU], do? It is none of their business, they plead. "It is a political matter," says the director of SALU on behalf of that body's president, Mr. Nico Kotze.

Mr. Kotze is wrong. It is not only a political matter; it is a matter for the Broederbond [Afrikaner Brothers League], in which he himself is bound not to oppose his fellow Broederbond members in the government, even, if as a result of his action, not a single white farmer will be left in a few years' time. The SALU clearly took sides against the farmer by giving people such as Dr. Simon Brand and Warren Clelow the opportunity at Lanvokon to propagandize dispossessing whites of their land.

What about those other farmers' leaders, has our dear minister of agriculture said one word yet about the

dispossession threat against farmers? Mr. de Klerk might as well have made the chairman of the Farmers' Union of Putsonderwater or Koekenaap minister; he would have had an honest, combative farmers' opinion and would have learned more about how a farmer feels about his land.

Instead Dr. Brand, a theoretical economist who, like Mr. de Klerk himself, is more leftist than left, was made the de facto minister of agriculture. He and the Minister of Planning, Mr. Hernu Kirel, are the ones who do most of the talking on the matter.

Indeed, Dr. Brand recently let the leftist cat out of the bag when he—quoted by FINANCE WEEK—stated that the development away from white farms to black plot dwellers must be seen against the background of the government's free market policy in agriculture and the objective of privatization and deregulation which the government tries to pursue with the administrative councils and elsewhere in agriculture. "These policy directions," says Dr. Brand, "may lead to considerable adjustments . . . which lead to serious problems of liquidation and even solvency, but they will contribute to a fairer distribution of land." In other words, the "fairer distribution of land" justifies the current policy of bankrupting farmers with good economic excuses. The suggestion is that the creation of "problems of liquidation and solvency," or in plain farmers' language the bankrupting of agriculture is intentional on the part of the NP [National Party].

Mr. Johan van Rooyen, the group director of the Development Bank of which Dr. Brand is the chief executive officer, also said, according to a statement to FINANCE WEEK, that white land can be given to blacks without truly dispossessing individual farmers. Blacks can be allowed to individually buy white land. The government can also buy the land of white farmers, for example, that of bankrupt farmers, and then give or sell it to blacks. Companies which act on behalf of blacks can also buy land from whites, and, subsequently, sell it to blacks. Mr. Van Rooyen says, however, that these methods are inadequate; they must be supplemented by massive credit and more relevant investigation by the state.

Massive credit . . . only to blacks of course. What does the ANC itself say? According to FINANCE WEEK, the ANC does not yet have a developed fundamental policy. The paper apparently never read the Freedom Charter. Dispossess the white farmers, and distribute their land to those who work it, is the demand.

This is dispossession without compensation. But even if the whites' farms are not individually dispossessed, but are bought for a pittance, it is, indeed, dispossession of white farmers as a group, for the policy is aimed at them as a group.

The cautious approach of the head of the ANC's team for constitutional and legal affairs, Zola Skweyiya, clearly lets the real objectives show through. He stated last September in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, that the land

question is not merely a point in dispute. It cannot be separated from the demand for termination of apartheid. Black anger has always crystallized around the land question, says Skweyiya. It can evidently only be solved when there is a government which is prepared to dispossess land on a large scale and install millions of blacks on it. However, he expects a storm of white opposition, so therefore that option cannot be applied just by itself.

Other options—such as that mentioned by Mr. Van Rooyen, undoubtedly—will have to be applied together with that.

That is practically the same reasoning as that what the black Zimbabwe dictator, Robert Mugabe, always has preached. He pointed out the limitations set by the circumstances, such as the constitutional fortification of white farms for a period of time. Now that that period is over and "white anger" has cooled off, he is going to nationalize the remaining white farmers' farms completely. On that program he now has fought an election and won it. Now he can apply what he has been wanting to do for a long time and, as he says, nothing will deter him.

This is the same recipe of Dr. Van der Merwe and Hernu Kirel: start slowly, but those 10 years (or three years, or two years, or one year as Mr. Kirel says) will soon be over and then the days of the white man on farmland are over.

*** Orange Workers: Whites Can Replace Black Labor**

90AF0157B Pretoria DIE PATRIOT
in Afrikaans 20 Apr 90 p 6

[Report on commentary by various individuals including Mr. Ben van den Berg, assistant director of the Association of Orange Workers (i.e. Association for the Furthering of Afrikaner Ideals): "White Sons Save Pretoria From Garbage Chaos - It Shows Black Labor Is Replaceable Say Orange Workers"]

[Text] White schoolchildren are currently used by the Pretoria City Council to remove garbage as a result of a strike by black workers.

The children, who are on vacation, are being employed to help after negotiations between the city council and the unions of the blacks reached a dead end on the question of a wage increase for the workers.

In Pretoria it now has become an everyday sight to see the garbage trucks, which work until late at night in order to finish, ride past with white schoolchildren on the back.

"For the children it is, of course, an easy way to earn pocket money," said one of the truck drivers with whom PATRIOT talked.

"They are also much more efficient than the blacks who usually do the work," he added, asking that his name not be mentioned.

The strike has already lasted for over a week, and there is no end in sight, said Miss Alta Oberholzer, a public relations officer of the Pretoria City Council, to PATRIOT.

"The number of workers who strike change from day to day, and we cannot determine exactly how many workers are absent."

Mr. Ben van den Berg, assistant director of the Association of Orange Workers, said in his reaction to the event that two important lessons can be learned from it.

"The first lesson is that the use of whites to do that kind of work proves that our people can manage without black labor," Mr. Van den Berg said.

"Secondly: The habit of making use of white labor only in an emergency situation, and of then taking the blacks back after their strike is over amounts to your abusing your people."

"Dismissing the whites again after they have furnished good, uninterrupted service and replacing them with foreign labor, which only continues in order to continually undermine your entire way of life, is entirely the wrong attitude."

* New Right Wing Monthly Publication Announced

90AF0157A Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER
in Afrikaans 11 Apr 90 p 12

[Report on announcement made at rightist rally in Pretoria: "Rightist Monthly VEG - To Appear Starting in May"]

[Text] The war against the Afrikaner started when the greatest leader of the Afrikaner nation, Dr. Henry Verwoerd, was killed on 6 September 1966 by six traitorous stab wounds.

That scandalous deed of violence has been followed up by a continued attack on Dr. Verwoerd's policy from the editing offices in Keerom Street, Cape Town. The campaign to undermine the people, to divide them and destroy them by means of the press has continually increased. The voice of the people had to be stifled. Thus said Mr. Meinhard Peters at the rightist rally in the Pretoria city hall.

On whose behalf is the leftist press writing, especially the so-called alternative press which is the voice of the revolution?

Advertise

Just read who advertises in the VRYE WEEKBLAD, WEEKLY MAIL, the black revolutionary papers. Who places the large advertisements in those? It is Rembrandt, it is the oil companies, it is other leftist capital interests, said Mr. Peters when he announced the new rightist monthly VEG (FIGHT).

Future

The Afrikaner must not allow his history to be rewritten by leftists, nor let his future be prescribed by them. VEG, which will cost 2 Rands per copy and 24 Rands per year, will regularly appear starting in May this year. VEG will be the Afrikaner's defense against the leftist press. It will supply penetrating rightist reading material which every national Afrikaner needs in order to be defensible, spiritually defensible.

* Commentary Calls for de Klerk's Departure

90AF0157D Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER
in Afrikaans 18 Apr 90 p 2

[Commentary by Gawie in "Perspective" Column: "de Klerk Must Go!"]

[Text] If F.W. de Klerk still does not realize that his advisers are not qualified or that his own judgment is extremely deficient, this country will pay a very high price.

The series of misconceptions on the part of the government since February this year is increasing every week. There is not one single government initiative which has proceeded according to anticipation; nor is there a single counteraction of the government which has yielded the expected result.

Let us start with the most recent one. It is the announced meeting between the government and the ANC [African National Congress] which was to have taken place on 11 April. The ANC postponed it, left the government embarrassed, and confirmed the impression that the ANC sets the agenda.

What is more significant, is that the ANC has gained time with that tactic to estrange leaders of homelands and of black city councils from the de Klerk government and to align them behind the ANC. With that, probably the most important single tactical advantage was achieved by the ANC against the government, for de Klerk's objective was to leave the negotiating table as the representative of the whites, with the support of a considerable number of blacks and other nonwhites.

In that manner the impression had to be created that the government enjoys broad support beyond party divisions and racial borders. As matters are proceeding now, the government is step by step being isolated. At this stage one can actually count on only Buthelezi's continued support. The positions of others, such as Nzandwizi of Gazankulu and Mangope of Bophuthatswana, can change abruptly as a result of coups, as already happened in Transkei, Ciskei, and Venda. And the Honorable Hendrickse of the Colored Labor Party apparently is very much under the impression that big problems await him if he does not fall in behind the ANC. The political instability of the Indians is so well-known that it must be expected that they will merely judge who will be on the winning side.

The lapse of time since Mandela's release has been used primarily to the ANC's advantage, and the government's basic tactic is about to be completely frustrated. Perhaps this sounds exaggerated, but the ANC is evidently playing cat-and-mouse with the government. The fact that the government was not able to make any gain in this respect is fatal. It has already largely lost the preamble to negotiations.

The second respect in which the government has seriously misjudged itself is that of the so-called peaceful marches. When the first of those was in the offing for Cape Town, and the government had to decide either to allow it or to refuse it, it decided under pressure to allow it and present it as a big tactical victory. The South African Police was ordered not to interfere because they must not get involved in police actions.

Afterward it soon became apparent that it was not possible to maintain the government's standpoint, because such marches could lead to disorder of the worst degree. The police were ordered to turn back marches to the white townships. This intervention led to the incident at Sebokeng where the police fired at the front section of the march, with very serious consequences for some of the troublemakers.

The government's assessment of the situation was completely wrong in this case. Its initial indulgence was anticipated to be rewarded with gratefulness and respect, although precisely the opposite should have been expected. Its indulgence has been abused. And its change in behavior now is a recognition of its initial misconception.

These types of forward and backward movements of a government in a prerevolutionary state are extremely alarming, for it shows a deficient understanding of, and an awkward grip on, the political course of events.

It is known that the de Klerk government lets itself be fooled into believing that, in the developing situation, the government must continually occupy "high ground." What this really means is that the government must lead the revolution; it must beat the ANC with every step. (That is the explanation for the series of steps taken since 2 February: rescinding of the ban on ANC and the South African Communist Party, relaxation of the emergency regulations, release of Mandela, etc.)

This politically naive approach already was tested various times in the past by governments which had been involved with revolutionary powers. And, in each case, it increased the revolutionary speed, for the simple reason that such action sets in motion the law of increasing expectations and propels the government from one area to another at a faster and faster speed.

Just how deeply this delusion has taken root in the de Klerk government is best illustrated by F.W. de Klerk's recent statement to press people in Cape Town that the "step of change must be almost breathtaking." One has to see that to believe it! If a revolutionary movement

were to state that as its objective, one can understand it, but for the leader of the government to say it means in fact that he is trying to take over the revolutionary leadership, for revolution is change at a fast pace, and change at an almost breathtaking pace is nothing but revolution. If de Klerk does not realize that, he is totally unqualified to serve as head of state.

This series of misconceptions (and there are more) must bring home the fact that other plans and evaluations of the government will be just as deficient. One of those is that it is probably in vain to expect that there will be quiet deliberation around the conference table, with de Klerk firmly in the position of head of state and government. As matters are developing now, his cabinet might well be replaced by an interim government in which Mandela and other ANC members will be included, before negotiations start.

When de Klerk took over, there was the slogan: "Give de Klerk a chance." Now he has had his chance, more than enough chance. He has proven that he is not up to the task to which he was summoned.

The de Klerk government is the greatest threat of the white nation. Therefore, the slogan on the HNP [Reformed National Party] banner is fitting and hits the mark: De Klerk must go!

* Viljoen Argues for Protection of Common Values

34000680A Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS
in English 12 May 90 p 14

[Article: "Political Rights: NP, ANC Moving Closer"]

[Text] The National Party [NP] has accepted that the protection of common values, rather than constitutional groups or minorities, is a better way of ensuring that the constitution in a new South Africa will protect individuals.

This emerged after acting-president and Minister of Constitutional Development Dr Gerrit Viljoen signalled a significant shift in NP thinking when he said group protection was not necessarily a permanent principle, but was viewed as a method towards achieving a just and effective dispensation.

Speaking on the first day of debate on his department's budget, the government's chief negotiator spoke of constitutional protection for minorities as being "an essential method or road—an open-ended road—at this stage in our history towards achieving success in nation building". In the interim, he argued, the existence of minorities—which was undeniable—should not be ignored and it would be "wiser to acknowledge and accommodate its conflict potential rather than sweeping it under the carpet".

In the interim, he argued, the existence of minorities—which was undeniable—should not be ignored and it

would be "wiser to acknowledge and accommodate its conflict potential rather than sweeping it under the carpet".

Senior Nationalists say they recognise that constitutional stability must be founded on common values shared by all South Africans, irrespective of race.

But, they say, certain constitutional guarantees will be necessary in the beginning to accommodate what Dr Viljoen called the "conflict potential" inherent in the reality of group diversity.

What emerges, however, is that there is already a measure of compromise in the National Party's once-rigid stance on groups, so that they now seem a step closer to the ANC's position of recognising, and being prepared to protect, only language, cultural and religious rights over and above individual rights.

Interestingly enough, it could be argued that this is a significant example of the "convergence" which the Democratic Party [DP] predicted and indeed towards which it committed itself to work.

It is equally interesting to note that as part of his justification for this shift of emphasis, Dr Viljoen cited in his speech the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto of African States which "recognised the need for protecting certain group values or rights, albeit in a transitional period".

Managing such a transition with the greatest possible success and effect is in fact at the core of the National

Party's gradual shift (convergence?) towards a position more readily acceptable to other important power-players.

The group concept—which even Dr Viljoen recognised had become discredited because of its association with the power privilege of apartheid—is one of the stickiest issues in the forging of a new South Africa. It is tainted by the notion that it could be the basis for a new form of race-linked inequality.

It is of concern to the National Party precisely because the whole thrust of its present effort is aimed at dismantling and removing race-based inequalities and being seen to be doing so.

One of the key figures in the ANC [African National Congress]'s constitution-making process, lawyer Mr Albie Sachs, sums it up when he says a problem arises when an attempt is made "to attach political rights to the right of the individual to be different".

The right to expression through groups and communities, he argues, can be protected in other ways.

In a statement that seems to come close to the thinking in the inner circles of the National Party, he says: "What we should look for is not protection of groups, but protection of interests."

Mr Sachs observed in an interview this week that while the gap between the government and the ANC on the question of group political rights was still large, it was no longer "enormously large".

The ANC believes—and the same sentiment was repeated often by the DP in last year's election—that special protection for whites would be the worst thing for whites themselves.

Angola

President Dos Santos Discusses Reform Issues

MB0406145890 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
1200 GMT 4 Jun 90

[Interview with President Jose Eduardo dos Santos by unidentified Egyptian journalists in Luanda; date not given—recorded]

[Text] President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' interview with Egyptian journalists in Luanda recently focused on four main issues: economic reform, political reform, the political situation in (?the country), and Angolan-Egyptian relations.

The Angolan head of state began by analyzing the consequences of Nelson Mandela's release and Namibia's independence on the Angolan peace process. He also discussed the reasons for these significant achievements.

[Dos Santos] Before reviewing the repercussions of those events on Angola, I would like to say that Namibia's independence and comrade Nelson Mandela's release are significant successes in the struggle for national liberation in Africa at large and southern Africa in particular. These were major victories by the African people.

Namibia's independence has concluded the OAU program for Africa's total liberation from colonialism. That event is historic for that reason alone. It will have very positive repercussions on the future of Africa in general and Angola in particular. Namibia's independence means Angola will have a peaceful southern neighbor with whom Angola will enjoy good relations. Therefore, Namibia will no longer serve as a base for aggression, which will positively influence the Angola peace process.

Comrade Nelson Mandela's release and the beginning of talks between the ANC [African National Congress] and the South African Government will permit the resolution of the apartheid issue which, in turn, will lead to the elimination of one of principal sources of destabilization and war in southern Africa. That will be yet another factor having a positive effect on the Angolan peace process.

[Correspondent] Comrade President, we know that Angola is [words indistinct] economic reform. We would like you to comment on the economic reform program's implementation.

[Dos Santos] We believe the program's implementation has been satisfactory so far. The first stage comprised the creation of formal and legal instruments permitting the program's implementation. This does not mean every one of those instruments is ready, but the principal ones are. For that reason, some of our economic activities have already been liberalized. This applies in particular to minor economic activities, notably in the area of services such as retailing, restaurants, and bars. We have

also made major liberalization efforts in the fields of small industry and agriculture. We could say some prices have already been freely set. However, the government continues to strive to conclude all the work connected with creating a packet (?of measures) [words indistinct] that we hope to conclude this year. Then we hope to begin implementing profound structural readjustment measures.

As you know, the Economic and Financial Reorganization Program [SEF] was defined to resolve a fundamental problem: We had to abandon administrative methods of management and move on to economic management. Obviously, one of the SEF's first successes was to defeat psychological and political barriers. We had to instill a new mentality among the majority of cadres, and we have done that. We also believe that the Western countries will show greater understanding within the framework of those forthcoming structural readjustment measures.

Of course, there are difficulties. The main difficulty will be the SEF's negative impact on the population's most vulnerable sectors. In fact, we have (?often) [words indistinct] measures to lessen the negative impact of those measures on the people who are worst off. I would say that that will be the main hurdle.

Another difficulty resides in the shortage of technically skilled cadres. Moreover, we do not have many Angolan entrepreneurs. Thus, the Angolan people will have to learn to be entrepreneurs. As for [words indistinct] the state bore the responsibility and the losses. Now that society, individuals, and collective (?associations) can assume certain responsibilities, things are changed somewhat. First, responsibility will have to be assumed. Then, there must be the ability to fulfill certain duties. I believe this must be a gradual process.

[Correspondent] Comrade President, what are the main guidelines on political reform for democracy in Angola now that the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party Third Congress is around the corner?

[Dos Santos] To answer you succinctly, I would say that in the field of politics, we also want to abandon our administrative methods and replace them with political methods.

We have a one-party system. Naturally, even that system can evolve. We want the party to play a political role. This means we want a clear distinction between party and state roles. First, we want to separate the party from the state. Second, we want to expand democracy in the party, society, and state. Though there are many ways to achieve those objectives, they are different.

We plan to expand the party's social base. Previously, religious followers could not be party members. We now want (?the members to allow) the party to accept religious followers into its ranks. We hope the congress will approve that decision.

Small proprietors cannot currently be party members. We are also going to change that situation. We also expect the congress to approve that decision. This means the party will take new steps [words indistinct] moreover, we want issues to be freely discussed within the party itself. We will allow recognition of a discordant minority [words indistinct] though people should constantly remember the majority's wishes should always be respected. That means that there can be different opinions without necessarily having dissension. Well, that refers to the party.

We are considering new management methods, restructuring the party, and (?above all), new conditions. Thus, our party's program and statutes will be readjusted. National consensus will back our program's basic principles, namely consolidating our independence, national unity, peace, and national reconstruction.

We are going to (?debate) and [word indistinct] the law that [words indistinct] which is also the electoral law. It will be during the debate on the draft project for revising the Constitution that the people will discuss the issue of a one-party or multiparty state. In any event, for now we think the People's Assembly will have deputies who are not party members [words indistinct] which will allow different viewpoints as well as open and frank discussions among party and nonparty members. We also have the (?civilian) society [words indistinct] we have to create conditions to encourage the masses to take initiatives. Then people can associate on the basis of various common interests, whether they be professional, cultural, economic, commercial, and so forth. In that way, people will start taking their first steps in the direction of democracy. We will begin with those associations which will then evolve along their professional, cultural, and other lines. Who knows? Later they could develop into political associations.

In any event, we do not recommend a sudden change from a one-party to a multiparty state. There are various stages ahead. People must learn and develop collective debate habits in order to exercise democracy. Under our circumstances, sudden change can be both very dangerous and disastrous. There have never been political parties in power in the People's Republic of Angola. We have had colonialism here. Colonialism took over Angolan territory and brought together various tribes, peoples, and cultures. [sentence as heard] The process of integration is not over yet.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, could you please comment on (?the progress) [words indistinct] committee of the eight African heads of state?

[Dos Santos] The committee of the eight African heads of state played a positive role up to a point. I must say that that committee was formed at the request of the People's Republic of Angola at a time when it was necessary to establish intermediaries between the Angolan Government and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. However, now that

the Angolan Government and UNITA have begun direct talks, held their first meeting in Portugal, and are preparing their second meeting, there is no longer any need for intermediaries. For that reason the committee has practically [words indistinct] and Angola will thank the goodwill gesture of African countries which supported (?those efforts).

[Correspondent] Are the talks now the only way to resolve the problem?

[Dos Santos] Obviously, for us it is the main solution. UNITA, however, continues to carry out military operations. It has intensified its action in northern and [word indistinct] Angola. It introduced weapons and [words indistinct] and other (?threats) from Zairian territory. It has lately attacked several targets in Cabinda Province [words indistinct] specifically in northern Zaire Province, bordering on Zaire, where it also attacked oil fields (?over an area of) 160 to 170 km. It destroyed more than 40 power pylons. We are currently making great efforts to repair and rebuild the electricity system. Luanda, for example, receives power from generators and (?power stations). This means that we consider the negotiation process to be the principal path. However, UNITA does not yet see it that way. That explains why we cannot abandon the war. We are carrying out defensive operations to discourage UNITA [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] Comrade President, Angolan-Egyptian relations go back a long way. Could you comment on the current state of bilateral relations and prospects for developing them?

[Dos Santos] You put it very well when you said that Angolan-Egyptian relations go back many years. During the Angolan people's struggle for independence, the MPLA had a branch in Cairo. The Egyptian people always expressed their solidarity with the liberation movements in general and the MPLA in particular.

Obviously, the two states established diplomatic relations after Angola achieved independence. There were some difficulties along the way but today we enjoy excellent relations and mutually advantageous cooperation at various levels. In particular, we would like to stress the role (?played by the Egyptians) [words indistinct] and we want bilateral economic relations to develop further. We also hope to see increased political relations between the parties in power, and among mass and social organizations, to strengthen friendship, [word indistinct] solidarity, and cooperation between our peoples, states, and parties.

[Correspondent] Your Excellency, what is your message to the Egyptian people at this time?

[Dos Santos] My message to the Egyptian people is, first of all, one of peace. We know Egypt was at war for several years but wisdom prevailed and it found a peaceful resolution to the problem. Egypt has returned to its place in the Arab League.

Our second message is that may Egypt consolidate its independence, peace, and prestigious position as a state [words indistinct]. Our third message is the hope that Egypt will be able to fully exploit all its resources for its own development and well-being, thereby contributing greatly to Africa's economic and social development.

The Angolan people want to maintain and develop cooperation with Egypt. We want our countries and peoples to cooperate so they will contribute toward a more prosperous world and a greater African Continent.

President Assesses Economic Recovery Program

*MB2605201690 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
1900 GMT 26 May 90*

[Text] The question of salary arrears, and arbitrary and indiscriminate dismissals on the basis of the reorganization of enterprises was the theme of a meeting President Jose Eduardo dos Santos held with the UNTA [National Union of Workers of Angola] National Secretariat and government officials responsible for economic management.

UNTA's report to the meeting severely criticized delays and distortions in the manner in which the SEF [Economic and Financial Rehabilitation] program's guidelines are being implemented by relevant organs of the state apparatus. The report noted that this has led to imbalances in the production-salaries-prices relationship, which is detrimental to workers' social conditions.

The meeting noted that the SEF program should be practically implemented in order to abide by the salaries-profits relationship. It recommended that UNTA play a greater role within the SEF program in order to ensure regular and closer cooperation with government.

Commission Established for 'War-Mutilated'

*MB0406204690 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
1900 GMT 4 Jun 90*

[Presidential dispatch issued in Luanda on 4 June]

[Text] Taking into account the need to urgently resolve some serious problems currently facing war-mutilated persons, and while a final decision is being awaited on the nature of the body that at institutional level will specifically deal with issues connected with war-mutilated persons, using powers bestowed on me by Paragraph B of Article 53 of the Constitution, I determine:

1. The Council of Ministers Secretariat is appointing a coordinating commission which includes representatives of the following bodies: the State Secretariat for War Veterans, the State Secretariat for Social Affairs, the General Staff Organizational and Mobilization Directorate, and the Angolan Red Cross.

2. This commission has the objective of taking stock of the real number of war-mutilated persons throughout the country. This work must begin in Luanda Province.

Paragraph B. To make a list of physically disabled people who must be demobilized from the Army and enter civilian life.

Paragraph C. To assist people requiring admission into hospitals to obtain artificial limbs, and establishing for this purpose a program of action and mechanisms of follow up and control.

Paragraph D. To give priority to the return of war-mutilated persons to their respective provinces of origin after their discharge from hospital centers, and to guarantee every kind of assistance that would ensure their effective integration into society.

Paragraph E. To implement measures stipulated in the emergency program that has already been approved as relating to the mutilated people of Viena Center, Ramiros, RP [expansion unknown] 20.

3. This dispatch takes immediate effect.

Let it be published.

[Issued] Luanda, 4 June 1990

[Signed] President of the Republic Jose Eduardo dos Santos

Commentary Criticizes Bush Policy on Angola

*MB2106214790 Luanda ANGOP in Portuguese
1940 GMT 21 Jun 90*

[Commentary: "Quo Vadis Bush?"]

[Text] George Bush's request to the U.S. Congress for the approval of yet another multimillion dollar military aid package for UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], that is to say for the Angolan war, did not surprise many people.

In fact, ever since Angola became independent nothing but requests by U.S. presidents for more threats, more bombs, and more weapons to fuel the Angolan internal conflict have been forthcoming from Washington.

According to a report in THE WASHINGTON POST this week, \$50 million has already been earmarked for that goal this year alone. However, Bush does not stop here.

Also it does not surprise anyone that the new aid package estimated at \$15 million will be channeled through the CIA, for that has become the hallmark of the agency's subversive policy against independent states.

What is surprising are the motives that the U.S. President uses to uphold his deadly hatred of the Angolan Government, which prevents him from looking at the means to achieve his goals.

As for the motives, one is aware that many of the arguments the White House used in justifying its refusal to recognize the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, such as the withdrawal of Cuban forces, have been removed with the signing of the New York accords.

Those accords have proved that the southwestern African conflicts can only be resolved politically.

As for the goals, President Bush can only be betting on a deliberate show of military force like in 1975, for direct contacts between the Angolan Government and UNITA, which are likely to open the way for a cease-fire, are in progress.

In this context, the denunciations by the international press of a conspiracy, involving a number of foreign states and circles against the legitimate Angolan officials, are proof of the U.S. activities.

Like 15 years ago, the White House wants its pawns to take power in Angola by force of arms. Therefore, it has resorted to increased arms supplies and is using Zaire and South Africa to fulfill its plans.

The increase in destabilizing actions recently carried out on Angolan territory, namely the military activities of antigovernment forces on the northern border with Zaire, the reports that UNITA intends to transfer its Jamba general headquarters to that border, and the sabotage of electricity and water supply networks as well as other infrastructures in Luanda and other districts, are related to those plans and could not have been carried out without external support.

Therefore, by ignoring the evolution of events in Angola and the trend of changes in international political thinking, President George Bush has resorted to a dangerous escalation of the Angolan conflict with unpredictable consequences. Quo vadis Bush?

Official Charges U.S. Part of 'Conspiracy'

*MB0206065990 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
0600 GMT 2 Jun 90*

[Text] On the day before yesterday the Angolan Embassy in Zimbabwe issued a denunciation of the organized plan by foreign agents to stage a coup d'etat against the Angolan Government which Angola had uncovered.

Andre Panzo, Angolan charge d'affaires in Zimbabwe, who stated this at a news conference in the Zimbabwean capital, added that the conspiracy against President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, supreme leader of the Angolan nation, was planned by the secret services of the United States, South Africa, Israel, and Zaire.

The Angolan diplomat said that the plan, which also included the murder of most important members of the Angolan Government and party, was to be carried out in the summer after steps were taken to cause the situation in Angola, particularly in Luanda, to deteriorate.

Andre Panzo added that it was also planned that some neutral or independent Angolan figures would be chosen to form a transitional government to immediately contact UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] to conclude accords of peace and national reconciliation.

The Angolan Embassy in Zimbabwe also pointed out that all the operations in the conspiracy would be financed by the United States, South Africa, Israel, Zaire, and some Brazilian Jews.

The operation, codenamed (Koma), was orchestrated by a former Israeli colonel living in Cameroon, where he had worked for presidential security.

Legislation Establishes Information Ministry

*MB1406082090 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 14 Jun 90*

["Law" signed by Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Luanda on 11 June 1990—read by announcer]

[Text] Whereas information is a complex and structural sector of strategic importance to the country's social sector;

Taking into consideration that information is a sector that should be permanently capable of meeting the requirements posed by the country's socioeconomic and political development, as well as the international situation;

Bearing in mind that the state ought to closely, coherently, and systematically follow information changes in order to pay greater attention to this sector;

Taking into consideration the demands posed by the objective and subjective conditions resulting from the requirements of the country's ongoing revolutionary process;

Under the terms of Paragraph B of Articles 38 and 49 of the Constitution, and in line with the powers conferred to me by Paragraph I of the Constitution, the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly approved the following law which I hereby issue:

Article 1. The Ministry of Information of the People's Republic of Angola is created as part of the central state apparatus' socioeconomic sector and under the terms of Law No. 2 of 1 February 1986.

Article 2. The Ministry of Information is responsible for:
A. Assisting the Council of Ministers in the drafting and implementation of the state's information policy.

B. Coordinating all activities relating to the country's information.

C. Bringing under its jurisdiction the information organs belonging to the national information system.

D. Exercising other functions assigned by the law, or implementing decisions made by higher echelons in connection with the activities of the Ministry of Information.

Article 3. The organization and functioning of the Ministry of Information will be outlined in its statutes to be approved by the Council of Ministers within 30 days from the day this law comes into effect.

Article 4. The rights and duties resulting from agreements between the Information and Propaganda Department of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party Central Committee and other sides are transferred to the Ministry of Information provided that they fall under the jurisdiction of this state organ.

Article 5. Existing enterprises, including staff and assets relating to the activities of the Ministry of Information are transferred to this ministry.

Article 6. All legislation contrary to the principles outlined in this is revoked.

Article 7. This law has immediate effect.

Read and approved by the Standing Commission of the People's Assembly.

[Issued] Luanda, 11 June 1990

[Signed] Jose Eduardo dos Santos, president of the republic.

MPLA Secretary Discusses U.S. Interference

MB0106202590 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
1928 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Italicized passages are recorded]

[Text] Afonso van Dunem Mbinda, MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party Central Committee foreign affairs secretary, is in Cuanza Norte Province to assist in public debates on third congress draft documents.

Secretary Afonso van Dunem Mbinda chaired a meeting on the congress draft documents in Ndalatando today.

He later spoke to the local radio station about the country's present political and military situation. He made new accusations against Zaire for having allowed the United States and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] to use its territory for increased military operations against northern Angola.

[Van Dunem] *Our government and people have noticed a huge infiltration of elements from the Republic of Zaire. Zairian territory is being used to infiltrate and mount attacks against our people and our socioeconomic objectives.*

We can confirm this situation. UNITA elements—UNITA armed bandits—in Soyo recently dynamited oil

wells, destroying more than 10 in Zaire Province. This once again shows the Zairian Government lets UNITA armed elements use its territory as a transit point. In the service of South Africa and the United States, UNITA armed elements continue to destabilize our country.

This situation is seriously worrying the government of the People's Republic of Angola. On one hand, we are ready to do our best to bring this matter to the attention of the Zairian Government so that it stops interfering in our country's domestic affairs; on the other hand, our government condemns this attitude, which contradicts good neighborliness.

This policy is part of an aggression mounted by a country and government against another government. Our country and our government are very worried. We believe the Zairian Government's action is condemnable.

Turning to U.S. plans to give UNITA \$80 million in additional support, Afonso van Dunem Mbinda said the Angolan Government has appealed to U.S. authorities to come to their senses:

[Van Dunem] *In terms of international law, this is a condemnable act. This proves the U.S. Government is interfering in our country's domestic affairs. I should add that the U.S. Government not only hopes to destabilize our government and country but also wants to go further.*

Our government is very worried about continued U.S. interference in our country's domestic affairs. Actually, one of the conditions our government proposed at the negotiating table is that the United States and South African stop interfering in our country's domestic affairs.

The party secretary for foreign affairs then discussed developments on the internal peace plan, following the visit to Angola by Durao Barroso, Portuguese secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation:

[Van Dunem] *Secretary of State Durao Barroso came to Angola to inform Comrade President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and our government about Portugal's willingness to host another meeting between our government and UNITA elements.*

We learned through the media that Durao Barroso described the first exploratory talks our government held with UNITA as good. At least the first contacts have been satisfactory.

As far as our government's search for internal peace in Angola is concerned, we can say that our country and government are still making efforts toward that goal.

GDR Friendship Team Fulfills Training Contract

*MB2705094890 Luanda ANGOP in Portuguese
1915 GMT 26 May 90*

[Text] Luanda, 26 May (ANGOP)—The GDR Internationalist Friendship Team this week fulfilled its generous cooperation contract with the Youth of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

ANGOP learned from a reliable source in Luanda last Friday that the team was in Angola for 13 years and trained 250 Angolan youths in motor mechanics, lumber milling, general electricity, civil construction, agriculture, and communications.

The cooperation contract went into effect in 1977 with the arrival of the first contingent of "blue shirt ambassadors."

Minister, GDR Official Sign Labor Protocol

*MB0206132890 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
0600 GMT 2 Jun 90*

[Text] Diogo de Jesus, Angolan labor and social security minister, and (Helmeke Berger), GDR secretary of state for labor and social affairs, yesterday signed a cooperation protocol on the temporary employment and (?designation) of Angolan workers in the GDR.

The protocol provides for changes in Angolan workers' labor and social conditions in view of the ongoing reforms in that East European country. Accordingly, (Helmeke Berger) said that her visit to our country was connected with her government's interest in improving the conditions of Angolan workers in the GDR.

Commentary Criticizes U.S. Support for UNITA

*MB1706074590 Luanda ANGOP in Portuguese
1915 GMT 16 Jun 90*

[Station commentary: "UNITA's War Language"]

[Text] The three-month truce that UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] recently proposed is nothing but a maneuver designed to deceive those who have not been closely watching the Angolan internal conflict.

Through its cheap and diversionary propaganda, UNITA boasts of being the main promoter of peace in Angola. Who does UNITA intend to deceive?

The reality in Angola is well known to the national and international public opinion. Jonas Savimbi's group has always used a war language that has already caused countless material and human losses to the People's Republic of Angola.

Used by the United States under the cloak of the racist South African regime, UNITA appears to be an organization whose main mission is to wage war in the defense

of geopolitical objectives extraneous to the fundamental interests of the Angolan people.

For the Angolan people, UNITA has always meant treachery. Innocent people die every day in bandit actions carried out under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, the false "prophet of peace."

Recently, a sabotage operation deprived the residents of Luanda Province's Viana District of electricity, a precious commodity for those whom UNITA propaganda claims to defend.

The Viana operation shows that the truce announced by UNITA's "Political Bureau" was immediately followed by renewed military actions against economic and civilian targets.

As part of its flexible policy, the Angolan Government seeks a lasting peace for the people, instead of truces proposed by an organization that has never shown seriousness in view of its association with foreign interests.

The arrogance of Savimbi and his group fits within the framework of the U.S. political thought regarding the People's Republic of Angola. At a news conference held in Washington last weekend, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen reiterated that the "U.S. policy has been and will continue to be one of support for UNITA."

Under the circumstances, we may assume that the war is continuing in Angola due to renewed U.S. support for UNITA, an attitude that is contrary to the New York accords on the southwestern African conflict.

The U.S. Government upholds peace at international forums, but in practice it regards pacification as the promotion of war in various parts of the world in the defense of its so-called strategic interests.

Only this can explain the supply to UNITA, through the Republic of Zaire, of huge quantities of weapons which are used against the peaceful people of Angola.

In response to the enemy's military actions, the Angolan Government reserves the right to defend the country's sovereignty and the people. Efforts are still being made in order to achieve the peace that the Angolan children want.

At the next exploratory meeting, to be held in Portugal under the auspices of the Portuguese Government this month, UNITA should show seriousness to prove the credibility of its position.

Official Urges U.S. To Support Peace Process

*MB1606164490 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1200 GMT 16 Jun 90*

[Text] Angolan Ambassador to Zambia Pedro Fernando Mavunza today called on the U.S. Administration as

well as other states and governments involved in destabilizing the People's Republic of Angola to play a more constructive role toward realizing the peace process in Angola.

In an interview with Zambian radio, the Angolan official pointed out that Zaire's attitude in allowing its territory to be used to destabilize Angola seriously (?jeopardizes) the supreme interests of the Angolan people and nation, the principles of African unity, and peaceful coexistence.

In reacting to the three-month truce proposed by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], Pedro Fernando Mavunza called on the puppet group to agree to discuss at the upcoming exploratory meeting foundations for establishing a definite cease-fire and the date it would come into effect, as well the cessation of acts of terrorism and the destruction of economic infrastructures.

UNITA Commentary on U.S. Aid, Support

MB1606075890 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 0615 GMT 16 Jun 90

[Text] Jamba, Frid. June 15 [dateline as received] Motions of repudiation against renewed efforts by the Luanda regime to try and undermine American support to UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] are continuing to flood the UNITA news agency newsroom from all parts of Angola.

In the latest repudiatory statement to reach the agency, UNITA (?armed forces) stationed at the Cuito Cuanavale front in southeastern Angola say that the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] regime's move is designed to weaken UNITA in order for it to succumb to the Luanda regime's proposals, which it describes as incompatible to the Angolan political reality and of being anti-democratic.

Reacting to an open letter signed by a Mr. Sebastiao da Costa Pessoa to United States President George Bush recently calling for the cutting-off of American support to UNITA, the statement points out that only free and fair multiparty elections can lead to lasting peace, freedom and social progress in Angola.

American support to UNITA is an express manifestation of solidarity with UNITA in its struggle for democracy in Angola which, once implanted as was the case in Namibia, will undoubtedly encourage other countries to take the same path of multiparty democracy, the statement points out.

It adds that following the defeat of the MPLA military offensive in the Mavinga area and at the Ionde/Nucundi front in the south of the country, it is clear that the MPLA cannot destroy UNITA militarily and that the only way out for ending the conflict is through the holding of direct negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA and the installation of a multiparty democratic system in the country.

On Wednesday [13 Jun] this week, Angolan children and youths in the UNITA liberated areas of Angola sent an open letter to the American people expressing gratitude for continued United States aid to UNITA, which they say is essential for the attainment of a multiparty democratic system, peace and national reconciliation in Angola.

MPLA Allegedly Diverts Foreign Aid to Army

MB1606080090 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 0619 GMT 16 Jun 90

[Text] Jamba, Frid. June 15....[dateline as received] A senior UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] official who has just returned from a six-month working tour of UNITA controlled areas of central Angola has said that most of the food relief aid sent to the area by international humanitarian organisations to offset the effects of famine is being deviated by the Luanda authorities to feed MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] soldiers.

Speaking in an interview on the UNITA radio station, Thursday [14 Jun], Gen. Mario Vasco Kanhali Vatuva said that emergency food supplies sent to famine stricken areas such as Alto Hama, Lunge, Bailundo and Ganda in Central Angola have done little to alleviate the situation because a large part of the food donations are deviated to MPLA army barracks by MPLA communist party officials and army commanders.

Local MPLA officials take charge of the food relief supplies at airports and the donor organisations have inadequate mechanisms to monitor the final distribution and thus leaving a loophole for deviation, according to Gen Vatuva.

The official added that the effects of the drought are less severe in the UNITA held areas he had visited, since the movement had taken precautionary measures by encouraging people to grow drought-resistant crops.

Gen. Vatuva has meanwhile disclosed that large numbers of urban dwellers have been arriving into UNITA controlled areas in the same region during the past few months to escape from persecution by the MPLA secret police, Minse [Ministry of State Security], which, he said, had stepped up arrests of people openly advocating an end to the war and the introduction of the multiparty system in the country.

UNITA Welcomes U.S. Congress Decision on Aid

MB1806064390 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 0600 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Commentary]

[Text] Jamba, June 17... [dateline as received] His excellency President George Bush and his Administration's policy in relation to Angola has been of extreme correction and firmness in the defence of the principles of freedom and multiparty democracy.

Recognising the national resistance struggle in Angola led by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] under the leadership of President Jonas Malheiro Savimbi as legitimate, the United States of America decided to support our movement so that the noble ideals of freedom, democracy and dignity, be materialized and that the Angolan people could at last live freely, respected and honoured.

The United States position contributed to the development of the situation in Angola towards possible ways of solving the Angolan conflict. Best wishes.

The recent decision by the United States Congress on June 14, 1990 in favour of increased American aid to our valorous movement, UNITA, reflects the firm determination of his excellency President George Bush, his Administration, U.S. congressional leaders, both Republican and Democrat, and the American people to continue supporting the Angolan people in their struggle for freedom, democracy and dignity.

Today, more than ever before, the American people's friendship with the Angolan people in the struggle for the just cause of freedom, is reinforced. The Angolan people, brought together in UNITA, and UNITA militants, thank the American Congress which passed, through the vote, such a just legislative act. It is in defence of the freedom of peoples that the United States takes such an important and uncontestable measure. In the specific case of Angola, the increase of material aid to UNITA reflects the United States reaction to the MPLA's [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] intransigence with regard to direct peace negotiations despite the proven flexibility and constructive initiatives which UNITA has been making.

Best wishes to the increase of aid by the United States of America to our valorous movement because it reflects the support of the American authorities to the process which leads the Angolan people to true national reconciliation, free elections and multiparty democracy.

Long live peace. Long live freedom. Long live multiparty democracy

Savimbi Addresses UNITA Manifestation Program

MB1906081590 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 0600 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Jamba, Monday June 18 ... [dateline as received]—Thousands of Jamba residents last Saturday [16 Jun] night attended a political manifestation programme in support of the recent big military victory scored by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] forces in the Mavinga area of southeast Angola against combined Soviet and MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] forces.

The event was also attended by the UNITA president Dr. Jonas Savimbi and other members of the UNITA leadership.

Speaking at the occasion, Dr. Savimbi noted that UNITA believes that not all the people in the Angolan capital Luanda are bad because there are many who share the need for lasting peace, freedom and democracy in the country.

"I would like to believe that there are good, sound people in Luanda who do not only want that the country be free, but also that the nation constructs and unifies itself because it is necessary to construct the nation. The nation is not constructed. We have the country," the UNITA president declared.

"I know that there are those who pulsate with us in heart and soul in Luanda. Young soldiers with the capacity to expel the Russians and Cubans from this country of Nginga, there are people in Luanda who are completely in agreement with us," he added.

He pointed out that Angolans "cannot accept that such a big, wonderful country with the potential of becoming one of the most important countries on the continent, loses its march and history because of two cousins or two brothers. Furthermore, could it be that everybody in Luanda wishes us ill? It is not true because they are entering and leaving, they are placing bombs, they are carrying out reconnaissance."

"The majority of people in Luanda are suffering. There is only a handful of individuals who cannot bear the weight and responsibility of peace. In comparison to the MPLA or others, UNITA's name draws sympathy, UNITA is union in action, it is a deeply emotional name," the UNITA leader concluded.

*** Nationwide Toll of War Described**

*90AF0173B Lisbon EXPRESSO
in Portuguese 19 May 90 p 5*

[Article by Sergio Soares: "Angola: The Interminable War"]

[Text] When peace finally returns to Angola, the people who run the government, whoever they may be, will be faced with the tragic balance of 15 years of civil war, which includes 180,000 dead, among whom there are 60,000 members of the military, 45,000 disabled, 40,000 war orphans, 800,000 refugees, and property damage estimated at more than \$20 billion.

Every four minutes, an Angolan child dies, which confers upon this country the record of the highest infant mortality rate on the planet.

As it enters its 15th year as an independent nation, the People's Republic of Angola finds itself tottering on the brink of bankruptcy and with nearly 3 million inhabitants living on the threshold of absolute poverty.

The people of Angola have not known a single day of peace since 11 November 1975 because of the bloody war for power that has been raging between the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. Angolans are still feeling no let-up in the war that sets the two belligerent parties against each other, in spite of the fact that they are currently holding direct talks.

Given the dramatic situation that the country is experiencing, thousands of people are currently surviving due to the generosity of emergency donations from the European Economic Community (EEC), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other nongovernmental humanitarian organizations.

Prior to independence, Angola had a flourishing economy that was the envy of the colonial power. But now, it has only some vital natural resources that assure it of considerable foreign credits, which it spends with the carelessness and wastefulness of one who knows how to be potentially very wealthy.

Most Angolans have become mere survivors who vegetate among the economic and social ruins into which the country has sunk in the last few years.

In spite of the serious difficulties and the shortages suffered by the overwhelming majority of the population, a small group of citizens lives in permanent ostentation.

Airplanes from TAAG [Angolan Airlines] and from other foreign companies that operate in the People's Republic of Angola land and take off daily full of Angolan passengers headed for Lisbon, Brussels, Paris, and Rio de Janeiro. All of these thousands of people leave the country with various amounts of currency, depending on the jobs that they hold.

Economically exhausted, the country's agriculture is practically paralyzed, and agriculture-related industries are registering productivity rates of close to zero.

Farmers cannot work their traditional lands because of the instability created by the war, and the few industries that are located around the big cities and are still in operation are producing very little because the State is not importing the raw materials which are indispensable in order for them to operate normally.

The civil war that has devastated the country since independence and successive military interventions by South Africa are two of the causes of the current state of affairs in Angola. The remaining blame can be assigned to the many leaders who, through neglect, incompetence, and unbridled corruption have helped make the problems worse.

Economy: Black Market Only

With the exception of the petroleum industry, which represents 90 percent of the country's income in hard currency, no productive sector is functioning under reasonable conditions.

In spite of the general paralysis of the economy, Angola's gross domestic product grew 52.4 percent last year, but that increase was due solely to increases in productivity in the oil industry, which is largely controlled by multinational companies from the United States, France, and Belgium.

Angola's official economy is virtually nonexistent when compared with the vitality of the parallel market, in which all citizens participate, no matter how respectable they may be.

A keen instinct for survival, in conjunction with the complicity of the authorities who allow the diversion of merchandise from official circuits, makes up a part of the personality of every Angolan, who finds all the goods that are indispensable for his life on the black market.

To try to control the economy, the government decided in 1987 to create a program of economic and financial reorganization aimed at gradually combatting the reigning economic breakdown.

Entirely correct, the above-mentioned program, known by its acronym "SEF" [Economic and Financial Reorganization], never saw any of the measures that it was pushing adopted.

From its very beginning, the program was faced with two big obstacles: ideological biases and the war.

Putting the program into effect presupposed the immediate devaluation, in a first phase, of the national currency (the kwanza), adopting a rigorous program of austerity in the areas of currency exchange and finances, reducing the national deficit, and limiting imports of consumer goods.

Faced with the failure of the economic methods used, the executive branch of government—for want of foreign financing—was obliged to turn to international monetary institutions, asking that the country be allowed to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In spite of the fact that the country has been accepted into these two institutions and that they have already diagnosed Angola's economic ills, the authorities decided not to apply the recommended remedies because they feared negative repercussions from a population that has already been punished too severely by all types of shortages. And so, as it is written at the end of the official letters, Angola entered the "third year of the economic and financial reorganization (SEF)" without adopting a single economic improvement measure. All it did was multiply the laws and decrees dealing with the application of the reorganization program.

Defense—a budget line item that is never revealed publicly by the People's Republic of Angola but which is admitted to consume 60 percent of the State budget—and the importing of foodstuffs (nearly \$900 million annually) are responsible for a large part of the country's deficit, which the \$3.4 billion in income does not cover.

The nation's economic dilemma is getting worse so fast that President Jose Eduardo dos Santos approved a decree last week in which several ministries are ordered to carry out priority actions that will have a significant social impact within a period of 30 days.

This package of measures, which is to be carried out in the areas of agriculture, light industry, trade, fishing, transportation and communications, and education and health, in addition to commissariats (town councils) and police, is aimed at "minimizing some of the concerns of a social character, and reassuring the citizens about the prospects and ways to progressively solve the various problems that society is facing."

Creating conditions for reopening butcher shops, fruit stands, production of animal feed and veterinary support, normal supplies of wood, the reopening of cafes, laundries, dry-cleaning stores, tobacco shops, beauty shops, and restaurants are some of the tasks that have been assigned to the Ministry of Commerce.

The fomenting of private initiative in construction, improving the Luanda airport and regional airports, providing managerial staff in connection with taxi service and transportation, and the distribution of potable water to outlying city neighborhoods are other actions dictated by the decree.

The list of measures to be enacted is as vast as a government program, and, for that very reason, no one believes that ministries that have done nothing for years will be able to accomplish all that work in just one month.

Tragic Social Toll

There is not a single province in Angola that does not have infrastructures that have been destroyed or populations that have been both physically and psychologically affected by the war.

The conflict has destroyed the network of highways, hospitals, subsistence-level agriculture, bridges, and electrical connections.

The only agricultural export product that the People's Republic of Angola has continued to produce since independence is coffee, but due to nationalization of the coffee plantations, production rates are now very low.

Falling back on foreign investment in this economic area, which was one of the most important areas in colonial times, would appear to be the only way out of the crisis.

The 1989 harvest was almost disastrous, being reduced to just 3,156 tons of commercial coffee (44 percent of the yield that was predicted), compared to 250,000 tons produced in 1973.

In financial terms, exports in 1989 yielded \$5 million less than in the previous year, that is, \$10.7 million.

As for mining exports, guerrillas have almost paralyzed the mines at Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte. As Noe Baltazar, coordinator of the restructuring commission for the mining sector, revealed recently, exploitation of these resources amounts to just 11 percent of their real potential.

If, with respect to the economy, Angolans have had nothing but vexation since independence, one can only say that an identical situation exists with regard to the civil war's effects on the people.

The final toll of post-independence violence is difficult to compute, but it includes 180,000 dead, 60,000 of whom are military personnel, 45,000 disabled, and a high rate of unemployment and salaries lagging behind—a plague that has been spreading in the last few months.

The hardships experienced by the majority of the population that does not belong to the dominant class have produced a veritable army of deprived people, comprising more than 3 million individuals who are either starving, displaced, or who make up the "lumpenproletariat" of the big cities.

It is from this segment that more and more people on the fringes of society are beginning to emerge. Their criminality has come to be viewed with great concern by the authorities and with growing fear by the people.

Currently, some 20 of these dangerous social outcasts, are being tried for a wave of crimes committed in the capital—ranging from murder to rape. These crimes have all the earmarks of having been committed with excessive cruelty out of sheer meanness.

The above-mentioned criminals were members of several gangs that have been recently disbanded and that have been terrorizing the city of Luanda for months. Known by the names of "Zecax," "Empty Box," and "Samba," these gangs were acting with complete impunity, and had become specialists in robbery, extortion, and blackmail of both people and institutions.

Another 50 dangerous criminals with prior police records have also been sent to a work camp because they represented a great danger to society.

Generalized Failure

Angola—which continues to be one of Africa's, indeed the world's, potentially wealthiest countries—lives with its hand held out to international charity, in spite of the fact that it has not lost the habitual arrogance of wealthy countries.

Excluding average officials of the State, the party, and military officers, the prototype of the common Angolan citizen is closer to that of a beggar than to any other definition.

Thanks to the distortions that have been created by the war and an imported political system which is foreign to African traditions, thousands of people maimed in the war, crazy people and beggars are swarming through Angola's cities, including Luanda.

When he visited a camp for the disabled in Luanda two weeks ago, the president of the Republic could not hide his anguish over the horrible living conditions of those disabled members of the armed forces who find themselves on their own. The national secretary of the Agostinho Neto Organization of Pioneers (OPA), Manuel Muandumba, stated recently in Stockholm that there are more than 40,000 war orphans in his country.

For a foreign observer, it is absolutely shocking to be a daily witness to the total abandonment to which these people are subjected by the State and by their more fortunate fellow citizens.

Foreigners therefore become the preferred targets of beggars and of minor officials and police agents practicing small-scale corruption.

Droughts and Endemic Diseases

In 1990, as a consequence of the combined effects of the military conflict and the drought (both of which have been going on for three years now), Angola's food shortage has grown to 250,000 metric tons of cereal.

In the provinces of Namibe, Cunene, Cuando Cubango, Huila, Moxico and Benguela, and Kwanza-Sul, with a population estimated at 6.5 million inhabitants, nearly 3 million are bordering on starvation, according to the report from the World Food Program.

The drought has likewise caused the deaths of 2.5 million head of cattle and has contributed to the alarming increase in desertification in the country's southern provinces.

The health situation has also become alarming with cholera, yellow fever, and malaria on the increase, in endemic form. The people have no access to medicine or to medical assistance, including in the capital.

In spite of the fact that the country imports millions of dollars worth of medicine, it is impossible to find a simple aspirin in Angolan pharmacies.

For years, all of the medicine intended for Angola has been diverted to the Republic of Zaire through a well organized network of "candongueiros" [black market speculators].

A new epidemic of cholera is hitting the City of Luanda with an average of 50 new cases every day.

According to the minister of health, the sudden increase in cases is due to recent cutoffs in supplies of energy and potable water to the city due to successive sabotage attacks carried out by the rebels.

Bad conditions of basic sanitation, especially the garbage and the standing pools of rainwater in the city's outlying neighborhoods, have contributed greatly to the increase in endemic diseases.

Between April and November of last year, 50,000 cases of cholera and 3,000 deaths were reported in the capital.

It is within this context of socioeconomic chaos that one witnesses the slow disintegration of authority, with most officials assuming an attitude of resignation in the face of the responsibilities with which they are invested. In Angola today, no one knows anything and no one is responsible for anything.

Evidence of this disintegration is everywhere and can be verified by the constant shuffling of personnel in the ministries and in the provinces. Such shuffling is often the result of favoritism toward one or another wing of the party, or is due to the fact that any possibility of recruiting capable leaders has been exhausted.

The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe is having more repercussions in the country than the authorities like to admit. They claim that the situation in Angola is different from that being experienced in the countries of Eastern Europe, where "the ruling classes became alienated from the masses."

It is to this destroyed nation, whose political regime will inevitably have to evolve as a result of the changes that a future peace agreement presupposes, that Portugal has committed itself—repeatedly—to cooperate with a reconstruction plan called "Parea."

The idea of this program, which is being called a "mini-Marshall Plan," was launched by the Portuguese Government with the objective of getting the international financial community interested in a joint investment project for Angola.

With peace knocking at the door and the country totally in ruins, Portugal will have to relaunch the above-mentioned program or risk looking ridiculous on the international scene.

*** Correspondent Describes Conditions in Luanda**

90AF0173A Lisbon O INDEPENDENTE
in Portuguese 11 May 90 pp 6-8

[Article by Isabel Oliveira: "Would the First Person To Arrive Please Turn On the Lights?"]

[Text] While the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] were giving birth to the beginnings of peace in Evora, and while Angolan leaders were shining in Lisbon, Luanda was a ghost city

plunged into darkness. O INDEPENDENTE's special envoy to the capital of Angola lived through a week in a terrible city, with no lights, with no water, with no garbage pickup, with no public transportation, and, in spite of everything, with no peace.

During the last week of April, Luanda was a ghost city. Plunged into darkness by UNITA operations commandos, unable to solve its energy problem, and frightened by the obligatory curfew, the capital city of the People's Republic of Angola lived through moments of desperation and solitude. Many people are already accustomed to it, especially those who live in the slums on the outskirts of the city in subhuman conditions, far beyond the worst that anyone can imagine. But others are not. They are the ones who live on the "islands," surrounded by air conditioning, hot and cold running water, and well-kept yards—diplomats, members of the government and the central committee of the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party], middle management personnel of the petroleum multinationals, many Portuguese who stayed behind in their former colony and have adapted themselves to the "schemes" of the parallel economy.

I found Luanda shut down, with no garbage pickup and no public transportation. Electricity and water would be the next to go, on 25 April to be precise, when UNITA guerrillas knocked out 26 high tension power pylons that supply the capital. That is when the nightmare began to get worse. There were very few people who succeeded in maintaining their normal routine. With no electricity, many companies closed their doors and sent their employees home. Of the few establishments that were still open to the public, the large majority have closed down due to lack of security. Even five-star hotels—many of which are not even comparable to our worst boarding houses—which have their own electric generators had to struggle with small blackouts, which meant doing without air conditioning or water.

Luanda died every evening when darkness fell. Then the star-spangled tropical sky spread over the city, and there were many people who went out into the streets as I did to contemplate a reality that electric lights had hidden night after night. But no one dared stray very far away from home. It seemed as if something very terrible was lying in ambush for us on every corner, and the best policy was not to risk it. During the period of enforced darkness, I frequently heard people say: "We should not tempt fate." And so, the inhabitants of Luanda had to do without an activity that is particularly dear to them—the weekend parties that take place in all the neighborhoods and in almost all the buildings that are more than five stories tall, and for which the people of Luanda prepare themselves diligently, preparing spicy dishes and storing away cold beers which cost them an arm and a leg on the black market. The weekend that I spent in Luanda was quite dull. There was no light for dancing nor any enthusiasm for big meals. It seemed that the lack of light made the people of Luanda more afraid and colder. Almost no one took a chance, as I did, on disobeying the

obligatory curfew, which was in force between midnight and 500. The inhabitants of Luanda retreated into their homes naturally, like the sun setting at the end of the day, although on other weekends they would have stayed up dancing until the early morning hours, according to what some people told me.

One of the things that struck me most strongly in Luanda was the fact that there is no public transportation, with the exception of long-distance vehicles. The fleet of buses that serves the outskirts of the city is very small, as is the number of drivers. At the end of the afternoon, long lines of workers form next to the bay. They want to catch the first bus at all costs. At first, I did not comprehend the reason behind such haste. Then they explained to me that this was the only guaranteed route. Anyone who does not succeed in catching the first bus may risk wasting hours waiting, or ending up without transportation. What happens is that the bus driver may be tempted—by a case of beer or a bottle of whisky—to change his route and not go back to the capital. Judging from what people told me, this seems to be a quite normal practice.

I wanted to find out how the people of Luanda traveled—if they traveled, that is. Nothing could be simpler, they answered. There are no buses or taxis, but one can get around in the Angolan capital. How? In "parallel taxis." These are nothing in the world but private automobiles and vans that have come to be used as means of collective transportation. Their owners charge potential riders an agreed upon price, which is discussed case by case and which is, as one can readily see, completely arbitrary. The State, which is unable to provide the city with a fleet of buses that would give it even minimal service, has found itself in the position of having to recognize these practices in a document that is known by all the people of Luanda as "Process 500." But transportation is just a small part of Angolan reality. I began to discover that there are "schemes" for everything and that the black market plays a fundamental role in this economy. The government has already realized that it can do nothing against the practices of the parallel economy. The fact is that drastic measures could be fatal to the government, because such measures would tend to arouse the population. In that case, a coup d'état would be imminent and the leaders of MPLA would prefer not to risk it. On the contrary, they have been making some of the most illicit practices legal, because they have realized that the people of Luanda are surviving only through the "scheme." It took me several days to figure out how these things worked. I ended up realizing that nothing could be simpler.

For Angolans, the salary that they receive every month is not important. They are not interested in having a lot of money if there are no products to buy. What makes an Angolan decide to accept a job is the "cabaz" that comes along with it, and its frequency. But just what is a "cabaz"? It is a kind of credit card that allows Angolans to go into a People's Store and buy basic necessities. What is really important is to know if the cabaz gives you

the right to a kilo of sugar per month or to a case of beer. Because it is in beer that one finds the stumbling block of Angola's parallel economy.

The basic unit of exchange is not the kwanza, but beer. Everything revolves around a Cuca or a Sagres, whether it is chilled or at room temperature. A case of beer is the equivalent of the salary of an average Angolan official, or of an airplane ticket to Lisbon—nearly 30,000 kwanzas. And the numbers are deceptive. That is because 30,000 kwanzas are worth 150 contos on the official market, but just 2,100 escudos on the "candonga" [the black market]. A large percentage of the active population of Luanda has access to a case of beer through the cabaz, but almost no one keeps it for personal consumption. The majority prefer to sell their cases of the precious liquid just as soon as they get outside the state-run supermarkets, where one finds the "candongueiras" [black market speculators], who are eager to do business with anyone who is ready to part with his precious beer.

Another economic abstraction is the "convertible kwanza." This is an expression used mainly in hotels. It means that we foreigners can pay in any currency except the kwanza. In other words, in hard currency. And furthermore, at the official exchange rate.

The parallel markets have been flourishing. The "Roque Santeiro" market, which is located in the part of town called Miramar, next to the port, is the perfect example of the triumph of the candongueiras. Here one can find anything, from medicine for fever, which is not for sale in the pharmacies, which for a long time now have been open just for foreigners to see, to hi-fi equipment and auto parts, most of which are stolen. The people of Luanda have practically nothing available to them in the official stores, but they know that as soon as they get their hands on some beer, they can overcome their problems in the wink of any eye. The "Roque Santeiro" market (the name comes from a soap opera that People's Television of Luanda broadcast several years ago) is expanding with the blessing of the government, which has already christened it with the new name of "Boavista market."

Free will is another one of the problems that the foreigner faces in Angola. The fact is that nothing, or almost nothing, is legislated. This means that everybody has the authority and the legitimacy to enforce his opinion. At first, it can seem amusing, but it becomes completely chaotic after a few days of butting heads with opposing positions. It all began with the photographs. As soon as they saw me with my camera in my hand, they told me that it was expressly forbidden to take pictures in Luanda. Even the bay was considered a high security zone. They told me that any agent of the government could take my roll of film away from me, or, if he happened to be in a bad mood, he could confiscate the camera itself. And, if it were to go that far and if I were to offer much resistance, I could end up in the municipal jail. It all depended on the person with whom I was dealing.

There is really a psychosis among the people of Luanda with regard to photographs. They are convinced that photographers are enemies of the people who want to distort reality and show only the city's degradation. They are aware that Luanda is no longer what it used to be, and they want to be its guardians. Ready to fight against anything and anyone, they invoke legislation that has never been enacted and accuse intruders of being counterrevolutionaries. It is not by coincidence that the Angolan news media broadcast the guidelines for the defense of the regime almost hourly. The government ads say: "In the city, in the field, in the factory, in the school, or in the barracks, we must avoid letting the enemy surprise us. We must be organized and vigilant in order to discover the intentions of the enemies of the people in time to neutralize them."

In spite of the heat, the intense heat, wearing shorts is not allowed in state offices or in restaurants and hotels that are run by the government. Of course, one can usually get around the problem with a beer, but not all Angolans are that "flexible." There are some who, conscious of their patriotic duty, do not allow any deviation from laws that do not exist. And they forced us to dress as if we were in one of the temperate countries of Europe. Had we done otherwise, nothing would have been accomplished. We would not have gotten past the door. In its dress code, Angola shows itself to be more backward and more puritanical than our legislation, which dates back to the 1920s. Men and women must cover their legs. It is also not allowed to enter any government office with a pronounced low-cut neckline, even if you are a man. But since everything in Luanda depends on the employee who is guarding the entrance, he can ignore what you are wearing, or he may tell you to button up all the way to the neck. And what is more, one should not answer in the same tone of voice with which one is questioned. The fact is that cases of abuse of power are numerous, and government agents are just waiting for an opportunity to shoot.

* Portugal Involved in Benguela Railway Project

90AF0172A Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
19 May 90 p 24

[Text] A group of international entrepreneurs, among whom are 10 Portuguese citizens who formerly resided in Angola, is proposing to reclaim the corridor of the Benguela railway. EXPRESSO received this information from Carlos Vitoria Pereira, the project coordinator.

This undertaking, known as the "Vitoria Pereira Group"—which also has South African, American, French, Belgian, English, Dutch, and Taiwanese interests—requires an initial investment of several million dollars. A study which was done on this project has already been delivered to the Angolan Government. The investors anticipate that South African coal will be exported from Anglo-Belgian (Cool)-Pty Ltd. to supply

the locomotives, and, consequently, they predict that both urban and rural life along the railroad corridor will begin to flourish again.

According to Vitoria Pereira, a Luso-Angolan geometrician who is a native of Mocamedes, this operation is counting on support from the Banco de Portugal and the Banco Luso-Francais (the latter is currently being incorporated by Portuguese businessmen in the French city of Pau.) Import-export companies from several European countries are also involved in this operation. Additional support is being sought from several hotel and supermarket chains.

Vitoria Pereira goes on to say that linked to this project, and already far along, is the construction of three ports in Sao Tome, among which is the terminal at Rosema, which will be used to store frozen fish. South African coal will be the type of energy to be used in the warehouses, with negotiations already under way between Sao Tomeans and South Africans. The group soon will start fishing on a large scale in this African country, and plans to extend this activity to the entire Angolan "maritime corridor."

Due to the fact that it has great expanses of eucalyptus and pine trees along the Lobito rail line, Angola also will be able to start exporting logs from these trees to Portugal. The originators of the project also think that this country has the potential to start exporting iron, manganese, and copper to the Far East once again, and will be able to do so through Portuguese companies associated with their group. For this reason, Vitoria Pereira explains, several entrepreneurs from Taiwan were recently in Portugal. Japan, which is finding it difficult to sell its machinery in the EEC, would also be one of the main parties interested in exporting Angolan raw materials through Portugal. The Americans, with whom the Vitoria Pereira Group has been in close contact, already have committed themselves to building companies integrated into the project under their own responsibility.

* Futility of Battle for Mavinga Discussed

90AF0172B Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese
11 May 90 p 19

[Article by Ferreira Fernandes: "Mavinga, 3 Months of Senseless Deaths"]

[Text] Three months after taking Mavinga, FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] abandoned this locality in southeastern Angola. The withdrawal of troops is interpreted as a "military victory" by the rebels of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and as a "political decision" by the Angolan Government. The fact that there has been no evidence of any intensification of military operations in the area recently is an indication that perhaps the latter interpretation may be more accurate than the former.

Nevertheless, the return of government troops to Cuito-Canavale, their fort in the region, signals the defeat of a political-military strategy which was worked out last December. According to the most radical elements in Luanda, this strategy was supposed to have culminated in the taking of Jamba, UNITA's capital, 350 km southeast of Mavinga.

When it occupied Mavinga during the first week of February, FAPLA obtained the greatest military victory that it has ever had over UNITA in the civil war, which has now been going on for 15 years. This victory was all the more important in view of the fact that the two forces had not had the direct support of their traditional allies. For the first time, neither South Africans nor Cubans participated in key combats.

Since 1982, the rebels had transformed the locality into their main axis of infiltration for the guerrilla incursions into the northern part of the country, and, especially, into the Central Plateau, which is the region inhabited by the Ovimbundo ethnic group, which constitutes their social base of support. Their largest military quarters and their logistical base were in Mavinga. On seven different occasions, it was subjected to governmental offensives, which were successively turned back on the banks of the Lomba River, a few km to the north.

When UNITA finally lost Mavinga this year, it was a harsh blow. News arriving then from Jamba reported that the rebels, and Jonas Savimbi in particular, were psychologically shaken. However, the advantage that the adversaries would achieve by controlling Mavinga would turn out to be quite minor.

From the military point of view, the occupation did FAPLA no good at all. The only strategic interest that it might have had was soon thwarted when it was discovered that FAPLA would not be able to use the airport because it had been mined and its runway was full of holes. They had been counting on using the airport so that they could have their Migs stationed just 15 minutes away from Jamba.

Nevertheless, UNITA's defeat at Mavinga reshadowed a possible rout of Savimbi's troops in that area, with the winter season from April to September and the dry season approaching. There had ceased to be any large-scale billeting of UNITA troops between the government front and the rebel capital. Meanwhile, for the first time, Angolan Air Force planes bombed Jamba on 24 February and 2 March.

Carrying the battle right to Savimbi's capital caused the Americans to react. In February, an Angolan delegation, composed of Franca Van Dunem, the negotiator whom the Americans already knew from having worked with him on the accords that led to the independence of Namibia, and General Norberto Monteiro Ngongo, went to Washington, where the State Department warned that it would never tolerate the fall of Jamba.

The following month [March], during the celebration of Namibia's independence, Jose Eduardo dos Santos allowed himself to be convinced by James Baker, the American secretary of state, that it would be a mistake to try to conquer Jamba. Without Namibia's torrid coastline, Savimbi's city would naturally lose importance. In other words, it would not be worth the risk of provoking American anger.

With the decision not to attack Jamba, FAPLA ended up holding a hot potato in its hands—the now worthless Mavinga. The detachments that FAPLA had quartered in Mavinga were being supplied by a logistical line more than 100 km long, which was constantly the target of attacks by small guerrilla groups. In short, this amounted to an inglorious effort, all the more so in view of the fact that the real fighting front of the civil war had moved up into the northern part of the country, where UNITA guerrillas had concentrated their forces.

And so it was decided to abandon Mavinga. General Franca Ndalu, the chief of staff who had personally commanded the operation that took Mavinga, and the most renowned of Angola's military leaders, was named to head the military forces in the Bengo region. Bengo, which borders on Luanda, is where the main fighting is being waged.

With Mavinga, conventional warfare came to an end. Guerrilla warfare and counter guerrilla warfare have now taken control of the country.

* Huambo Experiencing Lack of Security

90AF0177A Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
5 May 90 pp 10, 12

[Article by Henrique Monteiro; first paragraph is EXPRESSO introduction]

[Text] Under siege by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and surrounded by a wall, the City of Huambo owes its survival to the air lifts and military convoys that bring in supplies, at a cost of millions of dollars a year.

The plane flew in circles as it descended over the airport. "It is because of the missiles," I was later told by the TAAG [Angolan Airlines] pilot who flew us back to Luanda. At the airport, closely guarded by soldiers, anti aircraft, and armed helicopters, we were met by the official of the Provincial Commission who was to "escort" us on our visit to the second largest city in Angola: Huambo, formerly Nova Lisboa.

Huambo was—and is—a martyred city. Captured by UNITA in 1975 and recaptured by the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] a short time later, it has always been a city under siege. Capital of the province of the same name, Huambo is located in the Central Highlands, where the population is predominantly Ovimbundo and Jonas Savimbi's movement has the greatest popular support. It owes its survival to the

airlifts and military convoys that bring in supplies—obstinacy at a cost of millions of dollars a year.

Although it is surrounded by walls with sentry boxes every 100 meters, Huambo is not even minimally secure. The Hotel Almirante, where we were booked, was unable to put us up. The first explanation was that the building was under construction. Later—because you can trip up a government official faster than a cripple—we learned that part of the building had been destroyed by a bomb.

The explosive device, which had been placed in a trash container, has been subject to various interpretations. No one knows precisely whether its target was the hotel or the neighboring building that houses the "Sovias"—a less than loving diminutive by which people refer to the Soviet cooperants. No one knew whether it had been left there, about 20 meters from either of the buildings, because the perpetrators of the attack planned it that way or because something prevented them from going any farther. However it was, in addition to twisting the metal and breaking all the windows in three buildings, the blast resulted in three deaths.

"These questions drive us crazy," we were told, in a more or less furtive manner, by a resident of the city. "We have no idea how close they are or what they are capable of." But a former judge of the People's Court—who savagely defended the death penalty in a conversation with me—had no doubt that the bomb had been left there simply because the terrorist's hand had trembled and his body had refused to take one more step. "This is the advantage of being able to inflict the death penalty, which the Europeans think is so barbarous."

Disregard for Life

This is not to say, however, that a bomb is a big event in Huambo. Benfica's victory in the semifinals of a European match arouses greater interest and lengthier discussions. One lives here—one is forced to live here—with a disregard for life, which makes the justification of the death penalty a matter of very little interest.

The hotel where we stayed, situated on a broad avenue, did not promise to be any safer than the other one. On the contrary. The rear of the building looked out on the tracks of the Benguela railway and open fields beyond, and we soon learned that some European guests had been recently been abducted from this same hotel, which explains the friendly advice we were given in Luanda: "Wear sneakers that you can walk in, in case you end up in Jamba (UNITA headquarters)."

One of the employees of the restaurant, with its large windows blown out at the back, soon eased our minds. "We already have a generator and some searchlights at the back. So the soldiers who guard the hotel can see farther and it is safe."

Given the choice of being kidnaped or spending the rest of your life in that hotel, the former is much more attractive. Without running water, without lights, with

food rationed, with nothing to drink, not even water (with the noble exception of Cuca beer, which is manufactured a few steps away), this hotel—which, following UNITA bombing, became the best one in the city—did not offer a single reason for staying there. Still, we spent our nights in Huambo there on the balcony of the fifth floor (for safety against kidnappers), wavering between curiosity as to where the machinegun fire was coming from and fear of being hit by a stray bullet. The only pleasant thing about these nights was the mild climate, which the war could not destroy.

In the evening, however, we were surprised to find a "night club." Despite the twangy sound system and doubts as to whether the spider webs were "decor" or neglect, and despite the fact that it had only about six clients (we were proudly informed that it is always packed on Saturdays), the "night club," which offers a mixture of African music and Roberto Carlos and Joana, was evidence that the residents of this city do not live by war alone.

Children of Huambo

In Portugal, little is known about postindependence Huambo other than the song by Paulo de Carvalho, in which "the children around the campfire" say that "the stars belong to the people." Nothing could be further from the truth.

The children of Huambo drag themselves around the streets, undernourished, tattered and barefoot. When we wanted to photograph them, our "escort" would not permit it and said, in a serious tone: "This is not on the program."

We never found out what program our "comrade controller," an elegant official of the Provincial Commission kept referring to, even when we simply wanted to photograph the MPLA slogans painted on the streets. Because of this restrictive program, we could not visit schools, much less the market. The issue became the central theme of ideological debates between the government official and the *EXPRESSO* photographer, who would exclaim every 10 minutes: "[It was not this way] even in the Soviet Union, before Gorbachev!"

So it was more or less furtively, that is, outside the program, that I managed to have a strategic conversation with students of the high school and the trade school. The school records, to which I gained access through an admitted act of espionage, show that 90 percent of the students are failing. When I asked why so many of them were failing, they gave the hard-boiled and obvious reply expected in a city under siege: "People just don't care. One way or another, we will all end up in the Armed Forces anyway."

Half a Workday

The prospects for earning a living in Huambo are, naturally, not too great. All the products that reach there are transported by air or by military convoy. A dramatic

illustration are the enormous corn silos located in the productive zone of the city, which is still the second largest industrial park in Angola.

As Jose Miranda, director of ENDOMIL [National Milling Company] explained to us, the enterprise has the capacity to mill 280 tons of corn a day. Well, during all of 1989, it was in operation the equivalent of half a day.

This statistic reflects the state of industry in a city that requires 120,000 tons of raw material a year and receives only a little more than 3,000 tons. The first industrial unit we visited (and I do not know why, of all the ones listed on the program) was a bicycle factory that appeared to be the pride of the city. We were welcomed at the door by the director, who was eager to give us some facts and figures. When we asked if we could tour the facilities, he replied: "Well, the unit is not in operation now, for lack of supplies."

Then we went to an assembly plant for radios and television sets, where the big challenge this year is to produce color TV sets. Once again, we were told that the principal problem is the shortage of raw materials.

Then we went around to a textile plant—the "Booe" clothing company—its principal attraction being that it is a private company. The conversation was the same: The shortage of supplies and difficulty obtaining foreign exchange were hampering the development of the company. Mario Pereira Inocencio, the investor, had been promised \$5 million (for which he pays at the official exchange rate of 30 kwanzas per dollar) to import materials. He has only seen \$200,000 of it.

The wages are ridiculous, given that—just as in the rest of the country and particularly in Luanda—it is the speculators who set the prices.

"We are paying a little more than the minimum wage, which is 5,500 kwanzas a month (27,500 escudos on the official market or about 400 escudos on the unofficial market) and our employees have the right to two meals a day and medical assistance. However, once they know how to make some clothes, they buy a sewing machine and, in their own homes, they can make as much in one day as they would earn here in a month."

Obviously, the real prices are those of the unofficial market, at 2,000 kwanzas to the dollar, or 1,000 kwanzas to about 75 escudos. So the minimum wage will buy five packets of tobacco, which cost an average of 1,000 kwanzas apiece on the unofficial market. On the official market, naturally, one can only purchase essential goods, which are price-controlled and rationed and constitute the so-called "basic market basket." The problem is that they are rarely available.

If this is the situation in the second largest city in the country, situated barely 300 kilometers from the port of Lobito and served by an airport that can handle the big Boeing 707 cargo planes, it is not hard to believe those

who say there is a famine in the interior, in the eastern part of the country, far from the sea and the airports.

Obstinacy

The Central Hospital (a building dating from the colonial period, like all the others) serves a city of about 700,000 inhabitants and, in theory, serves a province of about 1.2 million inhabitants (theoretically, since there is no secure land route between the city and other locations in the province). The hospital employs 33 doctors, including seven Angolans, 16 Soviets, seven Cubans and three Vietnamese.

Visiting the hospital, one is alerted to the fact that it is absolutely vital not to get sick in Luanda. The provincial delegate of the Health Ministry himself frankly admits there are problems. First of all, there are no medicines in stock, although they are available on the black market, as the JORNAL DE ANGOLA itself has charged. Then there is no water, although they are in the process of digging a well on the grounds of the hospital itself. It should be noted here that the water problem has been dragging on since 1983, when the Lomau Dam, on the Catumbela River, was destroyed by UNITA. As for minor problems, there is the fact that the kitchen (which we visited, since it was on the "program") is disgusting; the laundry equipment does not work, so the clothes are washed by hand; and the surgical section has a shortage of equipment. Finally, we have learned that, a week after our visit, UNITA destroyed a wing of the hospital—the first attack against a civilian health unit.

In the absence of Commissioner Beto Van Dunem, we were received by Jose Manuel Lima, acting provincial commissioner. According to Jose Manuel, Huambo's principal wealth, its agriculture, has also been destroyed by the war. "We must hope for great changes," he said. "All the citizens should be free, and 14 years of independence have given us greater maturity." As to the prospects for peace, when it was commented that the most violent warfare between UNITA and the MPLA had been waged in Huambo, he said: "I don't think we will have problems. Our principle is to forget the past."

Another government official was more candid. As we were looking at the Benguela railway line, abandoned, and the Huambo station, almost in ruins, he confided: "It takes obstinacy to live in Huambo."

He went down the list of complaints. The power is supplied by generators that run on diesel, transported in military convoys from Lobito or flown in. Foodstuffs, transported by road, under close guard by the FAPLA [Angolan Armed Forces], are frequently the target of attack. Despite the security wall, built three years ago, the city is the victim of bombing and mortar attacks. Since the dam was destroyed, there is no water. Factory jobs have declined from 10,000 to 4,000, and even these are expendable. While we were looking at the railway line that once linked Lobito to Zaire, a distance of thousands of kilometers, he concluded: "How is it possible that things were allowed to get to this state of

affairs? Anyone who lives here and does not want peace is either in business with the black marketeers or the bandits."

* Commentator Urges Five Steps for dos Santos

90AF00881 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 13 Apr 90 pp 42, 46

[Commentary by Onofre dos Santos]

[Text] I am one of those who believe that the desire of the president of the RPA [People's Republic of Angola] to establish peace in Angola is a sincere one.

But this sincerity is not enough to ensure that peace will be achieved. It will have to be materialized in consistent and firm action which will prepare Angola for a future under a different sign, and will permit the president to concentrate on the burdensome task of national reconciliation.

Now the political program proposed for Angola, which is to be submitted to the Third Congress of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] to be held in Luanda in December, and which is set forth in the "Main Guidelines and Proposed Theses," has all of the characteristics of a moratorium on the regime.

It is a regime which is becoming aware that it can no longer meet the responsibilities assumed unilaterally when it proclaimed itself the sole executor of the Alvor Accords.

"After the signing of the Alvor Accords, which established the mechanisms for transition toward the proclamation of the total and complete independence of the Angolan people, it was only the MPLA which was able, at the proper time, to take them up and honor them..." ("Main Guidelines," page 7.)

Now that the methods and the principles have failed, the MPLA finds its maneuvering room reduced, but what it is seeking to obtain at this third congress is not the reform of the regime, but release from blame for the current state of affairs. The responsibility will not be assigned to the leaders of the MPLA, but to the usual scapegoats.

"The puppet bands of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], which were already, during the armed national liberation struggle, serving the interests of the Portuguese colonial government, allied themselves directly with the racist regime in South Africa...destroying economic and social targets for the purpose of making the materialization of the aspirations of our people difficult." ("Main Guidelines," page 8.)

"The positions and the political attitude of the United States Government oriented in this connection against our country..."

"Under the most adverse conditions of war imposed by the enemies of our fatherland, and the undeclared

blockade, the MPLA-Labor Party (PT) was able to guide the Angolan people in the struggle for peace, stability, and social security, even despite the inadequacies of an objective and subjective nature." ("Main Guidelines.")

These are fine words which fail to conceal the situation of social and economic catastrophe into which the Angolan people were plunged.

Instead of sincere self-criticism, there is an effort to guarantee the survival of the errors of the past, as the only way of guaranteeing the survival of their faithful executors.

"These factors strengthen the legitimacy of the present single-party system at this historic stage, a system which is perfectly compatible with the practice of democracy." ("Main Guidelines".)

This single-party "democracy" is clearly defined in these "Main Guidelines," in Point 5, "On the Trend Toward Lifelong Incumbency in Office."

Lacking the courage to return the choice as to their leaders and their continuation in their posts to the people, the only "reforms" the MPLA-PT is really urging in these "Main Guidelines" is the retirement of the party officials who are so attached to power that they are becoming an inconvenience. The authors of the "Main Guidelines," however, have taken care to restrict the time limitations on holding official posts to the provincial and lower levels.

The Next Congress

President Eduardo dos Santos has two choices. Either he can present himself as a failed debtor to the Congress, offering justifications and excuses in the manner of someone asking for time to change the direction of events, or he can choose not to wait for the Congress, taking immediate command himself of the proper dynamics for ensuring the triumph of peace and development in Angola.

I am not known to be situated in the same political quadrant as Jose Eduardo dos Santos, but I recognize that no one at this moment in the circumstances of time, place, and manner is situated as well as he is to set the rhythm and control the pace of the "hammer blow" which is about to strike in Angola's backyard.

Just as I am persuaded that he was made president of the MPLA and has continued as president of the RPA on his own and exclusive merits.

And just as I am also persuaded that if Eduardo dos Santos commits himself to approval of the so-called "Main Guidelines and Proposed Theses" at the Third MPLA-PT Congress, it will not be only the days of the single party which will be counted. It is not possible to triumph by prolonging weakness and contradiction. The edifice which the MPLA sought to build was a mistake beginning with its very foundations, and anyone who tries to shore it up will collapse with it.

Our strength now lies in recovering all of the virtualities of power in Angola, all of those underlying the Alvor Accords, in a search for the points which were undone with the 1975 squall.

We all know and understand what happened.

No one sincerely wants schism any longer.

Everyone committed errors, and many will certainly continue to be committed, but this only dictates that reflection should be undertaken by everyone, from the leaders at the top down to the population strata at the base of the pyramid.

Eduardo dos Santos should devote himself to this task, taking the initiative, and he should not let himself be limited to mediation maneuvers. The main responsibility falls on him today for reconciling all of the people of Angola, and returning to them the right to choose their government leaders. Because of his single and exclusive responsibility, he should be the guarantor of the transition to a real democracy (and not just that of the "Main Guidelines"), because only this will confer upon him absolute legitimacy for continuation as the president of Angola by right.

Because Eduardo dos Santos is not Aladdin, and he has no magic lamp with which to bring this about overnight, a number of steps will have to be taken. The first step, precisely, will have to be a solemn and formal statement of national commitment to the goals of peace and development. To achieve this, the president will have to commit himself to enter into direct and personal contact with all of the Angolan political personalities, both historic and nonhistoric, for the purpose of finding the solution which can rally the broadest national consensus.

It will be in the terms of that consensus that the proposal for changes in the Constitution, the Electoral Law, and the schedule for the general elections to be held in Angola will have to be presented. It is these elections which will inevitably have to be the culmination of the harmonization and reconciliation efforts.

2. Designation of a prime minister with the duty of forming a government bringing together personalities, whether affiliated with the MPLA or not, but in agreement about a new kind of dynamics and tension for peace, reconciliation, and development.

Different Tunes

The rebuilding of the country will basically depend on confidence, which no one has today in the present MPLA government of a Marxist-Leninist, dictatorial, party-privilege sort. Change will begin with the words of Eduardo dos Santos, but they must be accompanied by a resolute gesture in this direction. One cannot play one tune and dance to another.

3. Utilization of the resources and the vast experience of the refugee Angolan and Portuguese cadres, or those located in Portugal. It is urgently necessary to think of

establishing a council of those illustrious people with an irreversible love for Angola who continue to be forgotten and even scorned. They are to be found above all in Portugal, but, naturally, in Angola as well. They are the nonmembers of the MPLA, those disillusioned with the Angolan politics of these past 15 years, those who decided that their mission in Angola was concluded, but continue to think of it with a mixture of nostalgia and frustration.

This body, to be established in formal and legal terms, would be novel in that it would include Portuguese citizens. I am thinking of a number of former high government leaders Angola had, some of them good Angolans in their hearts and souls. This body could meet in Angola and in Portugal, serving as a sounding box and a repository of suggestions for the vast tasks in which the future government leaders of Angola will need friendly and sincere aid.

With Angolans and citizens "honoris causa" as its members, this council would be an agency of rapprochement between Portugal and Angola, and it would function at the outset as a factor in reestablishing the needed confidence and as a signal of change, not only for the essential cadres, but also the working people, the merchants, and industrialists.

President Eduardo dos Santos must have the courage to pronounce the magic words of peace and development, to introduce not only the Angolan people, but the Portuguese people as well, with whom a good number of the Angolan people coexist today, to "future shock," free of racial and colonialist complexes. This moment is a historic one, because it is an era of overcoming racism and colonialism. Eduardo dos Santos must understand this, and he must derive the necessary lessons from it. Soon.

4. Eduardo dos Santos should not ask this provisional government to do in one year what the MPLA-PT could not do in 15. But he should not, for this reason, fail to set demanding and difficult goals which can only be achieved with great patriotism, competence, and sacrifice.

This will be a government focused on day-to-day life, influenced, naturally, by the new atmosphere for which the president alone will be responsible. The president will have to guarantee the government's credibility and acceptance, and he will also have to make sure that the peace efforts will expedite the execution of its tasks.

This is an administration which will have to yield to a government of conciliation to be installed as soon as the consensus Eduardo dos Santos will have to promote has been achieved.

Revolutionary Government

But this provisional government will have to be a revolutionary government—in its tasks, in its methods, and

even in its goals. Overcoming complexes, this government will have to be one in which cooperation, with Portugal above all, is the true guideline. Joint meetings between this government and the Portuguese Government, will have to be held, in Lisbon and in Luanda, and also mixed commissions will have to be established on the level of the principal ministries, if not all of them, as would be desirable. The Angolan Embassy in Portugal should not continue to be a visa office for Angola, but rather an open door leading from Europe to Angola, and from Angola to Europe.

5. The last step, that for which everyone is waiting, will be the kiss of peace between Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. Eduardo dos Santos must know that the time has come to transfer the struggle the two have waged throughout these recent years from the battlefield to national reconstruction. Eduardo dos Santos must realize that it will not be by persisting in the stubborn absorption of political cadres from other political movements that the construction of the Angolan nation will become possible. To integrate Savimbi in the MPLA would be to attempt to subject him to a humiliation which no one regards as possible today, even for the most humble militants in the other movements. The examples of opportunism seen in some cases did not set a precedent. Just to tolerate this in the national tasks would be to belittle one who has shown grandeur. The wealth of Angola will have to be found in variety, and the breadth of vision needed to achieve this is expected of Eduardo dos Santos. And it must be remembered that Savimbi is not, just because he fought bloody battles during these years of Angolan incoherence, the sole national force. The real and only forces are those which emerge from the people. Until now, the only ones recognized have been those of the liberation movements. Eduardo dos Santos must rely on them and on the course which will lead to the final test, that of the popular consultation—consultation of a people who are so tired of suffering, and who will hail, in friendship and admiration, whoever is capable of awarding them the prize which after so much wandering they have an absolute right—the ability to live in peace.

* Ambassador to Lisbon Discusses Current Issues

90AF0090B Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 13 Apr 90 p 43

[Text] In connection with a full report like that being published today on the Angolan issue, it was urgently necessary to hear from the ambassador of the RPA [People's Republic of Angola] in Lisbon, Rui Mingas, concerning the recent developments which have occurred.

That diplomat began by stating to this newspaper that "the government of the People's Republic of Angola is committed, in the greatest honesty, to continued implementation of the peace process, with respect for the dignity of the Angolan people and the demand that above all, the national sovereignty not be questioned. At

the recent summit meeting held in Sao Tome and Principe, the chiefs of state of Gabon, Congo, and Sao Tome and Principe praised the efforts being pursued by our government with a view to peace. President Joao Eduardo dos Santos, in a statement to journalists at the conclusion of the summit meeting, reconfirmed the desire of the Angolan Government to maintain direct contact with UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. The position of the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, as restated at the recent meeting between Shevardnadze and James Baker, was well received by our side."

And continuing with his statement, the chief of the Angolan mission explained that "it has become necessary, on the other hand, that foreign intervention in the process cease, so that the people of Angola can by themselves overcome the problem which divides them. The recent report of preparations for a coup d'etat for the purpose of overthrowing the government of a sovereign country clearly demonstrates that there are forces which are not interested in peace for Angola. We have knowledge that political police and mercenary forces and regular armies have in hand a dark plan to promote destabilization in Angola. This plan calls for the strangulation of our economy, the promotion of popular discontent, the blockage of supplies of goods of first necessity—in a word, a whole series of actions which, far from contributing to peace, would push the country toward greater chaos. It is therefore urgent that this interference cease."

Rui Mingas concluded his statement to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS as follows: "The government of my country is prepared to pursue the peace process, and to maintain direct contact with UNITA."

* New Military Commanders: Educational Reforms

90AF0182A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
9 May 90 p 1

[Text] On Monday [7 May], the president of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, named Lopo de Nascimento to the post of president of the southern military front, replacing General Antonio dos Santos Franca "Ndalú," who will now become the head of the Kwanza-Bengo political-military front.

In another decree, Angola's head of state named Agostinho Ndjak to the post of adjunct provincial commissar of Huambo.

ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency], which reported this change, did not provide any further details.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General "Ndalú" is continuing to perform his dual duties as both the general chief of staff of FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola], and as deputy minister of defense.

The political-military region of Kwanza-Bengo is located close to Luanda, the capital of Angola.

In the last few weeks, the Angolan capital has been deprived of electricity as a result of sabotage perpetrated by bandits from UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola].

During the weekend, Angola's leader fired Carlos Fernandes, the minister of transportation and communications, and Pedro Bonga, the secretary of state for housing, for failing to carry out decisions made by the Defense and Security Council (CDS).

To replace them, the president of Angola named Antonio Kassomawn to fill the cabinet post of transportation and communications, and Ferreira Nicolau to fill the post of secretary of state for housing, urbanization and water resources.

Education

In another development, the cabinet minister for education, Augusto Lopes, announced a whole array of structural and curricular reforms soon to be forthcoming in his department's programs.

According to Augusto Lopes, the measure aims to go along with the demands of the country's current economic and social development.

Lopes, who spoke with journalists during the weekend in Huambo, added that an updating of the instructional programs in history and geography is expected, and he stressed that the restructuring and redirecting of instruction at the high school and university levels will be slow and gradual in order to avoid repeating mistakes that have been committed in the past.

The provinces of Huambo, Luanda, and Benguela were chosen as "pilot" provinces to test the new programs and working methods that the Ministry of Education has been pushing.

According to Augusto Lopes, high school-level institutions will continue to use the current four-year programs. He also stated that admission to university-level instruction will be decided by the process of aptitude testing.

In the structural sphere, Lopes stressed that university centers will be set up in Huambo, Luanda and Lubango, and that the naming of vice-presidents for each of these centers is anticipated.

The Angolan minister said that the creation of an office of studies and projects is likewise foreseen, an office which he classified as being the first step in the restructuring process. Such an office will make it possible to analyze the precise state of the sector that he directs, and also to work out projects in detail based on the country's current financial capabilities.

Meanwhile, the People's Republic of the Congo may play a role in the direct negotiations between the Angolan

Government and the UNITA rebel group, according to what Denis Sassou Nguesso, the head of state of the Congo, said on Monday [7 May].

In a speech delivered at the opening session of the meeting of the People's National Assembly (Parliament), Nguesso said that he was satisfied with the reforms now under way in South Africa, the independence in Namibia, and the prospects of direct contacts between the Angolan Government and UNITA.

The Congolese head of state said: "The Congo will once again show its continuing commitment to put an end to Angola's internal conflict, and will try to maintain the confidence of the principal protagonists."

In 1988, the Congo welcomed the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the "protocol of Brazzaville" and the "New York Accords" dealing with peace in Angola and the independence of Namibia, and it is one of the eight countries of central and southern Africa engaged in the search for peace in the People's Republic of Angola.

Botswana

* Export Performance in 1980s Reviewed

34000734A Gaborone BOTSWANA GUARDIAN-BUSINESS NEWS in English 11 May 90 p 11

[Text] Botswana's export performance in the 1980s was spectacular, leading to increasingly larger surpluses on the balance of payments each year, the 1989 annual report for Bank of Botswana has reported.

This in turn has built up a high level of foreign exchange reserves which, in terms of import cover, is now one of the highest in the world. Dominated by diamonds, particularly after the opening of the Jwaneng mine in 1982, total export earnings, in nominal terms, rose nine-fold from P4-25 million in 1980 to P3 661 million in 1989, at an average annual rate of 30 percent.

Diamond exports which amounted to P236 million and accounted for 56 percent of total exports in 1980, rose rapidly to P2 838 million and increased their share in total exports to nearly 80 percent in 1989.

The report also states that imports, on the other hand, have been rising at a slower pace of an average annual rate of 19 percent, compared with 30 percent for exports. From P4 68 million at current prices in 1980, total imports grew to an estimated P2 148 million in 1989. Mainly as a consequence of exports growing much faster than imports, the overall surplus on the balance of payments has been increasing rapidly each year (except in 1981, when it registered a small deficit) from a mere P72 million in 1980 to an estimated P880 million in 1989.

As a result, the gross foreign exchange reserves of the country rose from P255 million at the end of 1980,

sufficient to finance six months of imports at that time, to P5 248 million at the end of 1989, providing an import cover at current levels of about 29 months.

This, in no small measure, is attributable to the buoyant growth of the world economy especially after 1983. The period was particularly conducive to the growth of the developing countries, mainly because the industrialised countries, recovering from the oil price shock and the general economic downturn of the early 1980s, showed sustained growth.

This served as the basis for the general expansion of world output and trade. In addition, Botswana received a terms of trade windfall. The general weakening of the South African rand meant that many Botswana's imports (i.e., that from South Africa) became cheaper relative to the prices Botswana received from its exports to the northern hemisphere.

The report also reveals that over the decade, these developments on the balance of payments front enabled Botswana to liberalise progressively its exchange control system, which at the beginning of the decade, was already liberal by the standards of most developing countries.

The system is now virtually free of restrictions on current international transactions. While there are no restrictions at all on payments for imports, with authority to effect all such payments fully delegated to the Authorized Dealers (commercial banks), the delegated limits on all dividends have been progressively and substantially increased, particularly in the last two years, the report says.

* Accelerated Economic Diversification Needed

34000734B Gaborone DAILY NEWS in English 20 Apr 90 p 4

[Text] Botswana's foreign exchange reserves have remained nearly constant over the last nine months. The size of the reserves, namely P5 200 million, is still large enough to cover the costs of 29 months of imports.

But the fact that the reserves have stopped growing, makes one pause for thought. What has caused this change in the previous pattern of growth?

By far the most important reason for this stagnation is that diamond mining is near to current productive capacity of around 15 million carats per year. A second, much smaller factor, is the fall in the prices of copper and nickel, the two minerals exported by the copper-nickel mine of Selebi-Phikwe.

Against the modest export performance has to be set the rapid growth of imports. In previous years, the cost of imports grew at a rate of about 18 percent per year, but in the last three years this has accelerated to about 24 percent per year. Factors causing this faster growth of imports are the construction boom, the low level of

interest rates in Botswana compared to Botswana's rate of inflation and the continued growth of the public sector.

In other words, Botswana's rate of spending foreign exchange has started to catch up, and perhaps overtake, its rate of earning foreign exchange. This clearly cannot be allowed to go indefinitely. What can be done to reverse the trend?

The construction boom should not be stopped. It is a response to an accumulated demand for houses, factory shells and office buildings. But something could be done about interest rates and public expenditures.

Low interest rates can have harmful economic effects. They make it easier for households and businesses to borrow the money that is needed to pay for additional imported goods. The low rates of interest also encourage businessmen to arrange their financial affairs in Botswana so as to borrow as much as possible here, rather than to bring funds into Botswana from abroad. This also prevents the foreign exchange reserves from rising as much as they would have done, if interest rates had been higher in Botswana.

Public expenditures are also entirely under the control of the Government. This is why the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Mr Festus Mogae, called for "self restraint and responsible fiscal management" in his recent budget speech.

His appeal was echoed by the Governor of the Bank of Botswana, Mr Quill Hermans, who has spoken repeatedly about the "new economic realities" facing the country. He stressed last week that the peaking of Botswana's foreign exchange reserves was not unexpected but underlined the need to accelerate economic diversification, to attract new foreign investment and to promote manufactured exports.

We agree with both these sentiments. There are dangers in relying so heavily on the diamond mining sector. It would be unwise for Botswana to spend its share of mining profits as fast as they are earned. We will need a healthy cushion of reserves to ease the pains of adjustment during the 1990s.

* PRC Signs Contract To Replace Rail Line

34000734C Gaborone DAILY NEWS
in English 10 May 90 p 1

[Excerpt] The Botswana government and the People's Republic of China on Tuesday signed a contract for the relaying of the rail track in the Botswana main line between Francistown and Serule, a distance of about 88 km.

The contract was signed by the chairman of the Botswana Railways Board, Mr Charles Tibone who is also the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Works

Transport and Communications and the Vice President of the China National Complete Plant Export Corporation, Mr H. Luo.

According to a press release issued after the signing of the contract, Botswana will receive an interest-free loan of about P10 million, in the form of rails and various other components and 23 Chinese technical personnel will assist in the renewal of the track.

The agreement, the third between Botswana and China, was initiated by an Agreement and Protocol signed by the government of Botswana and the People's Republic of China on 18 March 1989, the release said.

The previous contracts were for the first and second phase of the project from Gaborone to Ramatlabama and from Francistown to Ramokgwebana, which were completed in 1987 and 1989 respectively. The first contract was of P10 million and the second one was P9 million.

Botswana Railways will provide for the previous contracts concrete sleepers, fastenings and ballast along with all the labour and other resources for the work, the release added. It also mentioned that at the end of the project, a further 88km track will be upgraded to continuous welded rails on concrete sleepers. This will bring the total length of such tracks to about 300 km.

The release further said the modern track is easy to maintain and should last at least 30 years before any further renewal, adding that work on this project will start towards the end of this year and will take 18 months to complete. [passage omitted]

* Soda Ash Project Interests Further Investors

34000734D Gaborone BOTSWANA GUARDIAN-
BUSINESS NEWS in English 27 Apr 90 p 13

[Text] Senior officials in the Finance Department of Soda Ash Botswana have revealed that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Common Wealth Development Corporation (CDC) are interested in buying some of the equity of the project.

According to information gathered by the BUSINESS GUARDIAN during the tour of the project late last week, the two Western financial institutions have already approached the government on the issue.

Soda Ash Botswana is one of the largest projects undertaken by a private company and the Government in this part of Africa.

Currently Soda Ash Botswana is a joint venture between AECI which has a 26.5 percent interest and management control, Anglo American and De Beers with 25.5 percent and the Botswana Government 48 percent.

Should IFC and CDC reach an agreement with the Botswana Government on the buying of equity, it means

that the government will offer the two financial institutions shares from its 48 percent interest which it now holds.

The Project has been designed to produce 300,000 tons of Soda Ash and up to 650,000 tons of salt per year, which is in line with the Southern African regional demand for these two basic materials. The size of the operation is equal to manufacturers elsewhere in the world. It involves extensive solar evaporation ponds and an associated large chemical factory.

Soda ash is a basic chemical with a current world production of 29 million tons a year. In Southern Africa, some 35 percent of the soda ash is used in glass manufacture, 30 percent in metallurgical applications, 13 percent in the detergent industry and the balance in general chemical manufacture.

Soda ash is the common name for sodium carbonate (chemical formula Na_2CO_3). It is an alkaline chemical basic to everyday life, with only ten other chemicals including sulphuric acid, caustic soda, anhydrous ammonia, chlorine and phosphoric acid exceeding soda ash in annual consumption.

About two thirds of the world demand for soda ash is produced chemically, using salt and lime as raw materials. The balance is produced from natural carbonate deposits, mainly in USA, Kenya and Mexico. And now this project will use the natural carbonate resources of Botswana.

The factory will include salt bagging facilities adequate to meet the demand for both fine and coarse salt in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and part of the Malawi and Zaire needs.

* Opposition Parties To Continue 'Unity' Talks

* Second Round 28 April

34000736 Gaborone DAILY NEWS
in English 20 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by Johannes Pilane: "Opposition Parties To Meet"]

[Excerpt] Leaders of four opposition political parties of Botswana are scheduled to meet for a second round of "unity talks" in Francistown on April 28.

The four top opposition party men expected to bring their heads together at Francistown's Thapama Lodge later this month are Dr. Knight Mapipe of the Botswana People's Party (BPP), Mr. Daniel Kwele of the Botswana Progressive Union (BPU), Dr. Kenneth Koma of the Botswana National Front (BNF) and Mr. Motsamai Mpho of the Botswana Independence Party (BIP).

Although Mr. Mpho was not available at the first session of the talks on March 24, he confirmed during a BOPA

[Botswana Press Agency] interview on April 17 that he was ready to join his colleagues for the April 28 consultations.

In a separate interview, BPP Secretary General, Mr. John Mosojane told BOPA the talks were expected to be closed with a joint political rally at Francistown's Tati-town freedom square on April 28. [passage omitted]

* THE GUARDIAN Comment

34000736 Gaborone BOTSWANA GUARDIAN
in English 11 May 90 p 11

[Text] Efforts by four of Botswana's seven opposition political parties to form some kind of a united alliance could pay dividends in future. The talks obviously come about as a result of the continuous thrashing during general elections of these parties by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party.

When the Botswana National Front [BNF], Botswana People's Party [BPP] and the Botswana Progressive Union [BPU] met in Francistown recently (and this time joined by the Botswana Independence Party [BIP],) it was clear that unity is their main objective. It was also clear that previous problems concerning ideological differences and the question of leadership were not paramount obstacles.

There is no doubt that since this was the second such talks in less than a month - with more still to come - the parties are now serious about an alliance. Further consultations will continue until any obstacles to unity are sorted out, even if it means making compromises by some parties.

It is indeed ridiculous for a small country like Botswana, with a population of just over a million, to have eight political parties. Probably the greatest irony of all is that many of these political parties do not diverse ideologies.

At least BPP, BNF, BPU and BIP seem to be strongly agreed on the important issue of national unity, which seems to have been 'relegated to the gutters' by other parties.

Opposition parties have in the past lost shamefully during elections. This was partly due to fielding different opposition parties' candidates, which split the votes. If some agreement could be reached whereby only one candidate could be fielded, may be there could be a difference in the results.

Political observers feel the time has come anyway for Botswana to be divided into two major blocks politically. When that happens, it will emulate the major democracies of the world where 'third parties' have no chance to survive. And Botswana, by the way, is a major democracy in its own right.

We therefore look forward to a different strategy by opposition parties in future, and probably for the next

elections. There is no doubt that a strong opposition keeps the ruling party on its toes, which means, a strong democracy.

Comoros

* Illegal Workers in Mayotte Create Tension

90AF0202A Paris LE MONDE in French
30 May 90 p 10

[Article by special correspondent Alix Dijoux: "Storms Brewing Over Mayotte"]

[Text] Overseas, too, cohabitation with foreign workers causes tensions, even in Mayotte where "cousins" from the nearby Comoros are treated as undesirables.

Mamoudzou—Suddenly, the barge connecting Petite-Terre to Grande-Terre, the two small inhabited Indian Ocean islands that form Mayotte, was bustling. As it was within 200 meters of the shore, a young man had taken fright and jumped overboard. Even before he could fall into the sea, he was caught and hoisted back on board. The man had trouble realizing that he was strongly held by a policeman who called for reinforcement from the land. Noisily, the crowd showed its satisfaction. "That's a Comoran. A car thief. The police had been looking for him for a week," a young Mahoran explained to the M'zoungous (the name given to whites in Mayotte). As for him, he did not miss any of the arrest. A passenger of the barge was the first to recognize the alleged Comoran thief among the other passengers. Surrounded by 200 Mahorans, the man did not have a chance to flee in spite of his desperate attempt to dive into the lagoon.

The rest of the story, all Mahorans know it by heart. Questioned by the police, then sent to the Mamoudzou jail, the Comoran will be tried. If he is found guilty, he will be sentenced and deported from the territory after serving his sentence. Deportation takes place only when the individual has been convicted in court (10 people were deported in 1989). In Mayotte, illegal immigrants are rarely escorted back to the border although, as the prefect, Mr. Daniel Limodin, pointed out, the law provides for such a procedure. Last year, on the other hand, the police turned back over 150 people who were trying to land on Grande-Terre aboard dhows coming from the island of Anjouan, about 80 km north-west of Mayotte.

'Caiman'

Most Mahorans would like the authorities to be tougher with illegal Comoran immigrants. "We hate them," a young adolescent from the bush stated firmly. For the moment, the cohabitation of a large immigrant community (estimates vary from 6,000 to 20,000!) with the Mahorans does not cause too much trouble. But that could change quickly.

Last 14 January, 5,000 to 6,000 people demonstrated in the streets of Mamoudzou during a "great march" against illegal immigration. "The slightest incident could

touch off a crisis," a young Mahoran executive assured. In Grande-Terre, advocates of strong measures are already toying with the idea of private militias. The receptionist of Hotel Baobab, Madi Bounou—a former French paratrooper in Madagascar from 1957 to 1964—created the Caiman group. "Caimans," he explained, "frighten people. This is why we chose that name. We are tired of thefts and rising crime. We no longer want these foreigners on our soil; there are too many of them. If they remain, we, Mahorans, are lost." Madi Bounou wanted to register "Caiman" with the Dzaoudzi prefecture as an association governed by the law of 1901 [i.e., recognized as serving the public interest]. The prefect categorically refused. "It is out of the question to leave the door open to private militias. The leaders of this group represent no one but themselves," Mr. Limodin indicated. Despite this refusal, "Caiman" is not going to pull its teeth in. "We are determined," the receptionist assured. "We are going to ask for the deportation of all illegals." But isn't it a fact that Comorans and Mahorans belong to the same family? "Abdou is Abdou, here or there," a young Mahoran seated next to a Great-Comoran assured. Besides, how could you tell the difference? The difference between the two people, who hail back to common origins, is supposed to lie in the accent of the Comorans, who speak Swahili like the Mahorans, but with some variants. "They are our cousins, that's true," Mr. Bounou said, "yet, they do not agree with us."

Exploitable Labor

What are these undesirable cousins looking for in Mayotte? Since the Comoro archipelago became independent in 1974, while the Mahorans chose to remain in the French community, relations between the three Comoro islands and Mayotte have been reversed. Until that key date, Mr. Attila Cheyssial, architect and sociologist, explained, Mayotte felt somewhat neglected in the archipelago. "The Mahorans would work in Anjouan or Moroni for a pittance. Today," he said, "the flow goes the other way!"

The Comorans come to Mayotte first to work and because of the attractive local minimum wage (Fr1,300 [French francs per month]), i.e., four to five times as much as what they would get in Moroni. The illegals who come to Mayotte belong to the best trained Comoran social categories: young graduates, former civil servants, even middle managers. "The ones who emigrate are obviously the most enterprising. Their good knowledge of French is an additional asset," the sociologist added. In the territorial community, they will accept any kind of work. Many are working on the waterfront, loading and unloading containers, which bring everything to Mayotte. Others work in the building trade or in road construction. Some become "taxi" drivers—most taxis are old Renault-4 jalopies imported from Reunion. Others again find work in the few shops, in the fields. Comorans are also employed as "boys" by wealthy Mahorans or M'zoungou civil servants. Up to 700 Comorans were found to work as "boys" in the 900 villas inhabited by M'Zoungous!

For all employers in Mayotte, Comorans have an obvious attraction. Here like anywhere else in the world, immigrants will do what they are told without protest, especially when they have no residence or work permits. Not registered—for good reason—with the local Insurance Fund, which serves as Social Security, they work for less than Fr600 on the average, i.e., less than one-half of the Mahoran minimum wage. "If I had to fire my Comoran employees tomorrow, my sales would drop by 30 to 40 percent," a businessman confided. For reasons of profitability or because they want to save, most employers close their eyes to the illegal status of this labor force.

Madagascar

* Impressions, Future of Homeland Discussed

90AF0194A Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE
in French Apr 90 pp 149-160

[Article by Rene Edelmann: "Madagascar—Too Late?"; first paragraph is DEFENSE NATIONALE introduction]

[Text] *Madagascar! It has been quite a long time since our journal has had the occasion to print anything on the "big island," except for a few short items here and there in our African column. We are all the more pleased to publish the objective impressions and hopes of a writer born on that island, who recently returned there and remains deeply attached to it.*

"Madagascar? It's too late!" Out of the blue, the young engineer I had met deep in the bush gave me this reply, dropping his head disconsolately.

I am a "Zanatany," a foreigner born on Madagascar. I had been traveling around the "big island" in search of wonderful childhood memories, and I was appalled. I remembered Madagascar as the "blissful isle," destined for every blessing. What had I seen? A country at rock-bottom, only just alive with a timid burst of energy that barely touches the Malagasy people, who remain hopelessly excluded.

Now that I am home again, when I ask myself the question, "What can be done?", my friend's answer haunts me. Is it really too late? Could President Ratsiraka not continue to reconquer the territory that he cheerfully lost during 12 years of Marxist orientation? Is it not possible to imagine a type of international aid that would be equal to Madagascar's needs and, above all, allow the Malagasy people to save themselves?

Rock Bottom

In Madagascar, everything—or almost everything—needs doing or redoing. A few World Bank statistics will give an idea of how serious the situation is. In 1988, per capita GNP [gross national product] in France was 10,740 dollars, the 17th highest in the world. In Madagascar, it did not exceed 230 dollars. Only 10 countries

were poorer still. One fact, more than any other, illustrates the collapse of the island since the French pullout in 1975. That year, it exported 4,544 tons of first-quality rice. In 1989, it has been forced to restrict its imports to 42,000 tons.¹ Its current purchasing power is 43-percent weaker than it was on the day of independence.

In 1988, out of a population of approximately 11 million, over 100,000 deaths were attributed to a resurgence of malaria. One wonders whether they might also have been due to weakness caused by malnutrition.

The Malagasy countryside reflects the general devastation. Everywhere, the forest—or what is left of it—is burning. The culprit is said to be the farmers' desire to create new pasture land or enrich the soil. In fact, in most cases, the real culprit is probably negligence or, perhaps, a more-or-less conscious desire to express the discontent of the rural areas. This very widespread practice of forest burning² has produced the distressing spectacle of irreparably damaged land. The impression of collapse is strengthened by the state of abandonment of the farming operations that foreign colonists, who were often French citizens from Reunion, were forced to leave 15 years ago. Ruined irrigation canals, sickly crops, and rusty factories show evidence here and there of an almost impossible retrogression.

Except for a few main roads,³ no effort has been made to maintain the highway network inherited from the French. Traveling anywhere, even on national 4 (Majunga-Tananarive [Antananarivo]) and 5 (Diego-Suarez-Majunga), becomes a matter of skill and, in some places, bravery. Thus, Madagascar often lacks the necessary infrastructure even to collect the products that people need to survive. Rice rots in certain rice-growing regions while famine reigns nearby in less well favored areas.

Nowhere, though, is the situation more perturbing than on the outskirts of Tananarive. With its population swollen to an immoderate one million plus, the capital city harbors tens of thousands of homeless, unemployed, sick, and even dying people, many of whom have nowhere to turn. Only the very eastern resignation of the Malagasy can explain the submission of this underclass.

Despite manifestations of discontent against Comoran or Karany⁴ merchants, whom the people accuse of exploitation, the service sector is still not in the hands of the Malagasy. It is dominated by a foreign social stratum made up of Indians, Chinese, and Europeans, whose prosperity, however well earned it may be, is still too ostentatious.

The "big island" has in fact fallen prey to all sorts of traffickers who are either members of the Malagasy elite or foreigners. Any even remotely profitable resource is spirited out of the country to the great detriment of government finances. What can the national police do? They are immobilized by a lack of transportation. What can the customs agents do? They are underpaid and, like

the rest of the civil service, have a tendency to cash in on the little or big favors that they are in a position to grant.

Misappropriation of public funds goes on at all levels. On its journey down from the higher realms, international aid is said to be syphoned off in non-negligible amounts. Knowing this, one can better understand the very relative effectiveness of foreign aid, nevertheless bestowed rather generously: It vanishes, so to speak, into thin air and goes to swell the foreign bank accounts of well-placed officials. Thus, Madagascar has the strange privilege of being an exporter of foreign capital.

The crowning blow is that food and clothing donated by charitable organizations ends up being sold at market price. As a result, in Tananarive, a pack of poor wretches are forced to rummage through the meager garbage of an underdeveloped country to feed and clothe themselves.

However, next to these manifestations of neglect, waste, and reprehensible extravagance,⁵ there are examples of rectitude, devotion, and competence, both among Malagasy officials and among the foreign executives who are working to put Madagascar back on its feet. "Once they had hit rock bottom, many decided to fight back," a Marist father in Diego-Suarez told me. Their efforts, together with President Ratsiraka's skillful change of course (he abandoned his Marxist orientation in 1987), have sparked a timid, perhaps temporary flame.

A Timid Flame

People who knew Madagascar two or three years ago agree that perceptible progress has been made, even in everyday life. The following particularly spectacular statistic is telling: In 1989, sugar exports, which in recent years have hovered around 25,000 tons (10,902 in 1985), reportedly jumped to 57,000.

One is also favorably impressed by the cars on the road in Madagascar, which are in very good shape compared, for instance, to the cars in Eastern Europe. The bush taxis are usually recent model Peugeot pickups that, with good maintenance, appear to withstand the deplorable state of the roads. Perhaps because of the ingenuity of Karany merchants, buying spare parts, medicine, food, and various materials does not appear to pose any major problems, except that they are very expensive, which makes them inaccessible to most Malagasies.

Thanks to international aid and, above all, church efforts—the importance of which cannot be overemphasized—the public health apparatus also appears to be in better shape. Endemic diseases are better treated, and the fight against extreme poverty is better fought.

The development of adventure tourism, an excellent barometer of the domestic situation, points to a certain climate of security. Even at night, we were able to walk through Tananarive's shanty towns and travel through certain areas of the bush without feeling in the least threatened. The tourist industry can, in fact, take advantage of a whole network of foreigners—in particular

French foreigners,⁶ who run decent quality hotel/restaurants even in the small villages and offer their customers the benefit their rich local experience. The current success of the luxury resort in Nosy-Be and the possibility of boosting tourism in general⁷ may perhaps be the brightest spot in Madagascar's future.

Progress can also be seen here and there on big projects—like the repair of the Tananarive-Tamatave highway. In Majunga and Diego-Suarez, a few new warehouses and even food processing plants are appearing, an indication that international trade is reviving. In fact, delicious Malagasy litchis can now be found for sale in France.

Lastly, unlike the common people, who feel only remotely concerned by this renaissance, the Malagasy intelligentsia appears more conscious of its responsibilities and is abandoning the "big island" less frequently for the advantages of life in France. College students are choosing professions more in keeping with the country's concrete needs. They grumble less about the prospects of being assigned to the bush as doctors, school teachers, or engineers.

How can these beginnings of a recovery be explained?

The succession of "black years" at the start of this decade traumatized both the people and its leaders. General economic collapse was accompanied by a decaying civil service. Famine gripped the cities, while the villages, reduced to self-sufficiency, fell prey to gangs of pillagers, especially in the south and west of the island.

It is difficult not to see that the stagnation was the result of the president's "political choices." The expulsion of the French colonists and specialists from 1973 to 1975 together with the semicollectivization of agriculture dealt an extremely severe blow to the economy.

Unfortunately, the disaster had to reach these proportions to overcome the stubbornness of the ideologues in power. Led by Ratsiraka, they had begun to admit to their mistakes by 1985. They were then smart enough gradually to go much further, returning, at the instigation of the IMF,⁸ to a true market economy. Madagascar submitted to an economic recovery plan that currently makes it one of the good pupils of the World Bank and the Paris Club. Thus, without alienating any of its backers, the "big island" managed to get international credit while the government in Tananarive rebuilt its power. This explains the current slight improvement. Government employees, who are being paid more regularly, have reestablished the presence of the state. The army and the national police have regained control of the main areas of dissidence through "strike" operations. It has been possible to gradually restore the infrastructure. With farm production and trade moving again, the economic machine is back in gear, come what may. It is currently possible, within the context of a certain trend towards democracy and despite the country's growing indebtedness,¹⁰ to speak of some sort of convalescence of the economy.

But is the same true of society? Not entirely. Despite hardship, the people still have not overcome their traditional *mora-mora*¹¹ passiveness. Weakened perhaps by hunger and despair, they patiently endure infinite restrictions, contenting themselves with just getting by from day to day. The ones who have initiative and want to get ahead seem rare. Behavior linked to witchcraft and custom (such as cattle theft and the unprofitable practice of raising zebu) is back with a vengeance. A telling example is the creation within the president's own party of the "sakehmihojaoro," a cult-like organization, led by a soothsayer, which is characterized by its members' blind loyalty to the president. Lastly, the extreme poverty of the urban belts, especially around Tananarive and Majunga, could give rise to renewed popular unrest.

Thus, what Madagascar is experiencing today is more a remission than a real recovery. The truth is that, however considerable the assistance of the international community may have been—especially that of France—it has not been enough to meet even half of the red island's real needs. Similarly, however praiseworthy the government's new policies and the people's patience may be, they have not been accompanied at all levels by the development of a sufficient degree of awareness that, for government to work, a modern nation must outgrow certain traditions whose persistence brings regression.

In other words, everything is happening as if international aid only benefited a tiny, often foreign fringe of the population and did not concern the heartland. Indeed, the heartland seems to evade the spirit and the rationale of this aid. It is world apart. In answering the question, "What can be done?," we must find an answer to this problem, above all others.

What Can Be Done?

May a "Zanatany" who loves his island be allowed to dream of a new type of aid for Madagascar?

Why "new"? Because the appeal of the countries of East Europe for assistance will create a much stronger demand for intensive aid. Requirements will double and perhaps even triple. We are not going to double or triple our foreign aid; ergo, the situation calls for even tighter management and new methods. Why Madagascar? Because Madagascar is still a new country, with a once industrious people and a potentially enterprising intelligentsia. It would make an ideal testing ground.¹²

What kind of aid, in the final analysis? At the twilight of their era, our empire builders sometimes doubted certain aspects of their accomplishments. My contact with them made me realize that we had tried to superimpose on African Madagascar principles, ways of thinking, and methods much better suited to our latitudes than theirs. Imbalances were created: uncontrolled population growth, the breakdown of the tribal structure, the indifference of the people to a new world that did not belong to it, political instability, anarchic urbanization, and so forth. Is it not time to let our former proteges find their own solutions to their problems—their own point of

equilibrium—based on their own traditions and culture? Our task would then be not to upset the balance with our actions and their side effects and, by not doing so, to promote and respect a second independence.

New Methods

Rather than "disguised abandonment," this point of view implies *accompagnement*. We will "accompany" the national figure or the local businessman whose prestige and methods seem most able to put the people to work, by providing him with loans and support. It will be up to him to establish goals and plans and to enlist the participation of the people—by using, for instance, young Malagasies managers we have trained, instead of foreigners with the same fields of expertise.

French cooperative aid workers would only work to get a project started, perhaps for just a few months or maybe a few years. They would train the native specialists who would take over after them. They would then stay in contact and would monitor and support their successor's work, which would also be their work. The project would only receive support to the extent that it was able to prove not only its profitability—our criterion—but also its contribution to the local equilibrium, specifically through the participation of the people. Moreover, at least initially, cooperative aid would place less emphasis on creating new infrastructures and more emphasis on fostering an awareness of the need to maintain existing installations.

Consideration should be given to decentralizing aid through local, regional, or nongovernmental organizations. The sponsorship system could be generalized. One region, one community, one parish, or one hospital would take charge of a counterpart in Madagascar. Working with the beneficiary, the sponsor would design its own assistance program, monitor it, and ensure the distribution of aid.

In the immediate future, our national foreign aid program, which is already considerable (almost 1 billion francs a year), could remain intact. Its current emphases (development of technical education, microfinancing, improvement of infrastructure, and farm aid) do in fact correspond to the major recovery priorities. However, support ought to be made more conditional. It should be cut, or even eliminated, in the event of waste or serious abuse. Beneficiaries should be held criminally liable in the event of failure. In addition, development plans should include follow-up and maintenance, not just implementation.

While the number of French cooperative aid workers (currently 415) certainly ought to be maintained, it should be possible to have the private sector bear part of this burden. Compensation could come in the form of advantages granted by the Malagasy state. The National Bank of Paris' plan to establish a banking subsidiary for the entire Indian Ocean comes close to this type of operation. To put the Malagasy banking sector back on its feet, the French bank sent a group of senior specialists

to Madagascar to train Malagasy managers there. Its efforts will be compensated by the smooth operation of the subsidiary.

It is especially important that we make every effort to support the renewal of local institutions that have proved to be useful and to have a sense of civic duty. The national police are a case in point. Providing it with, for example, the means to monitor the bush and the suburbs (lightweight vehicles, radios, and so forth) would at last allow it to start combating trafficking of all kinds. Similarly, the 10,000 young Malagasy literacy and health workers who make up the "development forces" at work in the bush could benefit from the experience of our adapted military service.¹³

By taking steps like these to improve existing institutions and by supporting the small landowners, office workers, and entrepreneurs who make up the middle class—by far the healthiest stratum—we can get things moving again. Recovery can only be achieved by a revival of private initiative, spurred by self-interest. The Malagasy, who is an individualist by nature, understands this policy perfectly.

Recognizing Malagasy Responsibility and Creating Awareness

The misgivings of Malagasy—beginning with the 30,000 who reportedly live in France—when it comes to the realities of their own country is a negative phenomenon that must be overcome. Madagascar must be saved by the Malagasy and, above all, by the ones living, as they say in Tananarive, in "the metropole" [France], who are often very well educated. Creating an awareness of this should be facilitated by their recently noted tendency to return to the homeland. In Madagascar as in France, a plan is needed to mobilize the goodwill of as many people as possible for the rescue of the "big island." A press campaign and celebrity appeals might be a good way to get things rolling.

One of the aspects of this awareness campaign would be to promote Madagascar among our European partners. Madagascar has a potential for diversified production (rare metals, gold, exotic fruits, fish, etc.) that is of great interest to the Community. In any case, the many trafficking operations on the island show that mining research still has more to offer.

Lastly, it should be emphasized that, for the first time in its history, Madagascar is no longer isolated or out of the way. It is only half a day by plane from Europe. Tourist development projects offer the best bet for an island that, relatively speaking, combines the scale of Australia with the charms of Polynesia. Once again, France is the best position to promote Madagascar—to make it fashionable, as it were. This psychological effort is of the greatest importance, because restoring confidence and making a commitment to the future of Madagascar is the cornerstone of its recovery.

Today, what Madagascar most needs is our confidence in it. There are potential investors: Karany traders, entrepreneurs from Reunion and Mauritius—and certain large French corporations that are aware of the potential of the "big island." All they are waiting for in order to invest and to make a local commitment is a signal giving the Malagasy state a certain stamp of reliability. All those who love Madagascar are waiting for this "signal." A plague on narrowminded quarrels and political choices. There is a life to be saved.

Footnotes

1. See Rajoelina and Ramelet's well-documented book, "Madagascar, la grande ile" [Madagascar, the big island], L'Harmattan, 1989.

2. Obvious just by flying over the country.

3. Specifically, the Tananarive-Tamatave highway, which is being rebuilt with Chinese and Swiss aid.

4. Karany is a Malagasy word meaning sly or deceitful. Its application to this group shows the unpopularity of a nevertheless very useful minority. The Karany are Muslims—usually Shi'ites—who came over from the Indies well before colonization. Together with other Indians, they control 40 percent of trade on the island. With a population of 17,000, they form the second-largest foreign community after the Comorans (25,000), who are generally poor.

5. Three years ago, on the Ankify cape across from the island of Nosy-Komba, a dock was built and a road put through to unload and transport tourists from Nosy-Be. Unfortunately, the area chosen for the port silts up so badly that navigation is beginning to suffer.

6. French citizens, who number 16,000 (as do the Chinese) constitute the third-largest foreign community.

7. There are plans to build luxury hotels and vacation clubs in the most picturesque regions: Nosy-Be, Fort-Dauphin, and Diego-Suarez.

8. In 1986, the IMF recommended a series of general reform measures (devaluation, elimination of subsidies, deficit reduction), together with farm price increases and the gradual liberalization of industrial prices and foreign exchange rates.

9. There are at least seven political parties. Censorship of the five daily newspapers has been curtailed. The last elections, which were monitored by the churches, gave the president only 62 percent of the vote. In itself, this "decent" result shows the existence of a relative degree of democracy, albeit still very insufficient, by our standards at least.

10. This year, the debt will supposedly reach 3.5 billion dollars. Service on the debt represents over 50 percent of goods and services exported.

11. Typical Malagasy expression meaning "take it easy." Pronounced moora-moer.

12. A World Bank loan, the first of its kind, recently gave Madagascar a start in that direction. The 85 million dollars (provided by lenders as diverse as, among others, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Norway, the EEC, the IMF, and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]) will be used to finance a five-year government plan of action to halt the dramatic deterioration of the environment.

13. The purpose of adapted military service is to teach young recruits a trade (masonry, carpentry, electrical work, etc.) and to have them build infrastructure.

Mauritius

* Employees Protest SMF Presence at CEB

90AF0203B Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 22 May 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Habib Mosaheb: "Sit-In Against SMF Presence"; italicized passages published in Creole]

[Text] About 150 manual laborers at the Fort Victoria power station in Salines held a "sit-in" this morning to protest the presence of SMF (Special Mobile Force) elements at their workplace.

It all began this morning when the SMF prevented seven workers from entering the premises of the CEB [Central Electricity Board] station. The reason given: they had no pass. One of the workers, a cleaner, had gained access to the station at 0500 hours, although he arrived without a pass. At about 0700 hours, he left to buy some bread and on returning was surprised to find he was unable to re-enter. Six other employees who were not carrying their passes found themselves in the same situation.

It was then that the Union of Employees of CEB [UECEB], exasperated by the continuing presence of SMF elements, decided to call a sit-in protest.

The sit-in ended about 1000 hours, when the seven "penalized" workers were allowed back in the station.

"From now on, a worker not carrying his pass will nevertheless be allowed inside the station on the condition his identity is verified by his foreman or another superior." In effect, the incident this morning was only the straw that broke the camel's back. The CEB workers are very upset about the permanent presence of SMF elements at the Fort Victoria station, who have been on the scene since the recent strike by CEB personnel. "We are employed by CEB, not by the SMF. We don't need any pass signed by the SMF or the police. We have worked here a long time—we are not some strangers trying to get into the station," said UECEB President Ignace Antoine.

"We also want to point out that the SMF does not man the checkpoint at the entrance gate every day. They only

do it when they feel like it. That is why the workers in most cases leave their passes inside the station," Mr. Antoine continued.

The employees penalized this morning had this to say: "We left our passes in our work clothes yesterday. This morning when we got to the station, some SMF guys demanded to see our passes. We explained that our passes were in our work clothes inside the station. They didn't want to accept that and refused to allow us in the station."

According to Mr. Ramphul, who is employed as a cleaner at the Fort Victoria station, "When I arrived this morning at 0500 hours, the SMF soldiers didn't ask me for anything. I got in without any problems, even though I didn't have my pass. I started to work right away, and at about 0700 hours I went out to buy some bread for myself and some friends. When I got back to the gate, some soldiers demanded to see my pass. I didn't have it with me. I explained the circumstances to them, but it did no good..."

The employees' union decided to take the whole issue to CEB management. It is demanding withdrawal of the SMF elements from all CEB stations.

It should be noted that the "pass" is signed by Commander Dayal of the SMF and by Mr. Jules Labat, CEB's general manager.

* NTUC Organizes To Protest Pay Raise

90AF0190A Port Louis WEEK-END
in French 20 May 90 p 5

[Article: "NTUC Mobilizes Against Pay Offer"]

[Text] The National Trade Union Council [NTUC], a confederation comprised of five trade unions and Mr. Follet's OUA [Organization of Artisans Unity], categorically rejects the wage scale approved Thursday by the government. It has decided to launch a national campaign to protest the pay levels unilaterally decreed by the finance minister. An initial rally is scheduled for Thursday, with three others to follow in Chemin Grenier, Medine-Camp de Masque, and Beau-Bassin. The NTUC is scheduled to hold a general assembly on 3 June at Patten College.

In remarks to the press on Friday, NTUC President Toolsyraj Benyadin discussed the "walkout" of confederation representatives from the discussions with Mr. Lutchmeenaraidoo, which occurred "when the minister refused to negotiate raises greater than 11 percent." The NTUC had insisted on negotiations based on a 30-percent raise. Mr. Benyadin also criticized the minister's reaction to the "walkout," "because the minister is trying to put words in the trade union's mouth by saying it has no reason to protest."

Mr. Benyadin expressed his astonishment at the finance minister's decision to continue negotiations after the NTUC "walkout." "In half an hour he reached an agreement on a 200-million rupee accord. This is proof

he simply dislikes negotiating with the NTUC because of its style." He attributed the accord with the MLC [Mauritius Labor Congress] and the SEF [State Employees Federation] to "lobbying" and "precooking" and accused the two groups of being "subservient to the government."

Continuing, Mr. Benydin explained that there was not much difference between the two proposed wage scales. "If it was raised at all, it was because of our walkout. To save face the government coughed up 200 million rupees."

According to Mr. Parapen, the outcome of the wage negotiations Thursday has serious implications for Mauritius. The "collusion" between MLC-SEF and the government was denounced, along with the agreement made "behind the workers' backs." The FPU [Federation of Progressive Unions] president and the NTUC spokesmen do not think the working class will benefit much from the wage hikes that were decreed, which range between 77 and 134 rupees for workers with a base wage of 700 to 1,200 rupees.

In the face of this situation the workers must mobilize to fight the accord. Referring to the leaders of the MLC and SEF, Mr. Parapen said the "working class needs to find out once and for all who is prepared to deal with the likes of Bhageerutty, Maleck Amode, and Cunniyah."

Possibility of Strike

Questioned about possible trade-union reaction, Mr. Benydin said a strike is not out of the question, but the matter will be decided by the workers themselves.

Tomorrow the NTUC executive board will meet to decide on the next steps. A tract will be circulated providing details about the confederation-wide mobilization.

*** PM Expresses Lack of Confidence in CID**

90AF0161B Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 7 May 90 pp 1,4

[Article by Harish Chundunsing]

[Text] The statement by the prime minister and minister of interior, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, to the Port-Louis Gymkhana Club to the effect that he did not have confidence in Andre Feillate and Regis Barbeau, deputy police commissioner and assistant commissioner responsible for security (CID), respectively, to conduct the second investigation into the murder of Azor Adelaide lit the powder keg. The prime minister's statement astounded everyone at the Central Barracks, particularly because he had already spoken out on this precise point last year, when he was asked why the second investigation had been entrusted to the Anti-Drug and Smuggling Unit (ADSU) rather than the central CID. At the time, Jugnauth opted for caution and mentioned no names in bringing up the ties of the accused, Sir Gaetan Duval, with certain high-ranking police officials.

"If the minister of interior himself has no confidence in two high officials, how could members of the public? If that is so, why does the prime minister not ask Feillate and Barbeau to retire in the public interest?" one high-ranking official asked this morning.

The first political party to react against the prime minister's statement was the MMM [Mauritian Militant Movement]. Addressing yesterday's assembly of delegates, MMM General Secretary Paul Berenger deemed Jugnauth's remarks about Feillate and Barbeau defamatory.

It should be noted that as deputy police commissioner, Feillate often accompanies the prime minister on his travels around the islands and thus was chosen to accompany the ministerial delegation headed by Jugnauth scheduled to go to Agalega Wednesday for a "site visit."

*** Iqbal Gunny: Preliminary Investigation Opens**

90AF0160A Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 9 May 90 p 1

[Article by Raj Gowrea: "Iqbal Gunny in Court This Morning"]

[Text] The preliminary inquest into the 3 March 1989 attempted assassination of Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth in Grand-Bassin opened this morning at Curepipe courthouse. Accused in this second attempt to assassinate Jugnauth are Iqbal Gunny and four other Port Louis men. Some 37 witnesses will be called to testify during the judicial inquest. This morning's was marked by the presentation of exhibits, including two razors that were in the possession of the principal defendant on the day of the attack, and testimony from four witnesses.

Sir Gaetan Duval, Queen's Counsel, appeared on behalf of Iqbal Gunny, while the other four defendants—Salim Fatehmamode (age 19), Bashir Khodabaccus (20), Anwar Hossen Ayood (25), and Azad Zoolfoo (21)—who are facing provisional charges of conspiracy in the attempted assassination, were represented by Ahmad Jeewa and Raouf Gulbul. Mr. N. Bhoyrul, "Crown Land Office," presented the evidence for the prosecution.

After presentation of the 16 exhibits, the first witness to testify was Dr. Bisnathsing, who related the circumstances that led him to prescribe treatment for the prime minister shortly after the attack when Jugnauth complained of neck pains. The physician testified that his examination of the prime minister established that the latter's neck had been traumatized. Later the court heard the testimony of inspectors Valaydon Ayacanoo and Danandjay Bucktowar, and superintendent Louis Marion. These witnesses gave technical testimony, supported by photographs reconstructing the events at Grand-Bassin.

Then George Wong, the principal inquest officer, read the deposition given by the principal defendant, Iqbal

Gunny, to the police; first, however, he produced in court eight letters the accused had sent to various individuals, including Sir Gaetan Duval, Police Commissioner Bhimsem Kowlessur, Mr. Paul Berenger, and Yousouf Mohamed. In the deposition read this morning, Iqbal Gunny described in detail his journey by taxi to Grand-Bassin for the express purpose of committing murder. The most important statement he made in his deposition was: "My intention was to cut his throat when he got into the auto..."

Gunny, a frail-looking man sporting a thin goatee and wrapped in a shawl, had been arrested in Grand-Bassin by security guards at the scene after his attempt on the prime minister's life.

*** Gunny Case: Police Testify, Medical Requested**

90AF0160B Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 10 May 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Dharmanand Dhoocharika: "Duval Says Client Should Be Examined by Psychiatrist"; italicized passages published in English]

[Text] Sir Gaetan Duval, attorney for Iqbal Gunny, the man who allegedly tried to assassinate the prime minister, requested yesterday at Curepipe courthouse that his client be examined by a psychiatrist. Mr. Navin Bhoyrul, representing the office of the prosecutor, replied that Duval's request would be considered but added that the accused should be examined in the presence of a government medical expert.

The preliminary inquest, held before Magistrate Bissoondoyal, received testimony from several witnesses, including high-ranking police officials.

Dr. K. Bissoonauthsing, an orthopedic specialist, said when called to the witness stand that he had examined the prime minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, at his home in Caverne, Vacoas, after the attack against him in Grand-Bassin. According to the physician, the prime minister was suffering from excruciating pains in the neck, shoulders and back, for which he prescribed medication.

Sir Gaetan Duval asked why the doctor had prescribed medications, and the latter answered because the prime minister was in pain.

"I was told that somebody jumped over him," he said. Inspector Valaydon Ayakanoo of the CID [Criminal Investigations Division] and other high-ranking police officials also testified, producing a schematic diagram of the site where the attack against the prime minister took place. Several photographs were also introduced into evidence.

Police Superintendent Casanove told the court that several of the prime minister's bodyguards, members of the CID, and other officers were present at Grand-Bassin to provide security for the prime minister and the other notables on hand. Superintendent Casanove was an

eyewitness to the attack on the prime minister at Grand-Bassin. When Jugnauth was assaulted with a razor by the accused Iqbal Gunny, Casanove saw the prime minister's bodyguards wrestle him down to disarm him. Two razors, a bag, two bottles, a purse, a kepi, and other articles were seized by the police. Superintendent Casanove was then cross-examined by Sir Gaetan Duval.

[Duval] Were you responsible for the prime minister's security?

[Casanove] *Yes, I was in charge of the security for the prime minister.*

[Duval] So it was you who decided where the policemen were to be stationed in order to ensure the prime minister's security.

[Casanove] Yes.

[Duval] How many police officers were on hand?

[Casanove] There were 25 uniformed police and 10 officers from the CID.

[Duval] There were also members of the NIU [National Intelligence Unit], were there not?

[Casanove] Yes. And there was the prime minister's bodyguard.

Assistant Superintendent Soopaya testified in order to identify a white kepi belonging to the accused Iqbal Gunny. The prosecutor, Mr. Navin Bhoyrul, also called to the stand, Assistant Superintendent George Wong, who read various depositions the accused had signed at CID headquarters in Port Louis.

According to his depositions, the accused Iqbal Gunny had written several letters in English to various notables including Police Commissioner Bhimsem Kowlessur, Sir Gaetan Duval (a former deputy prime minister), Mr. Paul Berenger, and Prime Minister Jugnauth. Those letters were produced yesterday in court.

The accused said he had armed himself with two razors, which belonged to his father. He paid 100 rupees to a taxi driver to take him to Grand-Bassin. As soon as he arrived, he said his prayers and asked a priest to bless him. He even bought a book titled **Life After Death** from a devotee of the Hare Krishna movement.

Later in his deposition, the accused said he meant to kill the prime minister. "My intention was to cut his throat when he got into the auto... I saw Jugnauth sit down. I was waiting for the chance to put my plan into action... I jumped on Jugnauth to cut his throat."

The accused Iqbal Gunny had also confessed his intent to buy a firearm (a revolver) for 5,000 rupees, in order to kill the prime minister at a rally organized by the MSM [Mauritius Socialist Movement] at Plaine-Verte.

He said he gave the 5,000 rupees to a certain Krishna Baghya to buy the revolver, but the latter kept the money and never brought the gun.

The accused Iqbal Gunny acknowledged having passed his SC [expansion unknown] examination. He has read the Koran, the Bible and other sacred scriptural works.

The principal inquest officer for the case also produced depositions from the four other defendants.

* Indian Instructor Joins VIPSU Unit

90AF0190B Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 17 May 90 p 1

[Article by Harish Chundunsing: "Indian Instructor for VIPSU"]

[Text] An Indian instructor is currently in Mauritius to train elements of the Very Important Persons Security Unit (VIPSU).

He follows two French instructors from the "National Gendarmerie Intervention Group" (GIGN), who provided training to a first contingent of men including those who make up the prime minister's security detail.

It should be noted that VIPSU is directly responsible to the "security adviser," Mr. Jugdip Narain Taimini. It was created following a second attempt, on 3 March 1989 at Grand-Bassin, to assassinate Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth.

This elite unit is currently composed of about 100 men, though the number is expected to be increased over time.

* Soviet Plans To Tour Area, Objective Discussed

90AF0156A Port Louis THE SUN in French
30 Apr 90 p 9

[Interview with Vladimir Maslin by APN correspondent Leonid Kokovitch: "Soviet Delegation Touring Mauritius and Madagascar"]

[Text] The recent visit that Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet minister of foreign affairs, paid to several African countries has drawn the attention of broad public opinion circles in the USSR on the problems of this continent. The country's parliament as well has not remained indifferent in deciding, specifically, to change the itineraries of its representatives who, in the past, visited mostly the West and the Far East.

This is the first time in the course of the proceedings of the present session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that Vladimir Maslin, member of the Committee for International Affairs and vice chairman of the Board of the Soviet Peace Fund (SPF) will be heading a Soviet public delegation to the Republic of Seychelles and the island of Mauritius as well as to the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. Vladimir Maslin was interviewed by Leonid Kokovitch, APN correspondent.

[Kokovitch] What is the specific purpose of this visit?

[Maslin] The Soviet delegation will visit some insular states in the Indian Ocean at the invitation of several political parties and public organizations in the countries in question.

The meetings that we will have in Victoria, Port Louis, and Antananarivo will certainly allow us to exchange information on problems relative to the enhancement of our cooperation, either in terms of public associations or parliamentary contacts.

The Soviet people follow with great interest the activities of the Republic of Seychelles and the islands of Mauritius and Madagascar, with a view to strengthening their economic independence, as well as the efforts made by these countries in the international arena with a view to making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and international cooperation. Soviet public opinion supports such a peace policy.

[Kokovitch] What is the specific manifestation of this support?

[Maslin] Let me cite you a very recent example. At the beginning of last February, Moscow was the seat of the first international seminar on limiting the race of naval armaments and a reduction in naval activities. The problems concerning the peace zone in the Indian Ocean and the security of the countries in this part of the world occupied a choice position in the agenda of this discussion. Its works brought together, among others, representatives of Mauritius and the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros. Let me point out that it is the Soviet Peace Fund and the Pacem In Maribus social commission that took the initiative to promote this meeting.

Another form of support is granting scholarships by our public organizations, so that national cadres of these countries could be trained in the higher Soviet schools. Currently, hundreds of graduates of such schools are at work in Mauritius and Madagascar. Seychelles nationals with Soviet diplomas are equally increasing in number.

[Kokovitch] We know that at the last session of the UN Special Committee for the Indian Ocean it was announced that the United States, Great Britain, and France had withdrawn. What is your opinion on this?

[Maslin] In my view, such a step can only destabilize the situation. In a certain sense it is a challenge hurled at the international community at a precise time when the USSR and the United States are engaged in a dialogue on the possibility of improving strategic missiles installed on naval facilities, as part of the disarmament process.

Soviet public opinion favors the continued work of the committee for the convocation of an international conference on converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. We intend to present this viewpoint in the course of our forthcoming meetings.

*** Ruling in Adelaide Case; Participants Named**

90AF0156B Port Louis *THE SUN* in French
4 May 90 p 4

[Report: "Let Justice Pursue Its Course"]

[Text] The Flacq court has determined that the testimony given justifies the fact that Gaetan Duval and Jacques David are to be committed for trial at the Assizes court. Anyone is innocent until proven guilty by the court. In the Duval-David case, they were not found guilty but will nonetheless go to court where they will have to prove their innocence, whereas the prosecution will have to prove their guilt. It is thus that all trials take place in civilized law-governed societies.

Duval and David will have the opportunity to defend themselves in the Assizes court as they defended themselves in the course of the preliminary investigation. All criminal court cases do not necessarily end with a guilty verdict. In any court people can be found guilty or acquitted. Let justice pursue its course! No one in Mauritius is above the law.

The preliminary investigation into the death of Azor Adelaide, on 25 November 1971, in Curepipe, in which the defendants are Sir Gaetan Duval and Jacques David, has been so far the longest ever in the legal annals of the country.

The investigation, which started on 7 September 1989, will have thus taken 190 days.

Actually, there have been no less than 91 sessions. The clerks of the court have transcribed no less than 2,695 pages of proceedings. The court has heard 66 witnesses, 40 for the prosecution, and 26 for the defense.

On four different occasions the court has not been able to meet because of the poor health of one of the two accused, twice in the case of Sir Gaetan Duval and twice in the case of Jacques David.

All in all, no less than 13 attorneys have been present, at one point or another, in the course of this preliminary investigation. In addition to the three prosecutors, Dhiren Dabee, Ashraf Caunhye, and Nuvin Bheekarry, there were 10 lawyers for the defense, only two of whom remained until the end: Yousouf Mohamed and Antoine Domaingue. Let us emphasize that other than the presence of Paul Lombard, from the French bar, present at the start of the investigation were Lewis Moutou, Kader Bhayat, Marc Hein, and Jacques Panglose who represented Sir Gaetan Duval. Because of other professional obligations, these defense attorneys have had to withdraw, one after the other; in the case of Bhayat, this was because of the testimony given by Paul Berenger, who had made references to him.

Jayen Cuttaree, Suresh Moorba, and Gavin Glover were present for the "watch briefs," respectively for Paul Berenger, Paul Sarah, and, finally, his lordship Judge Vinod Boolell.

The case was filed on 31 August 1989. Some of the witnesses who came to give their depositions included the current chief justice Sir Victor Glover and a former chief justice, Sir Maurice Latour-Adrien, and four head prosecutors: the current, Emmanuel Leung Shing and three former prosecutors: Sir Victor Glover, Cyrille de Labauve d'Arifat, and Jacques Vallet, who was also a former judge.

In addition, there also were two attorneys general, Sir Satcam Boolell who, furthermore, is deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and immigration, and Paul Cheong Long, former attorney general in a previous government. Let us emphasize that his lordship Judge Vinod Boolell testified as well.

Mohamed, Sir Gaetan Duval's lawyer, visited London on two occasions in the course of the preliminary investigation. The first time he had been replaced by Kader Bhayat whereas in the course of the second visit, it was Sir Gaetan Duval himself who had interrogated witnesses from the dock. Let us recall that attorney Mohamed had fallen suddenly sick in court and had required first aid from a Flacq physician.

*** Day Set Aside To Focus on Drug Abuse**

90AF0156C Port Louis *THE SUN* in French
30 Apr 90 p 12

[Report: "26 June Set Aside as Anti-Drug Day"]

[Text] The day of 26 June has been decreed by the United Nations to be the "Third International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking."

In Mauritius, in order to celebrate properly this important day, the "Trust Fund for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts" has organized a full program of activities, including exhibits, a workshop, a forum, and a rally. From 11 to 13 May courses will be offered for the promoters on "Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Activities for Substance Abusers" at the Anse-la-Raie Youth Center. The program calls for showing motion pictures, group discussions, lectures on drugs, and social work. The legal problem of drugs will be emphasized as well. Let us point also the participation of D.T. Kapadia, a noted Bombay "yoga consultant."

In a press interview, given last Thursday, Suresh Ramburn, president of the "Trust Fund for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts," expressed his worry at the increased use of drugs with every passing day. Thus, for the past three years the entire machinery has been activated to block this scourge, and training courses have been offered to anyone interested.

Vijay Luchmun, the secretary manager, described the already implemented projects and projects still under way, aimed at eradicating once and for all this sore of our modern society, which has no place among us.

*** Reinsurance: Foreign Companies Attracted**

90AF0161C Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 7 May 90 p 4

[Article by Leon Baya: "Reinsurance: Mauritius Attracts Foreign Companies"; italicized passages published in English]

[Text] Mauritius is now arousing lively interest among foreign reinsurance companies, Ministry of Finance sources report, due to plans for "off-shore insurance."

Two of the companies, whose respective international network is very extensive, have already decided to set up branches in our country: Munich Reinsurance [Re] Company of South Africa, Ltd., and Hollandia Reinsurance.

Munich Re is known in the Mauritian insurance sector because for several years already, it has been dealing with a number of local companies. The South African company opened a regional office in Port Louis last week, becoming the first to do so.

This Port Louis office, Munich Re's seventh in the region (after Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Namibia), aims to enable the company to better meet the needs of Mauritian clientele. "The need for surveys risk inspections, seminars and claims handling will be more effectively initiated by our regional office," Munich Re officials say.

Ernest Kahle, managing director of the company, is confident that the Mauritian market has growth potential and Munich Re wants to use this "on the spot" representation to better exploit that potential. According to Victor Vambe, director of the regional office, the company has set as its goal about a 50-percent increase in premiums, or 50 million rupees. It is estimated that total reinsurance premiums today are on the order of some 250 million rupees. Four years ago, Mauritians companies paid some 170 million rupees in reinsurance premiums, or 64 percent of all premiums, a percentage the minister of finance found too high.

Hollandia Reinsurance is setting up an office at the same time as Munich Re. The former is considered one of the biggest firms in the reinsurance sector and it has decided to set up a subsidiary, the Coral Reinsurance Company, Ltd., with capital of 25 million rupees. Company headquarters are at Chancery House.

In addition, the French Insurance Company (GFA) has expressed its desire to operate an offshore branch. The GFA owns 50 percent of the shares of Prudence Reunion, which itself holds 40 percent of the capital of Mauritian Prudence. The GFA is controlled by the German Aachner, which is reportedly fourth among the biggest financial firms in the FRG.

Insurance sources also report that a proposal has been made to increase the capital of one company to 10 million rupees compared with the current 2 million.

Certain company directors find the increase too high, while others think it is reasonable given the trend of affairs.

*** PT Supports Efforts To Reinstate Strikers**

90AF0161A Port Louis WEEK-END
in French 13 May 90 p 1

[Text] Sit Satcam Boolell's Labor Party (PT) has signed three petitions circulated by the forces making up the Anti-Dismissal and Anti-Union Repression Front. The three petitions deal separately with the reinstatement of the 14 members of the Executive Committee of the CEB [Central Electricity Board] Staff Association (in addition to the 15th member dismissed) into their respective posts, reinstatement of the 21 workers laid off from Le Meridien Hotel following the Chambac Brazier incident, but also the withdrawal of the Special Mobile Force (SMF) from all work sites of the CEB.

While the Labor Party, definitely in the forefront of politics since the famous May Day, did retract its intention of supporting the parliamentary petition of the MMM [Mauritian Militant Movement] concerning the dismissed CEB employees, it nevertheless joined with all the live forces despite the presence of the Mauritian Militant Movement in the front.

Dr. Arvind Boolell, Labor deputy from Vieux Grand-Port/Rose-Belle, signed the series of petitions for the Labor Party, petitions that the president of the Federation of Unions of Constituent Bodies (FSCC), D. Bharutt, had presented to him. "We refused to sign the petition of the MMM, which is a political party, but as for the live forces, the problem is different," Boolell explained.

The petitions were submitted to the prime minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Friday and read as follows:

Petition Addressed to the General Manager, 'Central Electricity Board'

"We, representatives of the following organizations, request that the fourteen trade union leaders and one union member dismissed by the CEB be reinstated in their respective posts.

"The fact that these workers have been selectively dismissed reveals the repressive antiworking class position of your management. We take this opportunity to inform you of our stand that trade-union leaders should be protected from such selective dismissals."

4 May 1990

Petition Addressed to the Manager, Le Meridien

"We, representatives of the following organizations, request that the five trade-union leaders and sixteen members of the union dismissed by Le Meridien, Ltd. be reinstated in their respective posts.

"The fact that these workers have been selectively dismissed reveals the repressive antiworking class position of your management. We take this opportunity to inform you of our stand that trade-union leaders should be protected from such selective dismissals."

4 May 1990

To the Prime Minister

"We, representatives of the following organizations, request that the SMF and the Police Force be made to withdraw from CEB sites of work and that the decision (already taken and implemented) to train SMF soldiers to take charge of the CEB stations in case of strikes or otherwise be revoked.

"We are of [the] opinion that in a democratic society, workers should be free to go on strike without having to face any situation where the army forces would act as *briseurs de greve* [sic, strike breakers] or where they would be compelled to work under the watch of armed soldiers (which is presently the situation at the CEB)." [previous two paragraphs published in English]

In addition to the PT, signers include: the FSSC [Federation of Unions of Constituent Bodies] (T. Benydin), the FSCC (D. Bharuth), the FPU [Federation of Progressive Unions] (K. Parapen), the FTU [United Workers Federation] (R. Mahadoo), the MMM (Paul Berenger), the FMP [Progressive Militant Force] (Jack Bizlall), the CDD [Democratic Rights Commission] (J.C. DeLapeyre), the Lalit Party (L. Collen), the UDM [Mauritian Democratic Union] (E. Chutel), the OMT/FNAS [Workers Militant Organization-National Anti-Sufferance Front] (Dev Ramano), the MTD [Democratic Labor Movement] (K. Seeparsad), and the GWF [General Workers Federation] (B. Jhurry).

*** Audit of Health Services, Other Sectors Reported**

90AF0161D Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 9 May 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Leon Baya and Raj Gowrea: "Overwhelming Audit Report"; italicized passages published in English]

[Text] The diagnosis of public health departments presented by the auditing director in his annual report for 1988-1989 and filed with the Legislative Assembly yesterday could not be worse. Administrative incompetence and inefficient management of public funds were once again pointed up in this 160-page report, which also condemns failings and lack of supervision in other sectors, particularly Customs, the Tax Office, Social Security, Public Works, and the embassies.

One can judge the degree of mismanagement of public health services by reading Item 14.6 of Nooroodin Hassim Punjatherachetty's report on storage at Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam Hospital. "There was an evident shortage of storage space in the stores. Stores items had to be kept in other sections of the hospital. This reduced

control. Security was inadequate, with inflammable liquids being stored with other items. Also, gas cylinders were kept near the entrance of the stores, which does not possess an emergency exit."

The audit goes on to indicate that in November 1989, 400 new blankets were received when 407 were already in stock. All stock represented roughly five years of needs. "The blankets were occupying considerable space. Rats had already started to eat the previous stock so that the new one runs a great risk of being damaged too," the report reads.

The lack of drugs has also become a common condition at Northern Hospital, where the audit detected incompatibility between prescriptions and entries for medications issued to patients. "Drugs prescribed on prescription forms did not correspond with those, or did not appear at all, in the respective files for some cases."

A case of pollution caused by Northern Hospital was reported by the audit, which reveals that in December 1989, one of the two sewage treatment units was still not operational, while the second did not operate properly. Moreover, defect in the chlorination system constituted a "serious health hazard" and effluents were polluting the Citron River as far as the Bay of Balaclava.

The lack of drugs was also evident at Victoria Hospital and the Orthopedic Center, particularly during the November 1988-January 1989 period. The situation was different at A.G. Jeetoo Hospital, which had a surplus: "It was found that there was overstocking in the majority of wards visited and the absence of proper monitoring had led to substantial quantities getting expired. Only a reasonable quantity of drugs should have been kept in the casualty and wards."

The audit also reveals very high water consumption at two SSRN [Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam North] and Brown-Sequard hospitals (with invoices of 1.2 million and 690,300 rupees, respectively). The waste was caused by leaks in the main pipes. Poor maintenance of equipment at the different hospitals is also pointed up by the report. At Jeetoo Hospital, for example, only one of the four electrocardiogram machines was operating, and at Victoria Hospital a "Sigma 20" machine received as a gift in March 1989 "was lying idle" because of the lack of the "necessary expertise for its commissioning."

Customs

Going over the Customs service with a fine-toothed comb, the audit notes that no satisfactory progress has been made on "missing bills" dating from the July 1978-June 1989 period. For the 1988-1989 fiscal year, nearly 3,500 bills could not be found. The audit also reveals "shortcomings" in manifestos, particularly poor classification and a lack of precise information.

On the subject of imported vehicles exempted from duty, the audit notes that in mid December 1989, the registration numbers for 632 vehicles exempted from duty for

the 1985-1986 to 1988-1989 period and "involving some 117.9 million rupees," had not been recorded in the Customs registry.

Tax Evasion

Concerning the Tax Office, the auditor emphasizes that 313 employers did not file tax returns for the last three years, while others still do not show the number assigned to each employee. The audit observes that the tax returns of many officials have not been reviewed. For the last three fiscal years, there were 1,295; 2,073; and 3,562 individuals receiving salaries of over 16,500 rupees a year but who were not registered with the Tax Office. "Contrary to prevailing procedures, these cases were not further investigated by means of test forms or questionnaires," the report emphasizes.

The audit points out that exporters of textiles and other products (78), professional individuals (104), and vehicle purchasers (5) were not listed as taxpayers. At the same time, it goes on to say that "no action for assessment was taken" on the some 3,000 work permits granted by the Ministry of Civil Service and Employment. "I am however unaware of how many of the holders of the work permits produced were not liable to income tax as none of the permits were accordingly endorsed," the report concludes.

The audit indicates that: 1) arrears were estimated at some 138.3 million by 30 June 1989; 2) out of the 1,077 "distress warrants" issued during the July 1973-June 1989 period, 240 representing a sum of 7.2 million had still not been executed by 18 July 1989; and 3) 785 companies submitted no "returns" and 1,002 others did not submit their books for three or more years.

Reviewing the situation in the Ministry of Labor, the audit harshly criticizes the poor use and approximate supervision of equipment. At the Plaine Lauzun workshop, it says, "control over tools issued was unsatisfactory," while at the Traffic Management Unit, four weighbridges and one calibrating machine costing a total of 1 million rupees were lying unused. The audit also points to an irregularity at the National Transport Authority. Police have opened an investigation and one employee has been suspended.

Mozambique

Chissano Addresses Pemba Residents 15 June

MB1806071490 Maputo Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1800 GMT 17 Jun 90

[Speech by President Joaquim Chissano on 15 June in Pemba—recorded]

[Excerpts] First, Pemba residents should know we are stopping over en route to Mueda, where we will participate in the Mueda massacre anniversary ceremonies,

marked on 16 June. The massacre anniversary is very important to the Mozambican people's history. [passage omitted]

It seems 16 June has always been marked by important events. History repeated itself, this time in South Africa, with Soweto's 16 June massacre by the apartheid regime.

However, is 16 June a day for crying? Is it not a day to celebrate victory? Yes, it is, because the 16 June massacre was not in vain; that massacre inspired the Mozambican people to victory.

For that reason, we have come to Cabo Delgado Province to gain inspiration and to inspire all Mozambican people. We also want to inspire Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front], the party for all Mozambican people, so we can achieve new and greater victories and [word indistinct] (?successes).

This is why our stay in Pemba will be short. We just did not want to lose this opportunity to salute Pemba residents and thank them for always providing a warm welcome. Such a reception clearly quells rumors that the Frelimo Party no longer enjoys popular support.

We know what the Mozambican people want; we know the Mozambican people want the Frelimo Party, their party. The Mozambican people want to see a strong Frelimo Party, and our people will work to ensure the Frelimo Party becomes the party that they want. Our people will want the Frelimo Party. The Mozambican people will work to strengthen the Frelimo Party so that it can act as the true party of the Mozambican people.

This is the feeling we got when we were enthusiastically received here in Pemba City even when [words indistinct] this reception demonstrates what we must expect throughout the province, throughout the country, at every corner that is visited by Frelimo Party representatives at provincial or national levels. The enemy should not think that the Mozambican people oppose their party when they only point out what they think are mistakes. Never. This is how we have always worked; this is how we have freed the country.

When we say that the power of the People's Republic of Mozambique lies with the people and that sovereignty in the People's Republic of Mozambique lies with the people, we are reiterating what Frelimo and the people want; we are reiterating what Frelimo has been; we are saying that only the people can prevent diversions, that only the people can strengthen the party they want, namely Frelimo. [passage omitted]

We would like to salute Cabo Delgado residents today for their work to make the Frelimo Party Fifth Congress decisions a success.

One of the decisions adopted by the Frelimo Party Fifth Congress was the need to develop our democratic practice in the People's Republic of Mozambique. One of the decisions adopted by the party fifth congress was to

develop democracy so that the power can truly belong to the people. This key decision, this very important decision is being fulfilled.

Accordingly, we are currently debating our future through the drafting of laws that will enable us to correctly apply the fifth congress decisions, as well as other decisions that may be adopted by the Mozambican people henceforth. We have begun to debate a legal basis that will govern all Mozambican people.

We have engaged in a debate so that no one would say that he or she did not know. We are engaged in a debate so that no one would say that he or she had not understood. This is why we have allowed the people to debate the constitution. We have allowed the people to begin a practice of greater participation in the drafting of their laws, particularly their fundamental law which is the Constitution. This is why we are carefully debating the proposed draft constitution.

Many people have aired their views. Some people have doubts. However, we have so far, at the level of leadership, tried to avoid to express our views on the debates so as to allow the people to truly express themselves freely, to express their feelings. This is what we have been doing.

However, some doubts emerge that require clarification, because we know that not every Mozambican is aware of how things work. Not every Mozambican is aware of what is going on in other countries worldwide. For example, it is not every Mozambican who knows that in many parts of the world, the head of state, be he a civilian or military, male or female, is the commander in chief of the armed forces. Our newspaper has reported for example that in Nicaragua, the commander in chief of the armed forces is the president who has just won elections there. The president of Nicaragua who won elections is civilian and a woman. She is not a soldier. The president of the United States does not require to present himself as a soldier to be a presidential candidate. He is first elected to the post and then becomes the commander in chief. It is the president of the United States who discusses the reduction of nuclear weapons with the party president or secretary general. The same is the case with the USSR. The president declares war against other countries or signs peace treaties with other countries in case of war.

These are just examples to show that there are issues that we shall begin to explain to the people, not to impose our views but to give a foundation to the people so that they can think freely.

At the moment, we are happy because people feel free to express themselves, they feel free to air their views. Some are demanding greater clarification of the drafted articles. People are making many proposals that I think would be of help in the drafting of this fundamental law so that it can be understood by our people.

As we are aware, the judicial law is at times written in a manner that cannot always be understood by everyone. However, we would like to minimize negative effects, taking into account that it was only after independence that our people began to have access to political debates. Before independence, only settlers had that right.

We would also like to thank Cabo Delgado residents, particularly Pemba residents, for active participation in the debate of the proposed draft constitution. There are many people who say: Well, we are debating the constitution but a decision has already been made. What we are saying here will not be taken into consideration.

We would like to assure you that all you say will be taken into consideration. We would like to assure you that we shall take everything into consideration. However, you must realize that to take into consideration does not mean that we are going to write down the wishes of each and every 16 million inhabitant in the country.

As we can see, different views emerge. What we want is to reach a consensus so that we can have what would be acceptable to the majority, the overwhelming majority of our people. What we want is to come up with something that will not be contested, although as time goes on, we may be able to improve on what will be decided upon. We shall equally benefit from proposals that may be valuable in future, although they may not currently or immediately be valid.

Likewise, when we debated the Fifth Congress topics, many things were proposed. We advised that these proposals be documented because proposals that are not correct today may be correct tomorrow inasmuch as conditions may change. Accordingly, we do not regret having carried out the debate and aired views.

In all organs, the Party Central Committee and Political Bureau, the People's Assembly, the provincial assembly, different viewpoints emerge, and many times a viewpoint that seemed to be wrong two or three years ago, may appear to be correct today. The person making this kind of proposal should not feel boastful. He or she should just recognize that proposal was made at a time when conditions did not allow its validity to be understood. [passage omitted]

Accordingly, if someone finds that his or her proposals do not appear after reaching a consensus, he or she should not think that the proposal was not taken into consideration. The proposal has been taken into consideration. The only thing is that it has to be subjected to other proposals in the consensus, to the line adopted by the majority of people.

However, if someone still feels that his or her proposals are right and must be included, he or she may have another occasion to bring them up, while carrying out what has been decided upon. Accordingly, it is necessary that we should implement what has been decided during the congress. As a matter of fact, we are already carrying

out the development of democracy in our country. This is important. As such, we would like to salute you for your participation.

Another decision that was adopted by the congress was that it was necessary to speed up the search for peace through all means. The Frelimo Party chairman and the Frelimo Party Central Committee received a mandate from the Frelimo Party Fifth Congress to pursue all paths that would lead us to peace. This is being fulfilled today.

We received a mandate to intensify the struggle against armed banditry, terrorism, and atrocities that decimate thousands and thousands of our people. This too is being fulfilled successfully today, with the participation of our people.

We do not adopt decisions in vain. We are carrying out what we consider a priority—the search for peace, our society's deepest democratization, the fight against terrorism and against banditry, and the continuation of our country's economic rehabilitation. In all these fields, we are achieving progress.

To achieve progress does not mean that we have already been able to resolve all our problems. Problems exist and will always exist. However, we feel that our decisions are being implemented.

We shall not accept to be maneuvered and deviated from fulfilling the tasks placed on us by our people through the Frelimo Party Fifth Congress where they all participated.

We want to ensure that decisions are made by the people. Accordingly, we told Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] that the basis for dialogue should be the recognition of this principle, that sovereignty lies with the Mozambican people and that only they are in a position to decide what they want.

However, Renamo continues to impose hard and dictatorial conditions, which go beyond our people's wishes, for it to sit at the negotiating table.

Renamo has said that it does not want a dialogue with preconditions. As a matter of fact, it was referring to issues which were not really preconditions. For example, the principle that sovereignty lies with people cannot be considered as a precondition. All we want is that we the Frelimo Party, the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and Renamo should respect the people's wish.

However, Renamo said no. They do not want to put an end to the war because they don't want to be deceived. We yielded and said: Alright, let us sit at a negotiating table before putting an end to the war. We said: Let us discuss the problem. We negotiated through friendly countries which we requested to assist us. We negotiated through noted Mozambican and foreign figures whom we asked to help us. Finally, we were told by these figures and these governments that Renamo had finally accepted to hold dialogue. We were told that Renamo

had agreed to hold dialogue in Malawi, a country that we suggested because of its closeness to Mozambique, because it can facilitate all operations in the negotiations, and because it is cheaper.

To demonstrate Malawi's proximity, after being certain that Renamo had accepted to hold talks there, we were able in less than 24 hours to send our big delegation. A day was marked for the meeting. We were in Malawi before that day.

The Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique sent a proposal to President Moi and the Kenyan Government. The same proposal was sent to President Mugabe and the Zimbabwean Government and to President Banda and the Malawian Government. The proposal that was also to be negotiated with Renamo suggested the following dates to begin talks: 11, 12, or 13 June. We received the reply that 12 June was chosen to begin talks. We are not the ones who set 12 June as the date to begin talks. We proposed three dates: 11, 12, or 13 June. We are not the ones who announced the date for the commencement of talks before receiving a reply to our proposal. The response came during the the middle of the week. All the same, we decided not to announce it. What we decided to do was to send an advanced delegation to Malawi on 8 June so that, together with delegations from Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Malawi itself, at the level of senior officials, they could discuss how talks would be led, in the hope that on 10 June, Renamo would be contacted to present our proposal on organizational aspects.

I say: organizational aspects. The aim was not to discuss the problem in depth. These delegations arrived in Malawi. However, the Kenyan delegation only arrived on 11 June. Even then, we thought we would be able to talk to the Kenyan delegation inasmuch as the talks had been set for 12 June.

After the arrival of our advanced delegation in Malawi on 9 June, we received another confirmation that everything was ready for dialogue to begin on 12 June.

On 10 June, there was a meeting between Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi.

It was decided that the delegations that were found in Lilongwe would leave for Blantyre where talks were expected to take place. It was confirmed that a Renamo delegation led by its head Mr. Dhlakama would arrive in Malawi on 11 June. In other words, we were again informed on 10 June about what we already knew.

Accordingly, we began to make preparations as on 10 June we were also requested to be in Malawi on 11 June instead of Tuesday, 12 June. This would enable the head of our delegation to already take part in preliminary consultations, since Mr. Dhlakama would also be there on 11 June.

Similarly, we were told that the Kenyan delegation would be in Malawi on 11 June and so would other

individuals supporting Renamo. Accordingly, they requested the presence of our delegation there on 11 June. They also requested the presence of Zimbabwean ministers in Malawi on 11 June.

This being the case, we all arrived in Malawi on 11 June. The first to arrive was the Renamo delegation led by Mr. Dhlakama. Mr. Raul Domingos, as well as other Renamo members were in Malawi. The Kenyan delegation was also there. Our delegation left Maputo only at 1400. Other members of our delegation were already there.

We were, therefore, quite astonished to hear that Dhlakama was not aware that there would be talks. What a coincidence then, that he came from Nairobi with a Kenyan delegation aboard a special plane on 12 June? Was it just by chance?

On arrival in Blantyre, the head of the Kenyan delegation said that he did not know that there were to be talks. Would it be assumed that his president allowed him to travel to Malawi on 12 June, despite the message that was sent to Kenya and despite Kenya's assurance that it would attend the 9 June meeting? Is it just by chance that they decided to arrive only on 12 June? They knew very well that talks were set to begin on 12 June.

This date was not chosen by the People's Republic of Mozambique. We proposed that they could take place on either of the three days. We did not set the date. The date was set after consultations with other parties. However, they told us that they did not know that talks would be held.

We announced just the (?opposite) to our people. On 1 June, that is 12 days before the date set for talks, when I addressed a meeting at the 1 June School in Maputo, I said that I was forced to keep our people in suspense. At that period, I could not yet announce the news to the people because I had been requested to wait. I had been requested not to announce what was going on until everything was certain.

Accordingly, we did not announce the news to our people. Our people were left in suspense, asking themselves what was going on, asking themselves whether or not our government was making any efforts toward peace. I felt quite bad about it, because I knew that our people were eager to know what was going on.

We decided to wait until we were able to confirm the information about holding talks. We did this to avoid being accused of having provided incomplete information. We decided to wait for information that we could prove. It was only then that we decided to inform our people that talks would begin on 12 June. We were then fully certain that that was what had been agreed upon.

Accordingly, we sent our delegation to Kenya with all seriousness. Further proof that all parties knew that there would be talks is that all delegations, including Mr. Dhlakama, arrived in Blantyre where talks were

expected to take place. They went to Blantyre. They did not go anywhere else in Malawi. Talks were expected to take place in Blantyre.

Foreign radios began to report that Renamo representatives abroad were saying that Renamo would not be represented in Malawi. The representatives said there was no Renamo delegation in Blantyre. However, a Renamo delegation was seen alighting from the same plane that brought the Kenyan delegation to Malawi. This is irrefutable proof. All the delegations were there.

However, Renamo continued to say that it was afraid because there was no security for its delegation in Malawi. However, the Renamo delegation was in that country for two days, 11 and 12 June. As matter of fact, all we know is that some of them stayed there until 13 June. They were there. They could be there for a longer period. We know that. However, they continued to say that they did not feel safe to hold talks in Malawi.

Had they agreed to hold talks on 12 June or had they agreed to begin talks on 11 June, we would have been able to hold talks on 11, 12, and even 13 June, because they were still there then. We would have moved forward. We would have been able to clarify many issues. We would have removed each other's doubts. We were all there in Malawi. Renamo members were not killed. Accordingly, there is security in Malawi. We could have held talks there. They simply decided to sabotage the talks. They simply decided to sabotage the peace process.

Renamo representatives in Washington, Nairobi, and Portugal said that Renamo does not want talks before some conditions are fulfilled. In other words, they are imposing preconditions to begin talks. They are imposing conditions. One condition they put forward is that we should stop our military offensive. They asked that the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Mozambique Armed Forces, should halt its military offensive in the Manica-Sofala region, where they have their principal bases. They said we should halt attacks so that we can begin talks. This was one of the conditions.

They demand the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Gorongosa, from areas where they are currently deployed, in order to begin talks. They demand that our country should stop carrying out vigilance work in neighboring countries, including Malawi, so that they can move freely. Do we know what vigilance work they have in Malawi? Do we know how far they have infiltrated each one of our provinces?

They have claimed time and again that they have infiltrated all of our provinces. We have not demanded that they abandon their vigilance and security services. Nonetheless, they have imposed that as a condition.

They have said they want talks in Portugal. How do they know we do not have security agents in Portugal? They have said they want talks in Kenya. How do they know we do not have agents in Kenya? However, they impose

conditions when it comes to Malawi. What kind of dialogue without preconditions is that?

If we were to (?alter) our forces' positions and withdraw the Zimbabwean forces from certain areas, where would we (?go from there)? They would have to tell us where they would agree to have our forces. In other words, to hold talks they must first give orders to our forces. Are they the people who must tell us what forces must replace the Zimbabwean forces?

If we stopped our offensive, where would that be? Where are we supposed to stop our offensive? If we stopped attacking Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia Provinces, where would we have to attack? Would they give us our targets then? Do they accept that we should tell them what targets to hit? Were that so, we would already have asked them to stop attacking civilians and destroying economic infrastructures. They have never accepted that. They have continued killing civilians and destroying economic infrastructures. However, they want to tell us where to attack.

Those are preconditions to sabotage the peace process. This has nothing to do with Malawi or the security problem in Malawi. They want to recover what they have lost. They are trying to gain time so they can reorganize themselves. They are trying to gain time to secure aid from backward forces interested in keeping the war alive in Mozambique. They are hoping to receive more aid, reorganize themselves, and counterattack. In other words, they are sabotaging the peace process.

However, we want to assure all Mozambican people and all our neighbors and foreign friends in every continent, that the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Frelimo Party, and the Mozambican people will not be broken by such shameful ploys. Instead, the Mozambican people and their government will redouble our efforts for peace. We do not lack imagination. Let us seek paths together with our friends. We are sure that one day Renamo will listen to the voice of reason. Either it will follow or be forced to follow the Mozambican people's wishes.

Our people have always known how to forgive and be patient. Our people have demonstrated (?more) [words indistinct] many times what words can say. Our people love peace and have always fought for it. Even when they fought Portuguese colonialism, the Mozambican people said they fought for peace. The Mozambican people shook hands with the Portuguese soldiers, even though they had fought them before. It is in the name of peace that the Mozambican people will be able to embrace the brothers they have been fighting. They will do so for the sake of peace, national unity, freedom, and democracy. Those who lost their lives in Mueda on 16 June, 1960 were fighting for peace.

The weapon you see on Frelimo's badge and on the national flag of the People's Republic of Mozambique is the weapon that fought for peace, independence, and people's power. It is not supposed to be a weapon that

encourages war. It is a weapon for national defense. Even when we were fighting the Portuguese, we did not have a war department. Instead, we had a defense department first known as DSD, Security and Defense Department. We never called it war department because we were defending the Mozambican people's sovereignty. Even then, we refused to transfer the Mozambican people's sovereignty to Portuguese colonialism.

It was with the same weapon that we defended our hard-won independence. Destabilization and war were imposed on our independent fatherland by those who wanted to keep colonialism alive and who did not want the Mozambican people to hold power.

Frelimo is here to reiterate that power belongs to the Mozambican people. Today, (?we are asking questions) and discussing issues. If the problem is that Renamo and other groups should come, let them come to Mozambique. They can do so freely, so that then the Mozambican people can choose. If our people find Renamo is right and answers their aspirations, they will choose Renamo. Why must we have all these ploys in Malawi? What is more, these talks should be held in Mozambique because this is not a war between Mozambicans and a foreign power. This is a struggle among Mozambicans. It is here in Mozambique that we should hold talks. It is here in Mozambique that we should find reconciliation.

The Mozambican people have the right to know: Who are those men known as Renamo? Who are they? Let them come here and let us achieve reconciliation in Mozambique. Why do they refuse?

We are telling them: We agree talks should be held abroad, but we can understand they should be scared. We deeply understand that Renamo's men should be afraid of turning up, and so we agreed that talks should be held abroad. Why do they hinder dialogue, even abroad? Talks should make it easier for them to return home safely and as soon as possible. Why do they refuse?

The people are here and they are ready to vote. If they like Renamo, they will choose Renamo. If they like Frelimo, they will choose Frelimo. If they like any other group, they will choose that group. Why are they hindering talks? Why do they want to decide for the people?

Dear brothers: This is what we are doing and what has happened since the end of May. However, as I said, we are neither tired nor angry. We know anger can affect our minds and make us lose our calm and our ability to reason. Thus, we neither want to be nervous nor angry. We do not want to take revenge on anyone. What we want is lasting peace based on national unity. We want peace to achieve national reconstruction and progress. Without peace, the freedom we have talked about will never really exist. We want peace so we can have freedom and we will achieve it. I say this and I believe it. We trust in our people. We are part of our people and we are at their service. The people must say what we have to do, and we will do it. Thank you very much. [applause]

President Chissano Swears in New Officials

MB2905182490 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1730 GMT 29 May 90

[Text] President of the Republic Joaquim Chissano said in Maputo today that the country was undergoing a transitional phase in various aspects of its life. The Mozambican head of state was speaking during the swearing in of newly appointed officials.

Chissano told the newly appointed officials that they would be faced with great challenges and because of this there was a need for great patience.

It should be pointed out that President Chissano a few days ago appointed Major General Eduardo da Silva Nihia deputy national defense minister, Paulo Zucula deputy agriculture minister, Agostinho Monjane deputy construction and water minister, and Salome Moiane deputy foreign minister.

President Chissano said that Mozambican officials currently faced great challenges and it was because of this that he had appointed cadres who would contribute to maintaining society's progress.

CPSU Envoy Meets With Frelimo Official

MB2605150790 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1400 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] (Eduard Sapskiy), a member of the CPSU Central Committee responsible for African affairs, is in the country for talks with the Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] Party within the framework of cooperation accords between the two parties. He has already met Alberto Sithole, chief of the Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs, with whom he exchanged views on the internal situation in the two countries, and the strengthening of friendship and cooperation relations between the two parties.

* Trade Minister Urges Increased Exports

90AF0103A Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 15 Apr 90 p 5

[Text] Minister of Trade Daniel Gabriel has appealed to the workers in the trade sector to use all of their abilities to find ways of improving and increasing exports (products and services). The head of the trade ministry made this statement in his speech at a ceremony marking the end of a technical-vocational course on export and import operations. The ceremony, at which 72 individuals graduated, took place in Maputo on 5 April.

Daniel Gabriel said that "the support of everyone for this undertaking is part of the strategy of the Ministry of Trade with regard to the need to promote an increasing number of activities in the export sector, so as to keep the people of Mozambique constantly familiar with the latest techniques used internationally in import and export activities."

However, Daniel Gabriel said that the current export picture and the immediate trade-balance prospects are not brilliant. He noted that although there is optimism, the difficulties our country is experiencing are tremendous, since the domestic economic situation is still difficult to predict and resources are limited. He stated that everything possible must therefore be done to prevent the gap between imports and exports from widening.

The activities leading up to this ceremony were a part of one of the ministry's priority efforts, one designed to develop the technical competence of our human resources. The businesses and institutions involved, or planning to be involved, in this export activity will have to plan, program, and adapt their training activities to their immediate or future needs.

The minister of trade emphasized that "the activities developed and planned for 1990, the implementation of which we are following closely, are part of a process and an undertaking which must be promoted, encouraged, and made dynamic." He added that vocational training activities should be a constant factor in development, both on the enterprise level and within the state apparatus itself.

The skilled manpower employed in the export sector should contribute to enabling the enterprises and institutions to play an ever more important role in the necessary processes of obtaining foreign exchange and developing exports, as well as participating more actively in international, domestic, and regional trade. With this in view, the number of courses being offered in the basic and specialized training sectors are designed to fill in the great gaps to be found in our skilled labor force.

On this same occasion, Daniel Gabriel announced that an identical course will be offered to cadres in the trade sector in other parts of the country, thus making it possible to train more people in the central and northern zones of Mozambique.

The director of the Foreign Trade Training Center at that ministry, Salomao Nhantumbo, said in explaining the course that it is designed for individuals who for various reasons have had no training in this sector, but who nonetheless are involved in this activity.

Salomao Nhantumbo said that through the center, the Ministry of Trade, has been training the personnel of various enterprises and departments engaged in trade activities since 1983. This sector plays a very important role in the national economy, above all in bringing in foreign exchange, and it is for this reason precisely that there is full awareness of the problem of personnel training in this sector.

The Foreign Trade Training Center, which was established with the help of the Cuban internationalists, is pursuing its activities today with multiple types of aid provided in the various aspects of the program by the United Nations Development Program (PNUD), the

Swedish Agency for Development (ASDI), and the International Trade Center (ITC).

Salomao Nhantumbo said that 72 trade operators were trained during the course which ended on 6 April, 35 of them in the export sector, and 37 in the import sector. The subjects offered during the course pertained to international trade techniques, subdivided into import and export techniques. During the ceremony, the graduates received their course attendance certificates.

* Mogovolas Official on District's Situation

90AF0103B Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
12 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] From 1984 until the middle of last year, the district of Mogovolas in the southern part of the province of Nampula was the target of successive attacks perpetrated by the armed bandits. Not even the district seat escaped the destruction of some of its institutions between 1985 and 1987. The administrator of the district, Francisco Kawene Munguambe, told our reporter that between the end of last year and the first quarter of this year, the political-military situation in Mogovolas improved considerably. An increase could be seen in the awareness of the population and its commitment to combat the armed bandits alongside the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM) stationed there.

Francisco Munguambe added that this increased awareness resulted from the implementation of the main decisions of the Fifth Party Congress, in particular the efforts which must be pursued collectively and individually to find local solutions to the problem of ending the destabilization war.

Administrator Munguambe divided the implementation of the main decisions of the party summit meeting in two parts. The first includes the physical participation of the citizens in the struggle against the armed bandits, and the second pertains to the reintegration of individuals who have been conditioned by the criminal elements to participate in acts of violence in society.

He further maintained that it was through these two components, added to the mobilization work of the traditional structures and the former colonial authorities, that the party effected its staffing for party tasks, and he emphasized its participation in the resolution of some social problems.

Our interlocutor assured us, on the other hand, that the people of Mogovolas, armed only with knives, have frustrated the armed bandits' attacks on many settlements. In this connection, he noted that very recently, using this same type of weapon, some citizens captured two AKM firearms in two clashes with the evildoers.

Moreover, Francisco Munguambe expressed his satisfaction with the massive return of the people who were living in captivity with the armed gangs. He added that

between the last quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year, 308 individuals arrived in Mogovolas. Of this number, 28 are regarded as active collaborators, while all the rest have been reintegrated in various settlements or placed in accommodation centers as displaced or needy persons. "The majority of these people already have plots of land where they are producing food for their own survival," he added.

Francisco Munguambe said that the gradual normalization of the political-military situation in the region and the participation of the people in the farm activities under way are playing an important role. By way of proof, he noted that about 138,000 hectares have been planted to various crops, including cassava, peanuts, and corn, which are basic food products for the local population.

Of this area, the administrator of Mogovolas went on to say, 6,000 hectares were planted by individuals displaced by the war, within the context of the Emergency Program.

"These achievements encourage our hopes that the approximately 28,429 individuals living currently as displaced persons will cease to be in that category. If no difficulties are encountered, they will no longer have to depend on foreign aid after this harvest," he emphasized.

However, the lack of rainfall which the region has experienced in recent months is a source of concern not only to the local people, but to the authorities as well. Similarly, this situation has been reflected in recent days in the water supply for the population, since the levels of the main rivers in the region are low.

"When I visited Mogovolas, I sent a message asking the Rural Water Department to solve the problem, because it is sad to see long lines of people walking great distances for hours on end, buckets in hand, in search of water. I have been in this district for more than five years, and I have never seen a spectacle like this. And I will not return to Mogovolas now until they have at least promised us to resolve this delicate question," Munguambe said.

Education Improving

Concerning the educational sector in his district, Francisco Munguambe said that an enrollment rate of about 67 percent has been achieved, as compared to 58 percent for last year. Thus an increase of nine percent has been seen, thanks to the mobilization, effected by the deputies in the assemblies of the people on various levels, of the parents and those responsible for education, for the purpose of reducing the level of student absenteeism. He also noted the improvements achieved, as a result of moral support, with regard to various of the teachers' concerns.

On the other hand, our source said that the school network in the district this year was expanded to a total

of 64 teaching institutions serving 11,648 students, as compared to 58 schools in 1989 with about 9,000 students.

"This increase is due to the reopening of a number of schools, the majority of them in communal settlements which had been brought to a halt or destroyed," he commented.

This Mogovolas official further said that 1,500 students in the first and third classes have received school materials, including texts and notebooks, from the UNICEF this year.

* Mubalo Center Launches Seed Project

90AF0103E Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
6 Apr 90 p 8

[Text] The reproduction of corn, peanut, and nhemba-bean seeds is to be initiated this year in Mubalo, in the district of Homoine, Inhambane Province, according to a report from the Inhambane provincial radio station which was quoted by Radio Mozambique.

That broadcasting station said the director of the project, Elias Zine, has announced that the testing of the seed for the crops mentioned is now under way at the various nurseries the project sponsors in Mubalo.

According to this source, the tests are designed to establish which species are best suited to the local soils, their productivity levels, and their resistance to disease.

Elias Zine added that since its establishment, the seed-production center in Mubalo has never engaged in the activity for which it was created, but has just produced corn, nhemba-bean, and peanut seeds. "The center has been producing like any farm, rather than as a seed reproduction center," he said.

It is this situation which an attempt is now being made to change, so as to supply seeds of better quality. The Mozambique Seeds (SEMOC) enterprise will play a technical role in the project. In fact, the director of the Mubalo project himself was assigned there by the SEMOC, following an apprenticeship in Colombia.

* Condition of Livestock Sector Discussed

90AF0103D Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
17 Apr 90 p 8

[Text] The indiscriminate slaughter and clandestine sale of cattle by illegal hunters in all of the provinces, especially those in the northern part of the country, including Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula, and in Maputo and Gaza in the South, constituted the key subject of discussion yesterday during the first session of the National Livestock Departments Meeting. It is being held in the capital of the country, and the national director for this sector, Felix Mondlane, is presiding. However, the actions of the armed bandits are seen as

the main factor hindering the development of livestock activity throughout the country.

During yesterday's meeting sessions, in which representatives of the livestock departments in all the provinces of the country participated, special attention was devoted to the activities in various aspects of the livestock sector being pursued in the provinces in the northern part of the country, in particular Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Nampula.

At that session, emphasis was placed on the livestock activity in the province of Niassa, which, its representative said, has seen some progress during the past year, in terms of an increase in the production and marketing of beef. This was the result of the gradual improvement in the military situation in the region.

The official reporting noted that the family sector accounted for the largest percentage of beef produced under the supervision of the provincial livestock departments. That sector marketed more than 7,000 tons, as compared to the total of approximately 5,000 tons for the state and private sectors. The percentage for the family sector exceeded the production total for last year.

In the course of these actions, the livestock sector in this northern province of the country has received major aid from the local government. This assistance had to do with transportation for livestock personnel, as well as the medicines required for the necessary veterinary treatments. The aid particularly benefited the districts of Mandimba, Cuamba, Mecanheles, and Lagos, to which the access roads have now been made relatively safe.

On the other hand, during this same period, the province of Niassa has produced almost nothing in the poultry-breeding sector because of the total inactivity of the establishments belonging to the state and private business sectors there. This inactivity was the result of both the unavailability of the necessary feed and the lack of organization.

On the other hand, the animals have been vaccinated against diseases, particularly the most common ones, including brucellosis, rabies, Newcastle disease, (tuberculosis), and avian smallpox.

Indiscriminate Slaughtering

The clandestine slaughtering of cattle, which still prevails in an alarming degree in the three northern provinces, also constitutes one of the problems which was discussed at length during yesterday's session. Better cooperation between the livestock departments and the units involved in the slaughtering of animals and the marketing of meat was recommended, among other measures.

Much of the information on the activities in the province of Nampula is contradictory. This is because of the inadequate gathering of data in the interior zones, where the effects of the war have been felt most intensively. In

these regions, an undetermined portion of the herds has been decimated by the armed gangs.

Moreover, the representative of the livestock sector in that part of the country said, the indiscriminate slaughtering of animals, cattle above all, and a possible outbreak of cattle plague in one of the districts of the province have been two of the main concerns. Solutions to these problems have not yet been found because of the war.

The National Livestock Departments Meeting, which is scheduled to end next Saturday, will continue today with the presentation and analysis of the reports from the other provinces in the country.

* Agricultural Program Benefits Refugees

* 'Project Nhamatanda'

90AF0105A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
16 Apr 90 p 1

[Text] More than 7,000 families, including displaced persons and those repatriated from the neighboring countries (Zimbabwe and Malawi), living in the centers established to accommodate them in the district of Nhamatanda, in Sofala, are benefiting from a farm program. It is being carried out by Project Nhamatanda, with financing from the Swedish Agency for International Development (ASDI) and assistance from the Mozambican Government, our staff in Beira has learned.

This project, which is already functioning, has a budget of more than \$1.6 million and about 200,000 contos in meticals. In its first phase, it is a part of the Emergency Program. Basically, it involves providing aid to the people in the form of production factors and resources, and distributing plots of arable land and seeds for various crops.

According to the information NOTICIAS has obtained, the program will devote greater attention to the development of rural extension in its second phase. Plans call for aiding each family to produce not only for its own consumption needs, but in order to sell its products on the market as well.

This process is also a part of the farm rehabilitation program, and, although it is only in the incipient stage, its goals include rescuing the displaced and repatriated peasants from a situation of dependence on the gifts and donations made available through the international institutions, within the context of aid for the thousands of human beings whose lives are threatened by war and poverty.

Reports from that district further indicate that, if the production yields obtained in the coming farm seasons are substantial, some families, with the aid of the project, could establish small peasant associations. "Everything will depend on the effort made by the individuals

involved themselves, and the local bodies," a source affiliated with the project told us.

Project Nhamatanda has already begun to produce positive results in terms of food, according to Francisco Antamingo Mangulenge, who is in charge of rural extension development in that district. This is the case because an unspecified number of families are about to harvest the first fruits of their farm production for this season (corn, sorghum, sesame seed, and nhemba beans).

Mangulenge said that the people who came from the Maringue district and are being accommodated at the Ramos Center, for example, could have obtained better results in raising corn if it had not been for the tremendous volume of rain which fell at the beginning of the year and destroyed the crop, while some areas were turned into vast lakes.

What this official told us was confirmed by our reporters, who could see during visits to certain centers that construction is under way on small barns for the storage of grains and other products brought from the higher zones, where they escaped destruction by the water.

Peasants Help With Planning

Speaking in particular about the goals of the project in the emergency zone, our source said that the activity at present is oriented toward the distribution of seeds, production tools, and plowed land to the peasants, as well as staff training. We further learned that greater attention will be devoted in the coming seasons to the people who were released by or fled from captivity under the control of the armed bandits, but arrived in the district too late to prepare the land for cultivation.

This individual also told us that last year 8,000 hectares of land were prepared for the raising of corn, sorghum, rice, peanuts, nhemba beans, butter beans, and sesame seeds.

On the other hand, our reporters learned that 118 hectares were prepared using the proper machines, which were rented, while the balance was prepared manually. In order to correct this problem of the machine shortage, the project has now purchased five tractors with their respective trailer attachments, and other types of farm machinery are to be sent to this district in Sofala shortly.

With the arrival of these production factors and resources, it is hoped that the preparations for future seasons can be carried out in accordance with the plans drafted. In addition, this will make the distribution of plots of land, which has been postponed, possible. This is a process which is also designed to help the peasants plan what types of crops to plant on their plots.

Last year, the project made available various quantities of seeds, including 120 tons of rice, 156 tons of corn, 40 tons of butter beans, a similar quantity of nhemba beans,

31 tons of peanuts, and 3.5 tons of sesame seeds, as well as various fruits and vegetable seeds.

Seeds Arrive

Mangulenge also told our Beira staff that further quantities of seeds are being distributed to the accommodation centers located in the district of Nhamatanda.

One of the aspects we observed during our stay in that part of Sofala was the involvement of the peasants in the clearing of areas in the low-lying zones (devastated by the rains) for the planting of corn and other vegetable crops. Several displaced persons explained to us that thanks to the support provided to them by Project Nhamatanda, they have a supply of corn in their barns which will last six to eight months.

Carlota Zunze, who comes from Maringue, noted, moreover, that in addition to the rainfall which ruined the crops in the low-lying zones, "the sorghum harvest yielded poor results because of the flocks of birds which invaded the fields in the early hours of the morning."

She expressed regret that the land which has been distributed is located in the low-lying zones, where it is difficult to raise corn.

"We spent months preparing the land, but then we could not harvest anything. This was because the rains, apart from washing away the crops, turned our farms into veritable creeks or lakes," she said.

* Equipment Arrives

90AF0105B Maputo NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 10 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Beira correspondent Goncalves Gauth]

[Text] A part of the resources and equipment allocated for Project Nhamatanda, which covers various farm areas, is already in use in the district of that name, while tractors and other equipment are waiting to be transported from the city of Beira to that part of Sofala, our correspondent in Beira learned from sources involved with the project.

Moreover, within the next few months, further resources and production factors imported from various countries are expected to arrive in this city. Our source told us, however, that the tractors which are to be sent to this district with their respective trailer attachments (five units in all) are currently at the MECANAGRO (Beira office) for a general inspection. A number of items of motorized equipment intended for the project technicians will be distributed shortly.

Silvio Galdinho Lima, the general coordinator of the project, said in statements to this newspaper that a great effort is being made to see that the needed equipment and production factors arrive as soon as possible, to

allow better preparation for the 1990-91 seasons, as well as the distribution of plots of land, which was postponed, to the peasants involved.

The equipment purchased includes 10 shelling machines, an equal number of road graders, grain threshers, and power saws, as well as bicycles for the technicians' assistants. "A unit from the self-defense forces will be assigned to support this project," our source told us.

Again with a view to making it possible to do better farm work, Silvio Lima said, the project has also purchased a caterpillar tractor for cutting timber and a grader for clearing and improving the trails which the vehicles will use.

Our reporter learned from the general coordinator that in order to allow communication among the individuals involved (and to be involved), the project has a radio, which was purchased in the United States.

He added that in order to ensure that there will be no breakdowns during the project operations, new alternative electrical energy sources will be introduced. To this end, an energy transformer which is to be installed for use in Project Nhamatanda is already in Maputo.

Our source explained that the transformer was purchased in order to ensure the proper functioning of the machines to be installed in a workshop. This workshop is scheduled to be built shortly so as to provide service for the machinery and other resources used in the project.

"The energy which supplies the district seat is controlled by the CFM [Mozambique Railroad] and will not guarantee the efficient operation of everything we plan to install in order to carry out our work. Now, with the transformer, we are seeking to ensure autonomy for our project," he said.

Education Plans

In its first stage, Project Nhamatanda plans to train, educate, and provide technical aid to the individuals displaced by the war, with a view to enabling the people now in an emergency situation to progress from subsistence production to surplus production.

The philosophy of the project also calls for training the peasants to operate machinery.

The activities in this program, which was launched in this Sofala district last year, will in the future have greater impact on the group of displaced persons. Moreover, proof of this could be seen by the Beira correspondent of this newspaper, who visited that area and observed the construction work being done on small barns for the storage of the corn harvested during this farm season.

Some of the displaced persons with whom our reporter talked said that had it not been for the heavy rainfall in February and March, self-sufficiency concerning food

could have been achieved. "However, an effort is being made to ensure that the second season will be crowned with success," this source said.

Moreover, the project is currently distributing seeds for the crops to be grown during the second part of the season, in which it is hoped that good harvests of fruits and vegetables will be obtained, since the people are now being aided directly by the technicians.

Increase in Areas

The general coordinator of Project Nhamatanda told our reporter that, initially, and with the arrival of the tractors, there will be a substantial increase in crop areas, aiming at accommodating yet another 7,000 families who were displaced by the war.

Also according to that individual, it was necessary to rent equipment (tractors) from private persons in order to clear land last year, which caused the project financial losses.

"With our own available resources, we will no longer be dependent on anyone, and we will be in a position to achieve the goals of the project," Lima emphasized.

*** Cuamba Survives on Small Business Sector**

90AF0103C Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese
15 Apr 90 pp 14-17

[Article by Alexandre Luis]

[Text] Trade activity and some small projects characterize the socioeconomic structure of the city of Cuamba. This structure exists as a result of the efforts of some private individuals, who despite the high cost of transportation and production, are serving as catalysts in the process of giving Cuamba a life of its own.

In our last issue, we discussed the farm situation in the district of Cuamba, where the current harvest is threatened because of the lack of rainfall. The most serious consequence of this situation is that since agriculture is the leading economic activity in the region, the rhythm of life has been interrupted. As a result, there will be hunger, and the farm marketing indices will decline.

Setting agriculture aside, the socioeconomic fabric in Cuamba also includes some trade activity, with small projects as well as some enterprises which are producing at less than their installed capacity. The situation is alarming because the small undertakings in the private sector cannot provide jobs for the majority of the individuals who live there. The alternatives for these individuals are farm and craft activities, the income from which will not cover the cost of soap, clothing, and other goods of first necessity in the stores.

The local population, which is made up for the most part of peasants, has no purchasing power. The peasants sell tomatoes from their plots at 100 meticals per kilogram, onions at 150 meticals, and a tin (cerelac) of peanuts in

the shell for 100 meticals. Meanwhile, the merchants are asking between 1,200 and 1,400 meticals for a bar of soap, between 1,200 and 1,700 for a kilogram of sugar, and up to 23,700 meticals for a length of cloth. And so the stores have very few customers, because of the high prices being asked, in terms of the low incomes of the people.

Based on a comparison of what is charged by the two groups, one can conclude that the peasant must make a tremendous effort in order to buy a length of cloth, while the merchant does not need what the peasant produces, because conditions in Cuamba allow all of the people to engage in farm activity.

Trade Activity

Wholesale merchants very often charter Antonov aircraft or boxcars in Nacala or Lichinga to transport their goods. By the time the products reach Cuamba, they cost double the real price.

The prices of soap, oil, clothing, and beer in the stores vary depending on the amount each merchant spends on transportation. One of the employees at the Cuamba branch of Niassa General Trade, which is a wholesale house, recalled that for three months, no products were delivered (the interview took place on 6 March). "During the time no goods were available, there was no activity, while the products sat in Lichinga awaiting transportation."

Madalena Fernandes, a retail merchant, said that her purchases of products have gone smoothly. Transportation has been available to her recently, because it is sometimes possible to use the goods train from Malawi, which makes the Malema-Nacala run. It should be noted that in the period between 1985 and 1986, the train did not go as far as Cuamba. According to Madalena Fernandes, supplies were brought in on Antonov aircraft. However, sometimes months passed without a flight to Cuamba. Even so, it was possible to reach Maputo. At that point, Maputo had nothing either. "The stores here had only rope and salt." Currently, used clothing is among the most popular products, since because it is cheap, it sells well.

Existing Projects

The only industrial units to be found in the city of Cuamba are a small textile project, some mills, and shops selling goods of first necessity.

The little textile plant was established by a Dutch woman in 1987 for the purpose of aiding women. Manual looms are used to produce rugs, blankets, and tablecloths. The thread used is purchased from TEXMOQUE in Nampula, while other items are produced locally from cotton. The wages of the 12 workers in this unit depend on what has been produced. But very often, according to Gabriel Baptista, a worker in the unit, orders come to no more than 10,000 meticals per month.

The facilities at the small plant include a machine for extracting edible oil from sunflower seeds. The daily production is 60 liters. This is the only machine producing oil for the people of Cuamba, of whom there are more than 30,000.

The socioeconomic structure of the city of Cuamba includes four other mills, all small establishments. Their situation is complicated, because when the machines break down, there is the problem of where to purchase parts. The owner of one of the old mills, Victor Morais, says that parts are purchased in Maputo, Nampula, or Malawi. "This is always expensive, because for a part which costs less than 50,000 meticals, we have to spend more than 200 contos for transportation and other costs." He added that the energy rates are high, as are the taxes imposed.

However, the existence of the mills is important to the life of the local population, because the main food staple is cornmeal. Even so, the four mills cannot satisfy the demand, so that people have to grind corn after working from 7:00 am until 9:00 pm.

There is an enterprise which mines garnets (semiprecious stones) in the environs of the city of Cuamba. According to Aurelio Armindo, a representative of that enterprise, the operation is proving difficult. "The mine has a capacity of 2,000 kilograms of garnets which can be cut and 11,000 kilograms of garnet rejects per year. To obtain these quantities, it is necessary to have two dumping tractors, two bulldozers, and two excavating shovels, and the processing and hydrogravimetric station must be functioning." None of these requirements is being met, and so the mine capacity is not being utilized.

However, not everything in this city is going badly. The Cuamba Dam located on Metecue Hill is an example of a project which provides electrical energy and water all day long.

Supply Plan Lacking

The administrator of the district of Cuamba says that the district has no plan to provide for a supply of goods of first necessity due to the shortage of transportation. "Last year, we received no sugar. In the final analysis, it is the merchants who have made an effort to supply the district."

The district receives products which include beer, sugar, sardines, and condensed milk from Malawi. These goods are brought in by soldiers from that country, who sell them to the people and merchants.

According to the local administrator, petitions will be filed with the provincial government asking that some merchants in Cuamba be authorized to purchase products in Malawi. Cuamba also receives products from the districts of Nipepe, Metarica, and Maua, despite the serious transportation crisis. "The people in the respective districts," the administrator says, "wait in line to

purchase salt and soap. In some cases, truck convoys have supplied these districts."

* Reporters Visit, Describe Toll of War

* Political Situation

90AF0176A Lisbon *EXPRESSO*
in Portuguese 12 May 90 pp 30R-31R

[Article by Henrique Montiero] txt

[Text] On the other side of the bay, in Catembe, mortars and tracer bullets were raining down. But people who were waiting in line on the Zambi esplanade, at the edge of Maputo, heard only the music of Xico Jorge, a Portuguese singer decried by Nuno Brederode Santos, a casual visitor, as "another Dino Meira who is trying to imitate Marco Paulo."

The contradiction between the war and this charming singer ("Please excuse the sound system; I recorded this in Lisbon with the Gulbenkian Orchestra," the artist was saying), mirrors the enormous crisis of a country that finds itself between the remains of a socialist regime, which never really functioned, and total surrender to a market economy and to capitalism. With some exaggeration, it could be said that Mozambique's political organization is "orchestrated" by the East, while it has an economy with music, arrangements and direction by the IMF.

Jose Luis Silva is a Portuguese who has lived his whole life in Matola, on the outskirts of Maputo. He agrees that there is "much more freedom" now. Still, Jose Luis, who is paid only in meticals, echoes the complaint of all the Mozambicans: "What we do not have is money."

The concept of more freedom is relative to a time when a citizen might be stopped countless times on the street and ordered to show his papers, or a time, not too long ago, when the people's courts could sentence a person to the humiliating "chambocada," a public whipping in the presence of his accusers and his relatives.

Meanwhile, the life of the citizens continues to be controlled by the more classic forms of totalitarian organization: One family controls 10 families on one street; three groups of 10 families are under the command of a block chief; and the block chiefs are directed by a district action group. In addition, the district has the popular militia (armed, or with immediate access to weapons) and the popular vigilance group (these groups, comprising volunteers and professionals, constitute the SNASP [People's National Security Force]—the political police), as well as cells of the OJM [Organization of Mozambican Youth, the New Generation (scouts), the OMM [Organization of Mozambican Women] and Frelimo [Mozambican Liberation Front] itself, not to mention the police and the Armed Forces.

Except for the scouts, all these organizations are present in the work places, along with the OTM [Organization of Mozambican Workers], the union federation. The

police, the military forces, the SNASP, the militias, the OTM, the OJM, the OMM, and the party exercise joint command by area. If this super-Orwellian organization functioned properly, a citizen could not take a single step that would escape the notice of the state. And yet, Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] holds meetings in Maputo.

This is not to say, however, that there is no control. After 2100 hours, it is not easy to travel around in residential neighborhoods. People have had to give up night school because of the difficulties. Even carrying a sack comes under suspicion after dark. Naturally, the justification for all this is the war.

For the time being, Frelimo leaders are not assuming any changes in the situation, but it is obvious to everyone, including the population, that the country's problems will not be solved unless there is an end to the conflict with Renamo. Peace is obviously the number one issue in Mozambique.

Crossroads

"If anyone could convince Frelimo leaders that they could open up the political system without losing power, the situation could be resolved," a Western diplomat told us. "The problem is that no one knows exactly who is running the country," he added. According to another European who has lived in Maputo for years, "the power is not yet in the streets, but it has already reached the sidewalks."

The dispute grows sharper by the day. Some mistakes are acknowledged. Sergio Vieira, director of the Center for African Studies and a member of Frelimo Central Committee, said to be a hardliner, is the first to tell you that many of the mistakes are simply the result of "Frelimo's lack of experience" when it took power, as well as the shortage of cadres. "The people's courts are a bone of contention, but after independence there were no more than 10 jurists in Mozambique. Justice had to be provisional."

According to Sergio Vieira, the basic question is whether, despite its mistakes, there is any alternative to Frelimo. As a good Marxist, he believes that democracy is nothing more than the "superstructure of the developed societies." And since the country's political program is minimal, i.e., "peace and food," and since no political force, including Renamo, is formulating any alternative program, he does not see any need for a multiparty system, for the time being. He believes, however, that if the social groups with particular interests, now only roughly sketched out, come to propose distinct programs, when social issues are no longer limited to peace and food, "then there could be a multiparty system."

This opinion is representative of the many doubts that exist about the democratic system. Incidentally, except for the regime's dissidents and some Frelimo leaders, no one talks about democracy. The demonstrations and

strikes that have occurred in Maputo were, above all, because of the social effects of the IMF accord, which was, ironically, one of the signs of a relaxation. Even Joaquim Chissano, president of the republic, who is considered liberal, has never once argued in favor of more than one party. The draft of the new Constitution, which is now under discussion, does not provide for more than one party, although the role of leadership of the state is taken away from Frelimo. Among the public critics of the proposed Constitution (except for Renamo, whose proposal for the Basic Law was written by constitutional scholar Tomashausen, a South African professor), only Frelimo veteran Domingos Arouca, who lives in Lisbon, had the nerve to tell Chissano that he was in total disagreement with the principles and proposed a Western-style Constitution.

Causes of War

The issue of a multiparty system could even be considered minor, compared with the analysis of the causes of the bloody civil war. For a long time, the Mozambican leaders only acknowledged "external causes" for the war. However, some of them now agree that the Soviet model for development, specifically in the agricultural sector, with mass transfers of people into "communal villages," was a mistake that enabled Renamo to win the support of many peasants. A high government official told EXPRESSO that just the idea of annihilating those who were said to have been "aligned with the colonial power" caused serious problems with the traditional "regulos" [Portuguese-appointed native chiefs] and the "cabos de terra" (assistants to the "regulos"). "If we examine the establishment of Renamo bases, we find that, in almost every case, it was preceded by the execution of a "regulo" or by some conflict over lands." A French sociologist who wrote a study for the Mozambican Government came to the conclusion that the creation of the communal villages, forcing the peasants to abandon their homes and their burial places, had contributed to the recruitments and aid to Renamo in the interior of the country.

Admission of Defeat

The organization of agriculture was all the more incongruous since, in the end, Mozambique never formed close ties to the East. Some of its historical leaders had been trained in China, but relations with China were never important. In 1980, only 20 percent of Mozambique's trade was with socialist countries and Samora Machel himself mistrusted the Soviet aid. When Mozambique and South Africa signed the N'Komati accords, in March 1984, this distancing from the East was already apparent.

The admission that mistakes were made with regard to the peasants has a ring to it of defeat, almost surrender. There is a desire to turn back, and one hears almost pathetic speeches. "It is not worth killing someone over a sack of corn. We plead with our brothers who are with the BAs (armed bandits, or "matsangas," names by

which Renamo is commonly known) to return home." According to an official of a government agency, "after the magic of being a country—of being independent—faded, the harsh reality of backwardness, with an 80-percent illiteracy rate, came to the surface." The desire to turn back is so great that, when "regulos" return to their villages, they ask Frelimo: "Can I be the chief again?"

The situation in the countryside, along with the economic crisis and bogus value of the currency (the metical, introduced in June 1980), has destroyed the agricultural wealth of the country, which is now producing only 60 percent of what it was producing in 1981 and incomparably less than it was producing before independence. The peasants will only exchange their produce for goods, since the currency has no value. No one is putting by a surplus, because of the constant pillaging. More than a million people have left the country (current plans for the post-cease-fire call for the repatriation of 2,500 refugees a day). In a climate of war, with no jobs available, gangs are appearing, which indiscriminately attack people, supply convoys, schools and hospitals. Individuals who have completed their two years of military service and who are unemployed, deserters from the FPLM [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique], Frelimo groups that have broken away: they are all contributing—as much as the war—to turn Mozambique into a "killing field."

And famine is a part of the picture—ironically, in a country mentioned in FAO studies as capable of feeding all of Africa, if its agricultural potential were suitably exploited—a famine as terrible as Ethiopia's, and because of which the government has had to issue successive appeals to the international community.

The seven richest countries have entrusted Japan with \$50 million to disburse to Mozambique as unconditional aid. The EEC, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the Commonwealth have joined the list of principal donors, which now hold meetings periodically.

Thus, the Mozambican regime has gone from grand statements about Marxism-Leninism—which can still be seen on walls today, although the paint has faded—to total surrender to the IMF.

In December 1986, a dollar was worth 40 meticals—a really bogus rate. Since then, the metical has gradually been devalued so that a dollar is now worth about 1,000 meticals and, even so, this is only half what the dollar is worth on the black market. Once, everyone had money, but there was nothing to buy with it; now the reverse is true—the stores are full, but no one has any money.

Maputo has become a kind of paradise for anyone whose salary is paid in foreign exchange. If it were not for the almost constant power outages, this would be one of the liveliest capitals in Africa. Far from the poor neighborhoods, in the Hotel Polana, in the Costa do Sol, in the

Zombi, or in the "Buzio," the fashionable discotheque, the partying is constant—in contradiction to the country's situation.

'Westerners are now seeing the People's Republic of Mozambique as a good place to invest. The United States has removed Mozambique from the list of Marxist countries, and a Portuguese diplomat summed up the situation very well: "If we wait for a better time to invest, by the time we get to Mozambique there will not be any more room for us."

* War Zone

90AF0176A Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
12 May 90 pp 32R-33R

[Report by Henrique Monteiro]

[Text] Seated in an open Toyota truck, pretending to aim a Soviet-made HS-17 grenade launcher, Maj. Valdemar Fernandes, of the First Independent Transport Battalion, was saying: "This is the best. It can kill a person at eight km. And it only explodes when it hits something."

The military convoy which he commanded, consisting of 50 civilians and military trucks, had left Maputo at 0600 hours and was headed for Inhambane, carrying fuel and food. So far, it had been an easy mission; the convoy had barely passed the Bobol army post, the last locale that one can reach without an escort. From there on, National Highway No. 1, filled with potholes and cut off at several points, is a war zone. We were only 40 miles from the capital of Mozambique.

When the convoy was forming, the major problem was to explain to the so-called "opportunists" that if they joined up with the military convoy, it was at their own risk. The officers explained: "Look, we have a mission, and it is not to escort you. If you fall behind, we will not stop for you. If you break down, we will leave you on the road."

After weighing the risks, several individuals decided to take a chance. This is the only way for them to get to Manhica, Xai-Xai (formerly Joao Belo), or Inhambane. Other people, without cars, settled themselves any way they could on top of the oilcloth that covered the big trucks that were carrying goods. The elderly, women, children, all sensing that this was a momentous event, obeyed the soldiers' orders.

"It is at their own risk," a lieutenant said to us. "They are sitting at the highest points; they are the easiest targets."

Road Mined

The column moved forward at 40 km per hour. It would reach Inhambane, about 450 km from Maputo, the same night. The only problem, aside from a possible attack by Renamo, was crossing the Limpopo River, near Xai-Xai.

The crossing is made by barge, because the bridge is no longer in existence. I asked if the BAs had destroyed it, but I learned that it has suffered a more ignominious fate; it had fallen to ruin for lack of maintenance.

Maj. Valdemar Fernandes, in whose hands we had placed ourselves, advised us to turn back before we reached the bridge. He assigned 30 commandos and two Mercedes trucks to us, so that we could return to Maputo.

"If you want to see action, there may be some in Tanninga. A while ago, a convoy of 40 trucks was stopped there," he said, adding: "Today, God willing, nothing will happen."

With a great deal of effort, the trucks skirted every pothole, as if the drivers' lives depended on it. In the beginning, I did not understand their concern, but the major set me straight: "They are going around the potholes because mines could be buried in them, under the sand." Then I understood and, from then on, the two EXPRESSO reporters breathed a sigh of relief every time the truck left another pothole behind.

'I Pretend It Is Not Me'

We passed Pateque and Maluana, ghost towns that the war has left deserted. Abandoned houses, in ruins, have graffiti left by the soldiers. The complaints are similar to the ones the soldiers made to me when the major's back was turned. "It is easy to get into the army; it is harder to get out." Some of them had already served for more than six months after their tour was up. They wanted to hurry home, although a few of them—those who come from farther away—admitted that, because of the circumstances of the war, they might be obliged to remain in Maputo.

Waldemar, our major, who studied in the USSR, had a serene air about him, but that did not hide his nervousness. "Nothing has ever happened to us. We have been attacked, but we have never had any casualties. These convoys are large and their guys are not crazy." I persisted; I asked if he was afraid to ride up there on top of the Toyota—if he would like to trade places and ride beside the driver. He thought for a minute: "Listen, when I come to these places, I pretend it is not me who is here. I pretend I am at home and someone else is here in my place."

Suddenly, the only vehicle ahead of us—an armored car with a German motor and a Mozambican body, shaped like the keel of a boat—stopped. The entire column came to a halt behind it. The report had been radioed ahead that, back there on the highway, a truck had gotten stuck in the sand in one of the many places where Renamo had taken out the road.

The commandos jumped from the trucks and took positions on both sides of the highway. Straight ahead was a small picnic ground, where we were headed. The major knew the place well. "Before independence,

people used to walk around here at will. I have been here countless times with my father, when we used to travel between Nampula and Maputo."

Fear of Attack

Suddenly, there was a loud boom, which echoed over the huge plain. All the soldiers ran quickly to the side where a column of smoke was rising.

"Be happy!" Maj. Valdemar bellowed to his men. "This is a warning. Now you know where they are."

Some of the men took combat positions, perhaps more in the hope of being photographed than of spotting a "matsanga." "Let them come. We will give them a taste of this," shouted others, grabbing for the Chinese-made AKM machineguns.

Nothing more happened. The men were more watchful and there was the sense of waiting for death. Finally, the signal came that the truck was ready to roll. The major jumped on the Toyota and gave the order to move out.

"They could be here," he told me, pointing to the ditches. "They jump out suddenly and begin firing on us and, until we can tell where the shots are coming from, we have a problem." Later, thinking it over, he added: "But maybe they fired the bazooka to let us know where they are and that they are not going to attack. If they do not attack, then we do not attack either, because our mission is to get all this to Inhambane. Well, this is the theory. Actually, sometimes I cannot control the men. As soon as they see the enemy, they want to fire on them."

Holding on to his AKM as if for reassurance, Maj. Valdemar scanned the horizon. I asked him if, since we were in the second truck, we would be the first to be ambushed. "No, usually it is the ones in the back." To break the tension, which was running through the column, I tried to talk to him about the machineguns: How does the AKM perform? "It is good; it shoots straight. But after three clips, the barrel melts."

Witches

After we had passed Esperanca ("Hope," an ironic name, considering the prevailing sentiment at the time), we approached Manhica, the first inhabited place since Bobol. The Armed Forces have a post here. Seeing the flag of the People's Republic of Mozambique flying from its mast, I confess that I understood the joy of the pioneers of the Old West when the cavalry arrived. The tension was becoming unbearable.

In Manhica, we jumped from the car and went in search of something to eat. We found nothing except for some cold Coca Colas—that glorious soft drink that turns up everywhere, even in the midst of wars and disasters. To go along with the Coke, we had combat rations, which our major found delicious. "These Portuguese rations are the best. The South African ones are no good. Neither are the British or Soviet rations. These are the good ones."

After the first meal of the day—it was already after 1100 hours—and after the EXPRESSO reporters had handed around cigarettes, the trip became calmer. We talked some more about the Renamo attacks.

Without knowing it, the major shared the fears of the Galician who said he did not believe in witches. He told us that one of Renamo's tactics was to attack with witches in the front line. There was one who had no breasts and who roared that bullets could not hurt her. "We fired at her and we were sure we had killed her, but the next time they attacked, there she was again." The major would not say it, but in Maputo it is common knowledge that many Frelimo soldiers have dropped their weapons and fled, not for fear of the bullets but because of panic at the sight of a witch.

Desolation

From Manhica on, we were in the desolate area of Taninga, where Renamo is lord and master. On the shoulders of the highway, we saw more and more vehicles, destroyed by fire during the attacks. Every pothole was approached with great caution; the soldiers constantly scanned the horizon.

We had come only 100 miles from Maputo, according to the road map, which the major did not trust. "This is much more than 100 km, he insisted, forgetting that we had lost time with the long wait. "We must have come farther. I think this is all wrong."

Another truck broke down—it had taken on water in one of the huge puddles that we had just passed through. The column stopped and the major decided to go back to Manhica.

It was then that he turned the two trucks and 30 commandos over to us, to escort us on our return trip. "From here to Inhambane, it is no different from what you have seen so far. The only difference would be if there were an ambush by the BAs..."

We returned to Maputo quickly, dodging only the potholes with sand in them. When we asked to stop so we could photograph the abandoned houses, the soldiers immediately jumped from the trucks and took up positions near each house. The political commissioner of the unit, who commanded the 30 men, said the photographer was taking a risk. "The bandits could be inside the houses, don't you see?" We had not thought of that.

Massacres, Abductions

Before the trip with Maj. Valdemar, Marracuene had been our most direct contact with the destruction caused by the war. In the daytime, you can go to Marracuene, 30 km north of Maputo, without an escort, although most Westerners think it is a foolish thing to do.

The inhabitants of this town, located on the right bank of the N'Komati River, do not sleep there. There are Renamo attacks almost every night, so they prefer to cross the river and spend the night on the other side.

During the day, life is almost normal. According to Faquir Oman, a Mozambican of Indian origin, disturbances are the norm. "You just have to resign yourself to it," he said, referring to the bomb that, on 6 April, destroyed his store and his house and scared his family to death.

A native of Portugal, an Alentejano from Serpa, heard our conversation and offered his own philosophy. "Look, you go on living." The Portuguese has a small store in the town square, but you will not catch him sleeping there. He goes to Maputo at night and returns in a "Chapa 100," not even fit for cattle, early in the morning. In fact, we saw him pass by at 0530 while we were waiting for the military convoy to leave Maputo. Even if he had not waved exuberantly at us, it would have been easy to spot him: among the dozens of people jammed on the back of the truck, he was the only white.

Nor is life in Marracuene normal for Fermon Manhique, a man who does not know how old he is. We came upon him there, inside a big blue tent, where he was cooking something. When we asked him what he was doing there, he answered simply: "I am a prisoner."

Fermon spent two years fighting on the side of Renamo. According to him, he was caught off-guard and kidnapped by the BAs. He explained that they had "mixed up his head."

Fermon spoke the xi-changane dialect, so we had to use an interpreter. "They gave me training and a weapon and I fought for them for two years." He could not say if this was right or wrong or what ideal he had been fighting for. He simply kept saying that they "put a drug" in his food that "messed up his head." He later managed to escape. Now he cuts cane, without receiving anything for his labor except food.

Alfredo Manganhel, 22, tells the same story, and so does Elias Massi, 45, who has not seen his family for nine years, because he has no money to get to Nampula. Told well or badly, it is a story that can be read in a report from the Ford Foundation and the Swedish Agency for International Development, written by William MInter, professor of African studies at Georgetown University. The report, entitled "Renamo Described by Former Participants," claims that most of Renamo's recruitment is by abductions.

Bandits at Large

In Ressano Garcia, on the border with South Africa, where the Mozambicans who work in the mines near Johannesburg are hired, we heard a different story. Out of sight of a major and a lieutenant who accompanied us on our travels, they told us that, on many nights, it was the Frelimo soldiers themselves who were attacking the town. The purpose was simply to rob stores, putting the blame on Renamo. With back wages owing to them and with no food, the soldiers had come up with this supply system.

To reach Ressano Garcia, we had hitched a ride on a Soviet MI-8 helicopter, which the Armed Forces use for rapid troop deployments. It is a 40-minute flight, always skimming the ground, to avoid the guerrilla's missiles. We had been advised not to go by convoy. A short time before, a convoy had been hit by a bazooka attack, resulting in an enormous number of deaths.

When they talk of the destruction of automobiles and convoys, of plundered villages, of arms and legs savagely cut off, of attacks against hospitals and schools, one is made aware of the devastating force of this war, with an incalculable number of casualties and damages amounting to more than \$15 billion; a war that has forced more than a million Mozambicans to live in refugee camps: 75,000 in Tanzania, 800,000 in Malawi, 24,000 in Zambia, 72,000 in Zimbabwe, 38,000 in South Africa, and 15,000 in Swaziland; a war in which no one knows for certain who is fighting whom; a war in which, in addition to Frelimo and Renamo (rivals for 14 years now), there is talk of gangs of "independents," soldiers who have not been reintegrated into civilian life, groups from one side or the other who, because they have not received any wages or supplies, are acting on their own account.

This is a war that causes general bewilderment. There is Esterao, a Mozambican from Tete, who was in a refugee camp in Malawi. When I asked him who was doing the killing, he replied: "Renamo." The next day, when he learned that I was Portuguese, he told me: "Listen, Frelimo is killing people, too. Just last Sunday, they came here and killed peasants, accusing them of giving food to Renamo. Here, everybody is killing everybody."

*** Fund To Support Small Businesses Launched**

90AF0180A Maputo NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 5 May 90 p 8

[Text] A Fund for the Promotion of Small and Medium Business will be launched this year in Mozambique, to support small businesses which the Mozambican Government feels have a relevant role in the development of the national economy. Antonio Branco, minister of industry and energy, made the announcement yesterday in a meeting with representatives of nongovernmental organizations and international agencies in service in our country.

The basic purpose of the Fund for the Promotion of Small Business (FFPI) whose activities were divulged during that meeting, is to develop small industry by providing financial support and incentives to local enterprises that plan to expand small technical industries.

Among other actions, the FFPI will finance studies and projects of local small industries, programs for industrial development in rural areas, and educational programs to foster local incentive regarding innovations; the FFPI will subsidize the financial costs, so that the latter will not create obstacles to the normal development of small businesses that are just getting started.

Speaking at that meeting, Minister Antonio Branco said the Mozambican Government was assigning a prominent role to small industry in the development of the nation's economy.

According to the minister, this priority is reflected in a series of measures that have been approved in recent years, aimed basically to foster the creation of small businesses, with special attention to those which use local resources and whose activity is associated with other development goals in their respective locales.

He noted that in the recent seminar organized by the Bank of Mozambique to divulge the FFPI, the important role played by small and medium companies in the development of business and even economic and social development was stressed.

He explained that many international and nongovernmental organizations have been playing an indisputably significant role in the process of the development of small industry, particularly in the most disadvantaged regions of the country.

According to Antonio Branco, it is the responsibility of the Mozambican Government to create the conditions to make it possible for the international aid to achieve the desired results, by developing the necessary mechanisms so the process may go forward without the bureaucratic red tape that is usually characteristic of government intervention.

The government official noted that the basic purpose of establishing the National Institute for the Development of Local Industry (IDIL) and, more recently, its local offices, was to create the necessary conditions so that the various agencies and institutions involved could work together in a coordinated way to foster small industry.

According to the minister of industry and energy, experience has shown, however, that it is not enough to create an agency for promotion; it must be accompanied by financing mechanisms suited to the needs of the various parties.

These mechanisms, he added, must be adapted to the economic situation of the country. While the economic relevance of the projects must be taken into consideration, he added, the mechanisms should ensure protection for small productive activities whose characteristics and geographic location require it.

*** Thousands of Displaced People Flock to Ile**

90AF0180B Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
5 May 90 p 1

[Text] The locality of Mugulama, in Ile District, Zambezia Province, has been receiving a huge number of displaced people since last December, when the Armed Forces of Mozambique [FAM] liberated them from the armed bandits. By the third week of last month, 30,338

people had flocked to that site, including women, old people, and children, all showing the signs of severe malnutrition.

Since that time, according to a source whom we contacted in the Provincial Emergency Commission, the provincial structures of the party and government in Zambezia have been channeling foodstuffs to Ile to aid the displaced people, who include former captives of the armed bandits and other people coming from Gurue and Alto-Molocue districts.

To restore the health of these people, most of whom look like skeletons, the agencies of the Health Ministry, in cooperation with the nongovernmental agency World Vision, are carrying out a [illegible] program in Mugulama.

The same source told NOTICIAS that Zambezia Province has had a significant increase (4.5 percent) in the number of displaced people since the end of last year. "We now have more than a million people who are suffering from the effects of the war and the natural disasters, most of whom are displaced people," he explained.

Our informant said the major reasons for the growing number of displaced and afflicted people were the FAM operations, which had liberated several zones, and the droughts which have affected the crops in the southern region of Zambezia.

Because of the drought, a poor rice crop is forecast for this agricultural campaign, particularly in Nicoadala, Inhassunge, and Chinde districts and the green belt of Quelimane City.

On the other hand, the prospects are encouraging for the corn and cassava crops in Mocube, Gurue, and Alto-Molocue districts. The same optimism prevails in Morumbia, Ile, Namacurra, Pebane, Mopeia, and Gile districts, but agricultural production will not have an impact on marketing, since the acreage under cultivation has been reduced because of the lack of security.

The Provincial Emergency Commission spokesman reported that, to aid the displaced and afflicted population, the provincial structures have decided to create two logistical centers: one in Quelimane City, to supply southern Zambezia; and the other in Mocuba, to channel food aid to the northern region of the province.

The foodstuffs will be shipped from Quelimane to Mocuba by rail and then transported to the affected areas by highway, instead of using airlifts, because of the high cost of the latter.

The logistical center of Mocuba will channel donations to Ile, Lugeia, and Alto Molocue districts and to the zones of Nampevo, Nipioze, Tebo, and Mugulama.

* Extension of Mavalane Airstrip Concluded

90AF0180C Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
5 May 90 p 8

[Text] The work of renovating and lengthening the main runway at Maputo's National Airport, initiated in 1982, was practically completed in the first quarter of this year. NOTICIAS has learned from engineer Dionisio Minerva, chief of the construction sector of the Aeroportos de Mocambique company, the project was executed by Tamega at a cost of more than 843 million meticals.

The work was done in two separate stages—the extension and then the resurfacing of the runway—and took so long to complete because of the lack of funds and of certain materials.

"In 1948 [as published], work was initiated on construction of the aprons and the renovation of the old runway, extending it by 700 meters. The work was interrupted because of the shortage of asphalt and cement," the engineer said.

The Mavalane Airport's main runway has now been lengthened by 960 meters, from 2,700 meters to 3,660 meters, all resurfaced, with a base of bituminous concrete.

The renovation and extension of the main runway at the Mavalane International Airport makes it easier for planes of various sizes to land, since the pilots no longer have to overwork the braking systems of the planes, which was often the case before these construction works.

The precarious condition of the runway was entailing heavy expense both for Aeroportos de Mocambique and for other companies whose planes customarily set down at our airport, which were spending large sums on airplane tires and other parts that were rapidly being worn out.

* Africare Finances Sofala Agricultural Project

90AF0180D Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
8 May 90 p 3

[Article by Goncalves Gauth]

[Text] People displaced by the war, repatriated refugees, peasants in the family and cooperative sectors, and some farm associations in Sofala Province will begin to benefit this year from a program for agricultural production (using animal traction), with financing granted by "Africare," a private U.S. organization, our correspondent in Beira learned a few days ago.

Africare has made an estimated 23.6 million meticals available for the acquisition of 40 oxen, to create 20 teams.

The project is aimed, in a first phase, to promote [the use of animal traction] by this population and by cooperatives, thus eliminating the problem of the shortage of

machinery and other agricultural equipment needed to prepare the ground for farming.

A source in the rural collectivization service of the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture [DPA] in Sofala told our Beira correspondent that contacts are being made with herdsmen, regarding the training of the animals. In Nhamatanda District, for example, activities are already in an advanced stage; we learned that dozens of displaced people are already being trained to use of animal teams.

In our contacts with individuals covered by the program, at the center in Muda for repatriates from Malawi and Zimbabwe, we learned that the parcels of land that had been allotted to them, in addition to being small, were located in low-lying areas, which means that during the rainy season they will be flooded for two or three weeks.

They also explained that, with the acquisition of these animals for tasks involving traction, many of the communal villagers or displaced people will be able to open up other areas for cultivation or to expand those which they already have.

Yield

Meanwhile, Valdemar George Schwartz, a technical engineer-agronomist employed by the DPA in this province, pointed out that the introduction of this farming technique opens new prospects for expanded production, whatever the crops, both in the family and cooperative sectors and that of the displaced and repatriated people.

Schwartz said the purpose of the program is to enable each peasant covered by it to produce not only his own food, but also a surplus for the market. "This is the only way the displaced peasants are gradually going to get away from relying on foreign aid for food and other articles that they need to start a new life," he stressed.

He noted that the program for agricultural production using animal traction will also solve several other problems of the peasant associations and agricultural cooperatives in Nhamatanda and Buzi, which are struggling with the lack of suitable machinery (tractors) needed for many farm tasks.

According to Schwartz, this type of production [using animal traction] is profitable, because it does not entail large financial outlays, as in the case of other [mechanized] production equipment. Many times, the cooperative members have been obliged to borrow money to rent machinery or buy fuel. "This is one of the reasons why the cooperatives and associations go broke."

Life as a Man

In Nhamatanda District, the activity is being supported by technicians of "Project Nhamatanda," a program for the recovery of agricultural production in that part of Sofala Province. The project covers more than 7,000 families, most of them displaced people or returnees.

NOTICIAS is in possession of other statistics which indicate that the use of animal traction in farming will also contribute to the formation or reactivation of cooperatives or the development of peasant associations in Sofala Province.

The introduction of this system of production will coincide with the process, now in progress in this province, of reorganizing the cooperatives so they will be independent and self-sufficient in every regard (the purchase of tools and materials and payment of the wages of the respective members).

"Purchasing these animals is simply creating the conditions to stimulate agricultural production in this part of the country," the agronomist said.

This aspect has been lauded by members of an association of "Djovo" in the Muda center for repatriates, who said that the "Africare" program will make it possible to solve the financial problems besetting their association.

* French Loan To Benefit Various Sectors

90AF0180E Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
10 May 90 p 3

[Text] On 25 April, the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation, a French financial institution, authorized the concession of three loans, totaling 224 million French francs (\$40 million), to our country for telecommunications projects, improvement of Maputo City's drinking water supply, and reorganization of the urban taxicab service, according to a note which recently reached our desk from that lending institution.

According to the note, it is a large sum, to be shared among three projects. The first loan—102 million French francs—will be spent on the installation of telephone stations in the major regional centers; specifically, Tete, Nacala, Quelimane, Inhambane, and Cuamba. A similar amount will be used to provide technical assistance to Telecommunications of Mozambique in the areas of operations, management, and training.

With respect to the supply of potable water to the Mozambican capital, the document from the French bank notes that 67 million French francs has been made available to enable the Maputo Water Company to treat the waters of the Umbeleze, and for technical assistance in the operation of its facilities.

Regarding the project to reorganize the urban taxicab services, a loan of 55 million francs will be used to acquire 243 light vehicles and 270 Peugeot minibuses, as well as the necessary spare parts to maintain the vehicles.

* RSA Firm Supports Cotton Growing in Buzi

90AF0180F Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
8 May 90 p 3

[Article by Antonio Janeiro, Beira Bureau]

[Text] The Buzi Company of Sofala is taking a further step in its continuing contribution to the current efforts to relaunch the nation's economy. After a dismal period (in which the problems are well known), it resumed sugar production on a large scale and conducted a series of feasibility studies for the recovery of the industrial complex, which involved the dynamization of alcohol production. Now the company has come up with another project: the creation of a joint company in association with a South African concern, which will open the doors to expand the cultivation and production of cotton on a large scale.

From information gathered by a reporter here in our Beira bureau, we learned recently that all the steps have been worked out to relaunch cotton production on land owned by the Buzi Company in this region. It only remains to formalize the mixed company that will carry out this undertaking.

Abdul Amir Jume Molgy, general director of the Buzi agroindustrial complex, advised us of this fact, adding that although all the legal technicalities have not yet been worked out for the formal creation of this joint company for cotton production, "we have agreed that we should go ahead with the preliminary work so that we will be able to meet the established schedule."

The cotton fields that we visited in this district, which will be developed by the Mozambican-South African company to be legally incorporated in the very near future, present good prospects for a yield of 2.5 tons of seed cotton per hectare. (Incidentally, 200 hectares have already been planted in cotton.)

As we observed during our recent visit, after only about two months of work, the plants of the so-called "white gold" are already more than a meter tall and are loaded with the yellow-green flowers, presenting an enchanting picture to anyone who visits there and also presaging a good harvest.

The creation of the joint company for cotton production in Buzi is linked to other actions that have also been planned as part of the strategy for the economic rehabilitation of this manufacturing complex. According to the plan, part of the foreign exchange deriving from the sale of cotton will be channeled to the sugar sector.

We also learned that, within the framework of the agreements, the South African partner guarantees, among other things, to supply seed, fertilizers, and various equipment, in addition to technical personnel. In this first phase, the program already has the benefit of a specialized technician, who informed us that his employer (the joint company) plans to enlarge the cotton acreage to 600 hectares in 1991, and expects to exploit another 100 hectares at short range.

Company-OMM Agreement

In addition to its primary activity (sugar production), the Buzi complex is also engaged in raising cows, goats, and

pigs, all well as small livestock (specifically, rabbits); it also has large areas devoted to rice and vegetables. Through the formation of the joint company with the South Africans, Buzi hopes to relaunch production of the so-called "white gold." After a period in which production failed to reach satisfactory levels, for various reasons, there are now prospects for large-scale production.

In this regard, the general director of the Buzi company told us: "Sometimes we have to become involved in many more things, seeking alternative solutions to our problems, to deal with the reversals that the current times impose on us."

In this way, he gave to understand that the company is making a real effort to achieve economic stability. Many vital projects have already been planned, some of which are already in execution, such as the [cotton project] we are describing here.

Our interviewee stressed that, in view of the results that the company expects to achieve in the current cotton campaign, and in anticipation of future manpower needs, an agreement has been reached between the future joint company and the OMM [Organization of Mozambican Women] in that district. Among other things, the agreement provides that a just wage will be paid to the peasants directly involved in cultivating or harvesting the cotton. The agreement also provides that a special fund will be made available to the OMM in return for its engagement in recruiting other peasants for this work.

The agreement offers important advantages to the parties involved. "On one hand, the OMM and the peasants will receive monetary benefits. The company will benefit from the assurance that the cotton crop will be cultivated and harvested in good time.

"We have the will, the manpower, and the support, and we believe in our abilities," Amir Juma said.

* Fate of Dondo Refugees Worries Authorities

90AF0180G Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
8 May 90 p 3

[Text] Some 24,000 people in Dondo District are surviving on donations. Contacted by NOTICIAS' Beira bureau, Lucas Simao Renco, first secretary of the party and administrator of this city in Sofala Province, said the district authorities are concerned and are doing everything humanly possible to reduce this dependence on donations.

According to the official, these thousands of people in an emergency situation are scattered over five centers created to accommodate them: Macharote, Muanza, Mafarinha, Savane, and Cheringoma. We note that these are the most recent data recorded by the local emergency office.

As in other parts of the country which are experiencing a shortage or complete lack of food and clothing (the case in Ile, in Zambezia Province), the situation of the Dondo

refugees is not, as we say, any "novelty." From what we learned, the quotas that have been shipped to Dondo are not adequate and in some cases (according to the official) "put us in a awkward situation."

With regard to foodstuffs, we learned that the quotas follow certain standards of distribution that do not meet the needs of the people. To make up for their extreme malnutrition in the past, for some families the rations must "now be fairly substantial, if this is possible."

This is now the usual procedure and, according to our source, it is to some extent throwing the normal supply quota off, because, in the state of war and famine that is now convulsing the country, this practice was not taken into consideration in setting the quotas for the distribution of food to the displaced people, either from donations or from the Provincial Department for Prevention of and Combat Against Natural Disasters.

As a result, these refugees are sometime obliged to go for days without eating "something substantial," unless they resort to the familiar "odd jobs" or to relatives—with some means, naturally—with whom they can arrange a more satisfying meal. Humanitarian aid to the displaced people has consisted in the distribution of corn meal, edible oil, beans, clothing, and—rarely—dried fish. H3 'Agriculture Impossible'

According to the administrator, Dondo District has very fertile areas of land, on which it is possible to grow rice, corn, millet, legumes, green, various types of tubers, and many other crops traditionally produced in the region, not to mention fruit trees (mangos, cashews, limes, oranges, avocados, papaya, and others). It happens, however, that there is not enough land currently available for farming to meet the present needs of the people in this area.

The reduced acreage is the result of the war and, as we know, only peace will put us on the road to plenty.

Our Beira bureau correspondent also learned that when the displaced people arrive, the first thing that happens is the "distribution of plots of land (which don't begin to meet the need because they are much too small for such large families) and of means of production."

According to our correspondent, the plots are meant more for subsistence gardening than for the production of food in sufficient quantities to generate a surplus.

"For this reason, there should be no thought of canceling foreign aid to the war refugees, whose situation is in no way stabilized and is a long way from reaching relative abundance, which would make us happy and proud," the official told NOTICIAS.

* Project Launched To Increase Shrimp Production

90AF0180H Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
8 May 90 p 3

[Text] The Fishing Research Institute (IIP) is conducting a pilot project for raising shrimp. Construction of the central station is nearing completion on the Costa do Sol, Maputo City. Fernando Lopes, national coordinator for the program, informed our news staff.

The project for the testing, development and expansion of techniques for catching and raising shrimp will cost about 1,198 million meticals, 68 percent of which has been donated by the UNDP (United Nations Development Program). The FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) is the executor for the United Nations.

Mozambique is contributing 22 percent of the total cost; the responsible agency is the Secretariat of State for Fishing. The Institute for Fishing Research is coordinating the program, under the direction of biologist Fernando Loforte.

According to Loforte, the pilot program encompasses three basic phases and will cover a period of two and one-half years. The first phase, or stage, of the project takes in experimentation and research, including study of the capture of shrimp larvae for raising and adaptation in tanks. The second is personnel training for the project. According to the national coordinator, the necessary personnel will need basic, intermediate and advanced training. Since this is a practically new activity, the intermediate and advanced training can only be obtained abroad.

The last phase is one of extension; i.e., the report of the results of the studies, which will indicate the feasibility of expanding shrimp culture under the present conditions in our country.

We learned that the salt flats have been indicated as suitable locales for the introduction of shrimp culture, in tandem with the production of salt. The locales with higher concentrations of salt are thought to provide the best conditions for the development of the shrimp.

In addition to the central station at the Costa do Sol, where the principal activities will be conducted, a secondary station is under construction in Matola-Rio, which will serve as a holding place for baby shrimp immediately after they are caught.

The Costa do Sol station has about 10 hectares of land devoted to the tanks. Including the buildings, the station occupies a total area of about 15 hectares.

Shrimp culture is considered one of the most promising ways to expand the production and exportation of this shellfish, widely sought after both on the domestic and foreign market.

The project got under way in December 1988 and should be concluded next year.

Namibia

Warning Against Abuse of Reconciliation Policy

MB1406102790 Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN
in English 11 Jun 90 pp 1, 3

[By Jean Sutherland]

[Text] The honeymoon period of freedom and independence was over, and any abuse of the government's policy of national reconciliation—no matter from which side—would not be tolerated.

This was spelled out in no uncertain terms by Namibian President Sam Nujoma when he opened the Children's World Creche and Development Centre in Katutura on Saturday [9 Jun].

President Nujoma said the true meaning of national reconciliation was being misconstrued by people who only concentrated on what suited them. He particularly singled out those who fired workers and told them to 'go and ask Sam Nujoma for employment,' and those who were intimidating and attacking law-abiding citizens.

"There are those who regard this policy (of national reconciliation) as a means to enrich themselves or (on the other hand) as a condition of lawlessness in which to intimidate law-abiding citizens," he elaborated.

"I would like to warn them: The honeymoon of freedom and independence is over," the President emphasized.

"If they want trouble, they will get it from my government. Action will be taken," he said to deafening applause from the large crowd.

President Nujoma said he was particularly concerned by the news coming out of Katutura "especially when those workers who wake up early every morning are disturbed by reckless elements" and were robbed and attacked.

"This government will not tolerate any further intimidation or attacks on citizens in Katutura or anywhere else. If you want trouble you will get it," he warned.

The President said the government regarded national reconciliation as "first and foremost" the redressing of the socio-economic injustices of the past.

"There cannot be genuine national reconciliation while the riches of our country remain in the hands of a privileged few, leaving the vast majority of Namibian people in abject poverty and destitute," he underlined.

Appointments and job allocations had to be done on the basis of colour, Nujoma said. But, he pointed out, in the past the majority of Namibian citizens, including women, had been excluded from participating in economic activities.

"(Now) those who qualify must be brought into the new system."

The President continued that national reconciliation was a process of give and take.

"It is not the spiteful act of firing workers and telling them to ask for employment from Sam Nujoma," he said.

"Yes, we have brought freedom, and while we are prepared to accept and welcome everyone in our country, others should also accept the reality of the new Namibia, of a free Namibia. Change must be accepted."

Turning to accusations made by certain sections of the media that the government was insensitive to the needs of the people and had not done anything to alleviate the wrongs inflicted on Namibians in the past, Nujoma said the new government had barely been in existence for two-and-a-half months.

Was this criticism genuine "or is their aim simply to undermine the welfare of the Namibian people," he asked.

"If national reconciliation is to succeed, we must all undergo cultural change. We must learn to overcome our superiority and inferiority complexes and accept the realities of the new situation."

It was up to everyone to work together towards creating an atmosphere of peace and mutual trust and understanding with a clear vision of reaching the ultimate goal of social justice for all Namibians, President Nujoma said.

It was in the interest of all Namibians that national reconciliation should succeed, "otherwise the consequences will be too ghastly to contemplate," he concluded.

Government Document on Foreign Investment Policy

MB2006151990 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1417 GMT 20 Jun 90

[By Johann van Heerden]

[Text] Windhoek, June 20, SAPA—The Namibian Government on Wednesday [20 June] released broad policy guidelines aimed at stimulating foreign investment in the country, to be incorporated in a formal investment code by the Namibian Parliament. The document says the government does not envisage restrictions, with minor exceptions, on the range of business activities in which foreign investors may be engaged.

"Although joint ventures with local investors will be encouraged, the code itself will not require foreign investors to offer an equity stake either to the state or the Namibian private sector." Natural resources, however, presented a special situation and there may be requirements that the government or a government agency should have a participating share of the equity of a company.

Two categories of foreign investors are foreseen:

—Foreign investors not eligible for, or not seeking the status of approved investment (who will be on a par with local investors), and

—Those holding a certificate of approved investment which fulfills some of the government's overall development objectives.

Guarantees and incentives are being planned to provide security of tenure and title, and free access to foreign exchange to meet essential investor requirements, particularly in the "approved" category. "In the event of expropriation, just compensation will be paid without undue delay."

Disputes between investors and the state about compensation for expropriated assets could be referred to international arbitration. Administration of the investment code would be a function of the Trade and Industry Ministry.

Hamutenya Discusses Accords Signed With U.S.

*MB2006151590 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1342 GMT 20 Jun 90*

[Text] Windhoek, June 20, SAPA—United States President George Bush and President Sam Nujoma of Namibia signed four agreements in Washington on Tuesday [19 June] concerning U.S. technical and economic aid to Namibia, said Information and Broadcasting Minister Mr. Hidipo Hamutenya.

Mr. Nujoma is visiting the U.S. to attend a United Nations-sponsored donors conference starting in New York on Thursday.

Mr. Hamutenya told a media briefing in Windhoek on Wednesday the first agreement provided for preferential duty free status to Namibia which allows for the duty free entry into the U.S.A. of up to 4,100 Namibian products.

Under the investment incentive agreement, the U.S. and Namibian Governments undertake to encourage economic activities in Namibia by private U.S. companies with a view to developing the economic resources and productive capabilities of the country.

"It provides for investment insurances, loans and guarantees which are back[ed] in whole or in part by the credit or public monies of the United States of America and are administered either directly by the government or the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an independent government corporation," Mr. Hamutenya said.

"This is essentially an investment by the U.S. Government, an invitation to American corporations to invest in Namibia with the guarantees provided in this agreement."

The third agreement provides for American Peace Corps volunteers, as requested by Namibia, to offer their

technical assistance in areas such as rural development, electrification of rural areas, health and education.

The special assistance development agreement provides for financial assistance from the U.S. Government for small scale development and would be directed to "activities in which self help is the primary element," Mr. Hamutenya said.

Government Denies Aiding Angola Against UNITA

*MB2106130090 Umtata Capital Radio in English
1200 GMT 21 Jun 90*

[Text] Namibia has denied it is supplying Angolan forces with military bases to launch attacks against UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola].

A Defense Ministry spokesman says there are no Angolan FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] soldiers at Rundu air base on Namibia's northern border with Angola. South African Conservative Party member Koos van der Merwe has claimed that Angolan soldiers were at the base.

The Namibian spokesman says Namibian Defense Force and police members are at the base to conduct border patrols.

Seychelles

*** Palestinian State To Provide Technical Aid**

*34000664 Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION
in English 27 Apr 90 pp 1, 2*

[Text] Seychelles is to receive technical help from the state of Palestine under an agreement signed at National House yesterday.

Though the state of Palestine, proclaimed in 1988, is yet to obtain a territory of its own in land now occupied by Israel, it has many trained cadres working in its own institutions in Arab countries and elsewhere until the day they can return to their homeland as a sovereign nation.

A team of Palestinian doctors and engineers has, for example, been sent to parts of Tanzania struck by floods recently.

Palestinian personnel will now also assist in Seychelles' development efforts, in fields where there is a lack of trained and qualified Seychellois.

The agreement follows a 1981 general accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.

Yesterday's agreement was signed by outgoing Palestinian ambassador Abdul Aziz Abu Goosh and external relations acting director-general Claude Morel.

Speaking after the signing, Mr Morel said Seychelles had always supported the cause of the Palestinian people, and the two governments had always had "cordial" relations.

He hoped the agreement would help bring the two peoples even closer.

Mr Abu Goosh, recalling that cooperation between the two sides started "long ago," said: "We are optimistic now that after you have achieved your victory, we will also achieve ours soon."

He said it was Palestine's duty to cooperate with its friends who were always in the forefront of the international arena in supporting it.

"We are thankful to the Government, the people, the President and the party of Seychelles for their continuous support to our just struggle," he added.

He hoped any future agreements between the two countries would be signed in Jerusalem, which, claimed by Israel as its capital, was currently in "a difficult situation".

However, Palestine would face peace, success and prosperity after the "difficulty".

He also hoped future agreements between the two countries would go beyond the items provided for under the agreement signed yesterday.

A statement from the Ministry of Planning and External Relations described the agreement as an indication of the "strong fraternal" relations between the two countries.

* MAS Accord Helps Capture Japanese Market

34000671A Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION
in English 12 May 90 p 3

[Text] To assist its envisaged Japanese market, Air Seychelles have recently entered into an agreement with Malaysian Airline System (MAS), which will provide space on its regular Tuesday flights from Tokyo to Kuala Lumpur which connects with Air Seychelles schedule flight from Kuala Lumpur to Seychelles.

With the establishment of a new sales agency for the airline in Tokyo, Mr Iwao Inagaki, the new Air Seychelles representative for Japan, who is on his first visit to the Seychelles, has expressed great confidence in the new company being able to send Japanese tourists to the islands.

In its inaugural year of operation, they have targeted for a minimum of 1,500 passengers. He said the majority of these would be honeymoon couples, whom he was sure would find Seychelles the most beautiful of destinations.

Mr Benoiton, the Executive chairman of Air Seychelles, after congratulating Mr Inagaki, said he was extremely happy that this initiative in Japan had finally been

established, and he was also very complimentary to the help given by various members of the Japan Seychelles Association.

* 1989 Central Bank Report Highlighted

34000671B Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION
in English 17 May 90 pp 1,2

[Text] The Seychelles economy operated at "near-boom" conditions in 1989, with the Central Bank estimating a "healthy" growth in real terms that may match, or even exceed, the 7.4 percent growth achieved in 1988.

However, the government budget deficit more than doubled last year, though much of the expected negative effects on the economy seemed to have a neutralised by strong tourism earnings.

Debt payments rose to a record level, but the country closed the year with a 41 percent increase in its foreign exchange reserves.

The Central Bank's review of the 1989 economy notes that tourism and industrial fisheries are now firmly anchored as the primary source of growth in the economy, while the construction sector "enjoyed yet another boom year."

However, with tourism and fishing gathering momentum, "the labour force...has shifted...to these more productive and remunerative sectors to the detriment of the traditional plantation sectors," the Bank points out.

Agricultural output remained depressed in 1989 "to the extent that continued reliance on imports could not be avoided."

In industry, the few available indicators pointed to mixed results.

A preliminary assessment of all available economic indicators "would seem to indicate a level of performance which may have matched the real growth rate of 7.4 percent achieved in 1988, the Bank says.

This rate of expansion has created a situation "redolent of excess demand" in the economy, with the current account deficit widening in 1989 despite the strong growth in tourism receipts.

Furthermore, labour market conditions, especially in tourism, construction and fisheries, reportedly tightened, though inflation was kept at bay and the average index of prices rose by a moderate 1.5 percent.

Being the final year of the 1985-89 National Development Plan, investment by the public sector was strong, says the Bank, with an estimated R160 million - R170 million being spent, mostly on housing, community development, education, fisheries and transport.

Looking at government spending, the Bank says last year's overall deficit of R155 million, two and a half

times that of 1988, "must be viewed as a lapse in the policy of fiscal moderation."

The Bank attributes the widening of the budget deficit to heavy capital spending and a marked growth in certain current payments, including debt servicing.

"Fortunately, the larger 1989 deficit occurred against the backdrop of strong tourism earnings which seemed to have neutralised much of the negative external implications of this adverse development," the Bank says.

"Since the declared aim of the Government is to achieve a balanced or surplus budget in 1991," it adds, "it is expedient that the 1990 budget achieves or exceeds its target.

"Should any slippages arise in the course of 1990, the necessary adjustment to achieve a balanced budget will be more painful and difficult to realise especially if the underlying buoyancy in tourism activity is not sustained."

Despite a widening in the current account deficit also, to R180.8 million, the country's balance of payments registered an overall surplus of R19.2 million, achieved mostly through heavier borrowing abroad.

The year therefore closed with Seychelles' gross reserves at a "respectable" R65.8 million.

The costs of servicing the country's external and domestic debt rose to a record R146.7 million in 1989. Debt servicing amounted to only R82.9 million in 1986, but had risen to R121.5 million by the following year.

Swaziland

Extradition Treaty Signed With Mozambique

MB2206085590 Mbabane THE SWAZI OBSERVER
in English 22 Jun 90 p 1

[By Phinda Zwane]

[Text] Swaziland and Mozambique yesterday signed an extradition treaty at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The treaty was described by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senator George Mamba, as an instrument that will be used by the two neighbouring countries to fight against crime.

The treaty was signed at a meeting of the Joint Commission between Swaziland and Mozambique.

The meeting discussed and made recommendations on illegal immigrants in each country, car smuggling, drugs as well as firearms and livestock smuggling. It was further agreed that security forces should join hands to eliminate the crime of smuggling.

Also present was the Minister of Justice Senator Reginald Dhladhla, and the Attorney General Mr. Majah'nkhaba Ddhlamini.

In his speech, the Mozambican Minister of Security Mr Mariano de Araujo Matsinha, condemned apartheid which, he said, was responsible for the troubles in this region.

"Increased external interference creates problems for our country and Angola. Since independence, the two countries have not enjoyed peace," said Mr. Matsinha.

In his closing remarks, Senator Mamba said the two countries should make thorough use of the treaty to ensure that all criminals are brought to book.

Zambia

President Kaunda Urges West To Support Gorbachev

MB1906184090 Lusaka Domestic Service in English
1800 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] District councils have been directed to revamp their revenue collection system and fire ineffective staff that have failed to bring in money owing to their councils.

Opening the 11th Northern Province conference in Kasama today, President Kaunda said if council workers charged with the task of collecting revenue are not effective, they should be fired because councils should be self-reliant and can only achieve this through running their commercial enterprises efficiently. He said workers who failed to make their grade should be replaced by others ready to take on the challenge.

He noted that successful financial management was the most vital tool in the implementation of Zambia's policy of decentralization, and those working to collect money from a court [words indistinct] should work even harder.

And speaking at the same ceremony Comrade Kaunda expressed concern at the developments in the Soviet Union and called on the western nations to come to the aid of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. He said it is important that the western world should help the Soviet president. Comrade Kaunda said he is convinced that the world needs a Gorbachev, adding that the Soviet leader has showed great desire for world peace in his actions.

Meanwhile, President Kaunda arrived back in Lusaka from Kasama this afternoon. He was met at the Lusaka International Airport by Secretary of State for Defense and Security Alex Shapi and other party officials.

Czechoslovakian Official on Bilateral Relations

MB1506085190 Lusaka Domestic Service in English
0500 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Text] Czechoslovakia Vice Minister Vera Bartoskova has hailed the relations between Zambia and her country and called for continued peace and mutual cooperation. Speaking in an interview with the ZAMBIA NEWS

AGENCY, Mrs. Bartoskova said as a representative of the new Czechoslovakian Government she would strive to extend the good relations that existed between the two countries.

Mrs. Bartoskova, who is on a tour of five southern African countries, said during talks with the minister of foreign affairs, Comrade Luke Mwananshiku, it had been agreed that consultations between the two countries will be held every year.

*** University Departments Closed by Brain Drain**

34000421D Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 30 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by Samuel Ngoma: "Unza Exodus Bites; 2 Brain Drain Hit Sections To Close"]

[Text] Two departments at the University of Zambia (Unza) Great East road campus face imminent closure after losing lecturers to South Africa's bantustans which offer lucrative contracts.

The departments of library studies and sociology have been hardest hit while other Unza faculties need more lecturers.

Unza sources yesterday confirmed that the brain drain has crippled the library studies department and adversely affected operations of other faculties.

At present there were only two or so lecturers manning the department and it was feared one of them was on his way out.

Many Unza lecturers have made their way to either the bantustans or neighbouring Botswana where educational authorities crave for Zambians manpower.

It appears the Unza library department's loss may be Botswana's gain because Gaborone is now looking forward to introducing a degree course in library studies needing a full-scale teaching staff.

Unza only offers diploma courses in both library studies and sociology.

"It's the same old story of deplorable conditions of service which is prompting the exodus and few efforts can stop the lecturers from leaving.

"There is not a single one, I guess, who is on a change of mind course. All seem to be on the move," the source said.

He suspected another department was going to run low on the teaching staff to join the two departments which have already been brain drained.

And Lusaka's Evelyn Hone College is facing a critical shortage of staff, it was learnt yesterday. Five lecturers would resign soon.

Long-standing vice principal Mr Solly Bayat retired recently and the man who was to take his post left, before even trying his new post, for Botswana where he would head a faculty.

The department of journalism is about to lose one lecturer and the college's paramedical department would be losing three lecturers.

Recently, the UNIP [United National Independence Party] Youth League branch of Unza appealed to the Government to improve lecturers' conditions of service to stem the exodus which has so far claimed 124 lecturers since 1984.

Branch chairman Cde Lackson Simokonde said: "We are worried about the time it is taking the Party and its Government to solve this problem and we therefore call for quick action because any further delay will affect the quality of education which in turn affects the quality of graduates from the university."

He pleaded with the Government to offer lecturers conditions of service which could equal those in neighbouring countries.

Cde Simokonde said even contracts as good as those offered by local parastals under Zimco could do.

Last week University of Zambia Students Medical Association president Cde George Sinyangwe complained that doctors graduating half-baked from the medical school were increasing because the teaching staff was in short supply.

Cde Sinyangwe warned that unless Government acted on the matter, the calibre of Zambian doctors would reach the lowest level.

Meanwhile, the Government's objective to fulfil the universal enrollment of seven-year-olds has still remained a pipe-dream because of the increased population growth.

A principal economist for human resources planning department at the National Commission for Development Planning Comrade Stephen Sianga said a good number of children failed to get school places at the required age.

Cde Sianga said in his research paper he presented to population experts in Lusaka recently that the Government as far as 1965 set goals of achieving for all seven-year-olds access to primary education but regretted that such objectives were yet to be fulfilled.

By the year 2000, the number of children in this category would soar to 463,000 and this would call for an increased demand on primary school teachers.

At present Zambia has 27,200 primary school teachers but more teachers would have to be recruited to cope with the workload.

Whatever measures would be taken, they would only yield positive results after 15 years, he said.

*** Poor Roads, Bureaucracy Hinder Relief Effort**

34000418A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 30 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Red Tape Delays Relief Supplies"]

[Text] The Government is experiencing problems in procuring relief supplies for the starving villagers in Eastern Province because of the cumbersome procedure involved in buying maize.

Eastern Province Central Committee Member Cde Maxwell Beyani said leaders had to negotiate with the Eastern Province Cooperative Union (ECU) but the actual authorisation had to come from the Zambia Federation of Cooperatives (ZCF).

But they had managed to get some supplies which were being delivered to the hunger-stricken areas.

Cde Beyani said in an interview yesterday the situation became complex because all the maize had been sold to ZCF which was responsible for storing grain for future use.

ECU bought maize from local farmers in the 1988/89 season and then sold the supplies to ZCF.

The maize was at storage yards within the province but the ECU could not sanction deliveries to starving villagers without the authority of ZCF.

The other difficult was the state of the roads leading to the drought-hit areas.

Cde Beyani said trucks could not be used to take relief supplies to the villagers because of the bad roads. This was made worse by the heavy rains in the area.

From November last year to March this year the famine hit areas could not be reached by trucks because roads became impassable.

Cde Beyani, however, assured that relief supplies would be delivered to the villagers although he could not say how many bags of maize have so far reached the famine victims.

Chama needs 15,000 bags of maize for immediate consumption to save many of the villagers from starvation. About 7,093 families who make up more than 35,465 people have no food and need help.

The other area which needs immediate help was Lumezi which was cut off from major towns because of bad roads and lack of communication.

*** Commentary Urges UNIP Responsiveness**

34000420C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 23 Apr 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] The beauty about the people of Zambia is that they believe in dialogue. When they see that something to better their lives has been done for them by the Government they do not hide their delight and openly praise the leadership.

By the same token when they see that something which with the best of intentions was initially mooted to benefit the ordinary man in the street, goes awry in the course of implementation, they do not hesitate to point out such shortcomings.

And when that happens, we are happy to report, the Party and its Government has always been willing to listen to such constructive criticism, and where possible take remedial steps. That is as it should be. That is, in fact, the very essence of our unique one-party participatory democracy.

And to reaffirm their adherence to the tenets of participatory democracy and the philosophy of Humanism, which places man at the centre of every activity, the Party and its Government recently convened a national convention in Lusaka so that Zambians from a wider spectrum of society could dialogue with the leadership on a wide range of issues.

Results of that fifth national convention can only be said to have been more than encouraging, which is why President Kaunda is now at Kasaba Bay to study some of the resolutions of the deliberations.

So it would be grossly unfair at this stage for anyone to start pointing accusing fingers at the Party for allegedly "ignoring" their so-called bright suggestions on this or that policy. Such critics must learn to be patient, after all Rome was not built in a day.

In any event, Party and Government leaders have not said they will not listen to anybody because they (the leaders) know better what is good for Zambia.

In the same vein, our leaders should not take all criticism levelled at them as a vote-of-no-confidence in them by the people. Nay, they must instead regard such criticism not as "stop signs" but as "indications" that something has gone wrong and must be remedied.

After all UNIP [United National Independence Party] is you, UNIP is people: So Party leaders must be seen to be responsive to the interests of the people at all times.

Zambians who have risen to leadership positions are men and women of high integrity and should live, as President Kaunda has always stressed, above board and must be willing to listen to voices of reason.

We do not like to sermonise, but it would be opportune to refer all Zambians irrespective of their political persuasions to some wise saying in the Bible that: "A gentle answer turns away wrath, but a harsh word stirs up anger."

*** Commentary: Immediate Action Needed on Corruption**

34000421A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 30 Apr 90 p 1

[Editorial: "De-Zambianise, Council Told"]

[Text] Price increases: This is a subject the whole nation worries about. It cannot be ignored. The empty bellies are begging for an answer. When will this question be answered?

This is actually the puzzle of the people in the urban centres. Just where are they going or where is the business community taking them? Prices have been decontrolled. Yes, that is a Government policy. But the Party and its Government has not said the prices should go to Lusaka's Chainama Hospital.

There is nobody talking about the black market because the prices are the same. Through poor service by over-charging, it takes one customer 20 minutes to get any service but the same customer pays heavily for the shoddy service.

Almost all hotels in Zambia have over-employed. They keep the extra people at the expense of the customers. The prices certainly rise to cater for this unnecessary slip up.

The fact that there are a few hotels in Lusaka and other towns in the country means that the customer will pay any cost. The Zambian is thus likely to keep away from the hotels. Is the hotel industry going back to the colonial days?

There is an absence of many Zambians who had been patronising hotels in the country. Today they say they "have been checked out" of the hotels. That is a sad phenomenon coming 25 years after independence. The hotels belonged to Zambians at least in patronage. But this will no longer be the case for many years after 1990.

Hotels are now for the affluent but markets are for both the poor and the rich. But the markets are also turning into places of the rich and no one can pretend that this is not so in Zambia. Many still buy from there.

But who is the person with money in our country today? It is those who are involved in corrupt practices like bribery and tribalism. These are the people surviving today.

The columns of the two national daily newspapers bear testimony to this as day in and day out the headlines scream about poachers, con-men, abusers of public

offices, robbers and petty thieves. The crime rate is on the increase while the majority of law-abiding citizens starve.

The Party and its Government should realise that the leadership code and other measures the Government took about two decades ago to prevent what is happening in 1990 are paper tigers.

We therefore, fear that the "Every one for himself and God for us all" attitude will grip the minds of the majority of Zambians. Driving hard bargains at markets might be a grave excuse. This should be arrested immediately by the Government.

The country should not wait until the situation cannot be controlled.

*** 40 Percent of Child Deaths Due to Malnutrition**

34000421C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Rescue Zambia—Kaunda; Malnutrition Deaths Frightening"]

[Text] Worried by rising malnutrition, President Kaunda yesterday appealed to donors to support Zambia's restructuring programme and rescue thousands of people trapped in poverty.

Addressing a news conference at State House, the President disclosed that child mortality had assumed alarming proportions with malnutrition accounting for 40.6 percent of all child deaths.

Minister of Finance and Planning Cde Gibson Chigaga is in Paris with a team of Zambian experts attending a consultative group meeting with donors chaired by the World Bank and the IMF is also present.

Cde Kaunda hoped Cde Chigaga's team would meet with favourable donor response to Zambia's programme. The meeting began on April 9 and is expected to end today.

Senior permanent secretary at the finance ministry Cde Leonard Nkhata had told the *TIMES* before the team departed that Zambia would ask for debt relief, balance of payment support and priority projects support to include health services.

Sounding concern on the rising death toll from malnutrition, Cde Kaunda said; "Malnutrition beats even malaria. The economy is a real problem. We hope all donor countries will look sympathetically at our programme. Until this programme is through suffering will continue."

"Government coffers could no longer stand the burden of free social services like education and medical facilities," he said.

"It is not that the Party has lost sympathy for the poor but the Government has no funds," he said.

A Central Statistical report put Zambia's galloping inflation rate at 122 per cent at the end of last year because of the price decontrols and devaluation of the Kwacha which squeezed the lowly paid further.

Standing at 59.2 per cent some time last year, Zambia's inflation rate was reported to have been the highest in the SADCC [South African Development Coordination Conference] region, according to the organisation's annual report.

The Party and Government leadership is worried about the suffering of the poor, the President said.

He had instructed a parastatal to bring in a high-powered team of consultants from the United States to study the working conditions of medical personnel at the University Teaching Hospital.

He hopes to meet the team next month. Cabinet is currently handling the matter, he added.

Government realised that a lot more is needed to be done than merely raising perks for professionals, especially doctors.

"Professionals also want job satisfaction. Part of our programme is to give them that job satisfaction," he said.

Cabinet is still making final touches to the proposed conditions of service for civil servants which will then be tabled before the four public service unions by a Government negotiating team.

Last week, Civil Servants Union of Zambia [CSUZ] general secretary Cde Alec Chirwa said his union would press for better perks because of the rising inflation.

The CSUZ has asked its 70 branches around the country to make submissions on what they would like to see in their conditions of service.

President Kaunda who flew to Kasaba Bay later told workers in the tourism sector to continue working hard because the industry had a major role to play in Zambia's economic recovery, Zana reports.

Addressing an airport crowd which welcomed him at the beginning of a two-week holiday, Cde Kaunda said the country's potential in tourism was so great that "we have not yet began to exploit it."

"If you receive the tourists well, they will come back but if you do not, they will not come back and Zambia will be a loser," he told workers to Circuit Safaris which manages Kasaba Bay lodge.

On agriculture, Cde Kaunda said there was an important need to diversify the cropping base to reduce the risk inherent in the weather in the event of drought or a lot of rain.

President Kaunda said he was happy to note that they would not face any famine despite drought which affected the area in January because people had planted enough cassava.

"It is important everywhere in Zambia that people do not grow one crop. We must also grow our own traditional crops," the President said.

President Kaunda said areas like the Copperbelt had a fair potential to grow sorghum while Northern and North-Western provinces could also grow millet alongside maize.

*** Copperbelt Mealie Meal Shortage; Exports Stop**

*34000418B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 25 Apr 90 p 1*

[Article by Simon Mwanza: "Halt Mealie Meal Exports, Jamas Told"]

[Text] Kitwe-based Jamas Milling Company has been ordered to stop exporting mealie meal to Zaire to end the present shortage which the district has experienced in the past few weeks.

Senior governor Cde Peter Lishika said he had information Jamas was exporting mealie meal for foreign exchange to set up an oil extracting plant.

Addressing the first district contingency planning committee yesterday at the civic centre to discuss among other things the mealie meal shortage and distribution of essential commodities, Cde Lishika said:

"Jamas should immediately stop its exports. I think this has contributed to the shortage which the district has been experiencing lately.

"The company should not create unnecessary problems," he added.

Other sources told the TIMES OF ZAMBIA that Jamas had already been paid about \$437,682.80 by Zairean importers and were currently taking mealie meal to that country to fulfil its contract.

"Jamas has already been paid the money and it is not possible to breach the contract now. This is the truth of the issue," the source said.

At the meeting which Jamas officials were conspicuously absent, Cde Lishika castigated the committee for its poor performance, saying if it met regularly, the shortage could not have arisen.

He said that last year the committee performed badly because of the failure to form quorums because most of the members absented themselves.

Meanwhile, the Government has launched investigations into the mealie meal shortage that only has affected the Copperbelt.

Commerce and Industry Minister of State Cde Chrispin Sibetta said in Lusaka yesterday the Ministry had sent deputy permanent secretary Cde Justin Zulu to the province because it had discovered that the shortage was not nationwide.

"I have asked him to study the situation and come back to me quickly. According to information we have, it is only Kitwe and Mufulira that are experiencing shortages. The rest of the province has mealie meal supplies."

The National Savings and Credit Bank management has refused to comment on charges.

*** Questions Surround Mealie Meal Shortage**

34000418C Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 24 Apr 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Mealie meal is not only the staple food item in Zambia but it is also a strategic commodity whose common and easy availability nation-wide is crucial to assure political, social and economic security.

The production and supply of this commodity should not be a play matter as past experience has proved. The Party and its Government recognises this fact and that is why mealie meal is now the only item whose price is controlled.

Not only that for mealie is the sole commodity which the State subsidises heavily through the coupon system in which families whose incomes don't reach a certain level can virtually feed on the taxpayer.

Having recognised that importance how come then there are grumbings, stampedes and unwarranted talk about mealie meal in sensitive areas like the Copperbelt, more especially in big cities like Kitwe and Ndola?

There is a vicious circle for sure. Everybody denies causing the shortage and in turn blames everybody else thus rendering the argument controversial but logically invalid.

The Copperbelt Cooperative Union says its maize stocks have quadrupled over last year's; the millers claim they are producing over normal capacity and they are not exporting to Zaire but the shopkeepers of NIEC [National Import Export Corporation] Stores, ZCBC and the lot allege that supply is erratic.

The cycle goes on. If as Copperbelt Central Committee Member Cde Rankin Sikasula said recently shortage of transport to distribute mealie meal is the cause of the shortage why is it that milling plant warehouses are not full or why shouldn't shop owners and consumers be allowed to obtain their requirements from source?

As if that were not enough yesterday Kitwe senior governor Cde Peter Lishika accused the National Savings and Credit Bank of worsening the problem by not cashing traders' coupons in time to allow them to buy fresh supplies quickly.

What has really gone wrong? Perhaps what Copperbelt programme coordinator Cde Shiyenge Kapini said about people selected to run "special shops" to serve coupon holders in the townships not doing so buttresses Cde Lishika's point about the bank's failure.

Given the above factors and explanations the main question remains: Where is the mealie meal ending up then?

It is against this scenario that we ask Cde Sikasula to convene his governors and other relevant arms of the Party and its Government to a brain-storming meeting to find not only the causes and effects but also a lasting solution of the crisis.

*** Poor Roads Stall Maize Collection in Mbala**

34000418D Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 9 Apr 90 p 9

[Article: "Maize Still Uncollected"]

[Text] More than 60,000 bags of maize in Mbala have not yet been collected from various centres because of bad roads.

Mbala is one of the major maize production centres in Northern Province but because of bad feeder roads that have not been maintained transporters are shunning the area and the produce is still marooned.

In an interview yesterday, area member of Parliament Cde Lightwell Sibale said despite repeated appeals to the Government there has been no response.

"There is no maize at the local grinding mill either. The Northern Cooperative Union is supposed to collect maize from production centres but because feeder roads have not been graded, transporters do not want to risk by deploying their vehicles on such roads", Cde Sibale said.

He said the district council has the money for the maintenance of feeder roads but faces a critical shortage of manpower to operate the graders.

He referred to a meeting where it was agreed that provincial engineers help grade the road network, but nothing has been done about it.

"I cannot even remember the last time the roads were graded. The money for grading the roads was paid last year by the district council but I think the problem lies with the provincial leadership who have the graders.

"The council has the money but has no manpower. They have to plead to the provincial leadership who have the machinery," Cde Sibale said.

He said that the local leadership was aware of the marooned 60,000 bags of maize.

He appealed for the grading of the road linking Mbala and Nakonde which is supposed to be a shorter connection to Mpulungu port.

He said instead of transporting the export through the shorter route truckers are forced to use the Dar es Salaam, Mpika, Kasama, Mbala and Mpulungu road.

He expressed fear that if the road is not properly maintained, the purpose of establishing a port at Mpulungu will not bear fruit.

"If this road was attended to, it would help save some little money which is being wasted by using this longer route. The road is no more a local road because it caters for international transporters," he said.

Meanwhile, impassable roads, inadequate transport and swept away bridges have cut Lumezi in Eastern Province from "civilisation", Lumezi MP [Member of Parliament] Cde Leticia Mwanza said in Lusaka yesterday.

Workers walked more than 300 kilometres to the boma to get their salaries and sometimes did not get paid for more than six months.

"They get their salaries only when one teacher volunteers to walk to get the money from Lundazi," she said.

The impassable roads have made it impossible for the scheduled ward elections at the end of the month to take place, but would instead be carried out in May when the roads were more accessible.

"The Government and the Lundazi district governor decided that the elections in the valley should take place in May when the roads are dry..."

She also said that since drugs were not available in the area, which has only one clinic at the chief's palace, alternative arrangements were being made to have drugs supplied by the Flying Doctor Service.

Cde Mwanza said the situation was very serious and there was virtually nothing that she could do on her own without assistance from donor agencies and the Government.

The people in Lumezi, she added, felt neglected by the Government because they receive no assistance.

Roads could not be graded because the only two council graders available had broken down and spare parts could not be found.

Cde Mwanza has appealed to Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) who have some mines along the Luangwa valley to assist in providing machinery to repair the roads.

* Cuban Assistance Requested for Agriculture

34000419A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 23 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Help Us, Cuba Urged"]

[Text] Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke has called on Cuba to extend its aid to the agricultural sector and other economic spheres.

Cde Masheke was speaking during a dinner hosted for the Cuban vice-president Cde Juan Almeida Bosque on Saturday at Hotel Inter-Continental.

He said the Cubans did a commendable job in assisting Zambia in the medical field and in providing scholarships in various fields. The number of Cuban doctors deployed in Zambia was now 170.

Cde Masheke said the doctors have helped the Zambian people a great deal especially in rural areas. He was hopeful in the "near future, the cooperation will spread to other fields such as agriculture and other industries".

Cde Bosque said Cuba would continue fighting for the total emancipation of the South Africans and other oppressed people in the region.

He commended President Kaunda for his significant role in the fight for peace in the region.

* Romania Moves To Cancel Scholarships

34000419B Lusaka *SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 29 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by Kondwani Chirambo: "2 Students Sent Back"]

[Text] Two Zambian students have been sent back home from Romania and more from other Eastern European countries may follow as the links established between the fading communist parties and UNIP [United National Independence Party] are being swept aside in the time of change.

Some Eastern European countries are contemplating cancelling scholarships awarded to Third World countries by the "dead or dying" communist parties and only foreign students on government scholarships might survive.

The charge d'affaires at the Romanian embassy in Lusaka Mr Ion Vasilui confirmed his country had cancelled the scholarships for two students studying journalism because the Communist party "is no more".

They were sent to that country on agreement between UNIP and the Communist party and so the interim government could not honour them. Three students on government scholarships have been allowed to continue with their studies.

Mr Vasilui said the two Zambian students from Romania had been transferred to the University of Zambia to complete their journalism courses.

And deputy head of the Czechoslovakia mission in Zambia Mr Zdenek Dobias doubted the Communist party in his country would be able to afford all the scholarships it awarded to foreign countries.

The Communist party's financial standing was believed to be poor and it had been fragmented by breakaway groups. Some former members have joined the Social Democratic parties, he said.

Czechoslovakia had offered ten party scholarships and four at governmental level to Zambia. An estimated 2,000-plus scholarships were dished out to other countries around the world, said Mr Dobias. But he said students studying on party scholarships were likely to be covered by government sponsorship.

"It is very unlikely that the Communist party will have enough funds to maintain the scholarships," he said.

"The government is legally not obliged to follow the scholarship programme because the agreement between UNIP and the Communist party expired two years ago."

Czechoslovakia is being led by an interim Civic forum of president Vaclav Havel awaiting elections in June to be contested by some 80 parties including the Communist party.

Grants for foreign scholarships were given by the Communist party according to political ties. Ethiopia which was strongly communist inclined received some 40 scholarships, he said.

He expected the number of scholarships to rise in future because some of the new parties would establish their own links with developing countries.

Some socialist-oriented parties might decide to link up with UNIP.

The offices of the Communist party have been turned into schools and many supporters have deserted the party, said Mr Dobias.

The question of scholarships might be clearer after the May elections.

Lessons for many foreign students in Romania were disrupted by the uprising that overthrew strongman Nicolae Ceausescu and was executed by firing squad with his wife on December 25, 1989.

*** Britain To Provide Grant for Essential Imports**

34000419C Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 10 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Britain To Give Zambia 30m Pounds Sterling"]

[Text] Britain has pledged a 30 million pounds sterling grant to Zambia for essential imports required to implement the 1990 reform programme that Zambia has agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A British high commission spokesman announced in Lusaka yesterday that the pledge would be made at Zambia's consultative group meeting scheduled to have begun in Paris, France, yesterday and ends tomorrow.

British minister for overseas development Linda Chalker made the announcement of the pledge.

Britain is also willing to reschedule 12.85 million pounds sterling (about K 840 million) of repayments which were due to be paid by Zambia in 1990 and 1991.

The measures announced by Mrs Chalker were in addition to the ongoing technical cooperation programme which last year amounted to 14 million pounds sterling (approximately K 938 million).

Mrs Chalker added that Zambia was an important country in Africa with which Britain had valuable and long standing historical links.

Zambia had made important progress recently towards financial stabilisation of the economy as a basis for economic recovery and restructuring.

Zambia's economic recovery and restructuring was for the good of the whole region, the statement said.

Britain will support Zambia's restructuring efforts provided such efforts were maintained and as long as the other donors played their full part to ensure that the aid gap was filled.

Zambia needed all the help that the donor community could give and certainly that was far more than Britain alone could provide.

Outgoing British high commissioner Mr John Wilson said at a farewell luncheon that Britain rendered financial support to Zambia because she had great confidence in the country.

Mr Wilson said Britain was impressed with Zambia's efforts towards its economic recovery programme. But its efforts could not bear much fruit without other donor agencies rendering assistance.

Britain would continue assisting Zambia to improve the country's general financial position, education and health. The country would also continue providing expatriate labour in areas where Zambia did not have skilled staff.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Cde Luke Mwananshiku said at the same function that the bilateral relationship should be consolidated.

Cde Mwananshiku said the nation appreciated Britain's efforts in helping Zambia in the agricultural, education and health sectors.

Cde Mwananshiku said Britain should rally behind the international community in pressing South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies.

He said the two countries wanted to end apartheid but they differed in their approaches.

Mr Wilson who called President Kaunda the "conciliator" said the changes taking place in South Africa should be attributed to him.

* Different Aid Rules for Bloc, Third World Hit

34000420A Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] The majority of developing countries prefer to improve their economies through the use of local resources. That is, however, their wish but determination is usually lacking.

They prefer the easy way out—to buy goods produced in developed countries. Demand for such goods is high in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Prices for such goods are high and so developing countries must find money to buy these goods. The answer lies in getting financial aid from the US, Japan or Europe.

Today it is becoming increasingly clear that whoever said "there is no aid without strings" was correct after all. The only difference is the thickness or length of the rope. Now there is also the question of colour.

Western countries poured money into Eastern European countries following their apparent rejection of communism. But this aid was given and is still being given without conditions. It was just a question of capitalism defeating communism without a single shot.

As President Kaunda pointed out last week no one ever asked the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe to adopt the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plans before being given aid. The President said he saw a bit of racism in the rush to the East.

This sudden change of attitude by Western countries should not alarm developing countries. But it should warn them against depending heavily on foreign aid. It is actually a retrogressive step.

IMF conditions are harsh but many developing countries have no choice but to borrow money from this organisation. Is there any light at the end of the tunnel for the majority of developing countries? It is doubtful if there is a heavy reliance on IMF loans.

It will in fact not be surprising if Eastern European countries do not develop fast using raw materials from African countries. But Africa should remain awake and

vigilant although the going is tough. There are still some friendly countries which want the economies of countries like Zambia to improve.

One such country is Japan which has been Zambia's all weather friend. She has not hesitated to come to Zambia's aid when requested. We therefore hope the outgoing Japanese ambassador to Zambia Mr Toshio Saiki will deliver to his government the appeal made by the Party Secretary-General Cde Grey Zulu that Zambia should not be denied aid.

The most important point is that developing countries should rely on their own resources for development. Borrowed money and borrowed manpower are not the answer.

* More Defections From Civil Servants Union

34000422C Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 23 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "More Plan To Ditch Union"]

[Text] About 3,000 agricultural officers are set to ditch the embattled Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ), and medics have announced plans to form their own union.

The *TIMES* learnt at the weekend that medics have been pressing for a hearing with the Ministries of Health and Labour, Social Development and Culture.

Fed up with the imbalance in representation by CSUZ, chairman of the organising committee for Lusaka's medics Cde Edgar Munakeembe and chairman of the Agricultural Technical Staff Association of Zambia Cde Patrick Simuchimba said in separate interviews, they were definitely "ditching the motherbody."

"If the teachers can have their own union which understands all their professional problems, why can't we?" asked Cde Munakeembe.

And Cde Simuchimba, said "we need to speak the same language, like the teachers do. I am advocating the formation of separate unions in each ministry which will properly look at the grievances of workers. At the moment the so-called branches are doing nothing."

Despite the "tactics" by CSUZ of allegedly keeping forms away from medics and agro workers who want to formalise their withdrawal from the union the rebels still insist on the duplication of new forms, said Cde Munakeembe.

Cde Simuchimba, quoting the Industrial Relations Act, said in fact, one could legally leave the union by merely informing his employer in writing and sending a copy of his letter to the union so that union subscriptions are stopped.

"We can do it individually, if we can't do it collectively, and it will be legal. But the Government must repeal the

1985 law which says one industry must have one union. It has caused a lot of hardships," he said.

*** Labor Leader: Councils Corrupt, Inefficient**

34000421B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 11 Apr 90 p 9

[Article: "De-Zambianise, Council Told"]

[Text] A top labour leader yesterday told off district councils for their failure to deliver the goods and called for the de-Zambianisation of key posts in these institutions to curb the suffering because of lack of services.

Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) former chairman Cde Benedicto Chikoti said he did not see any justification or any reason why district councils should not be de-Zambianised as well when the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) which at least tried under black governors was de-Zambianised.

Cde Chikoti who is a special advisor to ZUFIAW said this yesterday when he opened a three-day seminar being attended by the union's branch officials from all financial institutions including banks based in Ndola.

He said workers should not keep quiet but should speak out publicly so that they could receive what they deserved.

"Haven't councils failed us, if anything councils are not only the worst but have committed bigger sins than the black governors at BOZ?" Cde Chikoti asked.

He said when the labour movement spoke out against the introduction of decentralisation of the local government administration he was victimised for allegedly inciting people on the Copperbelt while other top labour leaders were detained.

"But if you look at these councils today they have not only failed to provide services to the people but even vicious projects are being conducted and financed by foreign international organisations while councils continue to mismanage the people's funds," Cde Chikoti said.

He said a lot of social amenities which people used to enjoy and took for granted during the colonial era such as abundant clean water, tarred roads and street lights were no longer there.

He said today townships were being built without provisions for water or roads. Repairing of houses or spraying of insecticides in houses to destroy cockroaches was unheard of.

He said during the struggle for independence the attitude of Zambians was that some of the social amenities were missing in their localities because they were black and this drove them to tears.

"We want to see these tears again because there are no roads and no water in Pamodzi and many other areas," Cde Chikoti said.

He said councils were failing to provide services despite the increased rates, rents, and taxes that people pay because of the gross financial indiscipline existing in these institutions and also because the lion's share of councils' coffers were used on maintaining governors and other Party functionaries.

"We have lost direction as a nation because discipline is lacking from top to bottom", Cde Chikoti said.

He said financial mismanagement in councils is so rife that even if the Lusaka Urban council for instance was given the whole annual allocation of New York City and Ndola was given the same allocation given to London and Kitwe received Moscow's annual allocation, these three local authorities would have no money within two days.

He said the Government should seriously consider bringing in experts from Scandinavian countries who have managed to run their affairs well.

Cde Chikoti said the current district councils' top executives who include district chairman, district executive secretary, financial secretary and their development secretaries who were formerly known as chief city engineers have lamentably failed to perform their duties.

*** Minister Defends Two-Tier Exchange Rate**

34000422B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: 'Forex' Measures Saved Economy; Worse Things Were To Come—Chigaga"]

[Text] The nation would have ground to a halt had the Government not acted to raise foreign exchange from sources other than copper exports, Finance and Planning Minister Cde Gibson Chigaga told Parliament.

He said this during the debate on his ministerial statement on the two-tier foreign exchange system prompted by a point of order raised on March 28 by Msanzala MP [Member of Parliament] Mr Levison Mumba.

In a session interrupted by frequent points of order, Masaiti MP Mr George Mpombo asked if it was now Government policy to embark on "unpopular and corrosive" measures to revive the economy, to which the minister replied that the country was doomed to worse economic problems.

It was better for the Government to have done what it did when there was still some foreign exchange coming in from the mining of copper.

If that was not done, a time would have come when Zambia would have had no fuel, no agricultural inputs and life would then grind to a standstill.

Asked by Ndola MP Mr Victor Konie if Government was considering pegging salaries to the US dollar, Mr Chigaga said the Kwacha was legal tender in Zambia.

Lukulu MP Mr Alexis Luhila asked the minister to confirm that all measures being undertaken were pursued "with much pressure" from the IMF.

Mr Chigaga said that was not correct and said copper production was falling while its prices on the world market were unpredictable.

In his answer to the point of order by Mr Mumba, Mr Chigaga said the policy of charging duty on the basis of \$1 to K40 was not irrational but logical and desirable.

Before the dual foreign exchange rate system, Zambia maintained a highly over-valued exchange rate, subsidising imports and discouraging exports which worked against the objectives of diversifying the export base and growth in non-traditional exports.

"In addition, the over-valued exchange rate was inhibiting efforts of import substitution as imports were relatively cheaper than locally produced goods."

Inflation reached 122.5 percent at the end of last December compared to 5.7 percent of Zambia's trading partners.

The present exchange rate was adopted to save the economy though it was not completely offering competitiveness and profitability to Zambia's exporters.

The Government was however not only considering to the market exchange rate to boost export but needed a tight fiscal policy to check inflationary pressures such as to lower production costs of goods and make exports more competitive on the world market.

*** Zulu Terms Multiparty Advocates 'Frustrated'**

34000420B Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Multi-Party Advocates Branded 'Frustrated'"]

[Text] Party Secretary General Cde Grey Zulu has described people advocating a multi-party system in Zambia as "frustrated individuals."

People calling for a multi-party system were either frustrated or were at one time disciplined by the Party and have a grudge they wished to settle.

They want to bring chaos and disunity in the nation, he said.

Cde Zulu was speaking in Kabwe, when hundreds of Kabwe residents met him at Mulungushi motel on his way to the President's Citizenship College to meet district governors taking part in the political educators' seminar.

The Party chief dismissed sentiments that a one-party system was responsible for the current economic malaise pointing out that even countries with multi-party systems had similar problems.

"Countries in Europe and America with many political parties are going through the same economic problems we have. In fact, America has the highest debt in the world," he said.

However, the Party leadership was studying the claim to have a multi-party system, he added.

"We have left it open if we think the multi-party system would bring peace and unity then we will change," Cde Zulu told the audience which included Central Province Member of the Central Committee Cde Alina Nyikosa, provincial political secretary Cde Eunice Phiri and permanent secretary Cde Khama Maimbo.

During the days Zambia had many political parties, the Party chief observed, fightings and killings were the order of the day but since the introduction of a one-party State in 1973, such calamities ended.

He urged people to remain united so that unscrupulous people intending to bring disunity in Zambia should fail to sway them.

Addressing participants attending the political educators' seminar, Cde Zulu said the Party was concerned at the lack of cadres to defend its ideology and policies from unwarranted criticism.

Cde Zulu said he was worried about the future because there were few people who could defend the Party's philosophy of Humanism and its policies.

"My worry is that we have few people who can defend the Party's philosophy of Humanism and policies from attackers some of whom have got money and imported ideas from their masters."

He said the Party had launched an educational programme to ensure political leaders were equipped with the necessary knowledge to defend the people.

He said the Party leadership had great responsibilities placed on them by the people —Zana

*** Single Party Defended; Japanese Support Cited**

34000419D Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 12 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Do Not Hold Back Aid to Zambia, Appeals Zulu"]

[Text] The party has appealed to Western countries not to curtail their aid to Zambia because of her advocacy for a single party state since the system was suitable for rapid development.

Describing the issue as "hot", the Party Secretary-General Cde Grey Zulu said in Lusaka yesterday though

a one-party type of democracy was in some cases not a solution to problems, the situation was different for Zambia because the system has accelerated development.

He told the out-going Japanese ambassador Mr Toshio Saiki who called on him at Freedom House that it was important that donor countries understood issues in their proper perspective.

"We agree that one-party state cannot always guarantee democracy but it depends on its suitability on the country in which the system is applied," the Party chief said, adding that not all multi-party governments were good.

There were some multi-party and single-party states that were oppressive and Zambia did subscribe to any of them.

Cde Zulu told the envoy that Zambia was not ready to switch to a multi-party state because this would bring much suffering through clashes by supporters of rival parties.

Perhaps in the future there would be need to go multi-party, he hinted.

On Japan, he said the two countries enjoyed excellent relations and hoped the links would further be strengthened.

The Japanese people's spirit of hard work had earned them great respect all over the world. And Zambia has benefited much from Japan's aid.

In reply, Mr Saiki said during his two-and-half years stay in Zambia he had signed 13 agreements—a reflection of total commitment to development projects in the country.

Japan was aware of the numerous economic difficulties Zambia was going through but there was hope the nation would pull through.

He described Zambia as a peace-loving nation.

*** Kaunda Considers Defeated Constitutional Change**

34000420D Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Bill Seeks Not To Wrest Power, Says KK"]

[Text] President Kaunda has said there is no subtle attempt by the Party and its Government to wrestle power from the people through the Constitutional (amendment) Bill defeated in Parliament last week.

Defending the Bill which seeks to effect changes to the Republican constitution, President Kaunda told a Press conference at State House there was nothing "strange" about it.

Among other things, the Bill sought to incorporate changes arising from the new constitution of the Party. Clause three sought to amend the constitution by repealing article 39 so that the President would not continue in office as Republic President if not elected President of the Party at the Congress.

Clause four sought to amend article 42 so that the Secretary-General could act as President of the Republic when the President ceased to hold office by not being elected President of the Party by the Congress.

Other proposed amendments sought to empower the committee of chairmen to adopt candidates for parliamentary elections instead of the Central Committee as at present.

The frontbench failed to raise the required two-thirds majority to effect the changes.

President Kaunda said he would study "the fears" of the backbenchers and see if "they are genuine" while on holiday at Kasaba Bay.

The Party and its Government would explain "a little better" what the implications of the proposed changes were it would try to convince doubting backbenchers that its intentions were not sinister.

"No one in the Party and its government is planning to take away power from people," he stressed.

The heated debate in Parliament over the bill culminated in a victory for the backbenchers who charged that it would wrest power from the people and limit it to the few.

On the multi-party system, Cde Kaunda said Zambians had a right to speak out.

At Kasaba Bay he would assess the basis of resolutions of the National Convention and pass over a paper for the National Council scheduled for September for a final decision.

He appealed to the defence and security personnel not to fall prey to enticements to destabilise Zambia.

"Look out, men of the armed forces, this is the time you will get offers to do the wrong things. When the going gets tough, the temptations grow both in size and speed," he warned.

Cde Kaunda was convinced the forces were backing "the people's revolution."

There will be no massive retirement of leaders despite the introduction of an attractive retirement scheme for them.

"Leaders are preparing for retirement but would do it one by one, two by two...." he said.

*** Kaunda: State Gives Guidelines, Not Censorship**

34000422A Lusaka *THE TIMES OF ZAMBIA*
in English 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Article: "Report Facts and Stick to Truth"]

[Text] President Kaunda has called for factual and responsible reporting saying off-target writing can tear the nation apart.

He told a Press conference at State House: "If you write to destroy, all of us will have to run, including Pressmen."

The Party and its Government would continue to uphold the freedom of the Press with all confidence but he expected the media to reflect the truth.

"It is true the majority of the mass media are Party and Government-owned but we want to have confidence in you fellows. Nobody is saying do not write the truth," he said.

The creation of the National Media Corporation [Nameco] and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation [ZNBC] did not mean the media would be controlled, he said.

The Government and its Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services does not control the media but merely gives guidelines.

Alluding to an opinion carried by the *TIMES* last November 2, the President said: "You cannot write about Eastern Europe and say what has happened there will happen here. You write the truth. But there is no truth in saying the Government will be overthrown tomorrow."

Visibly annoyed Dr Kaunda asked: "Where else can you write such nonsense and not end up in jail?"

He called on journalists to write with the interest of the nation at heart. "What we are saying is: Be responsible. If you don't believe in this revolution, resign and let others who believe in it get hold of the mass media.

"We are very free in touch, word and deed. Very free indeed, write to build and not destroy. Otherwise none of us will be here in peace but in pieces."

Zimbabwe**PLO's Harare Envoy Comments on U.S. Action**

MB2106144090 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1413 GMT
21 Jun 90

[Text] Harare, June 21, SAPA—The Palestinian Liberation Organisation's representative in Zimbabwe, Mr. Ali Halimeh [name as received], said on Thursday [21 June] that the United States' decision to suspend dialogue with his organisation was a victory for the PLO.

"We are not going to lose anything," he told ZIANA news agency. However, he said the decision could complicate peace efforts in the Middle East.

On Wednesday President George Bush said Washington was suspending its 18-month dialogue with the PLO because of the refusal of PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to condemn a Palestinian guerrilla raid on the Israeli coast on May 30.

Mr. Halimeh said the decision would only encourage Israel to further suppress the Palestinians in the occupied territories and increase its aggression.

"I feel this decision will complicate and frustrate peace efforts in the Middle East. The Americans are not being genuine but trying to neutralise the PLO to give the Israelis time to crush the intifadah (popular uprising)," he said.

He blamed the United States for being one-sided and said the 18-month dialogue did not have any practical effect.

*** Crop Producer Price Changes Announced**

34000729A Harare *THE HERALD* in English
26 Apr 90 pp 1, 7

[Text] Producer prices for white maize, white sorghum, wheat and oilseeds have gone up by between 4.61 percent and 26.5 percent while prices for small grains remain static and the yellow maize price was cut.

Beef producers have been awarded a 10 percent price increase while the producer price of milk goes up by 2-1/2c a litre.

The producer price increase for milk is with immediate effect, beef prices have been backdated to 1 March 1990, while that for wheat is with effect from 1 October this year. Other prices have been backdated to 1 April 1990.

The producer price for white maize Grade A goes up from \$215 a tonne to \$225 a tonne and yellow maize goes down from \$215 to \$191 a tonne. The producer price for wheat has been increased from \$400 a tonne to \$460.

Soyabean Grade B goes up by \$50 to \$485 a tonne, sunflowers rise from \$455 to \$505 a tonne while groundnuts increase by 25 percent to \$1,250 a tonne.

Cotton goes up from 92.5c/kg for Grade A to 117c/kg, the highest increase of 26.5 percent. The new producer price for cotton is an increase of 17c/kg on the pre-planting price announced last year of \$1/kg.

White sorghum Grade A is the only small grain whose price has been increased, from \$215 to \$225 a tonne. Red sorghum Grade A remains at \$180, mhunga at \$250 and rapoko at \$300 a tonne.

Announcing the new producer prices at a Press conference in Harare yesterday the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Cde Witness Mangwende, said the prices were arrived at after recommendations and detailed discussions with the leaders of the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union [ZNFU] and the Commercial Farmers' Union [CFU].

"In coming to its decisions, the Government has taken fully into account the wide range of factors which are involved. These factors include in particular the current financial position of the farming community and the supply and demand situation, on both domestic and export markets, for each of the controlled products.

"Government policy is designed to encourage increased production of those products which are in strong demand on the domestic and export markets," Cde Mangwende told the Press conference which was also attended by the president of the CFU, Mr John Brown, and the president of the ZNFU, Cde Gary Magadzire.

Cde Mangwende said the Government looked at the role of agriculture in the economy and the impact of the macro-economic policies on the development of the sector. The industry is a major earner of foreign currency.

The minister said the decisions by the Government on the producer prices for the controlled products for the 1990/91 marketing year represented "a fair and realistic balance between all the different factors."

The prices for grain reflected the policy decisions taken by the Government in September 1989 on the development of the grain sector. In the case of yellow maize, the cut in the price allowed farmers to sell to other farmers within specified farming areas, with the controlled price paid by the GMB [Grain Marketing Board] being 15 percent below that of white maize.

"Stocks of maize exceeded 1,150,000 tonnes as at 31 March 1990, compared to almost 950,000 tonnes at the same time last year. This level of stocks is considered high; there are heavy costs involved in holding excess grain stocks over and above the quantities required for normal domestic consumption, profitable exports and strategic reserves."

Cde Mangwende said red sorghum, mhunga and rapoko became regulated crops as from 1 April this year to encourage the development of local processing and consumption.

On soyabeans, sunflowers and groundnuts, Cde Mangwende said the growing demand for oilseed products both on the domestic and export markets must be taken advantage of by increased production.

He noted the increase in delivery from the communal sector of sunflower seed. In the 1983/84 season the communal farmers delivered only 4,724 tonnes of sunflower seed while in the 1989/90 season, they delivered 50,708 tonnes.

Cotton production had been disappointing. After reaching a record 323,000 tonnes in 1988/89, production fell in 1989/90 to 262,000 tonnes and was expected to fall further this season.

"I am convinced that farmers are experiencing viability problems. Furthermore the trading account of the Cotton Marketing Board has for many years been adversely affected by the disproportionate price relationship between export lint and lint sold to the domestic spinners."

The minister commended wheat producers for achieving a record intake of 283,835 tonnes in 1989 even though it fell short of domestic requirements.

The new price for wheat was based on the need to attract new investment into wheat production and also to provide an incentive to existing growers to expand.

The new producer prices for beef and dairy products also reflected the Government's desire to sustain the production base, Cde Mangwende said. He said the Cold Storage Commission [CSC] had been seriously affected by the decline in its total slaughtering.

In 1988 the CSC slaughtered 325,000 head of cattle but this went down to 293,000 in 1989, which fell far short of the number required to cover the commission's operating costs.

Milk sales to the Dairy Marketing Board [DMB] were expected to increase by 8 percent to a projected 260 million litres this season. The increase created serious handling problems during the recent flush.

The substantial increase in milk production had not been matched with adequate processing capacity. The Government had, therefore, approved the expansion of processing facilities including the go-ahead for the construction of the DMB's milk powder plant at Chitungwiza which would handle 400,000 litres of milk a day.

The prices for the controlled products for the 1990/91 marketing season compared to 1989/90 are as follows:

		Price \$/tonne		
		1990/91	1989/90	Percent
GRAIN		NEW	CURRENT	CHANGE
Maize	White Grade A	225	215	+4.61
	Yellow Grade A	191	215	-11.2

Wheat	Grade A	460	400	+15
Sorghum	White Grade A	225	215	+4.61
	Red (2) Grade A	180	180	0
Mhunga	Grade A	250	250	0
Rapoko	Grade A	300	300	0
OILSEEDS:				
Soyabeans	Grade B	485	435	+11.5
Sunflower Seeds	Grade A	505	455	+11.0
Groundnuts	Grade A	1250	1000	+25.0
Cotton (cents per kg)	Grade A	117	92.5	+26.5
LIVESTOCK:				
Cattle (per kg dead weight)	Ten percent increase in beef price schedule with effect from 1 March 1990.			
Milk (per litre)	Two and half cents per litre on the basic price with immediate effect.			

* Uranium Project Studies Near Completion

34000731A Harare THE HERALD in English
27 Apr 90 p 4

[Article: "Studies on Uranium Project in Kanyemba To Be Completed This Year"]

[Text] Feasibility studies on a uranium mining project at Kanyemba in north-east Zimbabwe will be completed this year, the CHAMBER OF MINES JOURNAL has reported.

The studies were started in 1987, after Inter Uran, which started uranium exploration in the Zambezi Valley in 1981, had realised the potential for establishing a mine at Kanyemba. This included geotechnical tests, hydrological investigations and processing tests.

Processing tests which were conducted in the United States had indicated that the ore was very amenable to acid leaching. The method consumed huge quantities of sulphuric acid and cost five times more in Zimbabwe than in the United States.

The metallurgical test work would be directed at finding a cheaper process. Another subject on the company's agenda this year was an environmental impact study.

Hydrological investigations had revealed that, should mining operations start, up to 900,000 litres of water an hour would have to be pumped out. This would be a major task by Zimbabwean standards.

It would take about three years before uranium is actually produced because of the time needed to install the infrastructure and develop the mine. With deposits of about 2,000 tonnes of uranium and between 6,000 and 8,000 tonnes of vanadium, the mine would have a life of about five years.

The mine would sell uranium in its raw form. The project was run on a 50-50 basis with Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan.

* Border Area Refugees Facing Starvation

34000731B Harare SUNDAY MAIL in English
29 Apr 90 p 3

[Article: "Thousands Refugees Need Food"]

[Text] Tens of thousands of refugees now settled along the Limpopo Corridor and in the Tete province of Mozambique face starvation unless food is dispatched immediately, according to the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association.

The executive director of Zimofa, Cde Herbert Matanga, told THE SUNDAY MAIL that more than 94,000 people who settled along the Limpopo Corridor and another 27,000 in the Tete province needed food immediately if a disaster was to be averted.

Zimofa has about 50 tonnes of food at the moment, which, Cde Matanga said was not enough to feed the hungry and war-ravaged peasants. Many more people were still pouring into the corridor in search of food and security.

"We are delivering whatever we have at the moment. With the situation as desperate as it is, we cannot just sit on the food here while people in Mozambique are dying," he said.

Cde Matanga, however, said that the flow of food to the affected areas was being disrupted by the lack of transport to ferry the food. Zimofa relied on donated transport to carry the food to peasants who have since become highly mobile refugees in their own country because of the war.

The MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) bandits, who have suffered severe setbacks in the past, are brutalising peasants in Mozambique, destroying crops and causing mass starvation. Most of the people who survive MNR attacks flee their homes in search of security.

"The normal pattern of resettlement has been disrupted. In the end a lot of people are just concentrated in a very

small area and they come with nothing, not even their clothes. Our job is to make them at least fit enough to be productive."

Along with food is also the dire need for drugs as these people who pour into the corridor will need medical care. Although the army medics were attending to the problem, the pressure was unbearable and more support was urgently needed.

Cde Matanga said a consignment of medicines will be sent to the affected areas without delay. He said the influx of refugees did not necessarily mean increased attacks by the MNR bandits. At times, he said, it was brought about by the successes scored by the joint Zimbabwe and Mozambique forces.

"If thousands of people in the hands of the bandits are freed by the forces they will have to be fed and food has to be dispatched to the areas as quickly as possible."

A fact-finding team is to be sent to the Limpopo Corridor and Tete to establish the extent of the problem. Cde Matanga appealed to all Zimbabweans to help alleviate a disaster looming in Mozambique.

* Medical Supplies Received for Refugees

34000731C Harare THE HERALD in English
10 May 90 p 7

[Article by Ziana: "Medicine Worth \$17,000 for Displaced Mozambicans"]

[Text] About 185,000 people along the Limpopo Corridor in Mozambique desperately need food, clothes, blankets and medicines—almost double the number who were in need less than a month ago—according to the chairman of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Association, Cde Herbert Mahlaba.

He said yesterday the number of those in need of food, clothing, blankets and medicine along the corridor had been 75,000 only a few weeks ago and risen to 94,000 about three weeks ago. Now the figure had nearly doubled to 185,000.

He received medicines worth \$14,745.91 from the Catholic Development Commission, which presented the bulk of the medicine, and the Anglican Church, whose gift was worth \$2,500.

He handed the medicines over to the deputy director of Army Medical Services, Lt Col Alexander Musoko, for use in treating Mozambicans.

Zimofa had asked for medicines from the two organisations following a request from the army, whose personnel in Mozambique had been sharing their medical supplies with the displaced Mozambicans.

The consignment was made up of paediatric medicines, malarial prevention tablets, aspirins, antibiotics and eye ointments.

* Army Says MNR Cleared From Chiredzi Area

34000731D Harare THE HERALD in English
3 May 90 p 3

[Article by Ziana: "Chiredzi MNR Menace Stamped Out"]

[Text] Masvingo—The Zimbabwe National Army says it has stamped out any MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) presence in Chiredzi district, where the South African-sponsored bandits have in the past been murdering people.

The commander of 4 Brigade, which is based in Masvingo, Col Mike Nyambuya, said in an interview yesterday that the area was now safe.

"There is no reason for any worries at all. We are in total control of the whole area."

Col Nyambuya said the army had increased its activities in Chiredzi and there had been no incidents involving bandits in the district since the beginning of the year.

"The army has adopted a new approach in eliminating the bandits by intercepting them before they cross the Mozambican border into Zimbabwe."

In Chiredzi a police spokesman attributed the improved situation to the vigilance of the civilians, who he described as being of late "highly alert and security conscious".

* African Development Bank Approves Loan

34000730A Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE
in English 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] The African Development Bank Group, (ADB), has approved a loan of \$300 million in foreign currency to finance the rehabilitation of the industrial sector.

The loan is seen by analysts as part of the pre-structural adjustment financing, to ease the path towards trade liberalisation and could help the private sector improve its competitiveness in an open economy.

The ADB regional representative Mr Bisi Ogunjobi this week said the loan was meant to finance the rehabilitation of the industrial sector in Zimbabwe. This industrial rehabilitation loan is the largest single operation by the ADB group in the SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference] countries.

It is envisaged that this loan will prepare the industrial sector to meet challenges of enhanced competition in both the domestic and export markets, by improving the installed industrial capacity output and productivity, as well as upgrade product quality and technology.

The combined effect will be to place Zimbabwean industries in a competitive position during the liberalisation era.

Prior to the granting of the loan, the government in December 1989 approached the ADB for assistance to prepare an industrial stimulation and export promotion study. The conclusions and recommendations of this study formed the basis of the industrial rehabilitation loan.

The duration of the loan is 12 years, including a grace period of three years at an interest rate of 7.5 percent.

The loan will be utilised over 24 months to finance the foreign exchange requirements for the importation of industrial spares and equipment, replacement of machinery and modernisation, machinery, equipment and technology.

The implementation of the industrial rehabilitation project will be directed by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, as the executive agency, with the active involvement of the Reserve Bank and the Zimbabwe Investment Centre.

With the approval of this loan, the ADB's operations in Zimbabwe now stand at 13 projects, and puts the group's commitment at ZD\$804,699 million.

* Steel Company in Rehabilitation Program

34000730B Harare THE HERALD
in English 30 Apr 90 p 3

[Text] Bulawayo (Ziana)—The Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company has begun a rehabilitation programme to increase productivity and ensure viability following consultations with the Government and international agencies.

A company spokesman at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair said the programme had two main thrusts—the full-scale development of an iron ore mine adjacent to the steelworks to supplement ore deposits at Buchwa Mine and the adoption of appropriate technology for producing the required quality and product range, in addition to modernising rolling mills.

"A crash programme to improve the operations of the plant began early this year with the help of Chinese experts," said the spokesman. He said a group of United Nations Industrial Development Organisation experts were involved in a quality improvement programme.

The spokesman said a number of new projects were under way after the company had identified opportunities to meet more local and regional requirements by providing export opportunities for higher value products.

He said a hot strip mill for flat products with an initial capacity of 200,000 tonnes, of which 100,000 tonnes would be for the domestic market, would be commissioned in three years' time.

"Another 100,000 tonnes is earmarked for the Southern African Development Co-operation Conference and

Preferential Trade Area markets which will generate more foreign currency and stimulate industrial growth in the region."

He forecast that the project would save Zimbabwe about \$100 million a year in addition to creating 400 jobs. He said subsequent flat product projects would include a cold rolling plant which was expected to employ 500 more people.

"Zisco [Zimbabwe Steel Co.] intends to develop downstream industries directly or indirectly by supplying basic materials to manufacturing industries within Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries. Already a chemical processing plant is under active consideration on a joint venture basis involving Zisco and Wankie Colliery to process crude tar and crude benzole," said the spokesman.

* Parliament Votes Supplementary Estimates

34000728B Harare THE HERALD
in English 4 May 90 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] Drought relief, teachers salaries, defence, health and home affairs received the bulk of the almost \$150 million voted in supplementary estimates by Parliament yesterday.

The supplementary estimates for 11 ministries were introduced to Parliament by the Minister of State for Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Cde Tichaendepe Masaya, and were approved without amendment after debate.

The Ministry of Education and Culture was granted an extra \$22.84 million; Home Affairs received \$22.4 million; Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare received \$12,171 million; Health got \$30,362 million extra and Defence received \$33,086 million, the biggest supplementary vote.

The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development was voted \$4.2 million; Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs got almost \$3 million; Information, Posts and Telecommunications received \$2.14 million; the Public Service got \$1.6 million; Foreign Affairs \$8.64 million and Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement \$7.5 million.

The estimates voted make up expected shortfalls in the ministry budgets to the end of June this year.

Responding to debate on his ministry's vote, the labour minister, Cde John Nkomo, said the Government was feeding 1.2 million people every month at a cost of \$3 million. The finance ministry had allowed his ministry to commit some of its allocation for the next financial year to cover the costs this month and next month.

"The \$3 million which we are spending on average covers the purchase of food, paying the drivers and

sometimes we have to hire trucks; as I am speaking right now my staff is in the field distributing food," said Cde Nkomo.

The exercise was "not easy," as transport was a major problem and sometimes army trucks had to be used, as well as vehicles from the District Development Fund.

The recent suspension of such relief was a result of the "exhausted allocation" of money.

If the Treasury allocated more money, then it might be possible to raise the current allowances for the food for work programme, said Cde Nkomo. About \$5 million was being spent on the exercise and additional people continued to enter the programme. [passage omitted]

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